Sharing the Burden? Empirical Evidence on Corporate Tax Incidence

This study investigates the direct incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT) through wage bargaining, using an industry‐region level panel dataset on all corporations in Germany over the period 1998–2006. For the first time we account for employment effects which result from tax‐induced wage changes. Workers share in reductions of the CIT burden; yet, the net effect of wage bargaining on the corporate wage bill, after an exogenous €1 decrease in the CIT burden, is as little as 19–28 cents. This is about half of the effect obtained in prior literature focussing on wages alone.     

The impact of the corporate income tax: evidence from state organizational form data

By taxing the income of corporate firms at a different rate than non-corporate firms, taxes can play an important role in a firm's choice of organizational form. The sensitivity of the organizational form decision to tax rates provides a key indicator of the distortion created by the corporate income tax. This paper uses new cross-sectional data on organizational form choices across states compiled in the Census of Retail Trade to estimate this sensitivity. The results document a significant impact of the relative taxation of corporate to personal income on the share of real economic activity that is done by corporations and that the impact is many times larger than has been found in the previous empirical literature based on time-series data. The results show little impact, however, on the actual operations of firms such as their labor intensity, wages and the like. They do indicate that firms are able to exploit the progressivity of the corporate income tax system by dividing into numerous firms.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

TAXES ON PAYROLL, REVENUES AND PROFITS IN THREE MODELS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Variations in company taxes are analysed for a right-to-manage model, an efficient bargaining setting and a seniority approach. Taxes cannot be shifted forward by the risk-neutral firm. Alternative income and bargaining power are allowed to vary with taxes. Employing asymmetric Nash solution it is found that changes in a payroll, revenue or profit tax can have differing implications for labour demand curve models and efficient bargaining solutions. This distinction might provide a novel basis for empirical work. Variations in bargaining power and-within a labour demand curve setting-the union's objective function do not change results.     

税收负担对企业固定资产投资的影响——基于税种差异视角的研究

本文以2003—2018年中国上市企业数据为样本,从税种差异视角分析了增值税有效税率与企业所得税有效税率变化对企业固定资产投资的影响。研究发现,增值税有效税率与企业固定资产投资的关系依赖于宏观经济环境和企业税负转嫁能力。具体而言,在经济上行期或税负转嫁能力较强的企业中,增值税有效税率降低促进了企业固定资产投资增加。所得税有效税率与企业固定资产投资之间始终为显著负相关关系。所得税有效税率的降低可以通过增强企业内外部融资能力来促进其固定资产投资增加,特别是当企业债务风险相对较低时,所得税有效税率下降对固定资产投资的正向影响效果会随企业融资约束程度的上升而增大。本文分析在一定程度上说明了不同税种的税负变化对企业投资产生差异化影响,进而为减税助力企业投资提供了新的微观经验证据。     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Fiscal policies,frictional labor market,and endogenous growth

This paper considers the spillover effects from public spending, and studies optimal fiscal policies in frictional labor markets. We obtain that the optimal shares of government spending in production and consumption are the same as those in a frictionless labor market under the Hosios condition. However, as higher capital accumulation increases the cost of job creation and maintenance, the optimal tax rate of capital income is positive. In addition, when the labor market is frictional, the marginal benefit of labor is larger than the marginal utility of leisure. Thus, consumption and labor should not be taxed uniformly any more. Our calibration suggests that all of the three tax rates should be positive. Moreover, in the situation in which the Hosios condition does not hold, the shares of public productive spending and public consumption both increase when the worker’s bargaining power is greater than the elasticity of search in the matching function.     

THE INCOME REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT OF CHINA'S PERSONAL INCOME TAX: WHAT THE MICRO‐DATA SAY

This article uses continuous micro‐level data to investigate the income redistribution effect of the personal income tax (PIT) in China beginning in 1997. We find that the average tax rate plays a larger role in determining the income redistribution effect of PIT than tax progressivity does. Although tax progressivity decreased as a result of rising personal incomes and a constant PIT policy prior to 2005, the income redistribution effect of the PIT improved as a result of the higher average tax rate. The tax reform beginning in 2006 increased tax progressivity while decreasing the average tax rate, thereby weakening the income redistribution effect of the PIT. Further analysis indicates that the middle‐income group was the only net loser before 2005, but it benefited from the PIT policy reform. A cross‐country comparison shows that China has a lower PIT burden and higher progressivity than developed countries; in fact, China's levels of progressivity and tax burden are similar to those of Latin American countries. (JEL H24, D31, H31)     

Fiscal policy,government debt,and economic growth in the Kaleckian model of growth and distribution

This article presents the Kaleckian model of growth and distribution that sets a budget deficit ratio as an indicator of fiscal policy and examines the short- and long-run effects of an increase in budget deficits and a rise in income tax rates on the economy. The key short-run outcomes are as follows. First, expanded budget deficits have a positive effect on the rate of capacity utilization. Second, the tax rate for wage income does not affect the rate of capacity utilization, whereas the tax rate for capital income has a favorable impact on it. This result implies that raising the tax rate for capital income can be an important policy instrument for stimulating the economy. Third, we find that the economy exhibits a wage-led aggregate demand in the short run. The main long-run results are as follows. First, the effect of expanded budget deficits on the growth rate is ambiguous, since a higher debt burden negatively influences the rate of capacity utilization and hence economic growth, despite the increase in demand caused by government borrowing. A higher budget deficit ratio thus raises the growth rate only if a certain condition is satisfied. Second, the tax rate for capital income has a positive impact on the growth rate. Third, the economy shows a wage-led growth in the long run.     

Flat income taxation,redistribution and labour market performance

A flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in European countries. This article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. Only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment. This finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity-efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way.     

The incidence of income taxes on high earners in Canada

This article explores the “brain drain” explanation for the concentration of incomes in Canada during the past 30 years, namely, that high-skilled Canadians make use of high salaries on offer in the United States to extract higher salaries at home. If this is the case, then for a given level of US salaries, the threat to accept outside offers should be more credible when the Canadian dollar is depreciating against the US dollar, and weaker when the Canadian dollar is appreciating. The data are broadly consistent with this claim: income concentration worsened during the depreciations of the 1980s and 1990s, and eased when the Canadian dollar began to appreciate in value. The article develops a simple two-parameter model based on the propositions that high earners in Canada can use US salaries to bargain for higher salaries, and that Canadian high earners can shelter part of their income from personal income taxes. It also offers some preliminary evidence about the parameter values consistent with available data. The results suggest that higher top marginal personal income tax rates may potentially accentuate top-end after-tax income inequality. If high earners are able to use their bargaining power to extract pay increases to offset higher tax rates, then the burden of increased personal income taxes will be deflected elsewhere, and may even have the perverse effect of making the after-tax income distribution more unequal than it was before.     

International joint ventures and tax competition in an integrated market

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it develops a theoretical model of international joint ventures to suggest a new approach to the determination of profit allocation between the partners in the joint venture. Second, we examine the issue of tax competition between two countries for an international joint venture. We find that even in the absence of any bargaining power for the domestic firms, the foreign firm would like to give up more than half of profits to its partner. Furthermore, the foreign firm would like to locate in a country in which the partner firm is more efficient. We also find, with numerical simulations, that the domestic firm will accept the joint venture if the foreign firm's technology is significantly more superior than its own.     

Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare

This paper analyzes the effect of labor-tax progression on employment and welfare in an economy with a unionized labor market. The government influences wage bargaining through its tax policies. Wages can be reduced by increasing the marginal labor-tax rate. If there are no restrictions on profit taxation, a first-best optimum with full employment is realized; this first-best optimum can always be implemented by a progressive tax schedule. If profit taxation is restricted, unemployment may arise. For this case, we show that the welfare-maximizing degree of tax progression is influenced by a variety of factors, in particular the wage elasticity of labor demand, the distribution of bargaining power, and the existence of unemployment benefits. Examples are given for both progressive and regressive tax structures. Comparative-static analysis reveals that a decline in union bargaining power, an increase in unemployment benefits, and an increase in the overall work force reduce the efficient degree of tax progression.     

On the optimality of a minimum wage: New insights from optimal tax theory

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not observe workers' productivity but only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.     

Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime‐Dynastic Income Concepts*

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed. When standard methodology is used and wealth‐tax burdens are measured against annual individual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes. In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects of wealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetime of family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties, wealth tax is mostly borne by high‐income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.     

The demand for tax haven operations

What types of firms establish tax haven operations, and what purposes do these operations serve? Analysis of affiliate-level data for American firms indicates that larger, more international firms, and those with extensive intrafirm trade and high R and D intensities, are the most likely to use tax havens. Tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income. The evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate taxable income, whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign income. Firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the most from using tax havens, an effect that can be evaluated by using foreign economic growth rates as instruments for firm-level growth of foreign investment outside of tax havens. One percent greater sales and investment growth in nearby non-haven countries is associated with a 1.5 to 2% greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation.     

Optimum Taxation of Each Year's Income

In this paper, a two‐type, two‐period model of optimum income taxation is investigated. I assume full commitment and that current income determines the agents' tax burden in each period. It is shown that such a tax system does not allow one to implement the optimal long‐term tax contract and that it implies positive marginal tax rates at the upper end of the income distribution.     

Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada

We study corporate income taxation when firms operating in multiple jurisdictions can shift income using tax planning strategies. Because income of corporate groups is not consolidated for tax purposes in Canada, firms may use financial techniques, such as lending among affiliates, to reduce subnational corporate taxes. A simple theoretical model shows how income shifting affects real investment, government revenues, and tax base elasticities, depending on whether firms must allocate income to provinces or not. We then analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behavior of corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting to comparable firms that must use the statutory allocation formula to determine their taxable income in each province. The evidence suggests that income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases. According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for “income shifting” firms is 4.9, compared with 2.3 for other, comparable firms.     

Multinationals,cross‐border acquisitions and wage dispersion

Abstract We examine the impact of cross‐border acquisitions on intra‐firm wage dispersion using a detailed Swedish linked employer‐employee data set including data on all firms and about 50% of the Swedish labour force with information on job‐tasks and education. Foreign acquisitions of domestic multinationals and local firms increase wage dispersion but so do also other types of cross‐border acquisitions. Hence, it is the acquisition itself rather than foreign ownership that increases wage dispersion. The positive wage effect is concentrated to CEOs and other managers, whereas other groups are either negatively affected or not affected at all.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.