加快推进存款保险制度的建立

无论从我国金融机构市场退出机制的现状还是从银行业未来发展的要求看，都有必要尽快建立存款保险制度，形成适合我国国情新的金融稳定机制，及时对出现严重问题、濒于破产或破产的金融机构进行处置。     

加拿大改革存款保险制度

早在1967年,加拿大就通过了《加拿大存款保险公司法》,并根据该法成立了加拿大存款保险公司(CDIC),专门负责魁北克省以外的全国范围内的存款保险业务。     

关于在我国建立存款保险制度的思考

存款保险是指符合条件的存款类金融机构（主要是商业银行）在按规定缴纳保险费后，存款保险公司对其吸收的合格存款给予保险，一旦投保金融机构出现支付危机或破产清盘时，存款人可得到一定补偿的保险活动。存款保险制度最早由捷克于1924年建立，然而对世界各国产生深远影响的当属美国存款保险制度的建立。     

关于建立我国存款保险制度的几点思考

一、建立存款保险制度的重要作用及缺陷 存款保险是指符合条件的银行等存款性金融机构依法缴纳保险费后,存款保险机构对银行吸收的存款予以保护。一旦银行破产,存款者依法可得到一定数额的赔偿。     

关于确立我国存款保险制度的思考

随着我国金融体制改革的深入发展,金融机构之间的竞争日趋势激烈,优胜劣汰的竞争规律必然导致经营不善的金融机构破产,这就给在该机构存款的客户带来损失,因此,尽快建立我国的存款保险制度,有效保护客户利益,维护金融秩序显得非常紧迫.本文就如何确立我国的保险制度提出了如下建议中国人民银行负责组建保险机构,并领导和控制其业务活动;按属地原则确立保险对象,实行强制保险;存款保险费的确定,应先采用单一的存款保险费事,再逐步实行差别费率;实行存款限额保险,反对实行全额保险;存款保险机构的保险资金由央行一次性注入部分资金,然后再由参加投保的银行定期交纳;存款保险应发挥资金援助和日常监管功能.     

存款保险制度建立的理论依据

存款保险制度(Deposit Insurance System,缩写DIS)是指根据公开实施的法律对面临支付危机或破产银行的存款人给予一定支付保障的制度。存款保险的产生是以银行破产风险的存在为前提的。本文通过对银行破产风险和央行监管局限性两方面的深入分析,指出了建立存款保险制度是保障存款者利益、稳定金融体系的有效选择。     

浅议建立我国合作金融机构存款保险制度

存款保险制度是保护存款人利益,维护金融体系稳定,防止金融信用危机发生的重要金融政策手段,是金融机构监管体系中的一个重要组成部分。随着我国金融体制改革的逐步深入,金融风险的防范日益成为金融监管工作的重点。根据我国城乡合作金融机构的实际情况,借鉴国外经验...     

对存款保险制度功能的理性思考

存款保险制度在保护存款人利益、稳定金融体系、克服逆向选择与道德风险、改善银行经营环境及促进银行公平竞争等方面发挥着一定的积极作用,但对这些功能不能无限夸大,辩证地看待更有利于走出对存款保险制度认识的误区,切不可忽视其局限性而将其功能过分拔高;存款保险制度本身也存在某些固有的缺陷,它所带来的负面效应也应当引起我们足够的重视;存款保险制度对金融稳定只能治标而不能治本,解决我国金融体系内在问题的根本途径应当是继续深化金融体制各方面的改革。     

Structuring Deposit Insurance for a United Europe

This paper analyses the difficulties associated with imposing a unified deposit insurance scheme in a unified Europe. Specifically, it investigates the determinants of optimal deposit insurance in light of the Commission's 1994 decision requiring mandatory minimum coverage and encouraging a single unified deposit insurance structure. Issues of deposit insurance premiums and tax burden are analysed in the context of a general equilibrium-type model. The results indicate that taxes, the optimal degree of deposit insurance, and societal risk aversion are all interrelated in such a structure. Therefore, a common insurance system may not be feasible nor appropriate for a first best solution; co-ordination and even unified taxation may be necessary. At the minimum, exceedingly close macroeconomic policy co-ordination will be necessary for the single market for financial services to come to fruition and achieve stability.     

Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking

In cross sections of US banks before the deposit-insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation. Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. We test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. In the case of unsystematic risk, we find no evidence of significant changes for any of the three. In the case of systematic risk, we find that risk-taking associated with lower charter values and larger size is indeed significantly weaker after reform. Risk-taking associated with capital ratios is also weaker after reform, though not significantly so. Since systematic risk is undoubtedly the more appropriate measure, reform seems to have reduced moral hazard.     

关于建立我国存款保险制度的研究

入世后,我国金融业对外开放日益扩大,竞争越来越激烈,金融风险不断增加,因此,建立存款保险制度势在必行。但如何构建我国的存款保险制度,以有效发挥存款机构的作用,是目前我国亟待解决的问题。     

存款保险制度的财政成本问题研究

存款保险有显性和隐性两种形式。近年来,显性存款保险制度在全球范围内获得了快速发展。存款保险制度会最终影响到政府的财政成本。本文从财政成本这个新的角度来分析存款保险制度如何影响财政成本,并借鉴国际经验,探索该如何优化存款保险制度设计特征以减少财政成本。     

论存款保险制度下的风险防范

存款保险制度是一种金融保障制度。建立存款保险制度有利于降低金融风险,防止挤兑发生及危机扩散。当个别银行出现流动性风险时,存款人因为有了相关的法律制度作保证,不再产生巨大的恐惧心理,能避免发生挤兑风潮。同时,建立存款保险制度有利于保护存款人的利益。在投保银行面临支付危机时提供救助,在投保银行破产倒闭时依法清偿存款人的存款,从而保护了存款人的利益。     

存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

基于2008-2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响.对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量.利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响...     

存款保险制度与银行公司治理

存款保险制度是各国构建金融安全网的重要组成部分,但该制度在各国实施的效果并不相同,它在对金融稳定产生积极作用的同时又产生了道德风险。本文从银行公司治理出发,结合各国存款保险实施的效果,认为完善的银行公司治理是克服存款保险负面影响的重要前提,银行公司治理的改善能显著提高存款保险制度的有效性,因此,在存款保险制度即将推出的同时,强化银行公司治理具有同等重要的意义。     

The Effects of Setting Deposit Insurance Premiums to Target Insurance Fund Reserves

A common feature of many insurance systems is that they are backed by an insurance fund and insurance premiums are adjusted to target this fund's reserves. This study analyzes the fund targeting policy of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It examines the distortions to banks' cost of deposit financing that result from setting premiums in this manner. The study's framework is a multiperiod, multibank contingent claims model where the stochastic rates of return on individual banks' assets are assumed to be correlated and match the actual empirical distribution of a sample of U.S. banks. The model identifies factors that are likely to exacerbate distortions due to insurance mispricing. The relative merits of a targeting policy and a flat-rate insurance policy are discussed, and the real effects of insurance mispricing are estimated. A method for valuing a government subsidy under a reserve targeting policy is also presented.     

Bank Capital Adequacy versus Deposit Insurance

This paper re-evaluates the Diamond-Dybvig analysis of deposit insurance by constructing a model in which an agent not in need of liquidity sets up a financial intermediary to sell liquidity insurance to other agents who desire such insurance. This intermediary resembles a real-world bank in that it is financed by both demand deposits and equity. It also dominates the Diamond-Dybvig intermediary, which is funded only by demand deposits. Provided the intermediary has adequate capital, it also is perfectly safe. Deposit insurance then is both unnecessary and incapable of achieving a superior outcome to that which private agents could achieve on their own.