实物期权理论在企业并购量化计算中的应用研究——以可口可乐并购汇源果汁为例

兼并收购是企业快速扩张的一种普遍选择,企业进行并购的主要目的之一是获得协同效应。若能在并购之前对协同效应予以准确量化,就可避免支付过高溢价,从而对企业的并购实践具有重要指导作用。文章结合可口可乐与汇源果汁并购案,运用实物期权方法对该并购可能产生的协同效应进行预测,并进一步推论,认为一般情况下,协同效应不应超过目标企业在并购前的市值。     

石油公司并购与协同效应的实现

1887年以来，世界已经历了五次公司兼并与收购的浪潮。其中20世纪80年代以来的第四次和第五次并购浪潮及其特点非常值得注意。出于公司增长和追求长期整体利益最大化的需要，并购(M＆A)已成为石油公司进入新地区和新业务领域的一条快捷和低风险的途径。石油公司并购后的优势主要来源于两个方面：一是运营方面的协同效应，诸如由勘探区块的互补、各种资产的优化配置和利用、下游产品销售网络的完善、市场风险的分散等带来的效益的提高以及成本下降所带来的收益；二是由资金筹措、成本节约以及资本运营效率的提高而带来的财务方面的协同效应。成功的石油公司并购必须在六个方面做好工作，即目标选择、建立领导及运作系统、“协同效应”管理、文化管理、沟通以及风险管理，这六个因素是实现协同效应的关键。     

知识产权保护与社会福利的匹配——基于网络外部性的实验研究

知识产权保护是一把"双刃剑",笼统地强调知识产权保护可能顾此失彼。用实验经济学范式考察网络外部性条件下知识产权保护与否的社会福利匹配,可以清晰地分离网络外部性的社会福利效应。知识产品的生产厂商定价较低时,保护知识产权会增加厂商收益,消费者福利无显著变化,社会福利增加;定价较高时,保护知识产权会降低厂商收益和消费者的福利,从而降低社会福利。强化知识产权保护为厂商制定高价提供了可能,网络外部性为必须消费者增加了效用,二者匹配的桥梁则是边界消费者,但边界消费者扩大网络效应又需要弱化的知识产权保护。     

基于网络外部性的价值模块整合与兼容性选择

本文分析了价值模块的网络外部性特征，并基于网络外部性研究了价值模块整合过程中的兼容性选择和价格竞争行为。研究结果表明：当由进入厂商选择兼容度时，兼容性越高进入厂商的市场份额越大，并能够获得更高的市场价格；当由在位厂商选择兼容度时，兼容度增加将减少消费者的转移成本，使更多的模块需求商转向购买进入厂商的产品，减少了在位厂商的市场份额；当转移成本的兼容性敏感系数较低时，在位模块供应商能够获得更高的价格，而当转移成本对兼容性很敏感时，较高的兼容度将迫使在位模块供应商降低价格。价值模块的网络外部性加剧了模块供应商之间的竞争，进一步促进了价值模块整合和产业融合的过程。     

不同类型企业并购协同效应的比较

企业并购的目的是为了产生规模经济,获取协同效应,谋求并购后企业价值的增长。本文以综合得分模型为基础,针对不同的企业并购类型,对其并购后产生的协同效应进行了比较和分析。     

随机需求下横向并购供应链网络整合优化策略研究

本文从系统优化视角,针对增设集散中心的横向并购供应链网络整合策略,利用变分不等式建立了随机需求下的整合优化模型。以市场链为主线,以供应链网络均衡理论为基 础,构建了以横向并购供应链网络活动总成本最小为目标的数学模型,通过转换成变分不等式采用改进的欧拉算法进行模型求解。通过数值算例进一步说明了模型的适用性和灵活性,得出了增设集散中心的并购整合策略能够降低供应链网络的平均运营成本的结论,通过对比不同市场紧密程度下产生的供应链网络平均成本协同效应,发现随着市场紧密程度的增加其协同效应更明显,为横向并购供应链网络整合优化提供理论依据与方法。     

从中海油收购优尼科受挫探析跨国兼并之要义

曾几何时中国企业不再对“兼并”一词感到陌生，近一两年更被多位学者形象的比作“兼并年”，联想蛇吞IBM的PC业务，TCL收购汤姆逊，不论是成功还是失败，亦或是困难重重，我们都看到中国企业正学习运用兼并，重组等市场手段主动影响目标市场的结构，借此扩大市场份额，降低综合成本，以期达到企业价值最大化和其他战略目标所做的种种努力，兼并尤其是成功跨国兼并要考虑诸多问题，并购的时机（涉及并购价格是否适当），并购方式以及并购后的文化整合等。本文就最近中国海洋石油有限公司（以下简称中海油）有意收购美国第九大石油公司——优尼科公司未果一案做简要的分析。     

并购——企业经营的核心?

现在企业并购的核心已经转变成为 :成本 +客户 +竞争对手 +资本市场。由于受到本身行业和管理经验的限制 ,一般都是同业兼并和相邻兼并 ,这两种兼并成功率最高。但是通过并购 ,市场达到饱和 ,所以产品市场上的并购在很大程度上成为一种加速死亡的方式。因此 ,内生并购和外生并购的融合、资本市场和产品市场的融合 ,使得现在企业经营进入一个新的阶段———资本市场成为企业经营的核心内容之一。研究发现 ,如果并购只是为了扩大市场份额 ,它们在 5年内成功率最高 ,但这样的企业越是并购成功寿命越短 ,所以大家开始寻求从节省成本、提高效率、…     

公司并购中协同价值的分析与确定

一、公司并购的协同价值及其来源 所谓协同价值是指公司合并后业绩提升所产生现金流量的净现值.协同价值来源于协同效应.公司并购的经营协同效应和财务协同效应所产生的协同价值可以从以下几个方面来考虑:     

煤炭企业并购财务协同效应思考

财务协同效应是指并购给企业财务方面带来的效益,从税法、会计准则、资本利用等方面,分析了煤炭企业并购所产生的财务协同效应,提出了煤炭企业并购财务协同效应还应从准备工作、财务风险规避、专业团队操作和全方位整合等方面进行完善。     

Cournot Oligopoly Conditions under which Any Horizontal Merger Is Profitable

Findings in economic theory suggest that horizontalmergers involving firms with aggregate market shareless than 50% are unlikely to be motivated by theconsequent reduction in competitivity. The resultsarise because, absent cost efficiencies, quantity-settingfirms in small mergers are impoverished by the merger.We demonstrate that this conclusion is a consequence ofthe strong restrictions imposed on the demand function,and we identify a well-behaved demand function suchthat any set of merging firms benefits from the reductionin competition even when there are no cost efficiencies.     

Endogenous horizontal mergers under cost uncertainty

This paper presents a study of endogenous horizontal mergers under cost uncertainty. Before knowing the exact values of their costs, firms decide sequentially whether or not to join a merger. After the merger decision is made, uncertainty is resolved and firms engage in Cournot competition with incomplete information about one another's costs. Due to production rationalization, the merged firms enjoy an advantage over non-merged firms in the sense that the merged firms' expected cost is lower. I show that mergers occur if and only if the uncertainty is large and that the larger the uncertainty, the greater the number of firms that will merge. Although a merger reduces competition and therefore hurts consumers, it improves productivity under cost uncertainty. I find that a merger increases social welfare whenever there are at least four firms in the industry before the merger.     

The effect of the Telefonica–BellSouth merger on the Argentine cellular telephone market

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of the merger between Telefonica and BellSouth, which took place in December 2004, in the Argentine cellular telephone market. In this market the merger under analysis is horizontal. The evaluation is carried out by performing a demand estimation, using the PCAIDS model, and a marginal cost estimation, using supply prices and the elasticities inferred from the previously estimated demands. With those results, a merger simulation is run under different hypotheses related to possible marginal cost reductions. The merger is found to be able to lower supply prices for relatively small marginal cost reductions. This is basically due to the fact that the individual firms’ demands are highly elastic, and that the cross elasticity between the brands affected by the merger is relatively small.     

审计市场中的合并、产业专用化投资和价格竞争

本文从产业组织的角度，分析了审计市场的合并、产业专用化和价格竞争等竞争行为，并进一步探讨了这些行为对审计质量和社会福利的影响。本文认为，审计质量的信号传递机制推动了产业中的合并行为，而审计产业的专用化投资行为在于策略性地阻止进入。由于审计产品的异质性、信任品特性以及强大的买方谈判能力使得审计市场存在激烈的价格竞争，而合并和产业专用化投资有助于事务所降低成本。因而，审计市场的竞争提高了社会福利。     

Mergers that harm competitors

Standard models of oligopolistic interdependence predict that firms remaining outside of a horizontal merger will benefit from it. Why, then, do nonparticipating firms feel threatened by mergers? This paper shows that under reasonable conditions a non-participating firm is harmed by a merger. The analysis is based on a spatial equilibrium with suppliers and demanders located at fixed points. Mergers harm non-participating firms as a result of the decrease in the level of marginal costs of the merged firm attributable to decreased output in markets where competition is eliminated. This lowered marginal cost makes the merged firm a more formidable competitor in markets in which outsiders participate. This effect is in almost all cases sufficient to make outsiders worse off after a merger. Simulations on a sample of spatial equilibria show that the harm to outsiders is a reliable index of the harm that the merger causes to social welfare.     

Exploring firm characteristics that differentiate leaders from followers in industry merger waves: a competitive dynamics perspective

Research in strategic management has shown that the timing of firm participation in a merger wave matters, as early movers have been shown to outperform later ones. However, while the consequences of the timing of action within a merger wave have been assessed, the causes that drive these timing effects remain unknown. We draw on the competitive dynamics perspective to investigate firm‐level factors that influence the large‐scale strategic behavior of leading or following within industry merger waves. We develop hypotheses based on the competitive dynamics argument that the awareness‐motivation‐capability of firms will influence the timing of competitive action. Consistent with this perspective, we show that a firm's strategic orientation, its structure, and its resource base influence the timing of firm entry in merger waves. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Merger Efficiencies Always Mitigate Price Increases?

In a Cournot model with differentiated products, we demonstrate that merger efficiencies in the form of lower marginal costs for the merging firms (the insiders) lead to higher post‐merger prices under certain conditions. Specifically, when the degree of substitutability between the two insiders is not too high relative to that between an insider and an outsider, increased efficiencies may exert upward rather than downward pressure on the prices of the merging firms. Our results suggest that in cases where firms engage in quantity competition, antitrust authorities should not presume that efficiencies will necessarily mitigate the anticompetitive effects of the merger.     

SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY*

In our paper, the target of a proposed merger, by setting a reserve price, is able to screen prospective acquirers according to their (expected) ability to generate merger‐specific synergies. Both empirical evidence and many merger models suggest that the difference between high and low‐synergy mergers becomes smaller during booms. Thus, a target's opportunity cost for sorting out relatively less fitting acquirers increases and, hence, targets screen less tightly during booms, which leads to a hike in merger activity. Our screening mechanism not only predicts that merger activity is intense during booms and subdued during recessions but is also consistent with other stylized facts about takeovers and generates novel testable predictions.     

What they know vs. what they do: how acquirers leverage technology acquisitions

Existing research suggests that in acquisitions of small technology‐based firms by large established firms post‐merger integration both enables and hinders acquirers' efforts to leverage the technology of acquired firms. This apparent paradox can be resolved once we account for the qualitatively distinct ways in which acquirers leverage technology acquisitions. Integration helps acquirers use the acquired firm's existing knowledge as an input to their own innovation processes (leveraging what they know), but hinders their reliance on the acquired firm as an independent source of ongoing innovation (leveraging what they do). We also show that experienced acquirers are better able to mitigate the disruptive consequences of the loss of autonomy entailed by integration, though we find no evidence that they achieve greater coordination benefits from integration. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.