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1.
Harrison Cheng 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):555-577
Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different
convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under
very typical and somewhat general conditions, the highest Bertrand equilibrium price converges to one higher than the competitive
equilibrium. We also give examples to show how to compute the limit of the highest Bertrand equilibrium prices and illustrate
the ideas of the proof. We explore conditions under which the supply curve is upward sloping, a useful condition for our results.
Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: May 10, 2001 相似文献
2.
Burkhard Hehenkamp Cheng-Zhong Qin Charles Stuart 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1999,9(2):211-224
We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite
number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of
the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic
dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium. 相似文献
3.
Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs.
Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through
a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit
outcomes.
Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000 相似文献
4.
Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists. 相似文献
5.
6.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):811-822
Summary. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices
vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover,
as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome.
Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: January 9, 2001 相似文献
7.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
8.
Summary. For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation
of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations
both fail to do so, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply
correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs.
Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: March 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Industrial Economics at the University
of Copenhagen during Spring 2000. Their financial support and stimulating research environment are gratefully acknowledged.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the European Commission.
Correspondence to: R. Amir 相似文献
9.
Yasuhito Tanaka 《Economic Theory》2001,17(3):693-700
Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium
of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry,
there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables,
price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an
assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition
(their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game,
a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms.
Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
10.
Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make
mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to
buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes
a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity,
or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase.
Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist.
Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian
State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26.
Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy 相似文献
11.
We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase. 相似文献
12.
Leo Kaas 《Economic Theory》2001,17(2):307-323
Summary. It is known that overlapping generations models with imperfectly competitive firms may exhibit a continuum of stationary
equilibria. The reason of this indeterminacy is that different price expectation functions of consumers lead to different
objective demand functions against which firms maximize. All these expectation functions fulfill perfect foresight in the
equilibrium, but they can be arbitrary off the equilibrium. In this paper it is shown that it is not this arbitrariness which
is responsible for the indeterminacy, but that the continuum of stationary equilibria emerges even if expectation functions
are rational.
Received: March 25, 1999; revised version: February 16, 2000 相似文献
13.
Patrick Bajari 《Economic Theory》2001,18(1):187-205
Summary. Collusion is a serious problem in many procurement auctions. In this research, I study a model of first price sealed bid
procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. I demonstrate that the equilibrium to the model is unique and describe three
algorithms that can be used to compute the inverse equilibrium bid functions. I then use the computational algorithms to compare
competitive and collusive bidding. The algorithms are useful for structural estimation of auction models and for assessing
the damages from bid-rigging.
Received: January 14, 2000; revised version: February 28, 2001 相似文献
14.
Alvaro Sandroni 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):423-433
Summary. In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. Agents' beliefs are different,
but correct in the limit. Some agents are more patient than others. I show that infinitely often share prices are low and
the economy stagnates. Also, infinitely often share prices are high and the economy grows. The changes from growth to stagnation
and from stagnation to growth are not caused by exogenous shocks. They are caused by speculative trade among agents with different
propensities to save and invest.
Received: January 8, 2001; revised version: April 11, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science
Foundation. 相似文献
15.
Summary. This paper investigates the characteristics of the optimal posted price in the standard sequential search paradigm. Much
of the intuition gleaned from the extensive sequential search literature in which the seller adopts a reservation price does
not carry over to the posted price setting. For example, an increase in buyer valuations can lead to a reduction in the optimal
posted price. We do, however, provide sufficient conditions on the hazard rate function h which ensure that an increase in demand induces an increase in the optimal posted price. As exhibited herein, the analysis
of the posted price model depends critically upon analytical properties of h. Amongst the issues treated are the elasticity of demand, finite horizon, sale of multiple units, and competitive equilibrium.
Received: October 21, 1999; revised version: March 7, 2000 相似文献
16.
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):353-371
Summary. This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining
games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium
approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for
multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium
approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity.
Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE.
Received: October 30, 1996; revised version: July 7, 1998 相似文献
17.
In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large. 相似文献
18.
Pravin Krishna 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):753-760
Summary. Conventional wisdom holds that product market competition disciplines firms into efficiency of operation. However, in a well
known paper, Martin (1993) has shown that in a linear Cournot setting (with costs determined first and product market competition
taking place in a second stage) the exact opposite obtains – a larger number of firms competing in the market implies lower
firm efficiency. The note clarifies further the links between market structure and efficiency. Specifically, it argues why
(and how) the result derived by Martin (1993) depends upon the assumptions made regarding the structure of demand and nature
of conjectures held by firms as to their rivals' behavior. An illustrative counter-example (with Bertrand behavior and non-linear
demand) in which entry increases efficiency is provided as well.
Received: March 2, 2000; revised version: September 19, 2000 相似文献
19.
Summary. We study pricing and product diffusion in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with product market frictions. Ongoing
R&D activity leads, with an endogenously determined probability, to continual improvements in product quality. We characterize
the steady-state equilibrium with endogenous product diffusion in which a number of different goods co-exist on the quality
ladder. We show that the severity of the economy's market frictions is a crucial determinant of the pricing structure, the
product diffusion pattern, the level of R&D investment, the rate of endogenous growth, the length of Schumpeterian product
cycles and the possibility of multiple growth paths. Eliminating market frictions leads to a degenerate product ladder of
precisely one step, containing only the most recent product, as in the monopolistic competition literature.
Received: August 16, 1999; revised version: March 6, 2001 相似文献
20.
Michael T. Rauh 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):901-906
Summary. We consider static non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend on their own actions and
finitely many summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
without any convexity restrictions on payoffs or the common action space. We show that this result applies to a broad class
of monopolistic competition models.
Received: April 13, 2001; revised version: December 18, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" The result in this paper generalizes a result in my PhD dissertation supervised by M. Ali Khan and Joe Harrington.
I thank them for support and encouragement. I also thank Sung Kim, Bruce Nanney, Ashvin Rajan, Kali Rath, and an anonymous
referee for comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献