Ownership and Cost‐Sharing Contracts

We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership in an incomplete contract framework developed by Hart, Shleifer and Vishney (HSV). We add two new elements to their model. First, the government may offer cost‐sharing contracts when procuring the good. Second, the owner of a private firm may divert resources that increase their own profit/utility but increase total costs. The cost sharing contract allows the government to reduce the private firm's incentives to dump quality in order to save on costs. However, this also leads to resource diversion, which increases total costs. We derive the preferred mode of ownership when the government optimally chooses the power of the cost sharing scheme. We find that the presence of quality‐reducing cost reductions only favours government ownership if the scope for resource diversion is substantial. A discussion of when resource diversion is likely to be important is also provided.     

基于Shapley值及Gahp的供应链知识共享收益分配研究

针对供应链知识共享中难以建立公平合理的收益分配机制问题,基于供应链知识共享及分配评价理论,结合供应链自身特点,构建了供应链知识共享收益分配体系。在传统Shapley值算法基础上,加入新的修正因子,利用群体层次分析法(Gahp)和Yaahp软件求出修正因子,并给出算例进行验证。认为分配体系的建立最大限度规避了合作企业之间的非合作博弈,将定性问题定量化、模糊问题明晰化;引入修正因子的Shapley值评价方法更具合理性、公正性,也更利于调动联盟企业的积极性;基于Gahp修正因子的计算,使得专家自身的权威在Ahp分析中也得到了一定的体现。     

Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value

We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72.     

Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities when forming the grand coalition is efficient. We show that any sharing rule satisfying efficiency, linearity, dummy player and a strong symmetry axioms can be obtained through an average game. Adding an additional axiom, we identify one unique rule satisfying these properties.     

Shapley值下的生态工业链风险联抗机制探讨

生态工业园区中企业基于同种资源不同程度的利用和废弃物在上下游企业间的流动而形成了两种不同的生态工业链形式.稳定性作为生态工业园区最重要的性质之一,可用抗干扰能力、经济生产力和环境效益来表征;园区的稳定性完全体现在生态工业链的稳定运行上,链上企业的经济生产力和环境效益是协同的,依赖于生态工业链自身对风险的抵抗能力.运用博弈论方法,对生态工业链上的企业产生的价值增值对整个系统的贡献重新进行估量,探讨在生态工业链上企业间合理地进行利润分配的有效形式,使受到干扰的或是稳定性较差的企业能从合作中受益,提高生态工业链的抗干扰能力.     

Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games

This paper axiomatizes the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games by using axioms which are different from those used in network games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, A14.     

A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents’ impatience, and an equal responsibility property.     

Reparations for African‐Americans as a Transfer Problem: A Cautionary Tale

We examine how different methods of reparations payments to African‐Americans affect both the black and nonblack populations of the United States using the framework of the transfer‐problem from international trade theory as a theoretical foundation. We find that reparations payments that provide incentives for blacks to use the payment toward purchases of goods and services produced by nonblacks might expand the income gap. Also a reparations payment in the absence of productive capacity owned by blacks is found to have no final positive impact on black income. These results indicate that a reparations payment strategy must be carefully and cautiously conceived in order to achieve the desired effects.     

Old‐Age Income Insecurity in Singapore: A Problem of Non‐Inclusive Development

With a growing old‐age population, ensuring income security for the elderly is becoming an increasingly important element of public policy worldwide. The World Bank report proposed a three‐tier system to avert old‐age crisis, which was extended into a five‐tier system by Holzmann et al. Our analysis of Singapore's old‐age income security system in light of these two systems shows that it lacks the basic zero and first pillars of protection against old‐age hardships. We show that a budget allocation of less than half a percent of national gross domestic product (GDP) can ensure that no elderly citizen suffers from poverty in Singapore. As Singapore occupies the status of a developed country, a government‐financed pension system that is adequate, affordable, sustainable and robust is long overdue.     

On the Aggregate Value of Recreational Activities: A Nested Price Index Approach Using Poisson Demand Systems

An important consideration in the development ofregulations and policies that administer naturalresources in an area is the value of the non-marketactivities supported by those lands. Little attentionhas been paid to the aggregate value of largegeographic areas. This analysis builds autility-theoretic price index and utilizes this indexto estimate an aggregate Poisson demand to valuebackcountry recreational hiking opportunities innorthern California.     

人力资本收益分享问题的探讨

现代人力资本的投资、产权、收益三类主体是对应的，并呈现出多元化趋势，这决定了个人、企业、国家共同分享人力资本收益。提出了现代人力资本投资的收益分享模型，分析了人力资本分享制度的基本特征，认为建立人力资本产权的认定与协调、行使与测评、流动与交易等机制是实现人力资本投资收益分享的关键。     

The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results

We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that significantly improved the paper. The second author is being partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program. He wishes to thank his advisor Yair Tauman and co-advisor Pradeep Dubey for their intellectual guidance, Akira Okada and Haruo Imai for their encouragement, and Shigeo Muto for his helpful comments to the first draft of this paper at the autumn meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 2003.     

基于系统科学的高层梯队战略协同问题研究

董事会和高管团队均是企业战略决策的核心主体,在统一的高层梯队框架下,两者如何实现战略协同、创造协同效应,成为学界迫切需要解决的问题。根据高层梯队理论及系统科学中的复杂系统理论和协同学理论,指出董事会与高管团队的关联性和互补性是创造高层梯队战略协同效应的根源,通过系统建模,对高层梯队的关联性和互补性展开分析,给出高层梯队战略协同效应函数,发现当增效价值大于零时,董事会和高管团队应进行广泛而深入的团队互动;当增效价值等于零时,团队互动过程可有可无;当增效价值小于零时,董事会和高管团队不应进行团队互动。     

供应链企业协同创新利益分配策略——基于夏普利值法改进模型

在借鉴大量文献的基础上,提出了综合考虑创新资源投入、创新创造收益和创新承担风险的夏普利值法改进模型,用于解决供应链企业协同创新利益分配合理化问题。将该模型用于研究一个由单个供应商、制造商和销售商组成的三级供应链协同创新联盟的利益分配问题,经仿真计算验证了模型的有效性和适用性。     

价值网络中网主企业技术创新的战略选择

随着价值网络理论和实践的不断发展,价值网络的技术创新为价值网络的发展壮大提供了不竭动力,成为网主企业成功运作价值网络的关键所在.从技术核心程度和技术网络外部性两个维度对价值网络中的技术进行界定,构建网主企业主导价值网络技术创新的战略选择矩阵,根据对不同象限内技术特点,可以制定出相应的技术创新选择战略.     

The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem

Abstract In the literature, the information structure of the hold‐up problem is typically assumed to be exogenous. In this paper, we introduce an additional stage at which the head office may grant individual divisions access to an information system before they undertake their specific investments. Although more information ceteris paribus enhances each divisions' profits, more information can reduce divisions' investments and destroy synergies for the other division that would have been generated by the investments. If this negative effect dominates, then information can be harmful for the entire company. Hence, information control can be a subtle force to deal with the hold‐up problem to a certain extent. In this paper we analyze those conditions under which information is either harmful or beneficial for central management.     

企业战略性供应链管理问题研究

随着企业战略经营思想的转变和合作竞争的发展 ,供应链管理已成为企业管理的新型手段 ,它改变了一些传统管理的观念 ,并由此引发了一场管理革命。本文主要从供应链的产生背景出发 ,结合供应链管理与企业战略管理之间的关系以及对供应链所产生的影响 ,对企业战略性地开展和实施供应链管理提出了一些建议。     

论资源学派的战略联盟观的特殊价值

联盟战略已成为企业在新环境下生存和发展的必经之道，由于对战略联盟认识的不同视角以及对战略联盟概念的不同界定，形成了泉多不同的战略联盟理论。具有代表性的理论有：价值链理论、交易费用理论、合作竞争理论和资源基础理论。在几种主要战略联盟理论中，资源学派的战略联盟观有其特殊价值。对企业战略联盟的发展有着非常重要的理论与实践指导作用。     

A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem

This paper describes a new continuous-time principal–agent model, in which the output is a diffusion process with drift determined by the agent's unobserved effort. The risk-averse agent receives consumption continuously. The optimal contract, based on the agent's continuation value as a state variable, is computed by a new method using a differential equation. During employment, the output path stochastically drives the agent's continuation value until it reaches a point that triggers retirement, quitting, replacement, or promotion. The paper explores how the dynamics of the agent's wages and effort, as well as the optimal mix of short-term and long-term incentives, depend on the contractual environment.