共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Graciela Chichilnisky 《Economic Theory》2012,49(2):293-307
Market objectives can conflict with long-term goals. Behind the conflict is the impatience axiom introduced by T. Koopmans to describe choices over time. The conflict is resolved here by introducing a new concept,
sustainable markets. These differ from Arrow-Debreu markets in that traders have sustainable preferences and no bounds on short sales. Sustainable preferences are sensitive to the basic needs of the present without sacrificing
the needs of future generations and embody the essence of sustainable development (Chichilnisky in Soc Choice Welf 13(2):231–257,
1996a; Res Energy Econ 73(4):467–491, 1996b). Theorems 1 and 2 show that limited arbitrage is a necessary and sufficient condition describing diversity and ensuring the existence of a sustainable market equilibrium
where the invisible hand delivers sustainable as well as efficient solutions (Chichilnisky in Econ Theory 95:79–108, 1995; Chichilnisky and Heal in Econ Theory 12:163–176, 1998). In sustainable markets prices have a new role: they reflect both the value of instantaneous consumption and the value of
the long-run future. The latter are connected to the independence of the axiom of choice at the foundations of mathematics
(Godel 1940). 相似文献
2.
Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic
shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result
is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett
61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient. 相似文献
3.
Gianluigi Guido M. Irene Prete Alessandro M. Peluso R. Christian Maloumby-Baka Carolina Buffa 《International Review of Economics》2010,57(1):79-102
The aim of the present study is to examine the role of ethical dimensions and product personality in the purchasing intention
of organic food products. The Prospect method (Caprara et al. in Test Psicomet Metodol 7(3–4):113–128, 2000), which integrates the Five factors model of personality (cf. Digman in Annu Rev Psychol 41(1):417–440, 1990) and the Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process, 50(2):179–211, 1991) extended to an ethical dimension, was employed, by using a Structural Equation Modeling approach. Results showed that moral norms—i.e., personal beliefs regarding what is right or wrong (Parker et al. in Br J Soc Psychol, 34(2):127–137, 1995)—can be considered the main motivator of purchasing intention, and they are, in turn, affected by subjective norms and product personality traits of Naturalness and Authenticity. Marketing implications for firms operating in the organic food industry are discussed, in their intent to shift from a “niche”
market to a broader diffusion of these products. 相似文献
4.
Andrew T. Young 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2011,24(1):19-28
Murphy et al. (2009) criticize Young’s (2005) test of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) using US industry-level quarterly job reallocation data and the federal funds
rate as a monetary policy indicator. I argue that not only are Murphy et al.’s specific criticisms misguided; more importantly,
they all but completely rule out the type of empirical study that Young (2005) advocates: specifically, one that (1) is quantitative and distinguishes between statistical and economic significance and
(2) attempts to exploit a hypothesis that is both a prediction of ABCT and not a prediction of competing monetary theories of the cycle. I argue that empirical studies embodying (1) and (2) are critical
to ABCT as a research program. Furthermore, I review the existing econometric studies of ABCT from the last 10 years and conclude
that there is much room for improvement along these lines. 相似文献
5.
Truncated distributions commonly arise in economics and related areas, see, for example, Lee (Econ Lett 3:165–169, 1979), Lien (Econ Lett 19:243–247, 1985; Econ Lett 20:45–47, 1986), Burdett (Econ Lett 52:263–267, 1996), Sercu (Insur: Math and Econ 20:79–95, 1997), Abadir and Magdalinos (Econom Theory 18:1276–1287, 2002), and Horrace (J Econom 126:335–354, 2005). In this note, we consider the most commonly encountered truncated distributions with heavy tails: the truncated t distribution and the truncated F distribution. For each of these distributions, we derive explicit expressions for the moments and estimation procedures by
the method of moments and the method of maximum likelihood. An application is illustrated to a popular data set in the econometric
literature.
相似文献
6.
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are linear in every rank-ordered subset of Rn+ . Such functions, the so-called Choquet integrals, have been widely used in the theories of collective and individual choice. We refer to bargaining solutions that can be rationalized by Choquet integrals as Choquet bargaining solutions. Our main result is a complete characterization of Choquet bargaining solutions. As a corollary of our main result, we also obtain a characterization of the generalized Gini bargaining solutions introduced by Blackorby et al. (1994, Econometrica62, 1161–1178). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, C78. 相似文献
7.
Arijit Mukherjee 《Journal of Economics》2012,106(1):75-82
The paper by Ghosh and Saha (Econ Theory 30:575–586, 2007) shows that entry can be socially excessive even if there are no scale economies. We show that exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for this result. In a simple model with R&D investment by the more cost efficient firm, thus creating endogenous cost asymmetry, we show that entry is socially insufficient instead of excessive if the slope of the marginal cost of R&D is not very high. 相似文献
8.
Paresh Kumar Narayan 《International Advances in Economic Research》2008,14(3):280-290
In this paper we analyze per capita incomes of the G7 countries using the common cycles test developed by Vahid and Engle
(Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8:341–360, 1993) and extended by Hecq et al. (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62:511–532, 2000; Econometric Reviews, 21:273–307, 2002) and the common trend test developed by Johansen (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12:231–254, 1988). Our main contribution is that we impose the common cycle and common trend restrictions in decomposing the innovations into
permanent and transitory components. Our main finding is permanent shocks explain the bulk of the variations in incomes for
the G7 countries over short time horizons, and is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the recent literature. We attribute this
to the greater forecasting accuracy achieved, which we later confirm through performing a post sample forecasting exercise,
from the variance decomposition analysis.
相似文献
Paresh Kumar NarayanEmail: |
9.
We provide a computable algorithm to calculate uniform ε-optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our approach can be used to construct algorithms that calculate
uniform ε-equilibria and uniform correlated ε-equilibria in various classes of multi-player non-zero-sum stochastic games. 相似文献
10.
Siegfried K. Berninghaus Karl-Martin Ehrhart Marion Ott Bodo Vogt 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2007,17(3):317-347
It is the main aim of our paper to study network formation in experimental setups in discrete and continuous time. Our design
is inspired by the theoretical model on network formation by Bala and Goyal (Econometrica, 68(5): 1181–1229, 2000) as well as the experiments by Callander and Plott (J. Public Econ., 89: 1469–1495, 2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (IEW Working Paper, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, No. 146, 2003). In particular, we analyze the role of star-shaped networks which are strict Nash-equilibria of the corresponding network
formation game. Our experimental results show that strict Nash networks prove to be a good indicator for predicting network
formation, particularly in continuous time. In explaining our results, it turns out that, among others, the complexity in
coordinating on stars, the inequity aversion against unequal payoff distribution in the network, and the groups’ degrees of
activity are the most important determinants for the formation of strict Nash networks.
相似文献
11.
In their recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Bagus and Howden (2010) present “quibbles” with fractional-reserve free banking. Specifically, they raise what they call “unaddressed issues” in
this system, with a particular emphasis on Selgin (1988). We deem their arguments to be more substantial than “quibbles” and see them as part of a longstanding debate about fundamental
aspects of monetary theory. We respond to their objections and attempt to specify how debate between the two sides might proceed
more productively. 相似文献
12.
13.
George C. Bitros 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2008,21(4):301-328
This paper centers on the structure of capital and the useful lives of its components by considering an economy with two representative
firms, one producing a necessity and another producing a luxury. This difference determines their reinvestment opportunities.
Therefore, while the one applies replacement, the other adopts scrapping. However, as these capital policies lead to different
service lives, the analysis confronts the issues raised by Miller (Review of Income and Wealth 29:284–296, 1982, Review of Income and Wealth 36:67–82, 1990) and deals with them by drawing on Haavelmo’s (A study in the theory of investment, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960) suggestions regarding the aggregation of capital. Among other findings, it turns out that the simulation results are highly
robust, thus demonstrating that real-world implications may be even stronger than strictly suggested by the model.
相似文献
George C. BitrosEmail: |
14.
Jason Allen James Chapman Federico Echenique Matthew Shum 《International Economic Review》2016,57(2):691-716
Using detailed transactions‐level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no‐arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers. 相似文献
15.
Gerald H. Lander 《International Advances in Economic Research》2006,12(4):475-490
I investigate the mean reversion tendency of small growth stocks. Using a carefully articulated research design employing established and empirically tested principles, my findings should support or refute the anecdotal evidence that small growth stocks make superior investments. The primary motivation for the study springs from the documented differential preference among investors for value and growth stocks. Despite evidence that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks, investors retain strong interest in growth stocks. Yet in examining the performance of Business Week’s (BW), smaller capitalization companies (called “Hot Growth Companies”) with respect to the overall financial market, Bauman et al. [2002] found positive excess returns in the pre-publication period but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. A limitation of their study is that their analyses relied on only three criteria: sales, BW rank and return on capital, which do not represent completely a firm’s financial health. I replicate Bauman et al.’s study but use a more robust and representative variable set to test the mean reversal hypothesis — Forbes’ financial criteria — and I focus on six variables. In the current study, I look at 4,200 companies listed in Forbes from 1980 to 2000. The results of the expanded study substantiate Bauman et al.’s [2002] study showing that there are positive excess returns in the pre-publication period, but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. An expanded future study will look at five additional variables to see if they make a significant difference on the effects of the returns of small growth stocks. 相似文献
16.
This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired
by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also
a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold
with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium
is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition
for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz
(Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions
about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition. 相似文献
17.
Roberta Patalano 《Constitutional Political Economy》2007,18(4):223-241
Since the contributions by D. North [(1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: CUP] and his Nobel Prize lecture [(1994). Economic performance through time, Nobel Prize Lecture. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 359–368], the relationship between mind and institutions has been increasingly investigated by economists. Mantzavinos,
North, and Shariq [(2004). Learning, institutions, and economic performance. Perspectives on Politics, 2(1), 75–84] introduced the expression cognitive institutionalism in order to define this stream of research. In the first part of the paper we discuss some recent findings of the cognitive
approach to institutions and its roots in the history of economic ideas. We also claim that in such an approach, no place
has yet been found for a crucial faculty of the human mind, imagination. We then explore the concept of radical imaginary developed by Cornelius Castoriadis in his book The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975; 1987). From the perspective of cognitive economics, and on the grounds of Castoriadis’ legacy, we aim at highlighting
some basic mechanisms of interaction between imagination, affectivity and institutions.
相似文献
Roberta PatalanoEmail: |
18.
The process aimed at discovering new ideas is an economic activity the returns from which are intrinsically uncertain. We
extend the neo-Schumpeterian growth framework to investigate the role of strong uncertainty in the innovative process. In particular, we postulate that, when deciding upon R&D efforts, investors hold ‘ambiguous
beliefs’ about the exact probability of arrival of the next vertical innovation, and that they face ambiguity via the α −MEU decision rule (Ghirardato et al., J Econ Theory 118:133–173, 2004). Along the balanced growth path, the higher the agent’s ambiguity aversion (α), the lower the R&D efforts and the economic performance. Consistent with cross-country empirical evidence, this causal mechanism
suggests that, together with the profitability conditions of the economy, different ‘cultural’ attitudes towards ambiguity
may help explain the different R&D efforts observed across countries. 相似文献
19.
This paper examines data from the Norwegian television game show Joker, where contestants make well-specified choices under risk. The game involves very large stakes, randomly drawn contestants,
and ample opportunities for learning. Central models of risk choice, including expected utility theory, give a simple prediction
of choice under weak conditions, as one decision is always first-order stochastically dominating. We document frequent, systematic
and costly violations of dominance. Many contestants appear to have a systematic expectation bias that can be related to Tversky
and Kahneman’s (Cogn. Psychol. 5(2):207–232, 1973) “availability heuristic”. In addition, contestants seem to make systematic calculation errors that are well captured by
the so-called Fechner model. 相似文献
20.
Louis Lévy-Garboua Hela Maafi David Masclet Antoine Terracol 《Experimental Economics》2012,15(1):128-144
We present a new experimental evidence of how framing affects decisions in the context of a lottery choice experiment for
measuring risk aversion. We investigate framing effects by replicating the Holt and Laury’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 92:1644–1655,
2002) procedure for measuring risk aversion under various frames. We first examine treatments where participants are confronted
with the 10 decisions to be made either simultaneously or sequentially. The second treatment variable is the order of appearance of the ten lottery pairs. Probabilities of winning are ranked either
in increasing, decreasing, or in random order. Lastly, payoffs were increased by a factor of ten in additional treatments. The rate of inconsistencies was significantly
higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in increasing and random than in decreasing treatment. Both experience
and salient incentives induce a dramatic decrease in inconsistent behaviors. On the other hand, risk aversion was significantly
higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in decreasing and random than in increasing treatment, in high than in
low payoff condition. These findings suggest that subjects use available information which has no value for normative theories,
like throwing a glance at the whole connected set of pairwise choices before making each decision in a connected set of lottery
pairs. 相似文献