社会资本、民主发展与政府治理——对69个国家的比较研究

社会资本被认为是社会的润滑剂和善治的社会基础。很多文献认为,高水平的社会资本能够提高政府的治理绩效。但是目前国内外的研究均忽略了社会资本发挥作用的制度环境。本文通过对全球69个国家的实证数据进行比较分析后发现,社会资本能否对政府治理产生影响,依赖于一定的制度环境。在民主制度建设不完善、民主发展水平较低的情况下,社会资本对政府治理并不能产生显著的影响;只有在民主发展水平比较高、民主制度比较健全的情况下,社会资本才能显著地促进政府治理绩效的提高。而且,民主制度建设得越完善、越充分,社会资本对治理的正面促进作用就越大。     

Local governance and public goods provision in rural China

In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level governance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time, this article compares two different governance modes. It finds that elections affect little on the size of revenue but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individuals to enterprises if possible. However, privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more difficult. It also shows that elections and power sharing are conducive to improve the allocation of public expenditures.     

Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?

Many countries since 1990 have adopted semi-presidential constitutions, which are often considered to be problematic, primarily because of the potential for conflict between the assembly-supported government and the popularly elected president. Such conflicts are said to lead to unstable governments, policy paralysis and the eventual undermining of the democratic regime. Using data for all parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1946 and 2006, we examine the effect of semi-presidential constitutions on the duration of prime ministers’ tenure in office, government accountability with respect to economic outcomes, and democratic survival. We also examine (for a smaller sample of post-communist countries) the impact of these constitutions on the progress of structural reforms. We find that the observed higher instability of prime ministers in semi-presidential democracies is more due to the electoral system than to the presence of a popularly elected president. We also find that semi-presidential constitutions have little impact on the government’s accountability to economic outcomes and on the survival of democratic regimes. Finally, we find that neither a weak president nor a weak government is optimal for the progress of economic reforms in post-communist countries. Regarding economic reforms, the optimal allocation of constitutional powers between the president and the government grants both significant powers.     

Toward a Humanist Reconstruction of Economic Science

This paper examines whether governance matters for the economic growth of developing countries, empirically captured within the institutional economics theoretical framework using the panel data estimation procedure. In doing so, it tests the effect of several dimensions of governance on the growth of 84 low and middle-income economies using regression specifications common in the growth literature. The empirical results show that political stability and government effectiveness is significantly positively correlated with growth. Voice and accountability and corruption are statistically significantly negatively correlated with growth. The regulatory quality and rule of law dimensions of governance are negatively but statistically insignificantly correlated with growth. The findings of this study imply that the dynamics of the current modern economy makes it necessary for developing countries to act now and within their own country, improve the dimensions of governance and establish good governance practices that are domestically relevant and internationally comparable and consistent.     

Structural and Cyclical Factors behind Current Account Balances

Global external imbalances widened persistently over the last several years and have narrowed abruptly over the course of the financial crisis. Understanding the extent to which structural or cyclical factors may have driven these patterns is important to assess the likely evolution of global imbalances going forward, as well as the potential adjustment that can be achieved through changes in policy. This paper assesses the link between structural and cyclical factors and current account balances using a panel of 94 countries from 1973 to 2008. We find that the medium‐term evolution of global external imbalances can be related in large part to structural factors including cross‐country differences in demographics, fiscal deficits, oil dependency and intensity, stage of economic development, financial market development, and institutional quality. Part of the narrowing in current account balances since the financial crisis appears to be related to various cyclical factors including changes in output growth, oil prices, and exchange rates, and may be expected to reverse alongside the economic recovery.     

International capital flows,liquidity risk,and monetary policy

In recent years, there has been a large amount of lending coming from the public sector of many developing countries. At the same time, the financial sectors in many advanced countries have issued a large share of portfolio debt to other countries. What are the implications of these events for the global financial system and overall economic activity? Do they have an impact on the transmission channels of monetary policy across countries at different stages of economic development? We investigate these important issues using a micro-founded model of money and banking so that the effects of monetary policy across countries can be meaningfully studied. Notably, the increase in capital outflows to the advanced economy renders monetary policy in developing countries to be less effective, while the effects of monetary policy in advanced economies are more pronounced. Yet, our results indicate that it can indeed be optimal for lower income countries to lend to the advanced world. Importantly, we find that the optimal amount of lending to advanced countries critically depends on the degree of liquidity risk — if it is sufficiently high, then public sector lending to advanced economies is not warranted. Consequently, our results indicate that governments in developing countries should carefully consider how much capital they send abroad to foreign countries.     

Foreign aid and governance in Africa

This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the debate on foreign aid and to verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data from 52 African countries for the period 1996–2010. An endogeneity robust instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares empirical strategy is employed. The findings reveal that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice and accountability) governance. While, these findings are broadly in accordance with Moyo and Collier on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank position on political governance nor the Asongu stance on the aid-corruption nexus in a debate with Okada and Samreth. The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence the election and replacement of political leaders in Africa may have insignificant results. It is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid and that economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political governance in recipient countries.     

Structural shifts in aid dependency and fiscal policy in developing countries

Foreign aid is a sizable source of government financing for several developing countries and its allocation matters for the conduct of fiscal policy. This article revisits the fiscal effects of shifts in aid dependency in 59 developing countries from 1960 to 2010. It identifies structural shifts in aid dependency and uses treatment effect methods to assess the fiscal effects of aid. It finds that shifts in aid dependency are frequent and have significant fiscal effects in developing countries. In addition to the traditional evidences of tax and investment displacement and ‘aid illusion,’ we show that upward shifts and downward shifts in aid dependency have asymmetric effects on fiscal accounts in developing countries. Large aid inflows undermine tax capacity and public investment while large reductions in aid inflows tend to keep recipients’ fiscal behaviour intact. Moreover, the tax displacement effect tends to be temporary while the impacts on expenditure items tend to last. Finally, we find that the undesirable fiscal effects of aid are more pronounced in countries with low governance score and low absorptive capacity.     

Multiple equilibria arising from donor’s aid policy in economic development

This paper presents a neoclassical growth model comprising education and child labor with a focus on developing and aid-receiving countries to demonstrate cyclical growth and bifurcation in economic development. The appearance of multiple equilibria has often been attributed to the internal affairs of recipient countries, such as technology in production, subsistence minimum in consumption, and liquidity constraints in investment. The main argument of this paper is that the aid allocation policy employed by donor countries, thereby the motive of aid-providers, leads to divaricated and cyclical development in the recipient countries.     

开放条件下我国财政政策转型研究

一段时间以来,我国政府主要是运用相机抉择的财政政策来调控宏观经济的周期性波动.实施这种相机抉择功能的财政政策在带来繁荣的同时,也蕴含着越来越多难以克服的危机,尤其是在中国这样的发展中国家里,过度频繁地利用经济政策来拉动经济增长的效果并不理想,反而会造成投资浪费以及经济的更大波动.因此,应尽早实现财政政策的转型,实行具有自动稳定功能的财政政策.     

Cyclicality of fiscal policy and the shadow economy

A survey of recent literature on cyclical properties of fiscal policy reveals that fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries whereas it is countercyclical in developed ones. However, there is no consensus on what drives the difference in this specific cyclical property of fiscal policy. Using cross-section and panel data sets for 78 countries we document that procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in countries with a larger size of the shadow economy. We also show that policies reducing the size of the shadow economy lead to a less (more) procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal response to shocks.     

Migration outflows and optimal migration policy: rules versus discretion

We study the effects of more open borders on return migration and show that migrants are more likely to return to the origin country when migration rules are softened, because this implies that they could more easily re-migrate if return migration is unsuccessful. As a result, softening migration rules leads to lower net inflows than is generally acknowledged. We show that if government follows rules to shape the optimal migration policy, it will choose more open “borders” than were its behaviour to be discretionary. However, this requires an appropriate commitment technology. We show that electoral accountability may be a solution to the commitment problem. As a matter of fact, observed softer immigration rules in western countries suggest the effectiveness of such a mechanism.     

Cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables in the EU

In this paper we present a stylised framework of fiscal policy determination that considers both structural targets and cyclical factors. We find significant cyclical asymmetry in the behaviour of fiscal variables in a sample of fourteen EU countries over 1970–2007, with budgetary balances (both overall and primary) deteriorating in contractions without correspondingly improving in expansions. Analysis of budget components reveals that cyclical asymmetry comes from expenditure. We find no evidence that fiscal rules introduced in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht affected the cyclical behaviour of fiscal variables. Numerical simulations show that cyclical asymmetry inflated average deficit levels, contributing significantly to debt accumulation.     

Institutions and the effectiveness of expenditures on environmental protection: evidence from Middle Eastern countries

Middle Eastern countries are among the top air emitters in per capita terms worldwide. We examine the effect of government expenditures on environmental protection (GEEP) on air pollution in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. Moreover, we explore whether countries with stronger quality of governance can exploit GEEP to reduce air pollution more efficiently. Empirical analysis, using data from 1996 to 2015 for a set of the MENA countries, shows that GEEP alone does not play a significant role in contributing to better environmental quality. However, improvements in quality of governance are shaping the final environmental effects of GEEP in the MENA region. Our results can help policy makers in the region and international community in discovering strategies for reaching the agreed goals under the Paris Climate Deal (COP21), namely net zero emissions in the second half of the century.     

Does the quality of political institutions affect intra-industry trade within trade blocs? The ASEAN perspective

There has been a renewed resolve for deeper integration and cooperation within ASEAN. Intra-industry trade (IIT) is often viewed as a way of achieving economic as well as political integration. This article tests for the effect that political regime and governance may have on the intensity of IIT. We particularly examine if quality of political institutions which includes corruption and democracy indices as well as economic factors comprising corporate tax rate, regional FDI flow, flexibility of exchange rate regime, size of the market, economic distance affect the intensity of horizontal and vertical IIT. The study finds that control of corruption and good governance both increase the vertical IIT but not the horizontal IIT. The study further finds that intra-economy FDI flow, stable exchange rate regime, market size and proximity positively affect IIT within the trade bloc. However the negative effect of corporate tax rate suggests that if countries were to coordinate their tax policies, they could avoid harmful tax competition and promote IIT across their borders. The findings regarding the effect those economic and political factors have on the intensity of IIT certainly warrants the attention of policy makers and researchers alike.     

Institutional Quality and Public Debt Accumulation: An Empirical Analysis

The question of public debt management for both developed and developing economies has generated an enormous amount of political as well as academic interest. This study examines how governance affects public debt accumulation in the MENA countries during the 1996–2015 period. The six Worldwide Governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) were used to measure the quality of governance in these countries. The results show that only three governance indicators support well the hypothesis that poor governance leads to higher accumulation of MENA public debt. Moreover, the estimates suggest a significant indirect impact of bad governance operating via decreased GDP growth. These findings have important implications for policy makers of these countries, which are currently facing major fiscal and external imbalances due to the high cost of war and terrorist attacks, low oil prices and a decline in trade. Sound public debt management represents an urgent task especially that public debt management problems often find their origins in the lack of attention paid by policymakers to the costs of bad governance and weak macroeconomic management.     

Developing Countries’ Net-migration: The Impact of Economic Opportunities,Disasters, Conflicts,and Political Instability

We provide regressions for the net immigration flows of developing countries. We show that (i) savings finance emigration and worker remittances serve to make staying rather than migrating possible; (ii) lagged dependent migration flows have a negative sign in the presence of migration stock variables; (iii) stocks of migrants in six OECD countries and in the developing countries have non-linear effects. Some of the non-linear effects of the economic variables vanish if indicators for disasters, conflicts and political instability are taken into account but new ones come in for these latter variables.     

Structural change: Pace,patterns and determinants

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of structural change in the world economy. The analysis relies on a newly constructed dataset comprising 169 countries and covering the period from 1991 to 2013. Shapley decompositions are employed to evaluate the pace and pattern of structural change across regions and sub‐regions. Country‐level estimates are then used to conduct an original empirical exercise on the determinants of structural change. The results suggest that labor reallocations (structural change) have played a critical role in enhancing economic performance since the early 2000s, even if they remain comparatively less important than within‐sector productivity improvements. The widespread reallocation of labor from agriculture to the services sectors has been the key driver of structural change. Finally, we find robust evidence that the pace of structural change is significantly shaped by human and physical capital. The policy implication is that investments in education and economic infrastructure are crucial to accelerating structural change.     

Governance during Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa

The governance advice that is offered to Africa usually identifies a list of ‘good governance’ goals like stable property rights, a rule of law, low corruption and government accountability as preconditions for development. These goals are difficult to implement not only because they are expensive public goods but in addition their enforcement is typically at variance with powerful interests in the political settlements of developing countries. The historical evidence and much institutional theory suggests that during their social transformations successful developing countries had a different set of ‘developmental’ or ‘growth-enhancing’ governance capabilities that enabled their states to support critical property rights transformations and assist firms in acquiring and learning to use new technology. The institutions and policies they used differed because their political and institutional starting points were different. There are therefore no blueprints for Africa or anywhere else, but certainly the good governance menu is unrealistic. Rather African countries have to experiment and develop institutional and policy solutions that work in their context and which are appropriate for transforming property rights and accelerating technology adoption.     

Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections

Do aid donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections? Are multiparty elections rewarded in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes? How do the rewards for institutional reforms compare to the rewards for substantive improvements in governance and political rights? These questions are of particular interest given both the spread of democracy and the emergence of autocracies with multiparty elections for the executive and legislature as the modal form of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, we examine temporal dynamics in aid flows before and after transitions to multiparty elections and the strategic allocation of aid rewards to specific sectors depending upon electoral competition and substantive improvements in governance and political rights. We find that, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes while also rewarding substantive improvements in governance and political rights. Sector specific analyses reveal that multiparty elections are rewarded with greater democracy aid and economic aid in both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the quality of elections matters: the adoption of democratic elections receives greater aid gains than the adoption of authoritarian elections.