Free riders: the rise of alternative unionism in Denmark

In this article we analyse some disturbing trends in the Danish labour market: while collective bargaining coverage is still relatively high, union density has been declining and—worse than that—there has been a substantial shift away from recognised and in favour of alternative unionism. The alternative unions are not parties to collective agreements, and they offer membership much cheaper than the recognised unions, in effect taking a free ride on the institutional supports that used to be effective only for the recognised unions. The article explains this conundrum by pointing to the political and institutional backgrounds to this development, which threatens to erode the very basis for the Danish collective bargaining system. On the background of general statistics and of a general employee survey, we point out the reasons behind the challenges confronting the recognised unions, pointing out that the recognised unions must become both more efficient in the member services and more cost efficient, if they wish to halt the present downhill trend.     

Union effects on pay levels in Britain

The contraction of union representation in Britain raises the question of whether or not unions still achieve a wage premium. Analysis of matched employer–employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey shows that there is now no demonstrable premium for private sector workers in general. However, unions do achieve a wage premium of around 9% for about half of employees covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The effect of union bargaining spills over to other employees in the same workplaces. The paper identifies circumstances where union effects are strongest—employer endorsement of union membership, high collective bargaining coverage and multi-unionism.     

The bargaining position of low-skilled and high-skilled workers in a globalising world

This paper extends the assessment of the impact of globalisation and technological change on the bargaining power and preferences of employees, by taking worker heterogeneity into account. In contrast with previous studies, two separate unions – representing low-skilled and high-skilled workers respectively – are considered. Using Belgian firm-level data, labour bargaining power and relative wage preference have been estimated by skill level. When these estimates are subsequently regressed on a set of potential determinants, the bargaining power of low-skilled workers appears to fall with imports and offshoring, whereas the bargaining power of high-skilled workers is only positively affected by R&D activities. In addition, a significant effect of globalisation is found on the relative preference of unions for wages over employment, indicating that the effect of globalisation on the behaviour of labour unions is more encompassing than frequently assumed.     

The trade union response to agency labour in Britain

The growth of agency work in recent years has posed a challenge to trade unions, which must decide if they will accept agency workers as part of their constituency and accept employment agencies as legitimate labour‐market actors. This article analyses the reaction of British unions to agency work and identifies four main responses: exclusion, replacement, regulation and engagement. It concludes with an evaluation of union policies, which stresses the need for unions to secure broad regulation of the agency labour market either through multi‐employer bargaining or employment law.     

‘Unbound’ employers' associations and derogations: erosion and renewal of collective bargaining in the German metalworking industry

Declining union density, the reduction in coverage or informal derogations from collective agreements are signs of erosion of the corporatist German system of collective bargaining. However, new developments can be observed like ‘unbound’ employers' associations or derogations from collective agreements. These new developments make it necessary to reassess the prospects of collective bargaining. At the first sight they seem to be little more than indicators of erosion or exhaustion, but the in‐depth analysis reveals that these developments can be starting points of renewal because they give stimuli to increase the associational power of employers' associations and, even more important for collective bargaining, unions. As a result, however, collective bargaining will become less corporatist in style.     

What has been happening to collective bargaining under New Labour? Interpreting WERS 2004

The late 20th century saw the rapid decline of collective bargaining, which had hitherto been the dominant means of regulation of employment in Britain. The article uses a comparison of the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys for 1998 and 2004 to assess how far this changed during the later period of economic growth and sympathetic labour legislation. Contrary to expectations, the data show that collective bargaining coverage has continued to fall, although much of this decline is concentrated in small firms in the private sector. The article goes on to analyse the recent change at sectoral level and examines evidence on the extent to which the character, as well as the extent, of collective bargaining had changed. The locus of management decision making has continued to move down organisations, both where collective bargaining occurs and also where unions are absent. Finally, the article evaluates how the perceptions of those involved in the bargaining process have shifted at a time of greatly diminished trade union influence.     

Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly

This paper combines internal bargaining between firms and their employees with a situation of imperfect competition, in particular a Cournot‐oligopoly. Wage bargaining is compared with simultaneous negotiations on wages and employment (efficient bargaining). It turns out that for a large range of parameter values a prisoner's dilemma concerning profits exists. The dominant strategy is efficient bargaining, while the joint profits are maximized with wage negotiations. A simplified example considers economic welfare and utility of the unions. Different welfare measures are considered like the usual IO measure of consumer and producer surplus as well as others. The term ‘efficient bargaining’ is not justified (at least for the present example) if the profits and the rents of the unions are considered, as these are maximized with wage bargaining. However, consumer and producer surplus are highest with efficient bargaining. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

We develop a game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

Bilateral Delegation in Duopoly Wage and Employment Bargaining

We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within‐firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

European industrial relations in 1999: chronicle of events

This article chronicles industrial relations developments throughout the European Union (EU) during 1999. The information is gleaned from articles published by the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO). The text therefore contains numerical references to records contained in the EIRO database in order to allow the reader easy access to the relevant records. The article is divided into five sections. The first contains an overview of political, economic and legislative events at EU‐level, the second looks at EU‐level developments in employee representation, the third looks at the impact of European economic and monetary union (EMU) on industrial relations and collective bargaining and the fourth and fifth give a more detailed country‐by‐country analysis of main trends in key industrial relations areas—collective bargaining and industrial action; and employment creation, working time and new forms of work.     

Collective bargaining and new work regimes: ‘too important to be left to bosses’

The formal negotiations process remains perhaps the least‐studied moment of collective bargaining. Drawing on ideal types of ‘distributive’ and ‘integrative’ bargaining and the ‘formal/informal’ distinction, this article reports non‐participant observation and ethnographic research into the negotiations process that enabled a change agreement in a British multinational, hereafter anonymised as FMCG. Informal bargaining relations provided the backdrop to—and emerged within—the formal negotiations process. Formal bargaining established new employment contracts based on a simplified internal labour market and generated the joint governance processes to enable and regulate the change process. Neither management nor union strategy was wholly derived from rational, interest‐based positions. The negotiations process was essential to strategy formation and to the emergence of sufficient ‘integrative’ bargaining for all parties to devise and approve new processual institutions and norms to deliver a more flexible labour process and to restore the long‐run viability for ‘distributive’ bargaining.     

Trade unions,collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance: a review

Coordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market outcomes and macroeconomic performance. This article provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. What emerges from the review is that it is different types and coverage of bargaining coordination, rather than cross‐country variation in trade union density, that matter for economic performance. High levels of bargaining coverage tend to be associated with relatively poor economic performance, but this adverse relationship can be at least mitigated by high levels of bargaining coordination. In the absence of formal bargaining arrangements, economies often develop informal bargaining mechanisms whose effects are similar to those arising from formal bargaining provided they both operate at similar levels of coordination. The consequences of labour market coordination or absence thereof depend on the monetary policy regime as non‐accommodating monetary policy can eliminate some of the adverse unemployment consequences otherwise associated with industry‐level collective bargaining. Finally, bargaining coordination seems to matter most in times of rapid economic change rather than under more stable conditions. Overall, we conclude that it is the total ‘package’ of (formal and informal) labour market institutions that matters for the performance of the economy rather than unionisation as such or individual aspects of unionism.     

Antecedents of concession bargaining in the Great Recession: evidence from Ireland

Concession or ‘give back’ bargaining involves firms seeking changes in pay and conditions of employment from trade unions in return for pledges of enhanced job security and sometimes other forms of reciprocation. Several distinct modes of concession bargaining are distinguishable in the literature, and three modes of concession bargaining have been identified in Ireland during the Great Recession: integrative, distributive and minimal engagement. Deploying qualitatively informed quantitative data on the conduct of collective bargaining during the Great Recession, this article examines a series of antecedent influences on the choices firms make in conducting concession bargaining with unions.     

The impact of corporate governance on employment relations in South Korea: the shareholder versus stakeholder perspectives

This study empirically examined the impact of corporate governance on employment relations outcomes utilizing a comprehensive data set drawn from 214 Korean firms. The study contrasted the stakeholder and shareholder perspectives of corporate governance in investigating the impact of corporate governance on employment relations outcomes. The results showed that the stakeholder corporate governance orientation (as compared to the shareholder orientation) had positive relationships with education/training expense, the level of average employee tenure and industrial relations climate, and had a negative association with number of strikes. Overall, the results implied that the stakeholder orientation of firms led to more beneficial effects for employees and more consensual relations with labor unions than the shareholder orientation did.     

Bargaining: separately or together?

This paper explores conditions under which economic agents will want to bargain collectively instead of individually with a common third party—when, for example, two firms (or unions), who are bargaining with the same, indispensable, outside party, will want to merge and bargain as one. I use a non-cooperative sequential bargaining model to analyze this question. Previous work has shown that agents prefer to bargain collectively if they are substitutes for each other in production. This result, however, depends on an exogenously fixed sequence of bargaining. I allow the bargaining sequence to be determined endogenously and investigate how incentives for collective bargaining vary with heterogeneity when delay is costly. The previous results are not robust when the agents are substitutes. In particular, substitute agents prefer individual to collective bargaining if they are heterogeneous and sufficiently patient. In the presence of transaction costs, substitutability of agents is no longer the sole determinant of collectivization. Rather, the degree of heterogeneity in production, in conjunction with the degree of substitutability between agents determine the incentives for collective action.     

Ever larger unions: organisational restructuring and its impact on union confederations

Unions have responded to current membership decline and other organisational problems by restructuring via mergers, increasing union concentration within and across union confederations. A particular noted feature are amalgamations to form ‘super‐unions’. These conglomerate unions threaten to undermine the role played by confederations in respect of political voice, bargaining coordination, and service provision. Despite these mergers, union pluralism still prevails in many European countries with separate peak associations organised along employment/occupational status or political and religious lines. After comparing the recent merger waves and increased union concentration in western European countries, the consequences for union movements are discussed.     

Unions and involuntary job separations

In contrast to the extensive literature on the effects of unions on wages, productivity and voluntary job endings, the effect of unions on involuntary job endings has received relatively little attention. This article demonstrates how unions alter involuntary job separation (redundancies, temporary job endings and dismissals) rates at different tenure levels using the British Household Panel Survey data from 1991 to 2008. A novel finding is that being a union member reduces a person's redundancy probability at low‐tenure levels, relative to an employee of a non‐unionised firm, but has no significant effect at high tenure levels. Union membership and union recognition are not related to different rates of temporary job endings.     

The de-collectivisation of pay setting in Britain 1990–98: incidence,determinants and impact

What were the causes and consequences of declining collective bargaining coverage in Britain? The demise of collective bargaining did not lead to a greater use of individualised payment mechanisms, ‘high-involvement’ practices or productivity gains. Wage inequality rose as a result of the decline. However, workplaces that abandoned bargaining created more jobs. Overall, these results raise questions about Britain’s labour market performance during the 1990s because they suggest that falling unemployment as a result of weaker trade unions came at the price of slower productivity growth and widening male wage inequality.     

Union recognition in Britain's offshore oil and gas industry: implications of the Employment Relations Act 1999

The Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA) has provided trade unions in the UK with new opportunities for achieving recognition. After a long history of anti‐unionism in the offshore oil and gas industry, employers have voluntarily ceded recognition to Trades Union Congress (TUC)‐affiliated trade unions. The legitimacy of this recognition process has been contested by the non‐TUC Offshore Industry Liaison Committee (OILC), an offshore workers’ union, seeking to act as a recognised bargaining agent. The ERA may be promoting ‘business friendly’ agreements at the expense of claims to recognition of other bargaining agents and of democratic employee choice.