Reforming the Bookbuilding Process for IPOs

The controversy over IPOs has raised questions about whether retail investors are being unfairly denied access to shares in IPOs and whether the new Internet auction methods might provide a fairer and more efficient way to allocate shares. This article argues that much of the popular concern may be misdirected. By and large, bookbuilding is well designed to accomplish price discovery in a cost-effective way. And standard auctions, which have been all but abandoned in a number of countries, have generally proved disappointing for equity IPOs (although they have been successful for bond offerings). The authors propose a "hybrid" form of securities issuance that would retain the advantages of bookbuilding while incorporating a public offer "tranche" for retail investors and other measures designed to increase transparency.     

Explaining underpricing of IPOs in frontier markets: Evidence from the Nigeria Stock Exchange

The paper provides empirical analyses of IPO underpricing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, from the period 1990 to 2006. The results indicate an average abnormal initial day returns of 43.1%. There is evidence of long-run underperformance of 0.6%. Results from our regression model explaining initial abnormal returns for the IPOs of Nigeria show that size of firm and audit quality are important variables affecting underpricing. The results also show the presence of a non-linear relationship between the offer price and underpricing.     

Analyst Behavior Following IPOs: The "Bubble Period" Evidence

We examine over 7400 analyst recommendations made in the yearafter going public for IPOs from 1999 to 2000. Initiations ofcoverage at the end of the quiet period come almost exclusivelyfrom affiliated analysts, whereas initiations afterward arepredominantly from unaffiliated analysts. Contrary to previousfindings, we find no evidence that the market discounts recommendationsfrom affiliated analysts once we control for recommendationcharacteristics and timing. Moreover, analyst coverage in thefirst year is not affected by underpricing, and after the flurryof initiations at the end of the quiet period, the number ofanalysts covering a firm during the following 11 months is unrelatedto the number of managing underwriters. (JEL G12, G14, G24)     

Rationing in IPOs

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. Before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We demonstrate that this mitigates the winners curse, that is, the incentive of bidders to shade their bids. It leads to more aggressive bidding, to the extent that rationing can be revenue-enhancing. In a parametric example, we characterize bid and revenue functions, and the optimal degree of rationing. We show that, when investors information is diffuse, maximal rationing is optimal. Conversely, when their information is concentrated, the seller should not ration shares. We provide testable predictions on bid dispersion and the degree of rationing. Our model reconciles the documented anomaly that higher bidders in IPOs do not necessarily receive higher allocations.     

On the marketing of IPOs

Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487–521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.     

Bookbuilding vs. fixed price revisited: The effect of aftermarket trading

Investors who possess information about the value of an IPO can participate in the offering as well as trade strategically in the aftermarket. Both the bookbuilding and the fixed price IPO selling methods require more underpricing when aftermarket trading by informed investors is considered. Bookbuilding becomes especially costly, since the potential for profit in the aftermarket adversely affects investors' bidding behavior in the premarket. Unless the underwriter can restrict its bookbuilding effort to a small enough subset of the informed investors, a fixed price strategy that allocates the issue to retail investors produces higher proceeds on average, contrary to the conventional wisdom in the literature. We therefore find a benefit to limiting access to the premarket and, hence, provide an efficiency rationale for the practice by American bankers of marketing IPOs to a select group of investors. We also provide unique policy and empirical implications.     

Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets

Market returns before the offer price is set affect the amountand variability of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing.Thus an important question is "What IPO procedure is best adaptedfor controlling underpricing in "hot" versus "cold" market conditions?"The French stock market offers a unique arena for empiricalresearch on this topic, since three substantially differentissuing mechanisms (auctions, bookbuilding, and fixed price)are used there. Using 1992–1998 data, we find that theauction mechanism is associated with less underpricing and lowervariance of underpricing. We show that the auction procedure'sability to incorporate more information from recent market conditionsinto the IPO price is an important reason.     

台湾地区股票发行向注册制过渡的经验

2006年1月11日，台湾地区公布了修订后的《证券交易法》，其中有关股票发行审核的第22条规定，“有价证券之募集及发行，除政府债券或经主管机关核定之其它有价证券外，非向主管机关申报生效后，不得为之。”这意味着股票发行审核已由核准制全面过渡到注册制，完成了台湾地区股票市场制度建设史上的一次重要飞跃。[第一段]     

中小板上市公司IPO:并购扩张还是内部成长?

本文从中小板上市公司IPO后并购及资本支出这一视角,来研究公司的IPO动因。研究证实了IPO募集资金量与资本支出的正相关关系,且公司内部投资是中小板上市公司的主要发展途径。在并购强度高的行业内,并购则成为上市公司IPO后可能选择的另一种扩张方式。此外,IPO后的股票增发及债务融资也为公司发展提供后续资本支持,可看作是公司IPO的间接动因。     

试论公平原则在我国IPO中的理解与适用

公平原则是民法和商法的基本原则，也是我国证券法的基本原则，其理论基础的核心是证券发行人或者上市公司应当平等对待所有投资者。笔者从民商法、证券法中公平原则的涵义分析入手，针对我国现行首次公开发行股票的几项具体制度，论述了如何正确理解公平原则对我国首次公开发行股票的指导意义，指出了由于僵化理解公平原则而导致的我国股票首次公开发行制度中的缺陷，根据公平原则的合理内涵以及国内外殷票发行的实践提出了完善我国首次公开发行股票制度的建议．     

证券分析师VS统计模型:证券分析师盈余预测的相对准确性及其决定因素

本文使用2005年35家券商对我国上市公司做出的每股盈余预测数据,考察了证券分析师盈余预测相对于统计模型的相对准确性及其决定因素。我们发现,我国证券分析师做出的盈余预测,同以年度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较小,证券分析师盈余预测具有一定的优势;但同某些以季度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较大,证券分析师盈余预测不具有优势。我们同时考察了决定证券分析师盈余预测相对准确性的决定因素。我们发现,公司每股盈余的波动性越大,公司上市越晚,跟踪公司的分析师越多,证券分析师的优势就越大。我们的研究对证券分析师以及投资者都有一定的启示作用。     

Bucking the Trend: The Informativeness of Analyst Contrarian Recommendations

This paper examines price reactions to analysts’ recommendations issued in the opposite direction of recent stock price movements. We find that upgrade and downgrade contrarian recommendations induce larger market reactions than noncontrarian recommendations, consistent with the view that they are more informative. These results are strongest in the period before Regulation Fair Disclosure, consistent with the view that private information was likely curbed after its implementation. Contrarian downgrades are more likely to be issued by all‐star analysts, but less likely by experienced and busy analysts suggesting that contrarian recommendations are subject to career concerns.     

Ownership structure and performance: Evidence from the public float in IPOs

We investigate whether the post-IPO market performance of IPO stocks is related to the percentage of shares issued to the public, namely, the public float. We demonstrate that a non-linear relation exists between the public float and post-IPO returns. Specifically, as public float increases, long-run returns decrease for low levels of public float and increase for high levels of public float. This relation persists even after controlling for various firm characteristics. The best long-term performers are firms that sell either very little or sell most of their stock in the IPO. We suggest that the choice of public float level creates a trade-off between incentives to insiders and power granted to outsiders. This trade-off determines the non-linear relation found between the public float and long-run returns.     

The Underpricing of Insurance IPOs

The previous literature documents that insurance initial public offerings (IPOs) are less underpriced than those of noninsurance firms. This difference is usually attributed to lower information asymmetry for regulated firms. However, we find that once one controls for the file price adjustment insurance IPOs, both stock and mutual, are no less underpriced than other noninsurance offerings suggesting the book-building process resolves any such information asymmetries. We also find that mutual IPOs appear more underpriced than stock insurance IPOs, but this difference is related to the differences in pre-issue managerial ownership.     

Valuation of global IPOs: a stochastic frontier approach

This paper studies the impact of global offerings on US IPO firms’ offer price using the stochastic frontier approach. We find that the offer price valuation efficiency for global IPOs exceeds that of IPOs with purely domestic offers by 3.1%. In particular, the global offering approach is most appropriate to those IPO firms, which offer larger proportion of new shares to international investors, underwritten by less prestigious investment banks and with larger firm-specific return variance. Our findings are consistent with the demand inelasticity, certification effect and investor recognition arguments that account for the benefits of global offering.

An Analysis of Lockups in REIT IPOs

We analyze how the unique characteristics of real estate investment trusts (REITs) affect IPO lockup agreements from 1980 to 2006. The findings show that, unlike industrial IPOs, lockup periods for REIT IPOs do not cluster at 180 days, tend to cover longer periods, and vary over time. Our results support the commitment device hypothesis instead of the signaling hypothesis. That is, REIT managers tend to use lockup agreements to alleviate moral hazard problems and protect post-IPO investors rather than to send signals to investors. Finally, contrary to previous studies, we find no significant negative abnormal returns around the unlock date for the whole sample. The lack of aggressive sales by insiders and the fact that REITs are not backed by venture capitalists can explain our finding.     

Distance,transportation and the underpricing of IPOs

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper examines the influence of the firm’s location on IPO underpricing using data from the Chinese stock market. We find that...     

中国企业境外融资回顾与展望

8年来，中国企业或在海外注册的中资控股公司通过海外证券市场募集了大量资金。仅红筹股、H股筹资总计达5500亿港币，海外融资与深沪两交易所被誉为国企融资的“三驾马车”，为国企改革和中国经济建设作出了较大贡献。     

REIT IPOs and the Cost of Going Public

We examine Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that went public between 1986 and 2004. Consistent with previous studies, we find that REIT IPOs are associated with lower levels of underpricing relative to traditional issues. We also find that REITs are associated with smaller file price revisions. Both findings are potentially attributable to the lower level of uncertainty associated with pricing REITs. In contrast, using an alternative measure of issuance costs that incorporates the share retention decision by preexisting owners, we find no significant difference between REIT and non-REIT issues, suggesting the results of previous studies are not robust to various specifications of issuance cost and that preexisting owners do not necessarily benefit from the lower level of underpricing. Additionally, we find no difference in the issuance costs of equity versus mortgage REITs, particularly once we control for the use of umbrella partnerships.