Medical insurance with rank-dependent utility

Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets. Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055. Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan     

Saving under rank-dependent utility

Summary. In this note we use the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model to analyze saving decisions. The RDU model enables us to separate the effects of pessimism and optimism on saving from that of concavity of the utility function. While pessimism induces more saving, the importance of this effect is shown to depend upon properties of the utility function such as prudence and temperance.JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D81.An anonymous referee provided helpful comments. Han Bleichrodts research was made possible by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). Louis Eeckhoudt acknowledges support from the Interuniversity Attraction Poles Programme - Belgian State - Federal Office for Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Affairs.     

PESSIMISM OR OPTIMISM: A JUSTIFICATION TO VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY*

This article analyses the determinants of voluntary contribution to environmental quality by introducing the perception of environmental risk. We consider individuals who are aware both of the impact of their voluntary contributions and of the quality of the current environment on the future quality of environment. Their preferences are represented by the RDU model. We distinguish three kinds of effect: environmental quality, wealth and risk perception. The first effects are not always sufficient to explain agents' implication in the improvement of environmental quality.     

Preference for safety under the Choquet model: in search of a characterization

Victor prefers safety more than Ursula if whenever Ursula prefers a constant to an uncertain act, so does Victor. This paradigm, whose expected utility (EU) version is Arrow and Pratt’s more risk aversion concept, will be studied in the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model. Necessary condition Pointwise inequality between a function of the utility functions and another of the capacities is necessary and sufficient for the preference by Victor of safety over a dichotomous act whenever such is the preference of Ursula. However, increased preference for safety versus dichotomous acts does not imply preference by Victor of safety over a general act whenever such is the preference of Ursula. A counterexample will be provided, via the casino theory of Dubins and Savage. Sufficient condition Separation of the two functions by some convex function is sufficient for Victor to prefer safety more than Ursula, over general acts. Furthermore, a condition on the capacities will be presented for simplicity seeking, the preference by Victor over any act for some dichotomous act that leaves Ursula indifferent. This condition is met in particular if Victor’s capacity is a convex function of Ursula’s capacity. For these cases, the pointwise inequality (necessary) condition is a characterization of greater preference for safety, extending the Arrow–Pratt notion from EU to CEU and rank-dependent utility (RDU). These inequalities preserve the flavor of the “more pessimism than greediness” characterization of monotone risk aversion by Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson in the RDU model and its extension by Grant and Quiggin to CEU. Preferences between safety and dichotomous acts are at the core of the biseparable preferences model of Ghirardato and Marinacci.     

Investor Reaction to Inter-corporate Business Contracting: Evidence and Explanation

We examine the stock market reaction to 1227 inter-corporate ordinary business contract announcements reported by Dow Jones between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2001. Around contract announcement dates, we find statistically significant positive average abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume for contractors, but insignificant positive abnormal returns and negative abnormal volume for contractees. Cross-sectionally, contract announcement period returns are higher for contractors who are small relative to the contract size, have higher return volatility, larger market-to-book ratios and higher profitability. The announcement period returns of contract-awarding firms are not significant and are only marginally related to cross-sectional explanatory factors. The results are consistent with two explanatory stories: contractor quasi-rents induced by the winner's curse and information signalling about contractor production costs. The results are not consistent with perfect competition, with contracts having positive net present values for both parties, and with a version of incomplete contracting theory.     

The effects of employment protection: Learning from variable enforcement

Employment protection legislation (EPL) is not enforced uniformly across the board. There are a number of exemptions to the coverage of these provisions: firms below a given threshold scale and workers with temporary contracts are not subject to the most restrictive provisions. This within-country variation in enforcement allows us to make inferences on the impact of EPL which go beyond the usual cross-country approach. In this paper we develop a simple model which explains why these exemptions are in place to start with. Then we empirically assess the effects of EPL on dismissal probabilities and on the equilibrium size distribution of firms. Our results are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. Workers under permanent contracts in firms with less restrictive EPL are more likely to be dismissed. However, there is no effect of the exemption threshold on the growth of firms.     

An optimal production method for penetrating foreign markets: Standardization,localization, and flexible technology

This paper examines firms' production strategies for supplying products tailored to the target country's local taste: developing a new localized variety and modifying an existing variety to fit the local taste. Adopting the concept of the flexible technology in industrial organization theory, the paper develops a simple theoretical model to examine when and why exporters or multinationals adopt flexible technologies to serve multiple markets. The results suggest that firms with basic varieties that are considerably different from the variety demanded by the local country are likely to develop localized varieties to serve the country, whereas those with basic varieties that are considerably similar to the demanded variety are likely to modify their existing varieties. In some circumstances, even when foreign production has an intrinsic cost advantage over exporting before the application of a flexible technology, firms may choose to be exporters by adopting the technology. In addition, the results indicate a possible industry equilibrium: Firms with basic varieties that are considerably similar to the variety demanded by the local country are likely to modify them and become multinationals, whereas those with basic varieties that are considerably different from the demanded variety are likely to develop new localized products and become multinationals. Otherwise, firms are likely to modify their existing platforms and become exporters.     

An explanation of each-way wagers in three models of risky choice

Punters may engage in betting on both a selection in an event to finish first or in one of the number of places, e.g. second, third or fourth. When the amounts staked with bookmakers at fixed odds on the win and place are equal, it is called an each-way bet. Each-way bets are apparently popular with punters but inconsistent with prominent models of wagering which assume gamblers are everywhere risk-seeking. In this note, we derive the conditions for win and place bets to be optimal in these three models of risky choice. The mathematical conditions for the each-way wager to be optimal, as opposed to a win and place wager with different stakes, are complicated and appear likely to occur rarely in practice. However, bettors obviously see the attraction in giving themselves two ways to bet on the one horse or two ways to win and betting each way. We suggest part of the ‘each-way’ betting attraction is that they are quick and easy to compute – a heuristic – to solve an otherwise complex betting strategy.     

Environmental Satellite Models for a Macroeconomic Model

To support national environmental policy, it is desirable to forecast and analyse environmental indicators consistently with economic variables. However, environmental indicators are physical measures linked to physical activities that are not specified in economic models. One way to deal with this is to develop environmental satellite models linked to economic models. The system of models presented gives a frame of reference where emissions of greenhouse gases, acid gases, and leaching of nutrients to the aquatic environment are analysed in line with – and consistently with – macroeconomic variables. This paper gives an overview of the data and the satellite models. Finally, the results of applying the model system to calculate the impacts on emissions and the economy are reviewed in a few illustrative examples. The models have been developed for Denmark; however, most of the environmental data used are from the CORINAIR system implemented in numerous countries.     

The Age of Hiring and Deferred Compensation: Evidence from Australia

The factors affecting age of hiring are estimated using Australian establishment data. Lower ages of new hires are associated with training and with workplaces using steeper tenure–wage profiles. Lower ages of hires are associated with steeper profiles throughout the age of hire distribution, whereas lower ages of hires are associated with the provision of training only among younger hires. Moreover, the evidence confirms that larger employers are more likely to hire younger workers but that lower ages of hire continue to be associated with steeper tenure–wage profiles even among larger employers. The robust role of the tenure–wage profile suggests that it is too early to conclude, as some have, that specific training is the paramount reason for the reduced hiring prospects of the old.     

Multiple equilibria in the context of inspection probabilities depending on firms’ relative emissions

This paper presents a model of environmental regulations with firms that are heterogeneous with respect to the cost for reducing emissions to the legally permitted level. Given that the enforcement capacity is limited due to budgetary constraints and that each firm's inspection probability depends on its emissions relative to other firms’ emissions, the likelihood of being punished for violations is endogenously determined and multiple equilibria may therefore arise. Hence, both good outcomes with high compliance rates and bad outcomes with many violations are possible. Multiple equilibria are most likely to emerge at intermediate levels of deterrence and at low permitted emission levels. However, it is generally not straightforward how stricter legislation impacts on equilibrium outcomes, indicating that behavioral expectations among regulated firms are an important factor to consider when adapting enforcement to changes in the law.     

Interstate switched access demand analysis

The breakup of the Bell System in 1984 led to the adoption by the Federal Communications Commission of a system of tariff charges that are paid to local exchange carriers by business and residential telephone subscribers, and interexchange carriers such as AT&T. These charges are designed to recover the costs associated with providing access to the public switched network to complete interstate calls. This system is known as the FCC Access Charge Plan. Flat-rate fees, named Subscriber Line Charges, are imposed on telephone subscribers, while usage-based charges are billed to interexchange carriers. These are called Carrier Common Line and Traffic Sensitive rates. Since CCL and TS rates are based on network usage, forecasts of switched access demand are required to set them properly.This paper presents an econometric model of interstate switched access demand developed and utilized by AT&T to produce forecasts of 1988 demand in connection with the Annual 1988 Access Tariff Filings. The model is estimated in a state-level pooled cross-sectional time-series framework, with dynamics introduced via polynomial distributed lags on price and income. It represents an extension of the econometric demand model developed and used by the FCC a year earlier to determine a reasonable forecast of 1987 Carrier Common Line switched access demand. Estimated demand elasticities and forecasts are provided. The model forecasts are also compared to those from other models.     

空间政策:由区域倾斜到产业倾斜

空间政策具有阶段性的特征,区域倾斜为主是空间政策发展的初级阶段,产业倾斜为主是空间政策发展的高级阶段。我国建国以来无论是实施区域均衡发展战略、非均衡发展战略、还是非均衡协调发展战略,都采取了区域倾斜为主的空间政策来进行空间调控。但是,区域倾斜的空间政策存在着效率与公平时空错位、对市场调控机制的损害和区域一刀切的弊端。产业倾斜可实现提高效率、区域公平和环境友好三大目标的统一,是我国今后空间政策的发展取向。主体功能区划将推进区域倾斜和产业倾斜的结合,是由区域倾斜为主向产业倾斜为主的过渡,在我国空间政策转换阶段,应更多运用产业倾斜的政策手段。     

金融监管制度与机会主义行为机理研究

由于金融市场的信息不对称和外部性难以根本消除,致使机会主义行为难以避免。金融监管制度的演变即是保障存款人利益、预防和化解金融风险维护金融系统稳定的过程,也是对金融机构和监管机构及相关代理人机会主义行为规避和治理的过程。本文以委托代理模型为起点,分析金融机构经营信息已知和未知两种状态下监管机构和金融机构各自的效用函数,通过引入监管制度和代理人风险偏好变量分析其对机会主义行为的影响。研究发现：信息状态转变会引起监管契约从强制型契约向合作关系型契约转变,机会主义表现形式也随之变化;不对称信息下绩效挂钩的监管收入激励模式会同时增加监管者和金融机构代理人的机会主义倾向;信息结构变化要求监管制度也应发生变化才能适应监管有效性要求。     

Outsourcing of peripheral services: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing plant-level data

In this paper we empirically explore outsourcing decisions of peripheral services using information from a data set of 926 Spanish manufacturing plants. We find that increases in outsourcing of peripheral services are positively correlated with increases in the plant׳s market share as well as increases in product market competition and product prices. These findings are robust to controlling for whether plants belong to single-plant or multi-plant firms. These patterns are consistent with a strategic shift in the allocation of attention to core manufacturing activities, and are at odds with traditional TCE and PRT theories of vertical integration.     

Market games with asymmetric information: the core

This paper concerns cores of economies with asymmetric information. Alternative definitions of the information available to traders in coalitions and the cooperative games they generate are analyzed. An important technical result states that such NTU games in characteristic function form are well defined. Properties of various cores with asymmetric information are examined. Sufficient conditions on information sharing rules are provided for the induced games to be totally balanced or balanced, so that their cores are nonempty. Incentive compatibility issues are considered. Finally, a perspective on this research area is provided.     

Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

We construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. The essential behavioral forces involved in these auctions are: (1) A demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have when synergies are relatively inconsequential, and (2) Bidding above stand-alone values in order to capture significant complementarities between units. The latter creates a potential “exposure problem,” as bidders may win only parts of a package and earn negative profits. Bidding outcomes are closer to equilibrium in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions. However, there are substantial and systematic deviations from equilibrium, with patterns of out-of-equilibrium play differing systematically between the two auction formats. These patterns of out-of-equilibrium play are analyzed, along with their effects on revenue and efficiency.     

PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION IN THE FACE OF A MEANS‐TESTED PUBLIC PENSION

We investigate whether households adjust their asset portfolios just prior to retirement in ways that are consistent with maximizing eligibility for a means‐tested public pension. We utilize detailed micro data for a nationally‐representative sample of Australian households to estimate a system of asset equations which are constrained to add up to net worth. Our results provide little evidence that healthy households or couples are responding to the incentives embedded in the means tests determining pension eligibility by reallocating assets. While there are some differences in asset portfolios associated with having an income near the income threshold, being of pensionable age, and being in poor health, these differences are often only marginally significant and are not clearly consistent with the incentives inherent in the Australian age pension eligibility rules. Any behavioral response to the incentives inherent in the age‐pension means test appears to be predominately concentrated among single pensioners who are in poor health.     

Foreign aid preferences and perceptions in donor countries

We present original survey data on preferences for foreign aid in 24 donor countries from 2005 to 2008. On publicly-funded foreign aid (Official Development Assistance, or ODA), we find patterns that are consistent with a standard model of democratic policy formation, in which donations are treated as a pure public good. Controlling for perceptions of current ODA, we show that individual preferences for ODA are (i) negatively correlated with relative income within a country-year; and (ii) positively correlated with inequality at the country level. We extend the analysis to explain variation in the gap between desired aid and actual ODA, arguing that lobbying by high-income special interest groups can divert resources away from the median voter’s preferred level of aid. Consistent with this, we observe that ODA is significantly lower where policymakers are more susceptible to lobbying. Finally, we present a novel test of competing “crowding out” hypotheses. Self-reported private aid donations are negatively correlated with actual ODA, and positively correlated with perceived ODA. This finding is consistent with an emerging argument in the literature, whereby ODA crowds out private aid by enabling charities to forego fundraising activities and crowds in private aid through a signaling channel.