信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资

各种形式的非正规金融在发展中国家和地区广泛存在。本文认为,由于中小企业信息不透明,且常常不能提供充分的担保或抵押,正规金融机构难以有效克服信息不对称造成的逆向选择问题,而非正规金融则在收集关于中小企业的“软信息”方面具有优势。这种信息优势是非正规金融广泛存在的根本性原因,金融抑制只是一个强化因素,同时非正规金融市场的各种特征也都源于其存在的根本逻辑。本文构建了一个包括异质的中小企业借款者和异质的贷款者(具有不同信息结构的非正规金融和正规金融部门)的金融市场模型,证明非正规金融的存在能够改进整个信贷市场的资金配置效率。     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

Information, Informal Finance, and SME Financing

Informal finance exists extensively and has been playing an important role in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing in developing economies. This paper tries to rationalize the extensiveness of informal finance. SME financing suffers more serious information asymmetry to the extent that most SMEs are more opaque and can only provide less collateral. Informal lenders have an advantage over formal financial institutions in collecting “soft information” about SME borrowers. This paper establishes a model including formal and informal lenders and high- and low-risk borrowers with or without sufficient collateral and shows that the credit market in which informal finance is eliminated will allocate funds in some inefficient way, and the efficiency of allocating credit funds can be improved once informal finance is allowed to coexist with formal finance. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 7 (in Chinese)     

我国农村正规金融与非正规金融效率分析

高效率的金融制度对经济发展提供强有力的资金支持,可以提高经济的总体竞争力,促进经济增长。对农村信用社、农业银行、农业发展银行和邮政储蓄银行等正规金融机构和村镇银行、小额贷款公司等非正规金融组织的效率进行调查,从资金配置效率、适应性效率和运行效率方面进行分析,结果显示：正规金融制度的效率偏低,非正规金融组织的效率偏高;两种金融制度的效率有各自的空间,在规模和范围较小时,非正规金融制度效率更高,而超出一定的发展范围和规模,正规金融制度的优越性则进一步凸显。     

Access to capital in rural Thailand: An estimated model of formal vs. informal credit

This paper analyzes the mechanism underlying access to credit, focusing on two important aspects of rural credit markets. First, moneylenders and other informal lenders coexist with formal lending institutions such as government or commercial banks, and, more recently, micro-lending institutions. Second, potential borrowers presumably face sizable transaction costs in obtaining external credit. We develop and estimate a model based on limited enforcement and transaction costs that provides a unified view of these facts. Based on data from Thailand, the results show that the limited ability of banks to enforce contracts, more than transaction costs, is crucial in understanding the observed diversity of lenders.     

县域视角下的贫困、金融发展与经济增长*——基于系统GMM方法的再检验

本文以内生区域金融发展理论为基础构建动态面板模型,同时引入贫困因素进一步识别区域金融与经济的非线性关系,将实证对象细化到县域层面,运用系统GMM方法检验贫困与非贫困县域金融对经济增长影响的差异。本文研究发现,信贷层面上的金融发展对经济增长的推动效应普遍存在,而储蓄层面金融发展的效应则存在地区差异,非贫困县的储蓄与经济无关,贫困县的储蓄与经济增长负相关。因此本文指出,区域信贷配给和区域信贷创造理论更适于解释贫困地区的金融发展问题,贫困县域储蓄的负效应是本地储蓄外流和转化效率低下的结果,与我国银行业跨     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

THE TREATMENT OF INTEREST AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF AUSTRALIA

This paper is divided into two main sections. The first part summarises briefly the main points which have arisen in the lengthy debate over the treatment of banking intermediaries in the national accounts. The discussion emphasises the method adopted in the early Australian accounts when banks were treated in the same way as the general government. It is argued that this method is simpler and provides a more realistic account of the functions of banks than the current SNA proposal.
The second part of the paper examines the functions of banks in Australia. It uses data of interest and administration cost for separate banking institutions to examine the incidence of bank costs. It is concluded that the costs do not fall on borrowers or lenders but are a charge in providing a communal service in the establishment and maintenance of the financial system.     

Systemic Characteristics of Financial Instability

I describe how in the new paradigm of a Competitive, Efficient, and Frictionless Economy (CEFE), introduced in Falahati (2019), macroeconomic imbalances with fluctuating levels of liquidity emerge endogenously. This provides a solid foundation for studying Minsky’s views on financial instability in an economy with a banking and risk-underwriting system. I identify an inverse relationship between liquidity premia and risk premia, which leads to endogenous risk-premium rating cycles, including credit-risk-premium rating cycles, and macroeconomic swings. Ceteris paribus, lower liquidity increases the prices of contracts covering risks (e.g., credit default swaps), whist it decreases prices of all other assets. The opposite occurs with higher liquidity. I analyze operations of banks, risk-underwriters, and the State/Central Bank, and present a new theory of banking which improves current understandings. This theory explains how a banking system uses the floating capital of the economy more efficiently, while it also generates greater systemic risks, compared to an economy without banks. I show how the banking system can induce macroeconomic booms and busts and generate endogenous asset price bubbles and bursts. I highlight other systemic problems of the economy and derive their implications for improving the financial management of the economy and its institutions.     

金融腐败:非规范融资行为的交易特征和体制动因

本文以改革进程中的非规范融资交易为研究对象 ,通过银行 -借款企业动态博弈和经验研究 ,归纳如下主要结论 :第一 ,在金融交易中 ,金融机构的腐败体现为利用资金配置权进行的两类寻租行为 ;第二 ,银行的寻租程度取决于改革进程中中央银行和财政对银行的转移支付和内控制度建设的相对力度比较 ,因而遏制融资腐败的方法是严格转移支付纪律 ,加强内控制度 ;第三 ,企业借款行为是在自筹资金和银行借款间进行的相对成本比较 ,企业被动选择行贿 (交租 ) ,因而其真实融资成本远远高于名义法定金融机构贷款利率 ;第四 ,由于存在转移支付机制 ,企业与银行的非规范金融交易的实质是对中央银行和财政转移支付的分割 ;第五 ,根据以上结论 ,民间借贷与正规金融价格实际是均衡的 ,不能简单定义民间借贷是高利贷 ,如果如此定义 ,则正规金融也同样具备高利贷特征。     

SOME ESTIMATES OF TRADE FLOWS IN BANKING SERVICES

This paper presents some estimates of international trade in banking services. We use IMF data on assets and liabilities of both domestic banks and non-banks with foreign banks, and of foreigners with the domestic banking system to construct measures of the volume of transactions on which banking intermediation services are provided across national borders. We then use estimates of the spread between borrowing and lending rates for depositors and borrowers with the financial institutions involved to estimate the value of international flows of intermediation services. Estimates are presented for 1982–84 and 1991–93 for the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.     

A DSGE model of banks and financial intermediation with default risk

This paper takes the view that a major contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008 was a failure to correctly assess and price the risk of default. In order to analyse default risk in the macroeconomy, a simple general equilibrium model with banks and financial intermediation is constructed in which default-risk can be priced. It is shown how the credit spread can be attributed largely to the risk of default and how excess loan creation may emerge due to different attitudes to risk by borrowers and lenders. The model can also be used to analyse systemic risk due to macroeconomic shocks which may be reduced by holding collateral.     

Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.     

Moving toward risk-based deposit insurance premiums in the European Union: the case of Spain

This article provides a scenario-based analysis of how the European Union proposal for a new funding model for deposit insurance systems (DISs) would affect the Spanish banking sector. We examine the risk profiles of commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives over the period 2007 to 2011 and compare the contributions to the deposit insurance fund (DIF) under the current flat-rate regime with those that would have occurred under the new risk-sensitive system. We find that a risk-based scheme could provide an incentive for sound management by reducing the premiums for credit institutions with better risk profiles. We also conclude that the proposed reform may help to mitigate the moral hazard associated with larger credit institutions.     

Natural or unnatural selection? The end of lending relationships for small businesses

We investigate the situation where small business borrowers and banks end their lending relationships. If credit allocation is efficient, banks terminate their relationships with risky borrowers. Alternatively, small business borrowers are more likely to end their relationships when they have poor investment opportunities and do not require borrowed funds. However, if the soft budget constraints of banks or credit crunches are a significant problem, banks are likely to continue their relationships with risky firms or end their relationships with nonrisky firms, which is representative of an unnatural credit allocation. Using Japanese firm-level data, we show empirically that these relationships end naturally, with natural credit allocation supported even during the recent global financial crisis.     

银行业结构对中小企业融资的影响*

本文结合世界银行关于中国中小企业的调查数据和中国银监会发布的银行业分布数据,分析了银行业结构与中小企业融资的关系。本文发现：银行业结构与中小企业受到信贷配给的概率呈现“U型”关系,即存在最优水平的银行业集中度使中小企业受到信贷约束的概率最低。根据本文研究,我国银行业集中度总体上高于最优水平,但不同地区又有所差异。本文还发现,考察银行业集中度不能只关注国有大型商业银行比重的下降,大型股份制商业银行比重的替代性上升也没有有效解决中小企业融资难的问题。因此,鼓励发展中小金融机构,才是支持中小企业融资的有效途径。     

Strategic interaction in undeveloped credit markets

This paper studies the strategic interaction between informal and formal lenders in undeveloped credit markets. In a model with adverse selection, loan seniority, market power, and differences in the cost of lending, it is shown that under general conditions a co-funding equilibrium will be a Nash outcome of the game. We demonstrate that a collateral requirement in connection with formal loans always generates a new co-funding equilibrium in which both lenders earn higher profits. A government subsidy to the formal lender may have the opposite effect. We relate our results to existing empirical evidence and the emerging discussion of how to best ensure financial viability and outreach of microfinance institutions.     

SOME NEW EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN PAYDAY LENDING MARKETS

A critical question in the policy debate about payday lending is whether other financial institutions can plausibly provide attractive and lower‐priced substitutes for standard payday loans. I present several new pieces of evidence addressing the question, focusing on whether credit unions, which are often held as the strongest potential competitors to payday lenders, do (or might) viably compete in the payday loan market. National payday loan offerings by credit unions show that very few credit unions currently offer payday loans. Credit union industry reports suggest that those credit unions offering such loans seem unwilling or unable to undercut substantially the prevailing prices set by payday lenders. Those industry reports also reveal that lower‐priced credit union loans generally ration riskier borrowers out of the market by imposing greater restrictions on approval and repayment; risk‐adjusted prices for credit union payday loans may not be lower at all. Survey evidence suggests that most current payday borrowers prefer higher‐priced but less restrictive standard payday loans to lower‐priced but more restrictive alternatives offered by credit unions. The combined demand‐ and supply‐side evidence suggests that one should not expect credit unions (or by extension banks) to offer lower‐priced, higher‐quality alternatives for consumers who currently use payday loans. (JEL G2, L0, L5)     

Study on the measurement of China’s financial intermediation ratio in terms of stock: 1992–2006

In terms of China’s financial intermediation ratio (FIMR) in stock, we make a thorough empirical study on the change of the ratios during 1992–2006. We find that: The monopoly position of bank credit in the financing channel of non-financial sector is weakened, but bank credit is still the most important financing channel for non-financial sector. There is a structure change in the financing channel of government sector and its FIMR is increasing. Though the scale of non-banking financial institutions underwent rapid development during 1992–2006, their role in social financing cannot be evenly matched with banking system. It is the change of various economy behaviors that induce the changes of FIMR in China.