The Influence of Long-Term Performance Plans on Earnings Management and Firm Performance

Boards of directors often implement long-term performance plans (LTPP) to focus management's attention on enhancing long-term shareholder value instead of concentrating their efforts on short-term earnings. This study provides estimation results suggesting that firms that compensate managers with LTPP are associated with lower levels of managed earnings than firms that have only short-term bonus plans. In addition, we find evidence that suggests that firms with long-term performance plans have significantly higher annual returns than firms that have only short-term bonus plans. We also find that firms with long-term performance plans are typically larger firms with smaller managerial ownership and larger institutional ownership than firms without long-term performance plans.     

Corporate Financial Control Mechanisms and Firm Performance: The Case of Value-Based Management Systems

Abstract:  We examine the performance of 84 firms that adopt value-based management (VBM) systems during the period 1984-1997. The typical firm significantly improves matched-firm-adjusted residual income after adopting VBM. This improvement persists for the five post-adoption years studied. After controlling for possible sample bias, we find that large firms show less improvement than small firms. We find a negative relation between tying compensation to VBM and post-adoption performance. We also find that firms reduce capital expenditures following VBM adoption, but that the reductions in spending do not differ based on the firms' growth opportunities. Overall, the evidence suggests that VBM improves economic performance and the efficient use of capital.     

Shifting corporate culture: executive stock ownership plan adoptions and incentives to meet or just beat analysts’ expectations

This paper investigates whether adoptions of executive stock ownership plans coincide with decreased incentives to meet or just beat analysts’ near-term EPS forecasts. Firms often assert that ownership plans focus executives on long-term performance. I find that the impact of these adoptions on meeting or just beating analysts’ EPS forecasts differs depending on whether the plan binds the CEO to reach ownership targets by a specified date. In particular, I find that firms that adopt plans requiring an increase in CEO ownership exhibit a lower propensity to meet or just beat earnings forecasts following plan adoptions. In contrast, firms that adopt plans that require no increase exhibit no change in the propensity to meet or just beat. The results suggest that firms use binding ownership plans to shift executives’ focus from near-term earnings benchmarks to long-term value creation.     

Characteristics Associated with the Corporate Decision to Adopt Long‐term Performance Plans

This study investigates why firms adopt long‐term performance plans. The results provide evidence that firms that adopt long‐term performance plans have higher risk as measured by Beta, have lower percentages of managerial stockholdings, have higher levels of investment in research and development expenditures two years prior to adoption of a long‐term performance plan, and experience increases in the ratio of debt to total assets in the two year period prior to long‐term performance plan adoption. Also, firms increase their investments in research and development and capital expenditures following adoption of long‐term performance plans.     

Do investors overreact to earnings warnings?

This study shows that contrary to what many managers argue, there is no overreaction to earnings warnings. Our sample consists of 986 firms that had significantly lower fourth-quarter earnings than analysts' forecasts during the period of 1983 to 1998. About 9% of these firms released quantitative earnings information while 6.5% of the firms disclosed qualitative earnings information prior to the formal earnings report dates. We find that although these firms experience significant stock price declines during the warning period, their share prices are still higher than the economic values, calculated using Ohlson's residual income model. Further, long-run operating and stock performance of these firms are not more positive than the performance of firms that do not warn. We also find that investor reaction to both warning and non-warning firms is positively related to the firms' long-run stock and operating performance. These findings support the argument that investors do not overreact to the warnings but base their reaction on anticipated long-term performance of the firms.     

The outperformance of family firms: the role of variance in earnings per share and analyst forecast dispersion on the Swiss market

Recent studies provide empirical evidence that family firms are outperforming their non-family counterparts in terms of stock market performance. For the Swiss stock market we find that family firms indeed outperform their non-family counterparts after controlling for firm size and beta. In addition, our data shows that family firms display more stable earnings per share in contrast to their non-family counterparts. Furthermore we find that the variance of earnings per share positively affects analyst forecast dispersion. According to anomaly literature, lower analyst forecast dispersion has been found to induce higher excess return, which our data supports for the Swiss stock market. By linking variance of earnings per share, analyst forecast dispersion and stock performance we provide an insightful explanation for the excess stock market returns of family firms. In addition, our text extends the theory of dispersion effect with an additional empirical element, the variance of earnings per share.      

Monitoring Role of Venture Capital in the Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Korea

Because the government has initiated the development of venture capital firms in Korea, independent venture capital firms have been significantly influenced by government regulations and interventions; in contrast, corporations have made venture investments internally to avoid the regulations. This study investigates whether the Korean institutional environment harms the monitoring role of independent venture capital firms, while it does not significantly impact corporate venture capital firms. In an IPO setting, we find that earnings management (long-term performance) significantly decreases (increases) with the ownership of corporate venture capital firms. However, we do not find a significant relation between the ownership of independent venture capital firms and earnings management or long-term performance. The results suggest that Korean independent venture capital firms do not play a role in monitoring their investee companies; in contrast, corporate venture capital firms play a monitoring role.     

Accounting-based downside risk,cost of capital,and the macroeconomy

We hypothesize that earnings downside risk, capturing the expectation for future downward operating performance, contains distinct information about firm risk and varies with cost of capital in the cross section of firms. Consistent with the validity of the earnings downside risk measure, we find that, relative to low earnings downside risk firms, high earnings downside risk firms experience more negative operating performance over the subsequent period, are more sensitive to downward macroeconomic states, and are more strongly linked to earnings attributes and other risk-related measures from prior research. In line with our prediction, we also find that earnings downside risk explains variation in firms’ cost of capital, and that this link between earnings downside risk and cost of capital is incremental to several earnings attributes, accounting and risk factor betas, return downside risk, default risk, earnings volatility, and firm fundamentals. Overall, this study contributes to accounting research by demonstrating the key valuation and risk assessment roles of earnings downside risk derived from firms’ financial statements, also shedding new light on the link between accounting and the macroeconomy.     

Earnings Quality and Market Values of Indonesian Listed Firms

We find that earnings quality (EQ) is reliably negatively correlated with the market values of equity of firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (IDX). The financial reporting process produces earnings viewed as increasingly ‘incomplete’ for valuation purposes by the capital market despite moves towards high‐quality financial reporting standards (IFRS) during the sample period 1995–2015. Time‐series analyses reveal that EQ decreases rather than increases through time. The role of earnings in valuation is replaced by other attributes, most notably net dividends. Firms that pay out dividends are valued significantly higher, and firms that issue equity are valued lower. These results are robust regardless of other accounting, market and governance controls. Large and closely held firms are valued higher than smaller firms, consistent with some aspects of the political cost hypothesis. Shares with higher idiosyncratic risk are valued higher, consistent with option value, as are shares where the volume of shares traded is more volatile. Collectively, the results indicate that the mere adoption of high‐quality accounting standards (IFRS) and other nominal changes in capital market regulations do not automatically increase the quality of the financial reporting process.     

An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan

In May 1997, the Japanese Commercial Code was amended to allow firms to begin granting stock options as compensation to top management and employees. Nearly 350 firms adopted option-based compensation plans between 1997 and 2001. These options typically have five-year lives and are out-of-the-money by about 5% at the grant date. Firms exhibit abnormal stock returns of about 2% around the announcements of plan adoptions. We find improvements in operating performance and observe that dividend policy and volatility remain unchanged post-adoption. Our evidence suggests that well-designed incentive compensation plans are consistent with the creation of shareholder value.     

Insider sales based on short-term earnings information

I find strong evidence of insiders selling shares prior to imminent bad earnings news through their Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. While Rule 10b5-1 selling plans may conjure images of regular selling over a sustained period of time, I find that insiders’ sales under these plans often consist of a small number of sales (the median plan consists of four sales) and commonly occur over a short period of time (the median plan lasts less than 150 days). Abnormal stock returns, earnings surprises, and abnormal earnings announcement returns are all significantly negative following plans that are short-term in nature, but not following plans that are long-term in nature. Although Rule 10b5-1 does not specify a minimum length for selling plans, finding that sales within short plans significantly outperform sales within longer plans suggests that restrictions on plan length would reduce the incidence and appearance of informed selling through Rule 10b5-1 plans.     

Nonearnings Corporate Guidance

We examine nonearnings related disclosure and find that many firms voluntarily provided guidance on capital expenditure (CAPEX) and provided strategic plan disclosure (SPD) before recent proposals to increase nonearnings information disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with high long‐term institutional ownership tend to provide both earnings and CAPEX guidance; that turnaround firms tend to provide SPD in lieu of earnings guidance; and growth firms tend to provide earnings guidance without SPD. Our results suggest that unconstrained firms make optimal disclosure decisions and that corporate guidance behaviors might not have contributed to earnings fixation and myopia in capital markets.     

An analysis of earnings management by European private firms

This paper addresses the questions of whether private firms in eight European countries engage in earnings management, and if so, whether tax incentives affect such practices. To measure earnings management, we analyze the earnings distributions of private firms and compare these distributions with those of public firms in the same countries. The empirical evidence suggests that in absence of capital market pressures, firms still have incentives to manage earnings, as we find that private firms avoid reporting small losses. We further find that private firms in some countries where tax regulation strongly influences financial accounting do not avoid reporting small losses. We attribute this finding to tax incentives reducing firms’ benefits of (upward) earnings management. Finally, our results suggest that some types of earnings management are due to capital market pressures and are specific to public firms since we do not find evidence that private firms avoid earnings decreases.     

The Value Relevance of International Financial Reporting Standards: Empirical Evidence in an Emerging Market

This study examines the value relevance of accounting information under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange (ADX, henceforth). Based on models developed by Easton and Harris (1991), and Ohlson (1995) and using monthly market data from 2000 to 2006, this paper investigates the value relevance of accounting information of firms traded on the ADX. Our overall results show that earnings scaled by beginning of period price are positively and significantly related to cumulative returns and that earnings per share and book value per share are positively and significantly related to price per share. We also find that value relevance of accounting information has changed since the market inception in 2000. The results documented herein extend the literature on value relevance accounting information in an emerging market that requires the use of IFRS. The study therefore contributes to the debate over the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the value relevance of accounting information reported under IFRS.     

Earnings Predictability, Information Asymmetry, and Market Liquidity

We investigate the relation between earnings predictability, information asymmetry and the behavior of the adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread around quarterly earnings announcements for NASDAQ firms. While we find an increase in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread on the day of and the day prior to quarterly earnings announcements for firms with less predictable earnings, we find no evidence of such changes for firms with more predictable earnings. During a non-announcement period, we find that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have consistently higher total bid-ask spreads than firms with more predictable earnings. This finding suggests that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity capital than comparable firms with more predictable earning streams, ceteris paribus. Hence, earnings predictability may be a legitimate concern of managers who wish to minimize their cost of equity capital at least as it pertains to bid-ask spreads.     

Why and how firms use operating cash flow in compensation**

This study considers the choice of operating cash flow (OCF) in contracts and further examines the sensitivity of the CFO's and CEO's compensation to OCF performance, conditional on our stylized indicator of the importance of working capital management (WCM). The analysis depicts OCF as conveying distinct information about WCM, and predicts that firms for which WCM is an important source of value are more likely to contract on OCF. The importance of WCM is instrumented by firm conditions that create strong demand for WCM, including large working capital, rapid growth in working capital, highly volatile working capital, and large debt relative to total assets. Using a sample of firms whose incentive plans explicitly include OCF measures and a control sample of firms without such plans, we show that all four indicators of the importance of WCM have positive association with the likelihood of contracting upon OCF, individually and collectively. In compensation regressions, we find that WCM importance has a pronounced positive effect on the weight of OCF, but muted effect on the weight of accrual earnings. The results suggest that firms include measures of OCF performance in contracts largely to provide incentives for WCM and internal cash generation.     

Management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital

We examine the relation between management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital in a cross-section of 1,355 firms over a 4-year post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period (2001 through 2004). We find evidence of a negative association between the quality of management earnings forecasting policy and cost of equity capital, and we document that the strength of the association is greater for firms with higher disclosure costs and for firms with more relevant quarterly management earnings forecasts. Our results are robust to the use of multiple methods to address both endogeneity and the measurement error in firm-specific estimates of implied cost of equity capital.     

Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

I exploit the adoption of state‐level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.     

The use of earnings and operations management to avoid credit rating downgrades

Firms placed on negative credit watch face the threat of a credit rating downgrade. At the same time, they are given the opportunity to put recovery efforts in place to retain their current credit rating. In this paper, we test to what extent firms use earnings management as a short-term recovery strategy. We find that both accruals-based and real earnings management are associated with firms avoiding credit rating downgrades, and that these alternative earnings management strategies tend to be complements rather than substitutes. However, following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, only real earnings management is significantly associated with the credit watch outcome. We find evidence that firms which maintain their rating via earnings management are better able to afford the inevitable earnings reversals, and that in the year following the credit watch period, the credit rating performance of these firms is significantly better than firms which undergo a downgrade, with fewer downgrades and more upgrades in this period. Our results also imply that credit rating agencies are not misled by earnings management but rather allow for some discretion in reporting earnings that facilitates the dissemination of private information about future firm performance.     

Geographic earnings disclosure and trading volume

Beginning with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131), Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, most US multinational firms no longer disclose geographic earnings in their annual reports. Given the recent growth in foreign operations of US firms and the varying operating environments around the world, information (or lack thereof) related to geographical performance can affect investors’ information set. Using empirical tests that closely follow the [Kim, O., Verrecchia, R., 1997. Pre-announcement and event-period private information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 395–419] model, we find results consistent with their predictions. Specifically, using a sample of firms with substantial foreign operations, we find evidence of a decrease in event period private information following adoption of SFAS 131 for firms that no longer disclose geographic earnings. These results suggest that decreased public information (i.e., non-disclosure of geographic earnings) reduces the ability of investors to utilize or generate private information in conjunction with the public announcement of quarterly earnings, which dampens trading. We also find evidence of a decrease in pre-announcement private information following adoption of SFAS 131. This is consistent with an overall improvement in public disclosures that has the effect of reducing differences in the precision of private information across investors in the period prior to the earnings announcement. However, such an effect is observed for both firms which no longer disclose geographic earnings and for firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings.