再论经理人股票期权的会计确认

谢德仁和刘文(2002)提出了经理人股票期权会计确认的利润分配观。本文在此基础上进行进一步论证,认为经理人股票期权赠予交易的经济实质是股东为激励经理人而将部分剩余索取权(在财务会计意义上就是利润分配权)让渡给经理人,而不是经理人直接用服务来交换股票期权,经理人股票期权赠予并不以经理人服务的投入为必备前提,经理人股票期权赠予交易内含的价值运动是具有一定价值的剩余索取权(所有者权益)从现有股东那里来,流到经理人处去。因此,在经理人股票期权赠予交易的会计确认上,应将经理人股票期权的对应项目确认为企业的利润分配。     

关于经理人股票期权会计确认问题的研究

本文对经理人股票期权会计确认问题进行了较深入的研究。本文提出 ,按照现代企业理论 ,经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享 ,行权前的经理人成为企业的非股东所有者。因此 ,应将股票期权确认为企业的利润分配 ,而非美国现行的确认为费用之处理 ,以反映经理人股票期权的经济实质。这样 ,股票期权的会计处理将不影响利润表 ,从而也更有助于推动用公允价值法计量之 ,以更科学地反映其价值。为此 ,应革新现行的财务会计观念与模式 ,建立非股东所有者的新概念 ,使之适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

浅析经理人股票期权的会计问题

经理人股票期权属于期权分类中股票期权的一种，它是指企业根据股票期权计划的规定，授予其高层管理人员（本文简化称其为经理人）在某一规定的期限内（通常在5至10年内），按约定的价格购买本企业一定数量股票的权利（一般在10万元以上），持有这种权利的经理人可以在规定的时间内行权或弃权。作为现代薪酬结构中的一环，在对职业经理人的长期激励方面扮演着重要的角色。     

经理人股票期权会计确认的探讨

经理人股票期权的确认问题是亟待解决的会计理论和实践问题。经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享。经理人股票期权是一项无形资产,应在经理人提供劳动期间内,将其平均摊销。应改革现行的财务会计观念与模式,增设“待转股本准备”科目,以适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

经理人股票期权会计确认问题研究

自安然、世通事件爆发以来 ,经理人股票期权的会计确认问题再一次成为争论的焦点。目前 ,关于经理人股票期权的会计确认存在两种观点 :“利润分配观”和“费用观”。本文从财务会计概念框架的角度以及对经理人股票期权经济实质的探讨出发 ,主张经理人股票期权报酬成本应当确认为费用。     

股票期权与上市公司经理人激励

根据委托—代理理论,签约双方目标函数不一致且信息非对称,引致激励不相容问题发生.要解决此问题,必须注重代理人长期报酬设计,将经理人利益与企业发展紧密结合起来.采用股票期权的制度安排方式,以股票增值实现代理人的剩余索取,能有效防范经理人道德风险的发生.针对我国国企经营者长期激励偏弱的现实,引进股票期权制度,重塑经理人激励约束机制,对深化激励制度改革具有重要的借鉴意义.     

论现行会计模式下经理人股票期权会计确认

经理人股票期权会计确认复杂的原因在于现行财务概念框架对一些经济现象的实质无法合理确认.为了使经理人股票期权能够在表内较为恰当的反应,为会计信息的使用者提供相对可靠的会计信息,有必要对财务会计概念框架、经理人股票期权的经济性质及表现形式综合考虑,使经理人股票期权会计确认在现行会计模式下相对合理有效.     

股票期权制度的失灵及经理人激励机制的改进

虽然在理论上股票期权具有很强的激励作用，但是至今没有令人信服的实证结果说明股票期权制度对企业绩效的促进效果。相反，很多企业对股票期权的热衷度在逐渐下降。事实证明了股票期权制度的失灵。本文在对股票期权制度失灵的原因分析基础上提出经理人激励机制的改进措施，并对我国经理人激励机制的完善提出了建议。     

经理人股票期权理论及其模型分析

经理人股票期权是为了适应现代企业制度的需要,对经理人员实行的行之有效的约束激励机制,其本质就是让拥有控制权的经理人员一方面能够拥有一定的剩余索取权,另一方面还要承担相应的风险,从而激励经理人最大限度地维护企业所有者的利益。本文通过阐述经理人股票期权的激励作用,提出了期权理论模型,进而使经理人建立长期激励的良性循环具有指导意义。     

Executive Stock Options

Abstract

As a part of the compensation package many companies provide executives with executive stock options, which are call options with additional restrictions. They provide some financial advantages to the executives and help the company retain the service of the executives who improve the company’s earnings and management.

Until recently the values of the executive stock options were not required to be disclosed in the company?s financial reports. But recent statements from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have made it necessary to value these executive stock options. The valuation of executive stock options is also required for investors and financial practitioners. This paper considers the award of performance-based executive stock options when the stock price at the time of stock option award exceeds a given preassigned value. It is assumed that the stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion, and that the number of stock options awarded at any time depends on the stock price at that time.

A valuation formula is derived using the method of Esscher transforms for a multiyear award plan. The closed-form formula derived is similar to the Black-Scholes formula for options and utilizes the standard bivariate normal distribution function, which is available in statistical software. In this paper the number of stock options awarded is assumed to be in a specific form, but the theory presented can be modified to suit other forms of award structure. Moreover, by suitable choice of parameters, a valuation formula is also presented for the award of fixed-value executive stock options grants; this formula is also in a closed form and involves cumulative distribution values of the standard normal random variable. Numerical illustrations of the use of the valuation formulas are presented.     

Accounting for Executive Stock Options: A Case Study in Avoiding Tough Decisions

We review the development of accounting requirements for executive stock options (ESOs) and find that the standard-setting process has been susceptible to pressure groups including the corporate sector, politicians and even the accounting profession itself. The failure of Australian and overseas accounting regulators to take tough decisions may have created a systematic bias towards the use of ESOs which can result in grossly inefficient compensation structures motivated by a desire to maximise reported profits rather than to create optimal managerial incentives. We conclude that most of the arguments against recognition of stock option expense can be dismissed as blatant self-interest at worst, or remarkably muddled thinking at best.     

American-style Indexed Executive Stock Options

This paper develops a new pricing model for American-style indexed executive stock options. We rely on a basic model framework and an indexation scheme first proposed by Johnson and Tian (2000a) in their analysis of European-style indexed options. Our derivation of the valuation formula represents an instructive example of the usefulness of the change-of-numeraire technique. In the paper's numerical section we implement the valuation formula and demonstrate that not only may the early exercise premium be significant but also that the delta of the American-style option is typically much larger than the delta of the otherwise identical (value-matched) European-style option. Vega is higher for indexed options than for conventional options but largely independent of whether the options are European- or American-style. This has important implications for the design of executive compensation contracts. We finally extend the analysis to cover the case where the option contracts are subject to delayed vesting. We show that for realistic parameter values, delayed vesting leads only to a moderate reduction in the value of the American-style indexed executive stock option.     

Exercises of Executive Stock Options on the Vesting Date

We investigate the motives for executives to exercise executive stock options on the options’ vesting date versus a later early exercise. We find that executives frequently exercise on the vesting date, executives with a greater need for portfolio diversification and riskier underlying stocks are more likely to exercise their options on the vesting date versus a later early exercise, and private information appears less relevant to vesting date exercises.     

The Effect of Executive Stock Options on Corporate Innovative Activities

This study investigates whether the implicit optionality of executive stock options (ESOs) induce managers to undertake innovative activities associated with various types of risk. We find ESO risk incentive (vega) to be positively correlated with all types of corporate innovations. We also find greater ESO risk incentive effects for the product‐related innovative activities that are associated more with systematic risk than idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we document the following pecking order for the ESO risk incentive effects: improved product, new product, alliance, and new research and development. Our results suggest that executives have more incentive to invest in projects with higher systematic risk.