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1.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
2.
Huei Chun Su 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2009,22(4):387-414
By comparing the philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty, this paper shows that some similarities
in the economic theories of Mill and Hayek are actually based on different rationales. It follows that any attempt to find
a common thread in Mill and Hayek to provide reasonable guidance for social policy can be promising only if we can find the
common ground from their social philosophy. While analyzing the rationales behind their opinions regarding the role of government
and taxation policies, this paper will focus on exploring the role of two philosophical ideas, liberty, and justice. This
will clarify the relationship between social justice and liberty as well as their status in relation to the ultimate principle
of rules in the philosophy of Mill and Hayek. This paper will offer an explanation why, in Mill’s utilitarian philosophy,
the pursuit of social justice aligns with the real freedom of everyone, but in Hayek’s philosophy, it is a hindrance. 相似文献
3.
Wulf Gaertner Reinhard Neck Lars Schwettmann 《International Advances in Economic Research》2011,17(1):1-11
We discuss the results of investigations where students from several countries were confronted with questionnaires describing
hypothetical situations. All situations start from the preference structure which underlies an equity axiom based on Rawls’s
difference principle. We ask whether respondents satisfy the equity axiom by supporting the worst-offs and how often they
revise their initial decision when more people join the side of the more advantaged. Moreover, we control for context-dependency
and investigate whether there are major differences across countries and cultures. The available data also allow us to consider
changes of justice evaluations over time. 相似文献
4.
The bioeconomic impacts of spatial fisheries management hinge on how fishing vessels reallocate their effort over space. However,
empirical studies face two challenges: heterogeneous behavioral responses and unobservable resource abundance. This paper
addresses these two problems simultaneously by using an unusual data set and an estimation technique developed in the industrial
organization literature. We apply the methods to location and species choices in the Gulf of Mexico reef-fish fishery. The
models are used to explore spatial effort substitution in response to two marine reserves. Individual attributes from a survey
of vessel captains are linked to each fisherman’s observed daily trip information to control for observable heterogeneity.
Some unobservable abundance information is captured by location- and species-specific constants and estimated by contraction
mapping. The empirical results confirm that there is significant heterogeneity in fishermen’s response to the formation of
marine reserves. They also show that ignoring unobservable abundance information will lead to significant bias in predicting
spatial fishing effort. 相似文献
5.
It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case
of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus
is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure
spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of
the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear
to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view.
相似文献
6.
Yutian Chen 《Journal of Economics》2011,102(2):137-156
By sourcing key intermediate goods to a potential entrant, an incumbent firm can credibly and observably commit to an intense
post-entry competition, thereby deterring the entry. At the same time, a collusive effect exists, whereby the entrant’s loss
from staying out of the final-good market is compensated through their sourcing transaction. We find that entry-deterring
sourcing in general has ambiguous effect on social welfare. However, there exist scenarios where it enhances not only social
welfare, but also consumers’ surplus. 相似文献
7.
We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’
perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable
values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive
operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under
uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative
risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering
the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment. 相似文献
8.
We study household formation in a model where collective consumption decisions of a household depend on the strategic choices
of its members. The surplus of households is determined by individual choices of levels of friendliness to each other. A strategic
conflict arises from a coupling condition that ceteris paribus, a person’s friendlier attitude reduces the individual’s influence in the household’s collective decision
on how to divide the ensuing surplus. While partners in an isolated household choose the minimum level of friendliness, competition
for partners tends to promote friendliness. We find that affluence does not buy affection, but can lead to withholding of
affection by an affluent partner who can afford to do so. In general, the equilibrium degree of friendliness proves sensitive
to the socio-economic composition of the population.
We would like to thank Clive Bell, Edward Glaeser, Roger Lagunoff, Eva Terberger and seminar audiences in Berlin, Birmingham,
Blacksburg, Exeter, Heidelberg, Manchester and at IHS in Vienna for helpful comments. We greatly appreciate the thoughtful
comments of a referee. 相似文献
9.
Edward J. O'Boyle 《Forum for Social Economics》2004,34(1-2):43-60
Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice. The key to integrating those standards into mainstream economic thinking is to begin with what happens in every exchange involving economic agents who are well-informed and free to act. What is gotten in the exchange is more highly valued than what is given up. However, there must be limits to that gain—identified in mainstream economics as profits, consumer surplus, and economic rent—in order to prevent one party from taking advantage of another and to assure that market exchange serves all economic agents fairly and effectively and not just those with the power and will to turn gain into excess. Mainstream economists argue that sufficient limits are imposed by the “invisible hand.” We argue instead that limits must be imposed more deliberately and directly by human economic agents and that those limits are supplied by the three principles of justice. 相似文献
10.
Bryan Caplan 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2008,21(1):45-59
Ludwig von Mises argues that public opinion, not the form of government, is the ultimate determinant of policy. The implication
is that, holding public opinion constant, democracies and dictatorships will have the same policies—a result I call Mises’
Democracy–Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. According to Mises, dictators have to comply with public opinion or else they
will be overthrown. I argue that he seriously overestimates the power of revolution to discipline dictators. Mises was perceptive
to note that, in practice, “dictatorially imposed” policies are often democratically sustainable, but he neglected several
mechanisms—all more plausible than the threat of revolution—capable of explaining this fact.
相似文献
Bryan CaplanEmail: |
11.
Rupert Gatti Timo Goeschl Ben Groom Timothy Swanson 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,48(4):609-628
We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers
must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance
of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the
appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is
of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative
surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both
efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions. 相似文献
12.
Since 1945, both Spain and Portugal have experienced significant market transformations. These countries were both led by
dictators for many years until the mid 1970s when each moved toward more democratic governments and more open markets. As
a result, each experienced significant changes in output with Spain’s becoming a model for proper market based transformations.
Although Portugal’s transformation has been less impressive it experienced improvements too. This paper uses a Parente and
Prescott (J Polit Econ 102(2), 298–321, 1994; 2000) type model to investigate the recent transformations in each of these countries and quantify the extent to which barriers
to technological adoption may have played for these two development experiences. Our results indicate that from 1945 to 2003
these barriers have fallen considerably but remain high, and are somewhat higher in Portugal than in Spain. 相似文献
13.
14.
Claudia Keser 《European Economic Review》2007,51(6):1514-1533
In a laboratory experiment, we investigate behavior in a principal-agent situation with moral hazard. We evaluate the predictive success of two theories. One is the standard agency theory, which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation constraint, typically requiring zero expected utility. The other is the “fair-offer” theory suggested by Keser and Willinger [2000. Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (1), 163-185], which requires that the principal provide full insurance against losses to the agent and leave him a share of at most 50% of the generated surplus. The treatment variable of our experiment is the cost of effort. As effort costs increase, expected net surplus of a contract decreases. We observe that fair-offer theory generally predicts observed contract offers better than standard agency theory. However, the predictive success of the fair-offer theory decreases, while the one of standard agency theory increases with decreasing expected net surplus. 相似文献
15.
Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining
coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at
high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial
incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or
start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the
key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full
feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination
failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good
coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and
(3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full
feedback.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52 相似文献
16.
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can
be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule
yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between
the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths
and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business,
Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard
McLean and Jeroen Swinkels. 相似文献
17.
Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Karl-Martin Ehrhart Christian Hoppe Ralf Löschel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,41(3):347-361
In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product
markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based
mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish
output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority
of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’
surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should
not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options
in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.
相似文献
18.
We study two-sided markets with heterogeneous, privately informed agents who gain from being matched with better partners
from the other side. Our main results quantify the relative attractiveness of a coarse matching scheme consisting of two classes
of agents on each side, in terms of matching surplus (output), an intermediary’s revenue, and the agents’ welfare (defined
as the total surplus minus payments to the intermediary). Following Chao and Wilson (Am Econ Rev 77: 899–916, 1987) and McAfee
(Econometrica 70:2025–2034, 2002), our philosophy is that, if the worst-case scenario under coarse matching is not too bad
relative to what is achievable by more complex, finer schemes, a coarse matching scheme will turn out to be preferable once
the various transaction costs associated with fine schemes are taken into account. Similarly, coarse matching schemes can
be significantly better than random matching, while still requiring only a minimal amount of information. 相似文献
19.
Edward J. O’Boyle 《Forum for Social Economics》2011,40(1):79-98
Ron Stanfield has had a long and distinguished career as a social economist and commentator on the social economy. Of special
concern to us in this article are Stanfield’s interests in social capital, sustainable development, and nurturance which we
refer to as caring. We also take up several other virtues including sympathy, benevolence, and generosity that have been part
of the economics literature from the time of Smith’s Moral Sentiments along with the associated vices of heartlessness, insensitivity, meanness, greediness, and others. This article attempts
to show that (1) adding social capital to the machine-like individual of mainstream economics results in the acting person of personalist economics who becomes more fully a human person through social interactions that foster the development
of several virtues or less fully a human person through other interactions that instill certain vices; and that (2) in matters
relating to sustainability, becoming more fully a human person calls especially for the practice of the virtues of justice
and moderation. In addition we have suggested a framework for thinking about sustainable development in terms of actuating
and limiting principles and for developing critical values or performance standards for sustainable development that are person-centered. 相似文献
20.
This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that
the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price
elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with
the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and
Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand,
in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal
congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context,
the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’
contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’. 相似文献