Reclaim your job

Ask most managers what gets in the way of their success, and you'll hear the familiar litany of complaints: Not enough time. Limited resources. No clear sense of how their work fits into the grand corporate scheme. These are, for the most part, excuses. What really gets in the way of managers' success is fear of making their own decisions and acting accordingly. Managers must overcome the psychological desire to be indispensable. In this article, the authors demonstrate how managers can become more productive by learning to manage demands, generate resources, and recognize and exploit alternatives. To win the support they want, managers must develop a long-term strategy and pursue their goals slowly, steadily, and strategically. To expand the range of opportunities, for their companies and themselves, managers must scan the environment for possible obstacles and search for ways around them. Fully 90% of the executives the authors have studied over the past few years wasted their time and frittered away their productivity, despite having well-defined projects, goals, and the necessary knowledge to get their jobs done. Such managers remain trapped in inefficiency because they assume they do not have enough personal discretion or control. They forget how to take initiative--the most essential quality of any truly successful manager. Effective managers, by contrast, are purposeful corporate entrepreneurs who take charge of their jobs by developing trust in their own judgment and adopting long-term, big-picture views to fulfill personal goals that match those of the organization.     

Strategy and society: the link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility

Governments, activists, and the media have become adept at holding companies to account for the social consequences of their actions. In response, corporate social responsibility has emerged as an inescapable priority for business leaders in every country. Frequently, though, CSR efforts are counterproductive, for two reasons. First, they pit business against society, when in reality the two are interdependent. Second, they pressure companies to think of corporate social responsibility in generic ways instead of in the way most appropriate to their individual strategies. The fact is, the prevailing approaches to CSR are so disconnected from strategy as to obscure many great opportunities for companies to benefit society. What a terrible waste. If corporations were to analyze their opportunities for social responsibility using the same frameworks that guide their core business choices, they would discover, as Whole Foods Market, Toyota, and Volvo have done, that CSR can be much more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed--it can be a potent source of innovation and competitive advantage. In this article, Michael Porter and Mark Kramer propose a fundamentally new way to look at the relationship between business and society that does not treat corporate growth and social welfare as a zero-sum game. They introduce a framework that individual companies can use to identify the social consequences of their actions; to discover opportunities to benefit society and themselves by strengthening the competitive context in which they operate; to determine which CSR initiatives they should address; and to find the most effective ways of doing so. Perceiving social responsibility as an opportunity rather than as damage control or a PR campaign requires dramatically different thinking--a mind-set, the authors warn, that will become increasingly important to competitive success.     

Selection bias and the perils of benchmarking

To find the secrets of business success, what could be more natural than studying successful businesses? In fact, nothing could be more dangerous, warns this Stanford professor. Generalizing from the examples of successful companies is like generalizing about New England weather from data taken only in the summer. That's essentially what businesspeople do when they learn from good examples and what consultants, authors, and researchers do when they study only existing companies or--worse yet--only high-performing companies. They reach conclusions from unrepresentative data samples, falling into the classic statistical trap of selection bias. Drawing on a wealth of case studies, for instance, one researcher concluded that great leaders share two key traits: They persist, often despite initial failures, and they are able to persuade others to join them. But those traits are also the hallmarks of spectacularly unsuccessful entrepreneurs, who must persist in the face of failure to incur large losses and must be able to persuade others to pour their money down the drain. To discover what makes a business successful, then, managers should look at both successes and failures. Otherwise, they will overvalue risky business practices, seeing only those companies that won big and not the ones that lost dismally. They will not be able to tell if their current good fortune stems from smart business practices or if they are actually coasting on past accomplishments or good luck. Fortunately, economists have developed relatively simple tools that can correct for selection bias even when data about failed companies are hard to come by. Success may be inspirational, but managers are more likely to find the secrets of high performance if they give the stories of their competitors'failures as full a hearing as they do the stories of dazzling successes.     

What really works

When it comes to improving business performance, managers have no shortage of tools and techniques to choose from. But what really works? What's critical, and what's optional? Two business professors and a former McKinsey consultant set out to answer those questions. In a ground-breaking, five-year study that involved more than 50 academics and consultants, the authors analyzed 200 management techniques as they were employed by 160 companies over ten years. Their findings at a high level? Business basics really matter. In this article, the authors outline the management practices that are imperative for sustained superior financial performance--their "4+2 formula" for business success. They provide examples of companies that achieved varying degrees of success depending on whether they applied the formula, and they suggest ways that other companies can achieve excellence. The 160 companies in their study--called the Evergreen Project--were divided into 40 quads, each comprising four companies in a narrowly defined industry. Based on its performance between 1986 and 1996, each company in each quad was classified as either a winner (for instance, Dollar General), a loser (Kmart), a climber (Target), or a tumbler (the Limited). Without exception, the companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled in what the authors call the four primary management practices: strategy, execution, culture, and structure. And they supplemented their great skill in those areas with a mastery of any two of four secondary management practices: talent, leadership, innovation, and mergers and partnerships. A company that consistently follows this 4+2 formula has a better than 90% chance of sustaining superior performance, according to the authors.     

The wisdom of deliberate mistakes

Before the breakup of the Bell System, U.S. telephone companies were permitted by law to ask for security deposits from a small percentage of subscribers. The companies used statistical models to decide which customers were most likely to pay their bills late and thus should be charged a deposit, but no one knew whether the models were right. So the Bell companies made a deliberate mistake. They asked for no deposit from nearly 100,000 new customers randomly selected from among those who were considered high risks. Surprisingly, quite a few paid their bills on time. As a result, the companies instituted a smarter screening strategy, which added millions to the Bell System's bottom line. Usually, individuals and organizations go to great lengths to avoid errors. Companies are designed for optimum performance rather than for learning, and mistakes are seen as defects. But as the Bell System example shows, making mistakes--correctly--is a powerful way to accelerate learning and increase competitiveness. If one of a company's fundamental assumptions is wrong, the firm can achieve success more quickly by deliberately making errors than by considering only data that support the assumption. Moreover, executives who apply a conventional, systematic approach to solving a pattern recognition problem are often slower to find a solution than those who test their assumptions by knowingly making mistakes. How do you distinguish between smart mistakes and dumb ones? The authors' consulting firm has developed, and currently uses, a five-step process for identifying constructive mistakes. In one test, the firm assumed that a mistake it was planning to make would cost a significant amount of money, but the opposite happened. By turning assumptions on their heads, the firm created more than dollar 1 million in new business.     

The ambidextrous CEO

Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously--when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.     

如何激发民营企业创新--来自实际控制人财富集中度的视角北大核心

在我国实施创新驱动发展战略的背景下,本文从企业重大事项决策者实际控制人的视角,分析其财富集中度对民营上市公司创新的影响。结果显示,实际控制人财富集中度越高,企业创新水平越低。机制检验显示,实际控制人财富集中度会降低企业风险承担。这表明,实际控制人财富集中度越高,其对创新失败风险的容忍度越低,进而不利于企业创新。进一步研究显示,政府补助(机构投资者)可以发挥“风险缓冲”(“监督制衡”)的作用,削弱实际控制人财富集中度对企业创新的负面影响。本文还发现,财富集中的实际控制人更可能进行技术并购,以作为自主创新不足的替代。本文从实际控制人财富集中度的视角对企业创新的相关研究进行深化,并拓展了政府补助、机构投资者、技术并购在企业创新中发挥作用的相关研究;同时从实际控制人财富分散成本和风险、政府风险分担和机构投资者制衡约束等视角为推动民营企业创新的政策制定和公司治理改革提供参考。     

Defining next-generation products: an inside look

The continued success of technology-based companies depends on their proficiency in creating next-generation products and their derivatives. So getting such products out the door on schedule must be routine for such companies, right? Not quite. The authors recently engaged in a detailed study--in which they had access to sensitive internal information and to candid interviews with people at every level--of 28 next-generation product-development projects in 14 leading high-tech companies. They found that most of the companies were unable to complete such projects on schedule. And the companies also had difficulty developing the derivative products needed to fill the gaps in the market that their next-generation products would create. The problem in every case, the authors discovered, was rooted in the product definition phase. And not coincidentally, the successful companies in the study had all learned how to handle the technical and marketplace uncertainties in their product definition processes. The authors have discerned from the actions of those companies a set of best practices that can measurably improve the definition phase of any company's product-development process. They have grouped the techniques into three categories and carefully lay out the steps that companies need to take as they work through each stage. The best practices revealed here are not a magic formula for rapid, successful new-product definition. But they can help companies capture new markets without major delays. And that is good news for any manager facing the uncertainty that goes with developing products for a global marketplace.     

Innovation: the classic traps

Never a fad, but always in or out of fashion, innovation gets rediscovered as a growth enabler every half dozen years. Too often, though, grand declarations about innovation are followed by mediocre execution that produces anemic results, and innovation groups are quietly disbanded in cost-cutting drives. Each managerial generation embarks on the same enthusiastic quest for the next new thing. And each generation faces the same vexing challenges- most of which stem from the tensions between protecting existing revenue streams critical to current success and supporting new concepts that may be crucial to future success. In this article, Harvard Business School professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter reflects on the four major waves of innovation enthusiasm she's observed over the past 25 years. She describes the classic mistakes companies make in innovation strategy, process, structure, and skills assessment, illustrating her points with a plethora of real-world examples--including AT&T Worldnet, Timberland, and Ocean Spray. A typical strategic blunder is when managers set their hurdles too high or limit the scope of their innovation efforts. Quaker Oats, for instance, was so busy in the 1990s making minor tweaks to its product formulas that it missed larger opportunities in distribution. A common process mistake is when managers strangle innovation efforts with the same rigid planning, budgeting, and reviewing approaches they use in their existing businesses--thereby discouraging people from adapting as circumstances warrant. Companies must be careful how they structure fledgling entities alongside existing ones, Kanter says, to avoid a clash of cultures and agendas--which Arrow Electronics experienced in its attempts to create an online venture. Finally, companies commonly undervalue and underinvest in the human side of innovation--for instance, promoting individuals out of innovation teams long before their efforts can pay off. Kanter offers practical advice for avoiding these traps.     

An Honorable Harvest: Universal Owners Must Take Responsibility for Their Portfolios

Despite a maturing industry of ESG professionals and coordinated efforts by shareholders calling for more responsible corporate behavior, we continue to see unabated climate and water crises, growing political instability, and continuing abuses of human rights in supply chains. The founder of a movement called The Shareholder Commons argues that to help business to address these systemic challenges, corporate responsibility must move beyond the company‐by‐company decision‐making model. An economy based on market competition cannot rely on individual businesses to adopt basic sustainability rules that take priority over profit. Critical sustainability boundaries must be implemented collectively to be effective. The crux of the problem is that although shareholder returns derive mainly from efficiency and productivity gains, they can also result from careless exploitation of common resources or powerless workers. And the competition for margin and capital makes it difficult for companies to recognize, let alone forgo, profitable exploitation. A sustainable economy demands that we help companies to distinguish between honorable and dishonorable profits, and to find ways to eliminate or offset the latter. The author holds out a model of capitalism that limits the availability of choices that exploit negative externalities and inequality while preserving the principles and practices that create value and a reasonable sharing of gains among all stakeholders. Universal owners—long‐term diversified investors—appear to be in the best position to formulate and enforce such a model, given the current design and practices of our capital markets. Such global investors have the incentive and power to engage in the collective decision‐making necessary for a sustainable economy. The power exerted by institutional investors through their allocation and stewardship of equity capital can be used to insist on more sustainable business practices. Because they are diversified across thousands of companies, universal owners can bypass the competitive bottleneck for margin and capital that holds sustainability back at the company level. These large investors can work together to establish authentic sustainability boundaries for the companies they invest in; and by so doing, they can allow us to leverage all the good work done to date on disclosure and ESG integration, and so realize a world in which companies continue to compete for profits, but also for a truly honorable harvest.     

Coming up short on nonfinancial performance measurement

Companies in increasing numbers are measuring customer loyalty, employee satisfaction, and other nonfinancial areas of performance that they believe affect profitability. But they've failed to relate these measures to their strategic goals or establish a connection between activities undertaken and financial outcomes achieved. Failure to make such connections has led many companies to misdirect their investments and reward ineffective managers. Extensive field research now shows that businesses make some common mistakes when choosing, analyzing, and acting on their nonfinancial measures. Among these mistakes: They set the wrong performance targets because they focus too much on short-term financial results, and they use metrics that lack strong statistical validity and reliability. As a result, the companies can't demonstrate that improvements in nonfinancial measures actually affect their financial results. The authors lay out a series of steps that will allow companies to realize the genuine promise of nonfinancial performance measures. First, develop a model that proposes a causal relationship between the chosen nonfinancial drivers of strategic success and specific outcomes. Next, take careful inventory of all the data within your company. Then use established statistical methods for validating the assumed relationships and continue to test the model as market conditions evolve. Finally, base action plans on analysis of your findings, and determine whether those plans and their investments actually produce the desired results. Nonfinancial measures will offer little guidance unless you use a process for choosing and analyzing them that relies on sophisticated quantitative and qualitative inquiries into the factors actually contributing to economic results.     

Innovating for cash

Despite companies' almost fanatical worship of innovation, most new products don't generate money. That's because executives don't realize that the approach they take to commercializing a new product is as important as the innovation itself. Different approaches can generate very different levels of profit. Companies tend to favor one of three different innovation approaches, each with its own investment profile, profitability pattern, risk profile, and skill requirements. Most organizations are instinctively integrators: They manage all the steps needed to take a product to market themselves. Organizations can also choose to be orchestrators: They focus on some parts of the commercialization process and depend on partners to manage the rest. And finally, companies can be licensers: They sell or license a new product or idea to another organization that handles the commercialization process. Different innovations require different approaches. Selecting the most suitable approach, the authors' research found, often yields two or three times the profits of the least optimal approach. Yet companies tend to rely only on the mode most familiar to them. Executives would do better to take several different factors into account before deciding which tack to take, including the industry they're trying to enter, the specific characteristics of the innovation, and the risks involved in taking the product to market. By doing so, companies can match the approach to the opportunity and reap the maximum profit. Choosing the wrong approach, like Polaroid did, for example, can lead to the failure of both the product and the company. Optimizing their approaches, as Whirlpool has done, helps ensure that companies' innovations make money.     

Columbia Law School Roundtable on A Governance Research Agenda for the Academy

Since Jensen and Meckling's formulation of the theory of “agency costs” in 1976, corporate finance and governance scholars have produced a large body of research that attempts to identify the most important features and practices of effective corporate governance systems. But for all the research that has been done in the past 40 years, many practitioners continue to see a disconnect between theory and practice, between the questions researched and the questions that need to be answered. In this roundtable, Martijn Cremers begins by challenging the conventional view that limiting “agency costs” is the main challenge confronted by boards of directors in representing shareholder interests and, hence, the proper focus of most governance scholarship. Especially in today's economy, with the high values assigned to growth companies, the most important function of corporate governance may instead be to overcome the problem of American “short termism” that he attributes to “inadequate shareholder commitment to long‐term cooperation.” And he buttresses his argument with the findings of his own recent research suggesting that obstacles to the workings of the corporate control market like staggered boards and supermajority voting requirements may actually improve long‐run corporate performance by lengthening the decision‐making horizon of boards and the managements they supervise. Vik Khanna discusses Indian Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending and its effects in light of a recent law requiring Indian companies of a certain size to devote at least 2% of their after‐tax profit to CSR initiatives. One unintended effect of this mandate, which took effect in 2010, was that all Indian companies that were spending more than the prescribed 2% of profits cut their expenditure back to that minimum, suggesting that CSR and advertising are substitutes to some extent, and that such legal mandates can discourage CSR spending by early adapters or “leaders.” Nevertheless, Khanna also found evidence of social norms developing in support of CSR, including a spreading perception that such spending can help some companies achieve strategic goals. Jeff Gordon closes by arguing that, to the extent investors are short‐sighted, their short‐sightedness is likely to be justified by their recognition that public company directors have neither the information nor the incentives to do an effective job of monitoring corporate managements. The best solution to the problems with U.S. corporate governance is to replace today's “thinly informed” directors with “activist” directors who more closely resemble the directors of private‐equity owned firms. Such directors would spend far more time with, and be much more knowledgeable about, corporate management and operations—and they would have much more of their personal wealth at stake in the form of company stock.     

The uncompromising leader

Managing the tension between performance and people is at the heart of the CEO's job. But CEOs under fierce pressure from capital markets often focus solely on the shareholder, which can lead to employee disenchantment. Others put so much stock in their firms' heritage that they don't notice as their organizations slide into complacency. Some leaders, though, manage to avoid those traps and create high-commitment, high-performance (HCHP) companies. The authors' in-depth research of HCHP CEOs reveals several shared traits: These CEOs earn the trust of their organizations through their openness to the unvarnished truth. They are deeply engaged with their people, and their exchanges are direct and personal. They mobilize employees around a focused agenda, concentrating on only one or two initiatives. And they work to build collective leadership capabilities. These leaders also forge an emotionally resonant shared purpose across their companies. That consists of a three-part promise: The company will help employees build a better world and deliver performance they can be proud of, and will provide an environment in which they can grow. HCHP CEOs approach finding a firm's moral and strategic center in a competitive market as a calling, not an engineering problem. They drive their firms to be strongly market focused while at the same time reinforcing their firms' core values. They are committed to short-term performance while also investing in long-term leadership and organizational capabilities. By refusing to compromise on any of these terms, they build great companies.     

Gender diversity and financial statement fraud

This study investigates the role of gender diversity in fraud commission and detection with a view to identifying whether companies with more female corporate leaders are less likely to be involved in financial statement fraud. Using a bivariate probit model, the role of female corporate leaders in financial statement fraud commission and detection is examined for Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018. The representation of female corporate leaders increases the likelihood of fraud detection, thus reducing firms’ propensity to engage in fraud. The finding confirms that women are risk averse and more committed to ethical practices than men in corporate leadership positions. Moreover, this impact of gender diversity is contingent upon the nature of ultimate controllers of listed companies: more female representation in top leadership roles can mitigate fraud commission or detect fraud effectively in non-state-owned enterprises, but not in state-owned enterprises. In addition, the recent anti-corruption campaign initiated by Chinese President Jinping Xi is a powerful form of public governance. Female corporate leaders play a more positive role in mitigating fraud commission and detecting fraud commission in the post-campaign period than in the pre-campaign period.     

Conquering a culture of indecision

The single greatest cause of corporate underperformance is the failure to execute. Author Ram Charan, drawing on a quarter century of observing organizational behavior, perceives that such failures of execution share a family resemblance: a misfire in the personal interactions that are supposed to produce results. Faulty interactions rarely occur in isolation, Charan says. Far more often, they're typical of the way large and small decisions are made or not made throughout the organization. The inability to take decisive action is rooted in a company's culture. But, Charan notes, leaders create a culture of indecisiveness, and leaders can break it. Breaking it requires them to take three actions. First, they must engender intellectual honesty in the connections between people. Second, they must see to it that the organization's "social operating mechanisms"--the meetings, reviews, and other situations through which people in the corporation do business--have honest dialogue at their cores. And third, leaders must ensure that feedback and follow-through are used to reward high achievers, coach those who are struggling, and discourage those whose behaviors are blocking the organization's progress. By taking these three approaches and using every encounter as an opportunity to model open and honest dialogue, a leader can set the tone for an organization, moving it from paralysis to action.     

Corporate Portfolio Management Roundtable

The dean of a top ten business school, the chair of a large investment management firm, two corporate M&A leaders, a CFO, a leading M&A investment banker, and a corporate finance advisor discuss the following questions:

• ? What are today's best practices in corporate portfolio management? What roles should be played by boards, senior managers, and business unit leaders?
• ? What are the typical barriers to successful implementation and how can they be overcome?
• ? Should portfolio management be linked to financial policies such as decisions on capital structure, dividends, and share repurchase?
• ? How should all of the above be disclosed to the investor community?

After acknowledging the considerable challenges to optimal portfolio management in public companies, the panelists offer suggestions that include:

• ? Companies should establish an independent group that functions like a “SWAT team” to support portfolio management. Such groups would be given access to (or produce themselves) business‐unit level data on economic returns and capital employed, and develop an “outside‐in” view of each business's standalone valuation.
• ? Boards should consider using their annual strategy “off‐sites” to explore all possible alternatives for driving share‐holder value, including organic growth, divestitures and acquisitions, as well as changes in dividends, share repurchases, and capital structure.
• ? Performance measurement and compensation frameworks need to be revamped to encourage line managers to think more like investors, not only seeking value‐creating growth but also making divestitures at the right time. CEOs and CFOs should take the lead in developing a shared value creation model that clearly articulates how capital will be allocated.

     

Funding growth in an age of austerity

Everyone knows that corporate growth--true growth, not just agglomeration--springs from innovation. And the common wisdom is that companies must spend lavishly on R&D if they are to innovate at all. But in these fiscally cautious times, where every line item of every budget in every company is under intense scrutiny, many organizations are doing just the opposite. They tighten their belts, subject nascent product-development programs to rigorous screening, and train R&D staffers to think in business terms so the researchers will be better able to decide whether an idea for a product or service is worth pursuing in the first place. Such efficiency measures are commendable, say authors Gary Hamel and Gary Getz. But frugality is not a growth strategy, they point out, and, in truth, there is very little correlation between corporate performance and the amount spent on innovation. Companies like Southwest, Cemex, and Shell Chemicals have shown that businesses don't have to spend a fortune on R&D to reap the benefits of innovation. To produce more growth per dollar invested, companies must produce more innovation per dollar invested. Hamel and Getz explain how businesses can dramatically improve their innovation yields. They offer these five imperatives: Increase the number of innovators among existing employees (whatever their job titles) by involving them in innovation processes and events. Focus on developing truly radical ideas--ones that change customers' expectations and behaviors and industry economics--not just incremental ideas. Look for innovation sources outside the organization, as well as inside. Increase the learning from small, low-risk experiments. And commit to long-term, consistent development efforts.     

The "barbarians" in the boardroom

According to conventional wisdom, the corporate raiders and buyout specialists who flourished in the 1980s were the antithesis of good management. Their goals of realizing quick profits from the acquisition of major companies--frequently through rapid cost-cutting and the breakup of conglomerates--made them the bane of old-school corporate leaders. Long-term management, it seemed, was being sacrificed on the altar of short-term profits. With the abatement of takeovers in recent times, top corporate managers have hailed a return to business-as-usual. But the takeover artists have not, in fact, retreated. Instead, these corporate acquirers, many of whom own large stakes in major industrial companies, are assuming board seats and switching their emphasis to overseeing the companies they control--with an eye toward the long term. In this new role, the takeover experts are not plunderers, nor are they creating quick profit at the expense of companies' long-term health; rather, they are defying expectations and, in a number of important respects, successfully implementing the agenda of the gurus of good management. Setting the pace in this new arena is the most powerful takeover group of the 1980s, the leveraged buyout firm of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company. KKR's partners hold board seats at nine different companies with $1 billion a year or more in sales.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

The dangers of feeling like a fake

In many walks of life-and business is no exception-there are high achievers who believe that they are complete fakes. To the outside observer, these individuals appear to be remarkably accomplished; often they are extremely successful leaders with staggering lists of achievements. These neurotic impostors--as psychologists call them--are not guilty of false humility. The sense of being a fraud is the flip side of giftedness and causes a great many talented, hardworking, and capable leaders to believe that they don't deserve their success. "Bluffing" their way through life (as they see it), they are haunted by the constant fear of exposure. With every success, they think, "I was lucky this time, fooling everyone, but will my luck hold? When will people discover that I'm not up to the job?" In his career as a management professor, consultant, leadership coach, and psychoanalyst, Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries has found neurotic impostors at all levels of organizations. In this article, he explores the subject of neurotic imposture and outlines its classic symptoms: fear of failure, fear of success, perfectionism, procrastination, and workaholism. He then describes how perfectionist overachievers can damage their careers, their colleagues' morale, and the bottom line by allowing anxiety to trigger self-handicapping behavior and cripple the very organizations they're trying so hard to please. Finally, Kets de Vries offers advice on how to limit the incidence of neurotic imposture and mitigate its damage through discreet vigilance, appropriate intervention, and constructive support.