Estate recovery and long‐term care insurance

Estate recovery is a policy under which the state recovers part of long‐term care (LTC) subsidies from the estates of deceased beneficiaries. This paper studies the effect of estate recovery on LTC insurance demand. This effect strongly relies on the bequest motive since the main purpose behind purchasing LTC insurance is to protect bequests from the financial costs of LTC. We find that the impact of estate recovery on LTC insurance depends on the level of parental bequests and on whether and how the parent anticipates the child's preferences with respect to informal care. More specifically, we show that estate recovery encourages the parent to purchase LTC insurance when his child is considered selfish or to like providing care. However, this policy could provide disincentives to LTC insurance purchase by the parent if his child is considered to dislike providing informal care. Our results also show that estate recovery reduces and may even eliminate public support crowding out of private LTC insurance demand. Finally, we characterize the welfare implications of financing LTC public support by estate recovery.     

Opting out and topping up reconsidered: Informal care under uncertain altruism

We study the design of public long‐term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non‐linear policies where the LTC transfer depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable, while children's altruism is not. Our policy encompasses two policies traditionally considered in the literature: topping up policies consisting of a transfer independent of informal care, and opting out policies entailing a positive transfer only if children fail to provide care. We show that both total and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This is obtained under full and asymmetric information. Public LTC transfers, on the other hand, may be non‐monotonic. Under asymmetric information, public LTC transfers are lower than their full information level for the parents whose children are the least altruistic, while it is distorted upward for the highest level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to highly altruistic children. In contrast to both topping up and opting out policies, the implementing contract is always such that social care increases with informal care.     

Another reconciliation between economists and forestry experts: OLG-arguments

Foresters often claim that the goal of good forest policy is to have a sustained forest yield, or even a maximum sustainable yield. They also claim that people wish to save a few extra trees for their children. This bequest motive is not modelled in the standard approach to the optimal rotation problem. In this paper, we present a standard version of an overlapping generation model augmented with a simple tree technology. We show in particular that the market equilibrium can be dynamically inefficient, and that a bequest motive in terms of trees can correct for the overaccumulation of capital that causes the inefficiency. The bequest motive also enables us to account for a harvesting intensity varying with age (young people typically cut more than elderly people) in spite of a perfect capital market.The crux of the argument is that a bequest motive is likely to increase the equilibrium interest rate and move the economy away from a maximum sustainable yield policy. It, however, improves efficiency and is able to explain empirical regularities that are not easily explained by a traditional perfect capital market approach to forestry.The author acknowledges comments from Karl-Göran Mäler, Stockholm School of Economics, participants in the economics-forestry economics seminar at the University of Umeå, and two anonymous referees.     

Deviant generations, Ricardian equivalence, and growth cycles

Two equilibrium possibilities are known to obtain in a standard overlapping-generations model with dynastic preferences: either the altruistic bequest motive is operative for every generation (in which case, Ricardian equivalence obtains) or it is not, for any generation. Dynamic equilibria, where the bequest motive is occasionally operative, cannot emerge. This paper studies bequest-giving behavior and out-of-steady-state bequest and growth dynamics in a Ak model with intra- and inter-generational consumption externalities. These externalities, by their very presence, do not destroy Ricardian equivalence. They may, however, give rise to deviant generations—generations that do not leave a bequest having received an inheritance, and vice versa—and that seals the fate for Ricardian equivalence. Consumption externalities may also generate interesting indeterminacies and endogenous growth cycles that did not exist otherwise.     

Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing

We develop a game‐theoretic model of private–public contribution to a long‐term project with sequential actions and moral hazard. A private agent is one who is in charge of both the financial contribution and the management effort, these two actions entailing private costs and uncertain ex‐post private and social benefits. A public agent is one who decides the amount of public funding to this quasi‐public good, knowing that the size and the probability of attaining a surplus ex post depend on the private agent's effort. We consider four public‐funding scenarios: benefit‐sharing versus cost‐sharing crossed with ex‐ante versus ex‐interim government intervention. We test our theoretical predictions by means of an experiment that confirms the main result of the model: Cost‐sharing public intervention is more effective than benefit‐sharing in boosting private financial contribution to the project. Furthermore, when public intervention comes after private contribution ( ex‐interim government intervention), both public‐funding scenarios have a negative impact on the private management effort. In our model, the latter result is explained by the private agent's high degree of risk aversion. These results have policy implications for strategic investments with long‐term social consequences. In deciding the optimal timing and method of the contribution, governments should also consider the indirect effects on agents’ long‐term management efforts.     

Free‐Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: A Laboratory Experiment*

We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.     

Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism

We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.     

Do Germans Save to Leave an Estate? An Examination of the Bequest Motive

I investigate whether a bequest motive for savings influences the post-retirement wealth trajectories of German households. Two measures of the bequest motive are studied: the existence of children as the main group of potential heirs and the respondents' declared intention to bequeath. While having children has no significant impact on households' wealth trajectories, stated bequest intentions are associated with considerable heterogeneity in wealth holdings. The main conclusion from this study is that both the pure life-cycle model and the life-cycle model with bequest motives provide a valid basis for a theory of household wealth accumulation once the heterogeneity of preferences is acknowledged.
JEL classification : D 91; J 14     

Keynesian Multipliers, Direct Crowding Out, and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

This paper studies Keynesian multipliers in a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition. We allow public and private consumption goods to be perfect substitutes in private utility. This enables us to study the effect of direct crowding out on the size of national income, profit and employment multipliers for a given rise in real public spending. A positive real national income multiplier is obtained if consumers value public consumption less than private consumption. In addition, we determine the effective marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods, both in the short run and in the long run.     

USING COMMERCIAL DISCIPLINE TO IMPROVE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: MISPLACED ENTHUSIASM?

Australia, like other democracies, has long sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of procurement for national defence. A recent review exhorted Defence procurement managers to exert greater “commercial discipline.” Similar calls have been made in other countries. This paper tests such public sector emulation of commercial practice by comparing the relative effectiveness of procurement via in‐house arrangements; a public procurement agency detached from Defence; and privatized provision. We show that what matters is not public or private ownership but how ownership and management are integrated and what incentive structures are applied. (JEL H44)     

Capital taxation, long-run growth, and bequests

It has been shown that higher capital taxes can have a growth-enhancing effect when combined with a revenue-compensating cut in wage taxes or with an expansion in productivity-increasing public services. The present paper demonstrates that these results critically hinge on the existence of a bequest motive. It is shown that a wage-tax cut is no longer growth-enhancing when bequests are operative. By way of contrast, increasing productive public services may well boost growth. The theoretical findings are illustrated by numerical simulations based on US data.     

Renewable resource and capital with a joy-of-giving resource bequest motive

In this article we ask whether a privately owned natural renewable resource can be conserved and managed efficiently when households have a joy-of-giving resource bequest motive. We model an overlapping generations economy in which firms have access to a CES production technology combining the natural resource, physical capital and labor. Our results shed light on the interplay between the resource bequest motive and the substitutability/complementarity relationship between capital and the natural resource in the determination of the equilibrium propensity to use the resource. The mere existence of the bequest motive does not guarantee that the resource will be conserved in the long run. When the resource is highly substitutable with capital, the equilibrium actually never exhausts the resource stock whatever the intensity of the bequest motive. When the resource is a poor substitute for capital, the equilibrium preserves the resource only if the taste for bequeathing is strong enough. Be the economy in over-accumulation or in under-accumulation of the natural resource, it always increases aggregate consumption to run the stock of capital at a level lower than the efficiency level.     

Private Information in the BBV Model of Public Goods

To analyze the private provision of a public good in the presence of private information, we explore the connections between two frameworks: the binary public good model with threshold uncertainty and the standard continuous model à la Bergstrom et al. Linearity of best responses in others' contributions is key to matching the two frameworks. We identify all utility functions that display this linearity, and we provide conditions ensuring that the minimal properties that Bergstrom et al. require for utilities are satisfied. Using techniques developed in the threshold uncertainty framework, we show existence and uniqueness of the Bayes‐Nash equilibrium—thus generalizing existing results—and we analyze its comparative statics properties. In particular, under the reasonable assumption that agents' income is stochastic and private information, we complement the full‐information crowding‐out and redistribution results of Bergstrom et al. If the government taxes agents' income proportionally and redistributes (expected) revenues lump sum, equilibrium public good provision can increase or decrease, even if the set of contributors is unchanged. Similarly, we show that crowding‐out can be one‐for‐one, less than one‐for‐one, or more than one‐for‐one. Finally, we extend our results to a multidimensional framework in which agents' unit costs of contributions are also private information.     

A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

To Leave or Not to Leave: The Distribution of Bequest Motives

We examine the effect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the desire to die with positive net worth. Using a structural life-cycle model nested in a switching regression with unknown sample separation, we find that roughly three-fourths of the elderly single population has a bequest motive. Both the presence and the magnitude of the bequest motive are statistically and economically significant. On average, households with a bequest motive spend about 25% less on consumption expenditures. We conclude that, among the elderly single households in our sample, about four-fifths of their net wealth will be bequeathed and approximately half of this is due to a bequest motive.     

Saving the public from the private? Incentives and outcomes in dual practice

We consider a monopoly physician offering free public treatment and, if allowed, a private treatment for which patients have to pay out of pocket. While patients differ in the propensity to benefit from private treatment it always yields better health outcomes than public treatment but is also more costly in terms of money and time. We study the physician's supply of private care and allocation of time costs across public and private patients and contrast these with the first‐best allocation. To increase the willingness‐to‐pay for private treatment the physician shifts time costs to public patients. While this turns out to be socially optimal, the resulting positive network effect leads to an over‐provision of private care if time costs are sufficiently high. A second‐best allocation arises when the health authority sets public reimbursement but has no control over private provision. Depending on the welfare weight the health authority attaches to physician profits, a ban of dual practice may improve on the second‐best allocation. Notably, a ban benefits not only public patients but also private patients with a moderate propensity to benefit from private care.     

Chores

We analyze situations where the provision of each of c public goods must be voluntarily assumed by exactly one of n private agents in the absence of transfer schemes or binding contracts. We model this problem as a complete information, potentially infinite horizon game where n agents simultaneously wage c wars of attrition. Providing a public good commits an agent not to take on the provision of another public good for a fixed period. We explore the strategic trade-offs that this commitment ability and the multiplicity of tasks provide. Subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) are characterized completely for games with two agents and two public goods. For games with two identical agents and c > 1 identical public goods, we establish that an equilibrium that yields a surplus-maximizing outcome always exists and we provide sufficient conditions under which it is the unique equilibrium outcome. We show that under mild conditions, the surplus-maximizing SPE is the unique symmetric SPE. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: H41, C72, D13.     

Social Security and Growth in an Altruistic Economy

This paper studies the macroeconomic impact of private and public intergenerational transfers in the presence of endogenous growth. It focuses on two-sided altruism implying that individuals have both a motive to make gifts to their parents and a motive to leave bequests to their children. The growth effects of social security depend on whether children are making gifts to their parents or parents are leaving bequests to their children. Which of the transfers is operative, in turn, depends on the size of social security benefits. Social security is legislated endogenously. The introduction of a social security program which definitely reduces per capita income growth and harms future generations is contemplated by altruistic individuals even if non-altruistic individuals disapprove it.     

Long‐term care and intrafamily moral hazard: Optimal public policy

The paper studies optimal public long‐term care (LTC) policy in the context of intrafamily moral hazard suggested by Pauly. The model considers a representative family consisting of an adult child and her elderly parent who might become dependent, in which case he places a special value on the LTC provided to him by his child. Since the child's caregiving is decreasing in the amount of insurance coverage, the parent prefers to underinsure, which is socially suboptimal. The child's choice of caregiving is also inefficient since she does not internalize its positive effect on the parent. The paper tackles these inefficiencies and shows that intrafamily moral hazard is a sufficient justification for public intervention targeted at insurance. If not necessarily for the introduction of mandatory public insurance, then at least for the taxation or subsidization of private insurance premiums.     

Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Dynasties and Uncertain Lifetimes

This paper studies how the lack of an annuities market affects savings behavior and intergenerational transfers in a dynastic overlapping generations economy. I find that the answer to this question depends crucially on altruism. On the one hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is operative, then the lack of annuity markets enhances capital accumulation. On the other hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is not operative, the absence of annuity markets can either increase or decrease aggregate savings. I characterize under which conditions capital accumulation is enhanced. I also prove that an overlapping generations economy with altruism and uninsurable lifetime risk faces capital overaccumulation relative to the modified Golden Rule. The efficient allocation corresponding to the modified Golden Rule can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by a pay-as-you-go social security system, and this can only be done if individuals are altruistic.