Quasi-Competitive Cournot Oligopoly with Product Differentiation and Symmetric Firms

Since Vives (1984 ), Cheng (1985 ) and Okuguchi (1987 ), the equilibria in Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation have been known to differ. Okuguchi (2005 ) has shown that Bertrand price‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms is quasi‐competitive but not perfectly competitive in the limit state of infinite number of firms. This paper formulates and analyzes two types of Cournot output‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms, in one of which symmetric firms producing the same goods are assumed to collude, and in the other, collusion is ruled out. The limit states are shown to be different in two oligopolies but they are both quasi‐competitive.     

Optimal Differentiation of International Environmental Taxes in the Presence of National Labor Market Distortions

We explore the implication of the `doubledividend' debate for international environmentaltaxes. In our scenario, small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts. Since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold, a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries. The optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply.     

“两税”合并对内外资企业资本结构的影响

我国“两税”(内资企业所得税和外商投资企业所得税)合并的立法程序正在进行,合并后内外资企业将实行统一的所得税税法,尤其是税率将统一。这将对通过债务融资可以产生税盾利益的资本安排产生重大的影响。这虽然是税制改革的一项重要举措,但是通过影响企业融资策略的传导渠道必将影响到我国的资本市场,所以不仅政府当局关心,微观主体也正在积极准备融资策略的调整,以应对新的挑战。当前两套税法对它们的资本结构有何影响?差别何在?合并后它们的资产负债率有何变化?企业将如何改变融资方式?这正是本文研究的目的。     

Weitzman Revisited: Emission Standards Versus Taxes with Uncertain Abatement Costs and Market Power of Polluting Firms

Studies dealing with the optimal choice of pollution control instruments under uncertainty have invariably taken it for granted that regulated firms face perfectly competitive markets. By introducing the product market into the stochastic framework of Weitzman (Rev Econ Stud 41:477–491, 1974), this paper shows for the case of a polluting symmetric Cournot oligopoly that Weitzman’s policy rule for choosing emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs is biased in the presence of market power. Since the oligopolists take into account their influence on the market price, their total abatement effort, including the restriction of output, is less vulnerable to miscalculations of the tax rate compared to price-taking firms. Consequently, the comparative advantage of instruments is shifted in favour of taxes. In a further step, the provided policy recommendations are generalised by abolishing the assumption that firms are symmetric.     

国外创业型企业产品开发战略研究述评

产品开发战略是创业型企业核心战略,对于创业型企业的生存和发展,起着举足轻重的作用。创业型企业产品开发战略在国外的研究主要集中在产品开发战略的制定、实施和评估3个维度。通过对国外创业型企业产品开发战略3个维度研究的回顾,阐述了以往研究的局限和今后的研究方向。     

Tradeable Emission Permits Regulations in the Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets: Welfare Implications

In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation.     

Outward Foreign Direct Investment Patterns of Italian Firms in the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme*

We consider the role played by the European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) as a possible driver of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) for Italian manufacturing firms. Using a panel dataset of about 22,000 firms covering the first two phases of the EU ETS and the period before the EU ETS, we measure the patterns of FDI towards countries not covered by the EU ETS. The results show that the EU ETS had a weak effect on the number of new subsidiaries abroad (extensive margin), while it had a larger impact on production taking place in foreign subsidiaries (intensive margin), especially in trade-intensive sectors.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

Product Quality and the Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxes

The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation is among the oldest issues in formal public finance and is important for policy in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. This paper develops and articulates simple but very general elasticity rules that characterize the optimal balance between the two in a model of endogenous product quality. These rules temper the preference for ad valorem taxation that emerges from homogeneous product models, pointing to relatively heavy reliance on whichever form of taxation has the least effect on product quality.     

中外企业联盟中中方企业的知识内部整合

为解决中外企业联盟中中方企业自主创新能力难以得到有效提高这一实际存在的问题,提出应在中方企业外部知识吸收活动和知识创新活动之间构建一条合理而有效的沟通途径,即知识内部整合。将中方企业的知识内部整合活动划分为4个子活动:知识共享活动、知识组织化活动、知识本地化活动与知识应用活动,分析了其知识内部整合的具体过程。最后讨论了4个子活动之间的相互关系,并建立了相应的关系概念模型。     

Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality is Scarce: The Case of n > 2 Firms

This paper describes a model of vertical product differentiation in which more than two firms compete in quality and price. Quality is of fixed supply, so firms participate in an auction to attain it. Firms then simultaneously choose prices. The paper determines equilibrium bids in the quality auction and the Bertrand equilibrium prices. In equilibrium one firm attains all the units of quality, but pays a price such that it, like the minimum-quality firms, earns zero profits. Aggregate welfare is computed, and is shown to decrease as competition increases.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

产品多样性与企业区位选择

在一个线性城市市场中有两个企业,每个企业生产两种产品,且每个企业在其中一种产品上具有垄断力量,而在另外一种产品上与其他企业竞争.本文讨论这个市场上企业的最优选址问题,研究表明,企业选址与垄断类消费者和竞争类消费者的比例有关.当垄断类消费者的比例足够大时,企业选择集聚;当竞争类消费者的比例足够小时,企业选择尽可能远离对方;当二者数量相差不大时,企业将选择中间状态.与社会最优选址相比,两个企业之间的距离既可能过远也可能过近.     

Welfare Policy in the Presence of Unionised Labour and Internationally Mobile Firms*

To what extent does the welfare state exacerbate the loss of jobs due to offshoring? We consider a model with oligopolistic sectors that are exposed to offshoring, as well as a unionised labour force that is entitled to unemployment benefits. We find that deeper economic integration induces wage moderation to the point that wages become independent of workers' outside options. Because the entire incidence of redistribution falls on net wages, the unions' willingness to moderate wages is constrained by the level of redistribution. Beyond an upper limit of redistribution, extending the welfare state compels unions to oppose wage moderation at the cost of losing jobs to offshoring. Below that upper limit, however, redistribution becomes less rather than more distortive.     

Product Differentiation and Public Education

We demonstrate that differentiation in public services can arise as a way of reducing competition among cities. Quality differentiation can be particularly relevant to the provision of education. If cities finance education through a property tax that generates "tax competition," we find that quality differentiation in education changes the amount of educational services provided. In the case of property-value maximization, this means a reduction in educational services in both the city with high quality and that with low quality. The reduction in educational services means that under reasonable conditions property values in both cities can increase.     

Eco-Labeling and Horizontal Product Differentiation

This paper investigates the impact of eco-labels on the abatement of emissions in a market with horizontal product differentiation. A distinction is made between an end-of-pipe abatement method and a clean technology approach. In the former case underinvestment is likely to occur even if the marginal willingness to pay for abatement of consumers is equal to the social marginal benefit of abatement. The level of abatement depends on the number of firms and on the number of consumers. For a large market with few firms overinvestment in abatement is also possible. Clean technology abatement achieves a first best level regardless of market size if all consumers have a marginal willingness to pay for abatement equal to its social benefit.     

Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free-entry market where the production process generates emissions. We consider the regulation by a three-part tax policy: the government sets an emission tax, a refunding scheme, and an entry-license tax. In contrast to the case of the two-part tax-refund policy under no entry, we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside, the first-best outcome is always attained. Further, the government’s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes. Our result implies that the tax-refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry.     

Tariff Reductions in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

This paper argues that the welfare effects of trade liberalization in the presence of foreign direct investment obtained under perfect competition cannot be extended to imperfectly competitive markets. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade liberalization may be paradoxically immiserizing when the traditional welfare-increasing result is corrected for the change in foreign capital revenue. Under imperfect competition this cannot occur, except under rather implausible assumptions. Indeed, a tariff reduction is expected to increase welfare when the welfare indicator is corrected for the presence of foreign capital, regardless of the type of market structure and the form of competitive rivalry.