Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment

Experimental Economics - We experimentally compare collusive behaviors in first-price sealed-bid auctions without and with a reserve price. Before the auction begins, a bidder may offer a bribe to...     

Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment

Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. We designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public officials. The experimental data confirm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and officials and, thus, increase corruption. Our results have implications with respect to possible anti-corruption policies targeting the legitimacy of the use of intermediaries for the provision of government services.     

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect is the more intense the lower the price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices. In the experiment we observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play. However, subjects tend to overbid the equilibrium strategy when prices are high and underbid when prices are low. We explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Third-party manipulation of conflict: an experiment

We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely unaffected by the third party’s incentives. We argue that our results are consistent with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.     

Inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity: results of an experiment with small businessmen

We investigate inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity by having subjects from distinct ethnic origins play the trust game [Games Econom. Behav. 10 (1995) 122]. The participants in the experiment are male small businessmen of Turkish or Belgian ethnic origin, all of whom have a business in the same city (Ghent, Belgium). Our main finding is that the average levels of trust and reciprocity are independent of ethnic origin and, moreover, independent of the ethnic origin of the opposite party.     

An experiment on the formation of expectations

People were shown charts of computer-created ‘time series’, and were asked for their projections of the ‘future’ direction they expected the series to take. The characteristics of the time series shown in the charts were systematically varied so as to allow inferences as to the effect of these characteristics on the respondents' forecasts. The series constructed were like sine curves with random error terms tacked on. Respondents showed a poor ability to forecast, and their forecasts had a considerable upward bias. However, they did appreciate the cyclical nature of the series, and their forecasts show that they were looking for the next turning point. Responses to any particular series were highly unstable: adding on an extra point frequently made a big difference in the forecasts that respondents made.     

Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment

We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity–setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot–Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, behavioural rules, and outcomes.     

Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling

We analyze experimentally two sender–receiver games with conflictive preferences. In the first game, the sender can choose to tell the truth, to lie, or to remain silent. The latter strategy is costly. In the second game, the receiver must decide additionally whether or not to costly punish the sender after having observed the history of the game. We investigate the existence of two kinds of social preferences: lying aversion and preference for truth-telling. In the first game, senders tell the truth more often than predicted by the sequential equilibrium analysis, they remain silent frequently, and there exists a positive correlation between the probability of being truthful and the probability of remaining silent. Our main experimental result for the extended game shows that those subjects who punish the sender with a high probability after being deceived are precisely those who send fewer but more truthful messages. Finally, we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria of a reduced form of the baseline game with two types of senders. The equilibrium predictions obtained suggest that the observed excessive truth-telling in the baseline game can be explained by lying aversion but not by a preference for truth-telling.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Financial support through the Ramón y Cajal program of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science is gratefully acknowledged. This work was initiated while the author was working at Maastricht University.     

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant advantage. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that forward induction affects the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework for dynamics. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia and Tecnología (SEC2002-01352 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-01) and the Barcelona Economic Program of CREA and excellent research assistance by David Rodríguez are gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Aurora García Gallego and Armin Schmutzler for helpful comments.     

Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment

We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort and on allocative efficiency. We experiment with funding contracts that differ in the structure of investor repayment and, thus, in their incentives for the provision of entrepreneurial effort. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces effort distortions and increases efficiency. Likewise, distortions can be mitigated by replacing outside equity by a repayment-equivalent standard-debt contract. We test both hypotheses in the laboratory. Our results reveal that the incentive effects of funding contracts must be experienced before they are reflected in observed behavior. With sufficient experience, observed behavior is either consistent with or close to theoretical predictions and supports both hypotheses. If we allow for entrepreneur-sided manipulations of project outcomes, we find that non-monotonic contracts lose much of their appeal.     

Holistic experimentation versus decomposition: an ultimatum experiment

In phase I, every participant plays the ultimatum game with each of the other five group members. For each of five offers, it is learned how many participants in each group would have accepted it. In phase II, the pie is 30 times larger. Thus, response behavior can be explored in phase I and, with this information, possibly exploited in phase II. Neither game theory nor equity theory suggest such holistic experimentation. Seventy-four participants out of 91 engaged in experimentation by submitting different offers in phase I. The remaining 17 submitted equal offers as suggested by decomposition hypothesis.     

Prudence and prevention: an economic laboratory experiment

In an economic laboratory experiment, we study the relationship between prudence and prevention in general decision situations. Previous theoretical research on this relationship posits a negative impact of prudence on the optimal level of prevention. Overall, we find both risk-averse and prudent behaviour among our subjects. Moreover, prudent subjects chose significantly less prevention than nonprudent subjects, confirming the theoretical results of one-period models in the literature. Our findings might have implications for health policy if prudence – rather than irrational decision behaviour, as previously assumed – is responsible for low levels of preventive effort.     

Recognizing contributors: an experiment on public goods

We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the highest contributors does not increase contributions compared to not recognizing contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. These findings support our conjecture that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige.     

异质信念资产定价研究

从随机游走、行为金融到混沌,从现代资产定价理论、行为资产定价理论到异质信念资产定价理论,3种学说和3种定价理论同时存在干当今资本市场的研究中,它们分别从不同方面、不同视角解释了资产价格的波动。本文的研究理清了3种重要定价理论之间的关系：理性与有限理性,线性与非线性,价格波动的外在机制与内在机制,为人们进一步研究资产定价理论提供了清晰的脉络。     

Checks and balances outside the government: an introduction to the symposium

The symposium brings together case studies that are all about reasonably successful experiments in institution building and policy making by interactions between public and private spheres. The cases deal with the provision of information enabling market to perform, law making, and the control of political discretion and public bureaus. Each in its own way, they show how agents have room for some reasoned choice, although eventually this room for choice is narrowed by the emergence of stabilized institutions that come to shape in a rather permanent way the environment within which they later operate. The common characteristic across these case studies is the non-Parliamentarian process through which process of experimentation, rationalization and institutionalization takes place.     

Correction to: Improving decisions with market information: an experiment on corporate prediction markets

Experimental Economics - A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09711-0     

Education and income attraction: an online dating field experiment

Prior studies have found a robust correlation in the education of dating and married couples. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such correlations are causal, that is, for the sake of relationship public goods such as the pleasures of the enlightened conversations that only a common high level of education might support. Being empirical studies, they cannot rule out couples matching on other characteristics like income, height or health, which are correlated with education, from driving results. We contribute to this literature by randomly assigning high and low education and income levels to 388 artificial male and female profiles on a large online dating website in China. We then counted thousands of ‘visits’ – clicks on abbreviated profiles, which included education and income information, from search engine results. We found that men’s visits to female profiles were unaffected by the profile’s assigned education level, while women’s visits to male profiles increase with the profile’s education. However, that increase was not increasing on the women’s own level of education, though their visits to the higher income male profiles was increasing on their own education. Our findings suggest that the relationship public goods that stem from a common level of high education are not at the forefront of either men’s or women’s minds before their first dates, when one might expect such goods to play a critical role in the decision to develop the relationship further.