Mandating behavioral conformity in social groups with conformist members

Social interaction among individuals with a preference for conformity gives rise to coordination externalities which are not internalized in a non-cooperative setting. Mandating behavioral conformity, by centrally imposing a common, group-wide action, internalizes these coordination externalities, but also comes at a cost of restraining individuals’ self-regarding goals. We explore a framework of social interaction among privately informed individuals with conformist preferences to examine when mandating behavioral conformity improves group welfare. Our analysis elucidates how the desirability of mandating behavioral conformity is shaped by the group's socio-economic structure. We find that mandating behavioral conformity is not desirable in social groups that are ex ante homogeneous—either with respect to members’ contribution to group welfare or their innate conformist tendency. In contrast, mandating behavioral conformity can be beneficial in those ex ante heterogeneous social groups where the individuals who contribute most to group welfare also exhibit the strongest preference for conformity.     

Macroeconomic effects of an indirect tax substitution

We study an indirect tax reform in a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition for both the Cournot and the Free entry equilibria. We show that it is possible to attain a positive balanced budget multiplier by means of a substitution of specific by ad valorem taxation. Moreover, although any tax substitution causes higher prices and the flow up of firms in the long-run, the Free entry equilibrium output can increase with respect to that of the Cournot equilibrium. Finally, in contrast with the partial equilibrium, welfare decreasing tax reforms are likely to occur even when the balanced budget multiplier is positive.      

Governing uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified crops

This paper analyzes the capabilities of three different governance regimes for adequately handling uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified (GM) crops. Adequate handling requires the development of sound procedures for identification of uncertainty and ignorance (U&I), reduction of U&I, decisions on how to treat irreducible U&I and monitoring of unexpected effects. The nature of U&I implies, however, that these procedures will be highly incomplete. Governance mechanisms that facilitate cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality are therefore needed. The three governance regimes (GRs) compared are: GM-crops are produced by private firms and these firms are made liable for harm (GR1); GM-crops are produced by private firms and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR2); and GM-crops are produced and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR3). The effect of bringing the civil society into the decision-making process is also analyzed. GR3 will be stronger in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality than GR2. Public research organizations have fewer conflicts of interest with the government than private firms, and academic norms are important. Difficulties in proving harm and identifying the responsible firm will make GR1 weak in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality.     

Payday-loan bans: evidence of indirect effects on supply

In November 2008, Ohio enacted the Short-Term Loan Law which imposed a 28% APR on payday loans, effectively banning the industry. Using licensing records f     

Taxation of firms with unknown mobility

We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule‐based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement.     

LISREL growth model on direct and indirect effects using cross-country data

Many papers have analyzed the factors affecting economic growth. However, these have concentrated on direct effects and ignored indirect effects through other variables in the model. This study investigates direct and indirect effects of various factors on growth with a causal growth model using LISREL (LInear Structural RELations) for a sample of 105 countries over the period of 1975–2002. Results suggest that ignoring the indirect effects of productivity growth, geography and economic development on economic growth may lead to a considerable underestimation of their ‘true’ total effects on growth. While the importance of the indirect effects of productivity growth and geography relative to their direct effects changes with the estimated model, the relative importance of the indirect effect of economic development on growth is found to be robust to different model specifications.     

Subjective well-being in China: direct and indirect effects of rural-to-urban migrant status

The purpose of this article is to provide a recent investigation on the determinants of subjective well-being among Chinese adults, with particular emphasis on internal migrants who hold a rural hukou and have settled in cities. Based on a sample of 7846 adults stemming from the 2011 wave of CHNS survey, we estimate different happiness functions using ordered probit regressions. We first confirm the influence of traditional demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (i.e. age, marital status, gender, illness/injury, income, and education). Second, our results emphasize the importance of taking into account regional differences, but also the positive impact of leisure time and social connections. Finally, our results highlight that being a rural-to-urban migrant is significantly associated with a decrease in the probability of reporting good or very good life satisfaction. We show that this relationship seems to be shaped by direct and indirect effects, and we identify the mediating role of regional patterns and social relations.     

Estimation of a Tobit model with unknown censoring threshold

Conventional wisdom suggests that only the estimated intercept is affected by imposition of a zero censoring threshold on a Tobit model. This is true for Heckman-Lee estimation. For maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, however, it is only true if the censoring threshold is known and is subtracted from the dependent variable. Failure to properly transform the dependent variable prior to ML estimation of a zero threshold Tobit model will generally bias the coefficient estimates. A long neglected topic is ML estimation of a Tobit model with common, but unknown, censoring threshold. This paper shows that the ML estimator of the censoring threshold is the minimum order statistic from the observed subsample, and that existing software for estimation of a zero-threshold Tobit model is easily adapted to include estimation of the censoring threshold.     

Speculative attacks with unpredictable or unknown foreign exchange reserves

During a currency crisis, speculators usually do not know the value of a central bank's foreign exchange reserves. In this paper I show that modelling speculators as having imperfect knowledge of reserves enriches the predictions of the classical model of speculative attacks. With realistic lags in reserve reporting and costs to unsuccessful speculation, successful speculative attacks will involve a jump depreciation, unsuccessful attacks may occur, attacks may occur when fundamentals are improving, attacks may not be preceded by large increases in interest rates, and fixed exchange rates may be abandoned with no attack and no decline in the money supply. JEL Classification: F31     

Non- and semi-parametric estimation in models with unknown smoothness

Many asymptotic results for kernel-based estimators were established under some smoothness assumption on density. We propose a combined estimator that could lead to the best available rate without knowledge of density smoothness. A Monte Carlo example confirms its good performance.     

Optimal management of an ecosystem with an unknown threshold

We consider an ecosystem with two distinct equations of motion that are separated by a threshold value of the state variable. We find that increasing uncertainty (both uncertainty embedded in the natural system and uncertainty of the decisionmaker about the location of the threshold) can lead to nonmonotonic changes in precaution: a reduction in uncertainty can first increase and then decrease optimal precautionary activity. This nonmonotonicity can help to explain why regulators often give conflicting arguments about optimal abatement policies in the face of uncertainty. For example, some regulators argue for an immediate reduction in pollutant loading until uncertainty about the underlying process is reduced while others call for no costly reductions in pollutant loading until the same uncertainty is reduced. These statements can be consistent even if both sides agree on both economic objectives and the system dynamics, but have different priors on the uncertainty involved.     

Livestock emissions regulation with unknown damages and strategic technology adoption

Livestock emissions have been identified as a contributor to greenhouse gas build-up yet have remained unregulated in the US. A game-theoretic model in the style of Tarui and Polasky (2005) was analysed where the dairy industry strategically chooses to abate air emissions with technology adoption and herd size decisions while a regulator chooses a tax rate on emissions to satisfy the desires of competing interest groups. This model allows the effects of potential air emission regulation on the dairy industry to be evaluated. Results demonstrate that dairy farms react to the increased cost of air regulation by decreasing herd size rather than investing in air emission abatement technology in the short run. This suggests that incentives may need to be put in place to induce adoption in emissions abatement technology at the livestock level in the long run.     

A note on bimatrix games with an unknown payoff matrix

We show that, using a simple decision rule, two players repeatedly playing the same zero-sum game without the direct knowledge of the payoff matrix will ultimately achieve the Nash Equilibrium if the game possesses a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. For other bimatrix games, the simple decision rule does not suffice to generate the nice convergence property.     

Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders

Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It may be possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this could make the proportion of winners known, and thus provide all the information that bidders need to make winner's curse corrections.     

The propagation of financial turbulence: interdependence,spillovers, and direct and indirect effects

We investigate the propagation of financial turbulence via trade, capital flows, and distance channels in the pre-crisis and Global Financial Crisis periods by modeling spillover and interdependence effects, using spatial econometric techniques. Financial turbulence is proxied by the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans in a country. Spillover effects are defined as significant changes in the linkages between countries due to a shock, and interdependence effects as strong linkages among pairs of countries independent of shocks. Using annual data of 40 countries from 2003 to 2010, we find that interdependence and spillover effects should be jointly analyzed. Furthermore, our results suggest that the capital flows channel is more important than the other two channels in capturing propagation of financial turbulence. By deriving what is known in the spatial econometrics literature as direct and indirect effect estimates, we show that the marginal effects of macroeconomic variables (like GDP growth, inflation, and credit growth) on financial turbulence take different forms during a crisis than in tranquil periods.     

Determining the environmental effects of indirect subsidies: integrated method and application to the Netherlands

The term ‘environmentally damaging subsidies’ covers all sorts of direct and indirect subsidies with negative consequences for the environment. This article presents a method to determine the environmental impact of these subsidies. It combines a microeconomic framework with an environmental impact module. The method is particularly useful for analysing indirect subsidies. These are often hidden, and therefore, not recognized as subsidies. Use of the method will provide a basis for formulating corrective policy. The method is applied to several important subsidies in the Netherlands, in agriculture, energy and transport sectors. The results reveal large environmental effects, which deserve serious attention from policy makers. To illustrate the specific features of the method, its application to a particular subsidy, namely the exemption of excise taxes on aviation fuels, is presented in full detail.     

North-South and South-South trade-related technology diffusion: an industry-level analysis of direct and indirect effects

Abstract .  This paper examines one direct and three indirect channels of North-South trade-related technology diffusion. We find that i) the largest impact on TFP in the South is from direct North-South technology diffusion; ii) there are also significant effects from indirect North-South technology diffusion, though their magnitude is smaller than that of the direct one; and iii) the impact of direct North-South technology diffusion on TFP in the South occurs faster than the impact of indirect technology diffusion.     

Optimal indirect taxation with a restricted number of tax rates

This paper analyzes the optimal structure of indirect taxation when the number of available tax rates is smaller than the number of taxable commodities. Such a constraint requires to choose the levels of tax rates and the groups of commodities that will be taxed at equal rates (or exempted). In a partial equilibrium framework, with a single agent and a low amount of tax collection, it is shown that the process of allocation of commodities to groups depends on both price elasticities and consumption spendings. Still, the optimal tax structure displays a weak form of the inverse elasticity rule; consumption spendings influence the size of the fiscal base, and may lead to many tax exemptions.     

Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer

Summary. This paper considers double implementation of Walrasian allocations and Lindahl allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria for both private and public goods economies when preferences, initial endowments, production technologies, and coalition patterns are all unknown to the designer. It will be noted that the mechanisms presented here are feasible and continuous. In addition, unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, our mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents. Received: March 12, 1998; revised version: March 12, 1998