Insider trading,stock return volatility,and the option market's pricing of the information content of insider trading

We find strong evidence that net insider selling is positively associated with future stock return volatility, consistent with insider selling increasing outside investors’ uncertainty. The positive effect of net insider selling is significantly stronger when the volatility is measured around the earnings announcement. Apparently, option prices do not fully reflect the information content of insider trading for future volatility. More specifically, we find no evidence that option traders adjust the implied volatility for the insider trading effect in a timely manner. Consequently, net insider selling is significantly associated with future option straddle returns and delta neutral returns.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

The side effects of quantitative easing: Evidence from the UK bond market

We examine the returns to UK government bonds before, during and between the phases of quantitative easing to identify the side effects for the market itself. We show that the onset of QE led to a sustained reduction in the costs of trading and removed some return regularities. However, controlling for a wide range of market activity, including issuance and QE announcements, we find evidence that investors could have earned excess returns after costs by trading in response to the purchase auction calendar. Drawing on economic theory, we explore the implications of these findings for both the efficiency of the market and the costs of government debt management in both the short and long run.     

A Note on the Intraday Patterns of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Hong Kong

This paper examines the intraday patterns of IPOs in Hong Kong during the period 1995–1998. The results reveal that the well‐known under‐pricing phenomenon of IPOs occurs only at the opening trading of new issues and vanishes afterwards. The return volatility of IPOs is found to be high during the first trading session, and declines rapidly during the rest of the first trading day until the end of the trading day. The intraday return volatility of IPOs is found to follow a double U‐shape pattern, which is similar to that of the general market. A great deal of trading activity was recorded during the first five minutes of the trading day. Consistent results are obtained for IPOs registered during the pre‐crisis and post‐crisis periods. This paper has practical implications for investors. Investors can benefit from the under‐pricing only if they subscribe for new shares in the primary market. There is, however, no profit‐making opportunity for day traders who buy shares on the first trading day. This shows that the Hong Kong market is efficient in adjusting for the IPO under‐pricing. In addition, it is likely that, because of Hong Kong's share allotment method, only big investors who apply for large numbers of shares can benefit from this under‐pricing phenomenon.     

The Nature and Persistence of Initial Public Offering Aftermarket Returns Predictability

This paper examines the predictability of monthly aftermarket returns of initial public offerings during the first six years of trading. Predictability is tested under the null hypothesis of random walk using a Markov chain analysis. The evidence shows that excess returns of IPOs (adjusted for the return on the equally weighted NASDAQ index) demonstrate non-random walk behavior through the first five years of trading and random walk behavior in the sixth year. This is accompanied by predictability of monthly excess returns conditioned on the two previous months' excess returns. A trading strategy is offered to capitalize on the predictability patterns. Implementing the trading strategy is not possible due to institutional barriers, providing additional explanation for why IPOs do not reach their intrinsic values for extended periods of time.     

PERFORMANCE LEVERAGE, AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN REVERSE LBOs

Previous studies have provided convincing evidence of improvements in the performance of companies that undergo leveraged buyouts (LBOs). This article presents evidence from the authors' recent study of the performance of 90 "reverse LBOs–LBO firms that go public again in an IPO—after they return to public ownership. The aim of the study was to track the performance of reverse LBOs and to reveal any association between operating performance and changes in leverage and equity ownership.
Among the principal findings of the study were the following: Despite a substantial decline in leverage ratios and equity ownership by insiders at the time of the IPOs, equity ownership of reverse LBOs remained more concentrated and leverage higher than that of public companies in the same industries.
The operating performance of reverse LBOs was significantly better than that of the median firm in their industries in the year prior to and in the year of the IPO. Although there is some evidence of a deterioration in the performance of the reverse-LBO firms, they continue to outperform their industry competitors for at least four full fiscal years after the IPO.
Greater reductions in the percentage equity owned by managers and other insiders at the time of the reverse LBO are associated with larger declines in operating performance.
The stock price performance of reverse LBOs after going public appears more "rational" than that of other IPOs—that is, there is less initial under pricing and no sign of the negative, longer-term abnormal returns reported by recent studies of IPOs.     

Is information risk priced? Evidence from abnormal idiosyncratic volatility

We propose a new, price-based measure of information risk called abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV) that captures information asymmetry faced by uninformed investors. AIV is the idiosyncratic volatility prior to information events in excess of normal levels. Using earnings announcements as information events, we show that AIV is positively associated with informed return run-ups, abnormal insider trading, short selling, and institutional trading during pre-earnings-announcement periods. We find that stocks with high AIV earn economically and statistically larger future returns than stocks with low AIV. Taken together, our findings support the notion that information risk is priced.     

Conversions of mutual savings institutions: Do initial returns from these IPOS provide investors with windfall profits?

We examine initial returns of fully underwritten IPOs of converting thrifts for evidence that managers and depositors of conversion-related offers earn significantly greater returns than investors in IPOs of other financial institutions. Regulators have suggested that new guidelines for conversion from a mutual to a stock thrift are designed to curb “windfall profits” earned by insiders investing in conversion-related IPOs. While there are reports of average initial returns of more than 20% for conversion-related IPOs, our results suggest that investors earn average initial returns of about 7%, which is not significantly different than returns from IPOs of other thrifts and commercial banks.     

Does Trading Improve Individual Investor Performance?

From 52,649 accounts and 10,615,117 transaction records obtained from a renowned brokerage house in Taiwan we find that individual investors purchase 73.4% and sell 64.5% of their stock portfolios each month. This is more than ten times the statistics for their U.S. counterparts. In general, individual investors have positive abnormal returns from factor-based models. However, they would have earned higher returns from following a buy-and-hold strategy. We find a U-shaped rather than a monotonic turnover and performance relation. The results do not support the overconfidence argument proposed by Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) nor does the rational model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We find that investors with large portfolio values tend to be informed traders whose excess trading does create performance value. We also investigate whether men are more overconfident than women and find that even though men trade more excessively than women, men's performance measures are not dramatically lower than women's. Specifically, the own-benchmark adjusted gross return for men is higher than that for women. The regression results indicate that electronic traders rather than men are overconfident.     

Innovations in financing: The impact of anchor investors in Indian IPOs

In 2009, the Securities Exchange Board of India allowed qualified institutional investors to anchor initial public offerings (IPOs) by participating in the issue at a price and allocation publicly disclosed preceding the issue. We study anchor investors (AIs) in Indian IPOs during 2009–2017. We find the share allotment and the number of AIs separately have significant impacts on valuation and underpricing; however, the net effect is nonsignificant. Further, AIs significantly influence other institutional investors' participation in the IPO and induce lower aftermarket volatility. Overall, our evidence suggests that AIs boost demand for and mitigate ex ante information uncertainty of IPOs.     

Retail Trading and IPO Returns in the Aftermarket

Using trade size from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) data set as a proxy for individual versus institutional trading, this paper finds that the effects of trading of these two types of investors on initial public offering (IPO) returns on the first trading day depend on the hotness of the IPO. My regression results reveal that IPOs’ open-to-close returns are positively related to small trade participation, small trade purchases, and small trade order imbalance in the hot IPO sample, but not in the cold and neutral IPO samples. In addition, the aftermarket prices of cold and neutral IPOs are primarily driven by the trading of institutional investors, who are less likely to be driven by sentiment.     

Investor Sentiment and REIT Returns

Recent advances in the field of behavioral finance have given a fillip to the use of behavioral factors in asset pricing models. This study adds to the understanding of the REIT return generating process by exploring the behavioral impact of investor sentiment on REIT returns. The results show that when investors are optimistic (pessimistic), REIT returns become higher (lower). These findings are robust when conventional control variables are considered. Empirical analysis indicates steady erosion in the importance of the default and term structure interest rate variables previously considered as important determinants of REIT returns. Previous noise trading papers that consider the impact of institutional traders conclude that institutional investors cannot arbitrage away noise trader risk. The results of this paper find an exception in the case of small REITs. Examination of REITs based on size reveals that the return generating process of small REITs differs from that of mid-size and large REITs. Analysis of the return generating process by performance shows high performance REITs are more sensitive to the independent variables in the model as compared to the low and mid performance REITs.     

Shell games: On the value of shell companies

A reverse merger allows a private company to assume the current reporting status of another company that is public. This can be done quickly, without fundraising, road show, underwriter, substantial ownership dilution, or great expense. Private firms that go public via reverse merger are often motivated by the need to quickly secure financing through privately placed stock (PIPEs) and the desire to make acquisitions using stock as payment. In each of the last eight years reverse mergers have outnumbered traditional IPOs as a mechanism for going public, and reporting shell companies are providing fuel for much of this growth. We study 585 trading shell companies over the period 2006-2008. The purpose of most of these shell firms is to find a suitor for a reverse merger agreement. These companies have no systematic risk, operations, or assets, and their share price tends to decline over time. Yet, these firms have investors. When a takeover agreement is consummated, shell company three-month abnormal returns are 48.1%. We argue that this exceptional return is compensation to investors for shell stock illiquidity and the uncertainty of finding a reverse merger suitor. We show that shell company returns are much greater at the consummation of a merger than those of a similar entity that in dollar terms is more popular among investors — Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs).     

What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

Privatisation Initial Public Offerings: the Polish Experience

The Polish government has preferred gradual direct sales to privatisation initial public offerings (PIPOs) by a 2.8 to 1 margin. Evidence suggests that the government has attempted to manage the timing of PIPOs. We, however, find no evidence of underpricing of PIPOs to a greater degree than that found for issues in the private sector. Both domestic and international investors in PIPOs earned predominantly positive buy‐and‐hold returns up to 36 months after listing. The difference between PIPOs and private sector IPOs average returns is statistically significant only for international investors.     

An empirical investigation of whether Australian capital gains tax reforms influence individual investor behaviour

This paper examines whether an asset's qualification for discounted tax treatment is associated with positive abnormal trading volumes and negative abnormal returns, as would be predicted if investors modified their behaviour to reduce their tax liability. Our examination of 152 initial public offerings (IPOs) documents that there is an incremental increase in abnormal trading volume for those IPOs that have experienced a significant increase in price since listing over those IPOs that have increased only marginally. Although we provide only limited evidence to suggest that this increase in trading volume is accompanied by a decrease in returns, this is not unexpected in a market that has anticipated this type of behaviour by the relatively small proportion of individual investors able to benefit from the discounted tax treatment.     

Aggregate insider trading: Contrarian beliefs or superior information?

We decompose realized market returns into expected return, unexpected cash-flow news and unexpected discount rate news to test the relation between aggregate market returns and aggregate insider trading. We find that (1) the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is much stronger than what was reported in earlier studies, (2) aggregate insider trading is strongly related to unexpected cash-flow news, (3) market expectations do not cause insider trading contrary to what others have documented, and (4) aggregate insider trading in firms with high information uncertainty is more likely to be associated with contrarian investment strategy. These results strongly suggest that the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is because of insider’s ability to predict future cash-flow news rather than from adopting a contrarian investment strategy. These results hold even after we control for non-informative trades and information uncertainty.     

Management of the IPO performance in Thailand

This research aims to explore the relationships between six major IPO elements in Thailand: underwriter reputation, ownership concentration, book-building, IPO allocation, the length of the lock up period, and investor interest and underpricing. The sample comprises 153 IPOs listed between 2001 and 2011. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that IPO allocation appears to be the strongest factor with a negative relation to underpricing. The length of the lock up period, issue size, industry, and hot issue market show significant and positive relationships with underpricing. Underwriter reputation is not associated with underpricing as the choice of underwriter is restricted by the Thai regulator's requirements. Book-building does not explain underpricing. Institutional investors play very limited roles in Thai IPOs. A small change in ownership concentration does not affect underpricing. Nevertheless, a longer lock up period can yield a higher initial return. Such a provision can restrain insider dealing.