Trade policies, concentration, growth and welfare

The aim of this paper is to analyse, through a theoretical model, the effects that the trade integration of two countries may have on industrial location, growth and welfare.The conclusions reached finally depend both on whether the import or the export costs are affected by the trade policies on which the integration process is based and on whether the rich or the poor country introduces them. In general, when integration leads to an increase of industrial concentration in the rich country, the growth rate increases and welfare improves in both countries. If integration means that industry moves to the poor country, the growth rate decreases; in spite of this, in this case the poor country can also improve its welfare.     

Return policies, market outcomes, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  The effect of return policies on market outcomes is studied in a model where consumers differ in their valuations of time. Product reliability is identified with defect rates. Producers first choose reliability levels and then compete in prices. For given defect rates, allowing returns makes products closer substitutes, enhancing competition and reducing prices. Being closer substitutes makes higher reliability less worthwhile, which reduces reliability. While the decrease in reliability reduces consumer welfare, the decrease in prices raises it. The latter dominates, so that aggregate consumer welfare increases with return policy.     

Credit policies,macroeconomic stability and welfare: The case of China

Using a new Keynesian DSGE model with credit constraints, we study the impact on macroeconomic volatility of a macroprudential credit policy of the type implemented by the Central Bank of China. We find that the countercyclical credit policy plays a non-negligible role in stabilizing the real economy, and that this effect is distinctly more pronounced when credit conditions are looser. By means of a second-order approximation method, we show that the macroprudential credit policy can significantly boost welfare, benefiting the entrepreneurial sector more than the household sector. The results can yield insights for the institutional and policy setting of China and other emerging countries.     

Discounting and divergence of opinion

Agents impatience rate and their anticipations about the future of the economy, are two essential determinants of the equilibrium discount rate, as illustrated by the Ramsey formula. Heterogeneity in time preference rates and in anticipations is widely acknowledged. Our objective is to determine the equilibrium discount rate when this heterogeneity is taken into account. Among others we tackle the following questions: As an additional risk or uncertainty, can dispersion in agents' characteristics lead to lower discount rates? What is the asymptotic behavior of the discount rate in such a setting? More generally, what is the shape of the yield curve?     

Public policies: will policy be ineffective if welfare is a random-walk

This study contradicts the view that policy cannot be effective if the welfare variable is a random-walk. Also, the study disagrees with the methodology employed by some proponents of this view, and goes on to show that the conclusion of policy ineffectiveness was only due to a wrong inference procedure. Furthermore, it points out that the notion of policy effectiveness suggests the examination of the relationship between policy and welfare; hence, what to look for is not a trend in the individual time series, but a common trend which relates the policy instrument and the welfare-variable in the policy environment under consideration.     

Endogenous Discounting and Climate Policy

Under risk of abrupt climate change, the occurrence hazard is added to the social discount rate. As a result, the social discount rate (1) increases and (2) turns endogenous to the global warming policy. The second effect bears profound policy implications that are magnified by economic growth. In particular, we find that greenhouse gases (GHG) emission should be terminated at a finite time so that the ensuing occurrence risk will vanish in the long run. Due to the public bad nature of the catastrophic risk, the second effect is ignored in a competitive allocation and unregulated economic growth will give rise to excessive emissions. In the long term, the GHG emission paths under the optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends of the range of feasible emissions.     

Does exchange rate variability matter for welfare? A quantitative investigation of stabilization policies

This paper studies what degree of exchange rate stabilization is optimal for several types of open economies. This is accomplished through a quantitative evaluation of optimal monetary policy rules in a two-country sticky-price model. First, a calibrated benchmark model with incomplete asset markets supports past conclusions from simpler models, emphasizing inflation stabilization rather than exchange rate stabilization. It also highlights that the utility gains from optimal stabilization policy are small. Second, while an economy extended to include consumer habits implies greater sensitivity by households to consumption variability, it has only minor effects on the benchmark conclusions and benefits. Finally, these conclusions are altered under an alternative environment where international asset markets exhibit asymmetry in the form of “original sin.” Such countries can benefit from policies that aggressively stabilize the exchange rate, with utility gains larger than the previous cases.     

Discounting and altruism to future decision-makers

Is discounting of future decision-makers’ consumption utilities consistent with “pure” altruism toward those decision-makers, that is, a concern that they are better off according to their own, likewise forward-looking, preferences? It turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics literature. In particular, “hyperbolic” discounting of the form used by Phelps and Pollak (Rev. Econ. Studies 35 (1968) 201) and Laibson (Quart. J. Econ. 112 (1997) 443) is consistent with exponential altruism towards future generations. More generally, we establish a one-to-one relationship between discount functions and altruism weight systems, and provide sufficient, as well as necessary, conditions for discount functions to be consistent with pure altruism.     

Revenue raising trade-restricting policies under uncertainty: The sub-optimality of the expected welfare criterion and some safety-first results

The analysis of trade-restricting policies under uncertainty has typically argued in favour of the specific tariff over alternative commercial policies such as the ad valorem tariff and the quota, when the raising of revenue and maintenance of consumer's welfare are the policy objectives. This paper reconsiders this result. It is demonstrated that, when the shape of the welfare probability distribution is considered explicitly, the quota may be the dominant trade-restricting policy. In addition, the analysis of trade-restricting instruments is analysed for the case where the principle of safety-first is applied to the revenue-raising objective.We should like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

External balance,dynamic efficiency,and the welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in interdependent economies

This paper investigates domestic and foreign welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that the welfare effects of a more stringent cap on emissions depend on the external balance of the policy implementing country, the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy, and the preference for environmental quality. Under dynamic efficiency, the global welfare loss of policy implementation in a net foreign creditor country is lower than of a policy in the net foreign debtor country. Moreover, although the country which has unilaterally implemented a permit policy would gain from a multilateral policy, the associated welfare loss for the other country is larger than that of a unilateral policy abroad.     

A welfare anomaly in the rate-of-return regulated monopoly model which creates opportunities for offsetting taxation and regulatory policies

The impact of the property tax on a fair rate of return regulated firm is examined. We find that a change in the tax rate has exactly the same effect on factor employment, output and hence the price as an equivalent change in the allowed rate of return. However, an increase in the allowed rate of return will lead to higher profits, whereas the same increase in the property tax rate will decrease profits. We find that an increase in the tax rate or allowed rate of return may result in a net increase in social welfare. This result contradicts the long-established belief that a lower (or no) tax is preferred to a higher tax rate in maximizing welfare. Finally, a linear iso-welfare locus is derived which creates the possibility of the regulatory agency or the tax authority offsetting the negative effects of the other's policy.     

An empirical evaluation of China’s monetary policies

This paper investigates the responsiveness of the Chinese government’s monetary policies in terms of the money supply and interest rates to economic conditions and the effectiveness of these policies in achieving the goals of stimulating economic growth and controlling inflation. We analyze the responsiveness and effectiveness by estimating the Taylor rule, the McCallum rule, and a vector autoregressive model using quarterly data in the period of 1992-2009. The results show that, overall, the monetary policy variables respond to economic growth and the inflation rate, but the magnitudes of the responses are much weaker than those observed in market economies. Money supply responded actively to both the inflation rate and the real output and had certain effects on the future inflation rates and real output. The official interest rates, on the other hand, responded passively to the inflation rate and did not respond to the real output. They do not have any effect on future inflation rates and real output either.     

Behavioural Economics,Hyperbolic Discounting and Environmental Policy

This paper reviews some recent research in “behavioural economics” with an application to environmental issues. Empirical results from behavioural economics provide a reminder that human behaviour is context-dependent, implying that policy may go awry if based upon models of behaviour which are inappropriate to the contexts in which decisions are made. Recognizing that agents may, in some contexts, systematically make mistakes raises challenging questions about the role of “paternalism” in government policy. The paper considers the research into hyperbolic discounting, and examines the implications for environmental policy. We develop a model of resource management under hyperbolic discounting, which shows that if a planner is unable to commit to a policy, the temptation to re-evaluate the policy in future could lead to an inadvertent collapse in the stocks of a natural resource.     

Hyperbolic Discounting,Borrowing Aversion and Debt Holding

Analysis of an original Internet‐based survey reveals that debt holding is related to time discounting through: (i) present bias, measured by the degree of declining impatience in the generalized hyperbolic discount function; (ii) borrowing aversion, captured by a sign effect in that future losses are discounted at lower rates than future gains; and (iii) impatience, measured by the overall discount rate. Hyperbolic respondents are classified naïve if their answers reveal them to be time‐inconsistent procrastinators, and otherwise sophisticated. Naïve respondents with more steeply declining impatience are more likely to be debtors. The sign effect relates negatively to borrowing. Survey responses indicative of high or declining impatience are associated with credit card borrowing and other overborrowing indicators.     

Altruism,fertility, and the value of children: Health policy evaluation and intergenerational welfare

This paper accounts for the value of children and future generations in the evaluation of health policies. This is achieved through the incorporation of altruism and fertility in a “value of life” type of framework. We are able to express adults' willingness to pay for changes in child mortality and also to incorporate the welfare of future generations in the evaluation of current policies. Our model clarifies a series of puzzles from the literature on the “value of life” and on intergenerational welfare comparisons. We show that, by incorporating altruism and fertility into the analysis of the recent U.S. experience, the estimated welfare gain of a young adult from reductions in mortality easily doubles.     

A Note on Discounting an Increasingly Uncertain Future

This note clarifies the roles played by the wealth and precautionary effects in determining the socially efficient discount rate for public investment projects and how the rate should vary over time. We first give a general characterization of the effects of stochastic shifts in the consumption growth rate on the magnitude of the socially efficient discount rate. We then show that increasing uncertainty in the consumption growth rate provides a natural and compelling rationale for discounting more distant future consumption at a lower rate.     

Demography and welfare economics

The focusing on demographic issues as an important part of welfare-economic assessment shifts the evaluative space in the direction of public discussion and social concern. A commoditycentred view of individual success and social welfare is often used in economics. But the linkage between our economic wealth and our ability to live as we would like has strong limits. This is partly because of interpersonal variations between individuals, but also because of variations in public and social arrangements (for example, for public health care, education and social security). The use of demographic perspectives can enrich economic analysis in several ways. In particular a demographically oriented system of evaluation can not only focus on variables that we all value, but it also gives us the freedom to decide what weights would be most appropriate for the exercise in which we might be engaged. The problem of valuation in welfare economics is ultimately a social-choice issue, requiring the use of explicit judgments on which the society can achieve some consensus through political processes.Lecture presented to the annual meeting of the Austrian Economic Association in Vienna, 24 May 1994. The author is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation for the research on which this paper draws.     

Choice and individual welfare

We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a “rational” ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. Our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective, and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis. We provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose. Namely, we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model). We require that for any two alternatives x and y, if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions, then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions. Together with some mild technical requirements, such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set. It therefore requires us to have a “prior view” about how important or representative a choice of x at a given situation is.