The economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement

This study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies. Policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention, an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement, and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions. Analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self‐interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient. The analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies, the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income, the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers, the socially optimal income redistribution, and the social welfare from intervention.     

No‐take marine reserves and illegal fishing under imperfect enforcement

No‐take marine reserves have been increasingly advocated as an effective means of supporting marine ecosystems and conserving fisheries resources. A major problem that can hinder the effectiveness of no‐take reserves is the incidence of illegal fishing, which has created significant ecological and economic losses in global fisheries. We construct a bioeconomic model to explore the connection between the effects of no‐take reserves and illegal fishing activities in relation to the level of regulatory control of illegal activities in the reserve and fished areas. Our parameterised model shows that the effects of no‐take reserves on both the extent of illegal fishing and the fish biomass critically depend on illegal fishing regulations and the scale and patterns of fish dispersal. In a fishery where illegal fishing can only be partially controlled, increasing the size of the no‐take reserve may result in a lose‐lose situation in which the level of illegal fishing effort increases and the total biomass decreases. Our results further show that when the pattern of fish dispersal is density dependent, imposing a stricter control on illegal fishing in either reserves or fished areas increases the aggregate level of illegal fishing.     

The welfare implications of Brazil's coffee export price subsidies during the ICA

To increase coffee export revenues during the International Coffee Agreement, Brazil provided selected purchasers with export rebates that could be used to pay for future coffee purchases. This subsidy mutated and grew over time, encouraged by rent seeking. The subsidy had huge cost to the Brazilian Treasury, $9.8 billion in constant 1982 US dollars, or about 13% of coffee export revenues. As exports were usually quota‐constrained, the subsidy increased Brazil's international coffee price, particularly during 1980–1986, absolutely and relative to its competitors’ prices. The unexpected variation in Brazil's price also caused the New York Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange to terminate trading in Brazilian coffee futures, making it more costly to hedge Brazilian coffee until today. The econometric evidence is mixed, but it seems likely the subsidy reduced Brazil's net economic welfare and redistributed income from the Treasury to foreign roasters, domestic exporters, and government bureaucrats.     

Optimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism

In this paper we study the optimal conversion policy set by a society composed of a sequence of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations. We show that society can be equivalently viewed as a sequence of hyperbolic discounting agents. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution to an intergenerational non-cooperative dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible conversion. We show that under both naive and sophisticated beliefs about future time-inconsistency, the option value attached to the conversion decision is eroded and earlier conversion occurs. This determines a drastic bias toward the current generation gratification, which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from deforestation.     

Efficiency, subsidies, and environmental adaptation of animal farming under CAP

The purpose of this article is to model the interaction between the targets of the current Comman Agriculture Politic (CAP): environmental adaptation, subsidies, and efficiency of animal farming. To this end we first have to identify the production frontier and relative efficiency level for each animal‐oriented farm in the sample. The production frontier and efficiency index for each type of farm (assuming no specific production functions) are identified using Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) techniques. We then address the relationship between relative efficiency, farm size, and environmentally friendly behavior by carrying out a nonparametric regression of efficiency, on economic size, a proxy for the degree of environmental appropriateness, and regional dummies. Calculations of the efficiency of the farms including direct subsidies are compared with the counterfactual exercise in the case in which direct subsidies are not considered. Finally, we look for relations between subsidies and factors such as farm size, efficiency, and environmentally friendly behavior. One key result shows that, on average direct payments generally tend to increase efficiency. However, in most of the cases the mean efficiency decreases as the percentage of direct payments rises. Direct payments are found to be positively related to environmentally friendly production, at least in Germany. However, in general, the direct payment system is not sufficient to offset the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms as well as the larger farms are more efficient.     

渔业补贴的类型及演变

渔业补贴被认为是引发过渡捕捞、扭曲国际贸易的重要因素,日益引起关注。本文概述了渔业补贴的基本类型,包括政府对行业的直接支付、税收减免和延期、政府贷款及贷款担保和保险、对行业的隐性支付或隐性收费、对渔业有影响的一般性政策或计划,并分析了各类补贴的性质和作用。通过简述美国、加拿大、挪威、冰岛等国渔业补贴政策演变历史,说明了渔业补贴问题的复杂性。     

Analysis of a supply-control program under uncertainty and imperfect competition: Chinese cabbage in Taiwan

Researchers have often attributed the farm–wholesale price spread, after adjusting for marketing costs, as compensation for marketing firms' risk bearing. However, price spreads in excess of marketing costs can also be due to marketing firms' exercise of market power. In settings where both imperfect competition and marketer risk aversion are plausible, a modeling framework must be sufficiently general to accommodate both types of behavior. This article develops and estimates such a model in the context of fresh produce marketing and develops the implications for analysis of supply‐control programs. The model is applied to the production and marketing of Chinese cabbage in Taiwan and specifically to the analysis of supply‐control programs implemented in this industry by the Taiwanese government. The empirical results provide little support for the hypothesis that marketing firms exhibit risk averse behavior, but they do show that marketing firms exercise oligopsony power in procurement of the product from farmers, and that this power is positively related to the quantity supplied in each market period. This provides a heretofore unexplored impetus for supply controls intended to raise producer incomes. However, such controls are also rendered less effective by imperfect competition because marketing firms capture part of the benefits from supply reduction.     

The effects of direct storage subsidies under limited rationality: a general equilibrium analysis

We study here the effects of a public subsidy to private storage set up at world level. To simulate the welfare effects and impacts on market fluctuations of this subsidy, we use a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model assuming imperfect expectations. We also perform different statistical analysis based on our CGE results and show that the storage subsidy can have the undesired effect of destabilizing agricultural markets, depending on the form of economic agents’ price expectations and on the structure of the shocks impacting the agricultural production.     

The Economics of Decoupled Farm Payments under Costly and Imperfect Enforcement

This paper builds on the literature covering agricultural policy analysis under costly and imperfect enforcement by introducing enforcement costs and misrepresentation into the economic analysis of decoupled farm payments. Specifically, the paper examines the economic causes and consequences of cheating on a stylized decoupled area payment scheme. Policy design and implementation is modeled as a sequential game between a regulator who designs the policy, an agency responsible for policy enforcement, and farmers. Analytical results show that complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient when enforcement is costly. The introduction of enforcement costs and cheating changes the welfare effects and transfer efficiency of decoupled area payments, the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to producers, the socially optimal income redistribution, and the social welfare from intervention. While the transfer efficiency of the policy is positively related to the extent of farmer misrepresentation, the incorporation of enforcement costs and cheating results in decoupled payments being generally a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that decoupled payments remain superior to coupled subsidies as a means of farm income support. Les auteurs ajoutent à ce qui s'est déjàécrit sur l'analyse des politiques agricoles dans le contexte d'une application imparfaite et onéreuse en intégrant à l'analyse du découplage des paiements agricoles le coût d'une exécution forcée et des fausses déclarations. Plus précisément, l'article examine les causes et les répercussions économiques de la fraude dans le cadre d'un programme stylisé de découplage régional des paiements. l'élaboration et l'application des politiques ont été modélisées comme un jeu séquentiel entre l'organisme de réglementation, qui échafaude la politique, l'organisme chargé d'appliquer cette dernière et les agriculteurs. Les résultats indiquent que combattre la fraude n'est pas économique quand une application forcée de la politique est onéreuse. L'introduction des coûts d'exécution et de la fraude entraîne une modification de l'incidence du programme sur le bien‐être social et de l'efficacité du transfert des paiements découplés aux régions, du degré d'intervention du gouvernement débouchant sur la réalisation d'un certain excédent par les producteurs, de la redistribution socialement optimale des revenus et du bien‐être résultant de l'intervention. Bien que l'efficacité de transfert de la politique présente une corrélation positive avec l'importance des fausses déclarations faites par les producteurs, l'intégration du coût d'une application forcée et de la fraude indique que le découplage des paiements n'est pas aussi efficace qu'on le croyait pour ce qui est de redistribuer les revenus. Malgré cela, l'analyse révèle que le découplage assure un meilleur soutien du revenu que le couplage des subventions.     

Agrobiodiversity conservation under an imperfect seed system:the role of Community Seed Banking schemes

The study is an empirical investigation of agrobiodiversity conservation decisions of small farmers in the central highlands of Ethiopia. The primary objective is to measure the effectiveness of Community Seed Banking (CSB) in enhancing diversity while providing productivity incentives. Our results indicate a significant impact of participation in CSB on farm‐level agrobiodiversity. However, the level of biodiversity conservation was not found to have the expected reinforcing impact on participation, indicating no support for simultaneity. CSB participation also led to an increase in productivity, consistent with a need for such incentives in order to enhance diversity at a farm level. Our assessment of the performance of the GLS estimator yielded a significant discrepancy between the GLS and bootstrap estimates. This led to the conclusion that bootstrapping asymptotic estimations might be required for appropriate inference.     

Effects of subsidies in Russian dairy farming

This study develops a microeconometric model of specialized dairy farms in the Moscow region using panel data over the period 1995–2001. The model is used to analyze the role of subsidies on profit as well as input and output allocation. Theoretical conditions for short‐term profit maximization are not rejected by the data. Differences between farms allow for a fixed‐effect specification. The dairy producers in the region demonstrate a low responsiveness to market signals, but technology change becomes important. Labor, land, and livestock had low shadow prices. Although subsidies have a distorting effect on the input–output mix, this study shows they relieve the credit constraints on dairy farms and have an important positive influence on farm profit.     

渔业补贴评估方法探析

近年来,渔业补贴问题一直是国际论坛争议的焦点之一。各相关国际组织、相关学者以及主要渔业国对渔业补贴都做了不同领域的研究。其中,就渔业补贴的评估,一些国际组织也提出了不同的定量分析方法。本文探讨了经济合作发展组织以及世界粮农组织提出的两种渔业补贴评估法,以便我国在定量分析考察渔业补贴效果时加以参考。     

休闲渔业分类补贴机制研究

休闲渔业的发展需要建立分类补贴的补贴机制。补贴原则上,要突出重点,控制总量;注重公平,遵循市场规律;讲究效益,科学发展;因地制宜,合理布局。补贴类型上,要区分整体类补贴和个别类补贴的差异,按照不同的类别建立相应的补贴流程。补贴手段上,要运用好长期补贴与短期补贴、一次性补贴与分阶段补贴等方式。分类补贴机制建立和实施将遇到诸多困难,为提供工作效率,应该实行规范化操作、控制实施分类补贴的成本、完善监督和信息公开机制。     

南京财经大学粮食经济研究所简介

一，机构性质 粮食经济研究所是原商业部于1988年4月特批成立的专门研究机构（部发（88）教字第七号），是我国高等院校中唯一一家以国内外粮食经济理论、政策与实践为其研究、咨询和培训为对象的经济研究所。专兼职人员30人，其中正副教授（研究员）21人，主要由南京财经大学经济管理领域的专兼职教学科研人员组成。     

Fertilizer subsidies and food self‐sufficiency in Indonesia

Indonesia is a net importer of almost all of its staple foods. National self‐sufficiency in food, especially the main staple, rice, is a core objective of economic policy. Poverty reduction is also a core policy objective. Since the 1970s, Indonesia has used agricultural input subsidies, especially on fertilizer, to stimulate agricultural production, largely in pursuit of the goal of rice self‐sufficiency. More recently, it has also used output protection, especially in rice, for the same purpose. This article utilizes a multisectoral, multihousehold general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy to study the trade‐offs between the goals of self‐sufficiency and poverty reduction when two alternative means are used to achieve them: a fertilizer subsidy, on the one hand, and output protection, on the other. It does this by analyzing the aggregate and distributional effects of these two sets of policies and by comparing their effects with nonintervention. The analysis shows that, in terms of its effects on poverty, a fertilizer subsidy can be a more effective instrument for achieving the goal of rice self‐sufficiency than final product import restrictions.     

政府补助对企业研发投入与成长的调节作用

基于中国水资源企业2012—2020年的微观数据,对企业研发投入与企业成长的关系进行实证分析。为消除企业研发投入中存在的内生性问题以及跨期影响等特点,采用系统广义矩估计法(SYS-GMM)对政府研发补助、研发投入与企业成长之间关系进行了实证分析。结果表明:水资源企业成长与企业研发投入之间呈U形曲线关系;政府研发补助对企业研发投入和企业成长两者间的关系具有调节作用,使两者呈现出的U形曲线坡度变缓。     

Input subsidies and crop diversity on family farms in Burkina Faso

Since their independence, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have used input subsidies to increase agricultural productivity and improve food security. We analyse the effects of both a fertiliser and a seed subsidy on farming households' land allocation among crops and crop diversity in Burkina Faso. Although previous studies investigated either the impact of a fertiliser or a seed subsidy on targeted crops, few examined the effects of both subsidies combined. Applying a correlated random-effects model with a control function approach to nationally representative, 2-year panel data collected from farming households, we find that those with access to the fertiliser subsidy allocate more land to the crops it targets (rice, maize and cotton) than non-targeted crops. Focusing on a minor crop with key agronomic and nutritional attributes, we conclude that land allocation to cowpea as the primary crop and intercrop declined with the fertiliser subsidy. The fertiliser subsidy also negatively affects crop diversity. However, we find that the cowpea seed subsidy offsets the bias of fertiliser subsidy toward fertiliser-targeted crops and enhances diversity.     

农业经济学与数学

从学科科学化进展的角度,讨论了农业经济学日益数学语言化的必然趋势。一方面论述了农业经济学依赖数学成为常规科学的历程,另一方面展望了这个学科继续运用数学发展自己的前景。讨论的基本出发点是现代农业经济学与数学的本质联系;焦点是农业经济学基础理论的科学化;主要结论是:以基础理论形式化为标志的农业经济学的科学化,必将更加依赖数学,更加有效地运用数学,才能更加有效地揭示规律,发展本学科的深层智慧。