Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region–specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within–region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non–monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.     

Production externalities and convexity

This paper explores in some detail the relation between production externalities (detrimental or positive) and convexity of the production-possibilities set. A set of sufficient conditions to rule out local non-convexity is derived in terms of the original production functions. The problem is illustrated for the case of one productive input. Regardless of whether externalities lead to non-convexity they may still give rise to a multiplicity of local private maxima even when the social maximum is a global one. The possibility of unique private maximum coupled with multiple local social maxima had been mentioned before by Baumol among others. The fact that externalities may lead to the converse case, as shown in the paper, seems not to have been noticed before.     

Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability

We evaluate how governance uncertainty—exemplified by turnout uncertainty—affects the trade‐off between internalization of externalities and political accountability in the design of the fiscal state. We show that centralization only weakens political accountability in the presence of negative externalities. Unlike positive externalities, negative externalities allow federal politicians to extract higher rents. This yields two new insights. First, decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities. Second, centralization may not be Pareto efficient in economies with positive externalities despite the fact that policy can be tailored to regional taste differences and centralization internalizes the positive externality.     

VOTING,LOBBYING, AND THE DECENTRALIZATION THEOREM

This paper revisits the well‐known fiscal “Decentralization Theorem” by relaxing the role of the assumption that governments are benevolent, while retaining the assumption of policy uniformity. If, instead, decisions are made by majority voting, the theorem fails. Specifically, (i) centralization can welfare‐dominate decentralization even if there are no externalities and regions are heterogeneous and (ii) decentralization can welfare‐dominate centralization even if there are positive externalities and regions are homogeneous. Similar results are obtained if a benevolent government is subject to lobbying. Hence, the Decentralization Theorem is not robust to relatively minor deviations away from the benchmark of a purely benevolent government.     

Network externalities and interconnection: the case of information intrastructures

Information infrastructures are characterized by the existence of direct and indirect network externalities. However, the presence of externalities poses two types of problem: they create phenomena of overproduction (consumption) and under-production (consumption); and they require the operators reach a critical size of subscribers quickly. Facing this question of critical size, the interconnection makes it possible for the networks to develop by relying on network externalities. However, the justification of interconnection does not concern the externalities solely but is also based on the existence of essential facilities. The first part examines the various types of network externalities, whose implications are presented in the second part. The third part deals with the stakes of the interconnection.     

Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division.     

Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division.     

Bio-economic modelling of soil erosion externalities and policy options: a Tunisian case study

Soil erosion is one of the most important of today’s environmental externalities and a major threat to sustainability of agricultural system. It constitutes the most widespread forms of land degradation throughout the world. The aim of this paper is to estimate the amount of soil erosion generated by the current cropping systems in Tunisia and to assess the economic and ecological impacts of policy instruments designed to handle this problem. The analysed policy options are based on soil conservation practices and direct incentive farming anti-erosive measures. The selected measures are the reduction of tillage, the avoidance of bare fallow and the use of legume-based crop rotation. A bio-economic modelling framework coupling the biophysical model EPIC to a non-linear dynamic programming farm model was used for this impact analysis. It was performed in a set of representative farms belonging to a region in North-Eastern Tunisia (Zaghouan) strongly affected by this phenomenon. The main finding of this research is the non-convexity of the crop yield—soil erosion space. That is, the use of more intensive techniques to increase productivity (i.e. crop yield) may be accompanied by rough changes in soil erosion (damage) curves, manifested either by non-monotony or non-convexity. In term of policy options and because of giving up convexity assumptions, incentive anti-erosive measures appear more efficient than conventional environmental policies such as Pigouvian taxes or quota systems. The implementation of soil conservation practices would leads to a net decrease in soil erosion and an increase in farm income. However, with the current interest rate of 7% the possible rise in income is not enough to stimulate farmers to invest on these practices. A maximum rate of 4% would be necessary to make this policy option more effective.     

Interest group politics in a federation

The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996–2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.     

Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

A large body of the mechanism design literature relies on convexity assumptions on the set of types (that is, on the domain of the mechanism). In this note I show that, at least for auction mechanisms with independent signals, it is always possible to extend incentive compatible mechanisms to incentive compatible mechanisms defined on any larger set of types. I acknowledge the comments of Luis Braido, Sérgio Orioli, Humberto Moreira, Frank Page and an anonymous referee. The financial support of Edital Universal 02/06, CNPq is gratefully acknowledged.     

Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis

The decision to allocate policy jurisdictions to different levels of government is related to a number of trade‐offs between the advantages and disadvantages of centralized versus decentralized provision of public services. A trade‐off central to many discussions is that between the internalization of externalities under centralization versus an “accountability” advantage of decentralization. In this paper we formalize this trade‐off in the context of a class of principal–agent models known as common agency.     

Endogenous Growth: Fragile Foundations?

The Frankel, Romer and Lucas theories of endogenous growth rest on the assumptions of knowledge‐based externalities and price‐taking representative agents. It is argued that, in a context of long‐run growth, these assumptions are mutually incompatible, that representative agents will cooperate to internalize the externalities and will cease to be price takers, and that, therefore, the relevance of theories based on those assumptions must be questioned.     

Do Urban Neighborhoods Benefit from Homeowners? Evidence from Housing Prices

Homeownership is heavily subsidized in most countries. The adverse effects of this policy on economic efficiency and income distribution are well documented in the economics literature. The main argument in favor of subsidizing homeownership is that it creates positive externalities that offset these adverse effects. In this paper, we test whether homeowners create positive externalities that capitalize into housing prices in multi‐storey buildings. Using semi‐parametric hedonic regressions with and without instrumental variables, we find no evidence of positive externalities, although the results with instrumental variables are somewhat imprecise. This result is robust to several sensitivity checks and to a relaxation of the identification assumptions of our instrument using set identification.     

EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN COMMONWEALTH GRANTS TO THE STATES: A CGE ANALYSIS*

This paper describes CSF, a general equilibrium model encompassing factors of relevance to economic efficiency in Federal/State funding including: interstate differences in tax bases and unit costs of State‐provided goods; factor mobility; congestion; State‐government behaviour incorporating the possibility that governments in subsidised States embark on expenditures with low benefit/cost ratios (flypaper effects); fiscal externalities; and non‐discretionary expenditures in each State associated with special national responsibilities. The model is applied to Australia where Federal/State funding is a major political and economic issue. Welfare effects of moving from the present Australian funding system based on fiscal equalisation to a system of equal‐per‐capita grants are calculated. CSF implies that the welfare gain from this move would be small. The most important source of potential welfare gain is a reduction in flypaper effects. The recognition of congestion externalities can eliminate the small welfare gain, but only under seemingly extreme assumptions. The results are not very sensitive to variations in assumptions concerning population mobility and fiscal externalities.     

Using Fast and Slow Processes to Manage Resources with Thresholds

Economists have relied on convexity assumptions for a long time but many natural resources that stem from ecosystems have non-convexities in their dynamics. This article illustrates the consequences of relaxing convexity assumptions for management and the role of fast and slow variables. The paper presents a general framework to handle systems with fast and slow variables, and illustrates the method using a model of coral reefs subject to fishing pressure. The insights obtained are used to discuss alternative management strategies.

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Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .      

The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem

This paper clarifies and synthesizes elements of the two decade old debate concerning the Coase theorem and the empty core. Five lessons can be derived from this debate. First, the Coase theorem may break down when there more than two participants (provided the additional participants bring an additional externality to the table). Second, the problem of the empty core does not disappear in a world of positive transaction costs. Under reasonable assumptions about the transactions technology, transaction costs may well exacerbate the empty-core problem. As a consequence, it is important to differentiate between transaction costs (when the core exists) and costs due to the empty core because each has different implications for rationalizing institutional arrangements. Third, the Coase theorem will not break down when the number of participants increases if the new participants do not bring additional externalities with them. If, however, additional participants bring in additional externalities, then the core may be empty and Pareto efficiency may not emerge from costless negotiations. Fourth, Pareto Optimality can be achieved when the core is empty by judicious use of penalty clauses, binding contracts, and constraints on the bargaining mechanism. Fifth, when a non-excludable public good is involved, a free-rider problem arises as the number of agents increases, and this undermines the Coase theorem; in this case, Coasean efficiency requires the participation of all agents affected by the externality in the writing of binding contracts.     

如何最优地"放权"——行政事项集权与分权的最优边界

"简政放权、放管结合"是深化行政体制改革、转变政府职能的重要内容之一."放权"政策体现了政府的权力分配模式从集权向分权的转变,其本质是一种"行政性分权".文章从提高经济运行效率即最大化中央政府效用的视角,以建模方式——建立了一个三层次政府的动态博弈模型,给出了集权与分权的边界,揭示"放权"政策的逻辑,从而试图为研究政府最优行政分权提供一种可行的思路,并尝试用这一模型为"放权"政策提供合理的解释.模型分析结果表明,(1)分权能够在不改变社会福利水平的情况下,通过减少中央政府的信息成本负担提升了经济运行的效率,这也是"放权"政策的主要目的.同时,权力的下放可能导致下级政府"寻租"的隐患,需要加大对这一行为的惩罚力度."权力清单"制度的建立,通过明确规定中间政府的权力范围,加强了对中间政府行使权力的监督,减弱了其滥用权力的动机.(2)具有以下特征的权力,分权往往比集权更优:下级政府的成本负担轻、连带惩罚力度小;权力实施时底层政府追求的目标差异程度小、彼此之间相互影响程度小.与历次国发文中下放的权力做了比对后发现,这些被下放的权力能够用上述的特征进行较好的解释.(3)各因素影响分权最优性的强弱关系是:信息成本和对中间政府滥用权力的惩罚力度这两个因素强于权力本身的若干特征,即带给下级政府的成本负担、连带惩罚程度;政策实施时底层政府追求的目标差异程度、外部性大小.     

Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games

An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors. The stochastic stability properties of the model are then examined and it is shown that stochastically stable states solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem which reduces to maximizing a Rawlsian SWF for a common class of utility functions. In contrast to previous analyses, the stochastically stable state is unique for a broad class of utility functions.     

Decentralization and local pollution activities: New quasi evidence from China

Traditional fiscal federalism theory holds that decentralization may improve the provision of public goods and services. However, the social welfare field with strong externalities may face different incentives and behavioural logics. This paper provides novel empirical evidence for the causal relationship between decentralization and local pollution. In this paper, we focussed on China's widely spread decentralization reform, which substantially expanded the economic and social management autonomy of county governments. Using the difference-in-differences method and a panel dataset from 1998 to 2007, we found that the reform would compel affected counties to loosen environmental regulation, adopt financial and fiscal policies that would actually support heavy-pollution industries' rapid economic growth. Overall, the reform led to a significant increase in local pollution, thus worsening the overall environmental quality. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis indicated that the reforms generated net gains in social welfare, but the substantial environmental costs cannot be ignored.     

Adoption externalities as public goods

A public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities. For positive externalities, agents furnish a public good by taking an action. Similarly, for negative externalities, agents furnish a public good by not taking an action. We examine these externalities in a binary choice problem, i.e. adoption externalities. In each case, there is a potential role for government intervention, even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed, since one equilibrium Pareto dominates all others. We analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models, and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention.