Do Germans Save to Leave an Estate? An Examination of the Bequest Motive

I investigate whether a bequest motive for savings influences the post-retirement wealth trajectories of German households. Two measures of the bequest motive are studied: the existence of children as the main group of potential heirs and the respondents' declared intention to bequeath. While having children has no significant impact on households' wealth trajectories, stated bequest intentions are associated with considerable heterogeneity in wealth holdings. The main conclusion from this study is that both the pure life-cycle model and the life-cycle model with bequest motives provide a valid basis for a theory of household wealth accumulation once the heterogeneity of preferences is acknowledged.
JEL classification : D 91; J 14     

Renewable resource and capital with a joy-of-giving resource bequest motive

In this article we ask whether a privately owned natural renewable resource can be conserved and managed efficiently when households have a joy-of-giving resource bequest motive. We model an overlapping generations economy in which firms have access to a CES production technology combining the natural resource, physical capital and labor. Our results shed light on the interplay between the resource bequest motive and the substitutability/complementarity relationship between capital and the natural resource in the determination of the equilibrium propensity to use the resource. The mere existence of the bequest motive does not guarantee that the resource will be conserved in the long run. When the resource is highly substitutable with capital, the equilibrium actually never exhausts the resource stock whatever the intensity of the bequest motive. When the resource is a poor substitute for capital, the equilibrium preserves the resource only if the taste for bequeathing is strong enough. Be the economy in over-accumulation or in under-accumulation of the natural resource, it always increases aggregate consumption to run the stock of capital at a level lower than the efficiency level.     

Another reconciliation between economists and forestry experts: OLG-arguments

Foresters often claim that the goal of good forest policy is to have a sustained forest yield, or even a maximum sustainable yield. They also claim that people wish to save a few extra trees for their children. This bequest motive is not modelled in the standard approach to the optimal rotation problem. In this paper, we present a standard version of an overlapping generation model augmented with a simple tree technology. We show in particular that the market equilibrium can be dynamically inefficient, and that a bequest motive in terms of trees can correct for the overaccumulation of capital that causes the inefficiency. The bequest motive also enables us to account for a harvesting intensity varying with age (young people typically cut more than elderly people) in spite of a perfect capital market.The crux of the argument is that a bequest motive is likely to increase the equilibrium interest rate and move the economy away from a maximum sustainable yield policy. It, however, improves efficiency and is able to explain empirical regularities that are not easily explained by a traditional perfect capital market approach to forestry.The author acknowledges comments from Karl-Göran Mäler, Stockholm School of Economics, participants in the economics-forestry economics seminar at the University of Umeå, and two anonymous referees.     

WHY DO CHILDREN TAKE CARE OF THEIR ELDERLY PARENTS? ARE THE JAPANESE ANY DIFFERENT?

We conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of why children live with (or near) their parents and provide care and assistance to them using microdata from a Japanese household survey, the Osaka University Preference Parameter Study. We find that the Japanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care and attention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support for the strategic bequest motive, but that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength of their altruism toward their parents and social norms.     

Estate tax and lifetime income inequality

This paper constructs a heterogeneous, intertemporal general equilibrium framework which integrates both intended and unintended bequest motives to examine the long-run effects of an estate tax on the inequality of lifetime income. The results are ambiguous in general and sensitive to the type of transfer motive involved. We find that in the purely intended bequest case, an estate tax increases the steady-state inequality of net lifetime income in the case where people's elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than one. However, in the purely unintended bequest case, the effect of an estate tax on inequality is dependent on the probability of survival.     

INCOME AND WEALTH OVER THE LIFE CYCLE EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA

In this paper we examine household wealth and income in the Netherlands using data from the Socio Economic Panel (SEP) in the period 1987–89. We provide an evaluation of the quality of the data and some simple statistics which describe the behavior of wealth, saving, and income over the life cycle. We find there is substantial heterogeneity in the behavior of households, and wealth holdings vary substantially even among the same age group. By exploiting the panel feature of the SEP, we derive saving from first differencing wealth. We find that a sizeable fraction of households do not dissave when old and we find some evidence in favor of the bequest motive.     

Do estate and gift taxes affect the timing of private transfers?

Proposals to alter the estate tax are contentious and have been considered largely in an empirical vacuum. This paper examines time series and cross-sectional variation to identify the effects of estate and gift taxation on the timing of private transfers. The analysis is based on data from the 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Legislative activity during this period reduced the tax disadvantage of bequests relative to gifts. Moreover, the magnitude of this reduction differed systematically across identifiable household categories. We find that households experiencing larger declines in the expected tax disadvantages of bequests reduced inter vivos transfers relative to households experiencing small declines in the tax disadvantages of bequests. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the timing of transfers is responsive to applicable gift and estate tax rates. The results also provide evidence of a systematic bequest motive for high-wealth households.     

Envy and Inequality*

We present an overlapping generations economy, populated by heterogeneous agents who care about both consumption relative to others and the bequest they leave to their offspring. We show that saving and bequest rates vary across the income distribution, and we obtain several interesting results. First, envy reduces the steady‐state capital stock and increases the degree of inequality in consumption, capital ownership, and bequests. Second, if the bequest motive is sufficiently strong the equalizing effect of bequests disappears. Third, income inequality for a given cohort increases with age. Fourth, the distribution of inherited wealth becomes more unequal than that of wealth in general. Fifth, economic position becomes more persistent across generations.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.     

Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism

We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.     

中国城镇居民储蓄的影响因素研究:基于三类储蓄动机的实证分析

本文用中国城镇居民1980-2007年的数据,检验了影响居民储蓄行为的三类动机,即生命周期动机、遗赠动机和预防性动机。结果发现这三类储蓄动机都对中国城镇居民的储蓄行为产生影响,其中生命周期储蓄动机是解释中国居民高储蓄率的重要原因,但收入分配差距扩大导致整个社会的遗赠储蓄增加,引起总消费不振。此外,由于居民面临的不确定性增加,中国城镇居民的预防性储蓄动机也随之提高。     

Nursing home choice,family bargaining,and optimal policy in a Hotelling economy

We develop a model of family bargaining to study the impact of the distribution of bargaining power within the family on the choice of nursing homes by families, and on the locations and prices chosen by nursing homes in a Hotelling economy. In the baseline (static) model, where the dependent parent cares only about the location of the nursing home, the markup of nursing homes is increasing in the bargaining power of the dependent parent, and nursing homes are located at the extreme periphery. We compare the laissez‐faire with the social optimum (which involves more central locations of nursing homes), and examine its decentralization in first‐best and second‐best settings. We explore the robustness of our results to introducing a bequest motive in a dynamic overlapping generations model, which allows us to study the joint dynamics of wealth accumulation and nursing home prices. If the bequest motive is strong, the markup is decreasing in the bargaining power of the dependent. However, wealth accumulation, by reducing interest rates, raises markup rates and nursing homes prices.     

Deviant generations, Ricardian equivalence, and growth cycles

Two equilibrium possibilities are known to obtain in a standard overlapping-generations model with dynastic preferences: either the altruistic bequest motive is operative for every generation (in which case, Ricardian equivalence obtains) or it is not, for any generation. Dynamic equilibria, where the bequest motive is occasionally operative, cannot emerge. This paper studies bequest-giving behavior and out-of-steady-state bequest and growth dynamics in a Ak model with intra- and inter-generational consumption externalities. These externalities, by their very presence, do not destroy Ricardian equivalence. They may, however, give rise to deviant generations—generations that do not leave a bequest having received an inheritance, and vice versa—and that seals the fate for Ricardian equivalence. Consumption externalities may also generate interesting indeterminacies and endogenous growth cycles that did not exist otherwise.     

Tax reform in a two-class growth model

This paper analyzes the welfare and distributional effects of tax reforms in a two-class model with exogenous labour supply. It extends the empirically calibrated, standard life-cycle model to include both pure life-cycle savers and households with an altruistic bequest motive. The tax reform simulations cover the move from an income to a wage and a consumption tax, respectively. The role of borrowing constraints is studied and a dynamic analysis of tax reforms using a static expectation approach is performed. The simulation results indicate that the two tax reforms have different impacts on the welfare of the two classes: while the pure life-cycle savers are better off with the consumption tax, the altruistically motivated households gain more under a wage tax. The results further show that while the introduction of a consumption tax is distributionally neutral, the move to a wage tax substantially increases income and wealth inequality.     

Bequest Motives and the Demand for Life Insurance in East Germany

Empirical studies of household saving remain inconclusive about the role of bequest motives. This may be due to the diluting effect of different tax regimes across countries and time on estimates of bequest motives. Relative to market‐based economies, the former German Democratic Republic can be viewed as an experimental institutional setting where life‐insurance demand was not influenced by tax considerations. This allows isolating bequest motives from other life‐cycle and precautionary savings motives. Analyzing the demand for life insurance, we find a significantly higher ownership probability among households with children and a high regard for the family, confirming bequest motives in life‐insurance demand.     

Social status pursuit,distribution of bequests and inequality

The quest for social status modifies lifetime decisions and as a consequence, the trajectory of the overall economy. Focusing on the relative wealth dimension of social status, we build a two-period overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents to investigate the effects of status quest on the evolution of bequest distribution and household inequality. We show that the bequest motive and the concern for social status not only increase the stationary level of capital but also enhance the household equality.     

Wealth Inequality and Intergenerational Links

Previous work has had difficulty generating household saving behaviour that makes the distribution of wealth much more concentrated than that of labour earnings, and that makes the richest households hold onto large amounts of wealth, even during very old age. I construct a quantitative, general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model in which parents and children are linked by accidental and voluntary bequests and by earnings ability. I show that voluntary bequests can explain the emergence of large estates, while accidental bequests alone cannot, and that adding earnings persistence within families increases wealth concentration even more. I also show that the introduction of a bequest motive generates lifetime savings profiles more consistent with the data.     

THE IMPACT OF BEQUESTS ON LIFETIME WEALTH ACCUMULATION: AN ECONOMETRIC STUDY OF TWO GENERATIONS OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN INDIA

Using retrospective data on bequest receipts and wealth over two generations of rural Indian households, we have estimated the effect of bequest receipts on the lifetime wealth accumulation of recipients. We exploit the availability of data on two generations of the same household by estimating a family fixed effects model that controls for unobserved, intergenerationally-persistent household endowments. Our results suggest an adverse impact of bequest receipts on the wealth accumulation of recipients. This effect is much more negative for the current generation of household heads than for the previous generation, indicating that the disincentive effects associated with bequest receipts have increased substantially over a generation. Such disincentive effects are consistent with the commonly-observed phenomenon of "regression to the mean." The empirical results also show that the positive association between schooling and wealth accumulation has strengthened substantially over the course of a generation, implying rising returns to schooling.     

Consumption over the life cycle: The role of annuities

We explore the quantitative implications of uncertainty about the length of life and a lack of annuity markets for life cycle consumption in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which markets are otherwise complete. Empirical studies find that consumption displays a hump shape over the life cycle. Our model exhibits life cycle consumption that is consistent with this pattern. Our calibrated model, which includes an unfunded social security system, displays a hump shape but the peak occurs later in the life cycle than in the data. Adding a bequest motive causes this decline to begin at a younger age.     

Social security is NOT a substitute for annuity markets

Common wisdom suggests that a fully-funded actuarially fair social security system should increase welfare when households face longevity risk and annuity markets are missing. This wisdom is based on the observation that social security pays benefits as life annuities and therefore appears to complete the market. However, we argue that common wisdom is based on a benefit-only analysis that ignores a fundamental cost—social security crowds out the bequests that households leave (and receive) in general equilibrium. We conduct a general equilibrium cost-benefit analysis of the longevity insurance role of social security, and we show that under certain conditions this decline in bequest income offsets any possible gains from access to a public annuity pool. We abstract from distortions to national income and factor prices to show that the equilibrium bequest channel is all that is needed to reach this conclusion.