Firm non‐market capabilities and the effect of supranational institutional safeguards on the location choice of international investments

Research Summary : We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary : The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

RELATIONSHIPS,COMPETITION AND THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT BANKING MARKETS*

It is well known that competition can destroy incentives to invest in firm‐specific relationships. This paper examines how the tension between relationships and competition is resolved in the investment banking market, which for decades has been characterized by both relationships and competition. The model studies the impact on relationships of four different dimensions of competition: non‐exclusive relationships, competition from arm's‐length intermediaries, non‐price competition, and endogenous entry. The analysis shows how market equilibrium adjusts so that relationships are sustained in the face of such competition. Banks are shown to establish relationships without either local or aggregate monopoly power. The model rationalizes two distinct empirical regularities of market structure: the invariance of market concentration to market size; and a pyramidal market structure with an oligopoly comprising similar‐sized players at the top and a large number of small banks at the bottom. The analysis may also shed light on the industrial organization of other professional service industries.     

Let them go? How losing employees to competitors can enhance firm status

Research summary : Because employees can provide a firm with human capital advantages over competitors, firms invest considerably in employee recruiting and retention. Departing from the retention imperative of strategic human capital management, we propose that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the labor market. Specifically, increased rates of career‐advancing departures by a firm's employees can signal to potential future employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience that enhances external mobility opportunities. Characterizing advancement based on subsequent employers and positions, we analyze data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of perceived firm status between 2004 and 2013. We find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Managerial summary : Firms often emphasize employee retention. Employee departures, especially as a result of being hired away by competitors, are often viewed as threats to a firm's competitive advantage. We propose, however, that employee retention need not be an unconditional strategic imperative. We argue that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the market for human capital by signaling to potential employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience, which can help them obtain attractive positions with other employers. Analyzing data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of firm associates between 2004 and 2013, we find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leaders,laggards, and the pursuit of foreign knowledge

This paper analyzes how firms in different technological and market share positions use foreign R&D to augment their technological capabilities. Technology transfer issues and absorptive capacity arguments are examined to analyze the different technological capabilities of leading and lagging firms. In addition, a new strategic rationale (in terms of non‐dominant market share firms) that has not been considered in prior studies analyzing knowledge‐seeking FDI is offered. From a panel dataset which includes information on all foreign R&D investments made by publicly traded Japanese manufacturing firms (from 1974 to 1994), I show that Japanese firms investing in foreign R&D tend to be the non‐dominant market share firms, but also the technologically leading firms across fairly diverse industries. By considering both the technological and market share positions of firms, this study reveals important characteristics that influence when firms use foreign R&D as part of a strategy to augment their technological capabilities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Search Costs and Investment in Quality

In this paper we analyze how lower search costs affect firms' incentives to invest in quality. We identify two conflicting effects. On the one hand, lower search costs increase incentives to invest in quality by eroding the market share of low quality firms and increasing the market share of high quality firms. On the other hand, by intensifying price competition, lower search costs adversely affect high quality firms more than low quality firms. The net effect of a change in the search cost on quality is shown to depend on the initial quality distribution. There is a critical value such that, if the proportion of high quality firms is initially below this value, lower search costs increase this proportion, whereas if the initial quality is above this value, lower search cost decreases the proportion of high quality firms. We show that our results are consistent with a ‘superstar effect.’     

Information Gathering Externalities for a Multi‐Attribute Good

Most goods and services vary in numerous dimensions. Customers choose to acquire information to assess some characteristics and not others. Their choices affect firms' incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers' choices. We characterize a model in which a monopolist invests in the quality of a product with two characteristics, and consumers are heterogeneous ex‐ante. Consumers do not internalize their influence on the firm's investment incentives when choosing which information to acquire. Cheaper information affects consumers' information gathering and thereby firm investment. This can paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits, and welfare.     

Shock Value: Bill Smoothing and Energy Price Pass‐Through

Energy prices are volatile, affect every consumer and industry in the economy, and are impacted by regulations including gas taxes and carbon pricing. Like the pass‐through literature in general, the growing energy pass‐through literature focuses on marginal prices. However, multi‐part pricing is common in energy retail pricing. I examine the retail natural gas market, showing that while marginal prices exhibit full or nearly full pass‐through, fixed fees exhibit negative pass‐through. This is consistent with the stated desire by utilities and regulators to prevent ‘bill shock.’ I discuss implications for pass‐through estimation and for proposed alternative pricing structures for regulated utilities.     

Money secrets: How does trade secret legal protection affect firm market value? Evidence from the uniform trade secret act

Research summary : We investigate the impact of trade secret legal protection on firm market value in the context of acquisitions. On one hand, market value may increase because trade secret assets become better protected from rivals. On the other hand, market value may decrease because trade secret protection reduces information about the target and its competitors available to potential buyers, increasing uncertainty about its value. Buyers will discount their offers in expectation of being compensated for riskier deals. Using a sample of private equity investments in the United States, we find that trade secret protection has a positive effect in industries with high mobility of knowledge workers, but a negative effect in industries with (1) high resource–value uncertainty and (2) high poor‐investment risk. Managerial summary : We argue that an increase in trade secret legal protection might not unequivocally benefit firm owners when selling their business. A stronger trade secret protection increases the market value of firms in industries with high workers' mobility, but it decreases the market value of firms in industries with uncertain resource value and/or high risk of poor‐acquisition investments. Based on the contingent effect of trade secret protection, companies may want to adjust their strategic decisions, including where to locate or relocate, based in part on whether they will derive benefits or suffer losses when trade secrets are better protected. Finally, our study should help policymakers understand more fully the economic impact of government policies associated with trade secrets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly

We study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention for a risky venture. A natural monopoly is regulated i) for economic purposes; ii) because it can cause losses of substantial size to third parties (the environment or people). The regulator observes the production cost without being able to distinguish the initial type (an adverse selection parameter) from the effort (a moral hazard variable). In addition, the investment in prevention is non observable (another moral hazard variable) and the monopoly is protected by limited liability. We fully characterize the optimal regulation in this context of asymmetric information plus limited liability. We show that incentives to reduce cost and to invest in safety are always compatible. But, in some cases, higher rents have to be given up by the regulator.     

Race to the top: Does competition in the DSL market matter for fibre penetration?

High speed broadband creates potential productivity gains and has a positive impact on economic growth. Achieving Europe's broadband access objectives will require large scale investment in next generation broadband networks, and it is imperative that an appropriate investment climate is created to encourage fibre network rollout. This study considers whether and how competition in the DSL market affects the incentives of operators to invest in the deployment of high-end fibre optic networks. Most earlier research on the drivers of investment in broadband technology has focused on the effect of mandatory access policies, such as local loop unbundling, or competing infrastructures. We posit that competition in the DSL sector may also influence fibre penetration, possibly to a considerable extent. We find that the relationship between service-based competition and fibre penetration is non-linear: a lack of or severe DSL competition is correlated with a negative effect on fibre penetration, but if a moderate degree of competition is already present in the market, more service-based competition may positively influence fibre penetration. The scale of these effects however varies with the openness of the DSL market: operators' incentives to invest in fibre appear to be more sensitive to changes in DSL competition if there is extensive local loop unbundling.     

Interchange fee regulation and service investments

This paper analyzes the impact of interchange fee regulation on the investment incentives of a payment card platform in the presence of full merchant internalization. We distinguish between investment in consumer and retailer services. We find that the optimally regulated interchange fee can be above the privately optimal one to induce the platform to invest more in retailer services. We also demonstrate that the two prominent regulatory benchmarks of a zero interchange fee and regulation according to the “tourist test” tend to set too low investment incentives under a total welfare standard. Instead, “tourist test” regulation can be a reasonable approximation under a total user surplus standard.     

Why Do Firms Enter a New Product Market? A Two‐Dimensional Framework for Market Entry Motivation and Behavior

What are the energetic forces that induce established firms to enter new product markets? While most previous research has explained the economic profits expected from a new product market as firms' distinctive motivation for market entry, some recent studies also emphasize interfirm competition and benchmarking activities as another important factor that motivates firms' new market entry. To explain the established firms' diverse new product market entry behaviors, this study presents a two‐dimensional scheme of entry motivation in terms of the degrees of target market profit focus and competitor focus. The first dimension captures the economic motivation of firms' new market entry that ranges from focusing on the direct expected profits from the target market to considering more strategic/indirect benefit incentives. The second dimension captures the degree of firms' external motivation for entry affected by competitors that ranges from independent entry decisions to fully competitor‐oriented entry decisions. Using multiple‐industry survey data, the current study empirically verifies that these two entry motivation dimensions explain a great portion of actual firms' new product market entry behaviors and that they are independent of each other. Subsequently, this study validates that firms' operational size and their environmental factors like perceived technological uncertainty and competitive intensity upon new market entry affect the degrees of the two dimensions of firms' new product market entry motivation. More specifically, large firms less emphasize target‐market profits than small firms, and when perceived technological uncertainty is high, potential market entrants become less target market profit focused but more competitor focused. Under a highly competitive new market condition, firms focus on both target‐market profits and competitors. Based on the analysis of new market entry motivation dimensions, the current study proposes a new typology of established firms' market entry behaviors. The suggested typology represents the four different types of new product market entrants and examines specific characteristics and entry strategies for each type of potential entrants. This entry‐motivation framework should provide a deeper understanding of the backgrounds of entry behaviors and assist firms in developing appropriate entry strategies and in advantageously responding to rival firms' actions with regard to entry.     

Complementary assets,start-ups and incentives to innovate

We examine to what extent market conditions facilitating start-up formation affect firms' R&D investment and profits. We consider a model in which R&D efforts of an incumbent firm generate partly tacit technological know-how embodied in a key R&D employee, who might use it to form a start-up. The availability of complementary assets influences whether new firms are created and determine expected profits for start-up's founders. A large availability of complementary assets has the direct effect that the generation of start-ups is fostered. However, as a strategic effect, the incentives of incumbents to invest in R&D may be reduced because of the increased danger of knowledge loss occurring through start-up formation. We characterize the effects of an increase in the availability of complementary assets, showing that counter-intuitively there are cases in which it induces an increase in incumbents' R&D investment.     

Competition,governance, and relationship‐specific investments: Theory and implications for strategy

This paper uses biform games to examine the endogenous decision to invest in relationship‐specific assets. It addresses the questions of how competition affects suppliers' decisions to produce a general‐purpose product or a relationship‐specific product for a buyer and under what circumstances a governance arrangement designed to share investment costs between the transacting parties increases the investment in relationship‐specific assets. We offer a balanced perspective that emphasizes both the superior transaction value of relationship‐specific products and their high transaction costs while considering the competition effects generated by alternative investment plans. The model and its extensions generate new insights into investment decisions regarding relationship‐specific assets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivation matters: Corporate scope and competition in complementary product markets

Research summary : We argue that a pure capabilities‐based view does not accurately explain the competitive dynamics of increasingly common settings in which firms act as both complementors and competitors. We propose that the Awareness‐Motivation‐Capability framework is more appropriate for these settings. We derive predictions from both a pure capabilities view and the AMC framework, and test those predictions in the U.S. auto leasing market, in which the leasing subsidiaries of car manufacturers directly compete with the same independent lessors who provide complements to the manufacturers. Although our results are consistent with capabilities playing an important role, motivation appears to be a critical factor explaining the competitive dynamics of the market. Managerial summary : Firms that compete with business units owned by larger corporate parents face additional considerations. Such subsidiary competitors can be motivated by broader corporate considerations, shifting their objectives, and consequently, their strategic actions. Expecting subsidiary competitors to pursue business unit profitability can mislead managers toward pricing, product mix, or market entry errors. We present an important example from consumer finance, where independent auto lessors, such as Bank of America (BoA), compete with captive leasing subsidiaries like Ford Motor Credit (FMC). Since FMC is motivated to subsidize and support vehicle sales for its manufacturer parent, a cost advantage is not enough for BoA to dominate the market. Understanding broader corporate motivations of competitors helps managers anticipate competition levels in potential markets, thereby improving decision‐making and performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time compression (dis)economies: An empirical analysis

Research Summary: To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time–cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997–2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks 1 month faster. About 88% of the projects exhibit negative time–cost elasticities with over 39% of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12% of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development, and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency. Managerial Summary: How fast should firms invest? The conventional view is that acceleration increases market revenues but also inflates costs. However, there is no recent empirical evidence of this tradeoff. Our article systematically investigates the costs of compressing time in investment projects. Results show that most firms in the oil and gas industry are significantly time inefficient in their operations. Specifically, by accelerating investments, firms would also substantially decrease costs. We estimate the magnitude of these time inefficiencies for specific oil and gas industries and firms and study which strategies might mitigate this problem. This fine‐grained analysis should help firms assess their financial incentives to accelerate projects and prove informative to stock market analysts’ valuations of firm investment timing.     

Horizontal subcontracting and investment in idle dispatchable power plants

We analyze horizontal subcontracting and show how idle production facilities can reduce contracting costs by credibly protecting against hold-up. Our analysis contributes to understanding competition between power firms that increasingly use intermittent generation sources. Their unilateral incentives to invest in maintaining underused units, such as dispatchable gas-fired plants, are underrated by plant profitability indicators. From a policy perspective, decentralized strategic investment incentives reduce the possible need for centralized security of supply measures. Our welfare analysis indicates that quantity competition can lead to a lower market-clearing price than price competition.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Global strategy and population-level learning: the case of hard disk drives

Some scholars argue that firms within the same industry engage in similar foreign investment behavior irrespective of nationality because they face a common set of pressures and incentives. Others emphasize the persistent diversity in business practices and behavior of firms from different nations as they invest abroad. Using the hard disk drive industry as a case, this paper explores whether nationality or industry has the greater influence on global strategy and whether it affects industry performance. The findings suggest that firms from the same nation are likely to adopt similar global strategies initially, but that, over time, the industry as a whole converges on the same blueprint for action. At the same time, however, strategic focus and organizational characteristics moderate national influences: firms from the same nation are more likely to adopt the same global strategy if they compete in the same product segment and are of similar size and age. The evidence also indicates that the national industry that is first to select what becomes the dominant strategy acquires an advantage over competitors from other countries. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.