博弈视角下大学生互联网消费信贷决策行为研究

基于博弈论视角,从理论上构建了金融机构与大学生消费信贷决策的动态博弈模型,并引入信誉机制,比较分析了传统金融机构退出大学生信用卡市场而互联网金融大举进入校园信贷市场的深刻原因,同时借助大学生消费信贷调查一手数据实证检验了信誉机制的有效性,研究结果表明:在单次和有限次重复博弈中,“囚徒困境”普遍存在,而在无限次重复博弈中,尽管利率和交易成本下降有利于促进交易,但信息不对称问题却使博弈只能进行有限次,因此要达成长期合作,必须引入具有“社会性惩罚”的信誉机制来抑制大学生的短期投机行为,然信誉机制对于促进传统金融机构与大学生合作的作用有限,更多的是促进互联网金融机构与大学生消费信贷关系的达成,实证结果验证了该结论。由此得到的启示是,充分利用互联网大数据优势、强化互联网金融市场监管、引导大学生树立正确的消费观和责任意识,有助于破解“一放就乱,一管就死”的监管困局,这对于规范互联网金融校园消费信贷市场具有重要现实意义。     

Trust and social efficiencies

In a variant of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, if extra costs are associated with the verifications built into strategies that could otherwise produce Pareto efficient equilibria, the attainment of efficient play becomes problematical. Evolutionary-game versions of this dilemma are studied here in an attempt to understand the difficulties societies face in maintaining efficient interactions mediated by trust.     

基于Nash谈判的包装容器回收逆物流利益分配模型

对于是否采取积极的态度处理包装容器的回收逆物流问题,主机厂和供应商之间存在着博弈,在传统的合作模式下,双方仅从自身的利益出发,进入了囚徒困境,在供应链思想的指导下,双方从供应链有利度的宏观角度出发,可以达到新的纳什均衡,提高博弈双方和供应链整体的收益。通过预算回收成本,确定了供应链思想下博弈有利方让渡利益的大小。从博弈论的角度对包装容器的处理问题进行分析,拓展了包装容器的研究思路,研究结果也为企业如何处理包装容器提供了一定的理论依据。     

同业互查与重塑诚信——基于博弈论的注册会计师行为分析

当前注册会计师的诚信缺失问题引起全球的广泛关注。其实,注册会计师的诚信缺失是一种“囚徒困境”,而产生这种“囚徒困境”的原因主要在于对不诚信的处罚太轻,缺乏职业道德,执业环境太差以及上市公司本身的问题等。本文试图利用博弈论方法来探讨解决注册会计师不诚信问题的办法,提出解决注册会计师不诚信的一种方法——建立新型同业互查制,并证明了这种方法的可行性,最后还论证了这种方法的优点。     

企业员工绩效考核中合作的博弈分析

员工的绩效考核对于企业的人力资源管理来说,是一项重要但难度很大的工作。在绩效考核中,人力资源部门、部门主管以及员工之间存在着各种合作上的问题。本文尝试将其三者引入到博奕论中的"囚徒困境"模型中,借其模型能解决在绩效考核中部门主管,员工和人力资源部门间的合作问题。     

供应链管理中企业合作的博弈分析

供应链管理的关键是节点企业间的战略合作,但是企业的短期行为会使合作陷入困境。通过对所构建的博弈模型的重复博弈进行分析,证明了只要博弈双方以长期利益为目标,合作才是最优战略,从而说明了供应链企业间建立长期的合作伙伴关系是可能与必然的。     

产业集群创新中行业协会的“囚徒困境”分析及措施

企业之间的相互信任、知识共享及分工协作是产业集群形成和发展的基础,也是产业集群创新的关键。文章从这个原则出发,引入了"囚徒困境"博弈模型,分析了两个企业在产业集群合作创新中可能会遇到的困境以及策略,并针对性地提出了构建产业集群内的行业协会来促进企业间合作创新的观点以及一系列政策措施建议。     

Learning games

This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.     

The Political Economy of Revolution and Democracy

A bstract . Electoral democracy and revolutionary violence are both forms of political competition involving leaders vying for public office. Political leaders seek benefit from public position. By redefining those benefits into concepts of profit and costs , a rational choice framework can give an ordering of those types of political competition which are of the greatest value to officeholders, assuming that they are profit-maximizers. The ordering that result conforms to the definition of prisoner's dilemma and creates a game theoretic matrix based on leader's choices of either electoral or violent competition. The result is an explanation of various modes of political competition. The analysis draws on experimental work on prisoner's dilemma and on empirical material drawn from Latin American politics. Revolution, democracy, and dictatorship are shown to be varieties of a basic cost-benefit analysis of political leaders.     

博弈论在企业应收账款中的应用分析

在激烈的市场竞争中,赊销作为一种销售策略普遍存在。文章就企业与竞争对手之间的"囚徒困境"博弈,分析了应收账款的产生背景和企业选择赊销的被迫性,进而通过企业与客户之间的相机决策博弈,构建模型,在动态的博弈中,依次剖析了企业赊销的选择前提和应收账款的后续管理策略。     

会计师事务所“低价揽客”的博弈分析

本文从博弈论的角度对会计师事务所的“低价揽客”行为进行分析,认为“低价揽客”使会计师事务所在审计定价方面陷入“囚徒困境”,进而加剧了事务所之间的恶性压价竞争,降低了审计质量,加大了审计风险,导致事务所的人才流失,影响会计师事务所的可持续发展,并进一步分析了“低价揽客”的成因和提出了相关建议。     

订单式出口促进:国贸专业校企合作博弈的路径优化

国贸等商科专业由于合作上的直接利益兼容性弱,校企合作更易陷入囚徒困境。本文从博弈论的分析出发,结合多年国贸实践教学改革,运用合作博弈的方法,得出订单式出口促进是国贸专业突破校企合作囚徒困境的理想路径,并能为商科其他专业人才的培养与教育提供借鉴。     

Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics

In an evolutionary set-up, we append an ecology of iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game strategies, consisting of unconditional cooperators (AllC), unconditional defectors (AllD) and reactive players (TFT) with two repeated strategies that have received less attention in the evolutionary IPD game literature: the error-proof, “generous” tit-for-tat (GTFT) which, with a certain probability, re-establishes cooperation after a (possibly by mistake) defection of the opponent and the penitent, “stimulus–response” (WSLS) strategy that resets cooperation after the opponent punished for defection. An abundance of rock–paper–scissors like patterns is discovered in the 3×3 ecologies comprising Pavlovian and “generous” players. Interestingly, the evolutionary success of Pavlov seems to depend on the absence of unconditional cooperators in the ecologies investigated.     

中小企业产学研合作中的“囚徒困境”

文章首先针对“中小企业产学研合作中,潜在的合作策略如何在不合作占优势的环境中取得立足之地”这一命题,从分析中小企业与学研机构自身的性质特征出发,寻找两大组织合作的必然性,同时也发现两者合作的艰巨性.这一艰巨性为中小企业产学研合作的“囚徒困境”的产生埋下隐患.然后基于参与人都是理性的假设,揭示了中小企业产学研合作的“囚徒困境”的形成过程,并由此得出结论:改变博弈结构是破解中小企业产学研结合中“囚徒困境”的根本之道.     

Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments

Strong reciprocity is a fundamental human characteristic associated with our extraordinary sociality and cooperation. Laboratory experiments on social dilemma games and many field studies have quantified well-defined levels of cooperation and propensity to punish/reward. The level of cooperation is observed to be strongly dependent on the availability of punishments and/or rewards. Here, we propose an operational approach based on the evolutionary selection of prosocial behaviors to explain the quantitative level of the propensity to punish in three experimental set-ups. A simple cost/benefit analysis at the level of a single agent, who anticipates the action of her fellows, determines an optimal level of altruistic punishment, which explains quantitatively experimental results on a third-party punishment game, the ultimatum game and an altruistic punishment game. We also report numerical simulations of an evolutionary agent-based model of repeated agent interactions with feedback by punishments, which confirms that the propensity to punish is a robust emergent property selected by the evolutionary rules of the model. The cost-benefit reasoning is not to be taken literally but rather to embody the result of the selection pressure of co-evolving agents that have make them converge to their preferences (which can be seen as either hard-wired and/or culturally selected). In this view, the prosocial preference of humans is a collective emergent process, robustly selected by adaptation and selection. Our main contribution is to use evolutionary feedback selection to quantify the value of the prosocial propensity to punish, and test this prediction on three different experimental set-ups.     

The shared reward dilemma on structured populations

In this paper we study the recently introduced “shared reward dilemma” (Cuesta et al. in J Theor Biol 251:253–263, 2008) in the presence of a structure governing the interactions among the population. The shared reward dilemma arises when the prisoner’s dilemma is supplemented with a second stage in which a fixed reward is equally distributed among all cooperators. We first extend our previous results on the equilibrium structure of this game to the case of a one-shot game taking place on a regular network. Subsequently, we consider an evolutionary version of the game on both lattices and random networks. We show that the evolutionary game on graphs exhibits important differences with the case of well-mixed populations. In particular, there exists an important parameter range in which the cooperation is boosted and a single cooperator can invade a population of defectors. We study the dependence of the cooperation levels on the neighborhood size, finding that on random networks the level of cooperation reached decreases as the neighborhood size increases. Moreover, square lattices favor cooperation more than random networks, and on them cooperation may be almost full for certain parameter regions even for large neighborhood sizes. Further, we show that the effect of the population structure is never detrimental for cooperation. We interpret our results in terms of weak versus strong temptation and discuss the nontrivial issues involved in trying to promote cooperation exogenously by means of such a reward mechanism.     

Does social learning promote cooperation in social dilemmas?

In this study, we analyze how emergence of cooperation is related to social learning. Cooperation is an example of social behavior. It is frequency-dependent that is the success of a particular behavior depends on the number of individuals adopting each behavioral trait. We study how social learning can affect the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas represented by two well-known games: Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift (SD). We show that, in the PD game, increase in the proportion of social learners leads to the alleviation of the social dilemma. Whereas, in the SD game increasing the proportion of social learners does not always lead to the alleviation of the social dilemma, that is there is no simple monotonic relation between social learning and the weakening of the social dilemma.

     

基于博弈论的供应链管理分析

运用博弈论的思想,从“囚徒困境”类的完全信息静态博弈、重复博弈、不完全信息动态博弈、信号博弈等角度,对供应链节点企业的合作关系进行分析。     

Exercising power in a prisoner's dilemma: transnational collective bargaining in an era of corporate globalisation?

The extraordinary growth in foreign direct investment coupled with the widespread declination of union penetration has increasingly allowed multinationals to pit unions across borders as competitors for investment and jobs. Based on a theoretical analysis of the exercise of power in a prisoner's dilemma game, the essential conditions and incentives for cooperation among unions across borders for the purpose of collective bargaining with multinationals are identified and practical, strategic‐level implications for transnational interunion partnerships are addressed.     

基于渠道道德的厂商与中间商博弈分析

研究营销渠道中厂商与中间商的道德问题。根据道德性对双方收益的影响,首先建立了基于道德的中间商选择博弈模型;然后建立了厂商与中间商的道德性博弈模型,对均衡结果进行分析,找出影响双方道德性的因素;最后建立了基于长期合作的有限次重复博弈模型,认为长期合作是维持双方高道德水平的重要因素。