不对称信息环境下企业诚信的博弈分析

经济社会要求企业必须做到诚信,但企业在现实的经营过程中,其表现往往是不诚信的。出现这一矛盾的根源,在于信息的不对称分布,本文通过建立企业诚信的一般博弈模型和重复博弈模型,讨论不对称信息环境下企业的行为选择,得出企业追求长期利益会导致诚信的结论。最后指出,企业要真正做到诚信,就要增加重复博弈的机会,变一次性博弈变成重复博弈。     

The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods

This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods with positive spillovers across jurisdictions. If spillovers are symmetric, the non-cooperative game played by jurisdictions admits a unique equilibrium, and an increase in spillovers reduces the total provision of public goods. Smaller jurisdictions always reduce their contribution, but larger jurisdictions can increase their contribution. When spillovers are asymmetric, equilibrium is unique if spillovers are low, while multiple equilibria exist for high spillover values. In the case of two jurisdictions, an increase in the flow of spillovers to one jurisdiction benefits agents from that jurisdiction but harms agents in the other jurisdiction. Beyond the case of two jurisdictions, the effect of changes in spillovers cannot be signed. An increase in the spillovers flowing to a jurisdiction can actually result in an increase in the supply of public goods by that jurisdiction and harm agents residing in it, while benefiting agents in the other jurisdictions. The results of the paper reveal the complexity of interactions that will plague the design of institutions for multijurisdictional local public good economies with spillovers.      

区域公共物品政府供给的博弈分析

区域公共物品是一种特殊的公共物品,不仅具有公共物品的一般属性,还具有其自身特殊属性。正是由于区域公共物品的这些特性,区域内地方政府在供给区域公共物品时容易陷入"囚徒困境",导致区域公共物品供给不足,阻碍区域经济一体化的发展。本文运用博弈分析原理,对区域公共物品供给不足进行了分析,认为区域公共物品供给不足除了区域公共物品的特性以外,政府的有限理性和信息不对称也是导致区域公共物品供给不足的重要因素,并就区域公共物品供给不足提出一些政策建议。     

城市开发问题的博弈分析

城市开发活动是开发企业与开发企业、开发企业与行政机构的互动行为 ,而城市开发行为的最优选择也是在各类投资主体之间的互动博弈中形成的。先行投资困境、优势区位问题、行政介入问题和可持续开发问题 ,都反映了投资主体博弈的特定后果。从博弈论的角度来思考 ,我们能对城市开发问题的实质内涵有更为深刻的理解。     

供应链管理中企业合作的博弈分析

供应链管理的关键是节点企业间的战略合作,但是企业的短期行为会使合作陷入困境。通过对所构建的博弈模型的重复博弈进行分析,证明了只要博弈双方以长期利益为目标,合作才是最优战略,从而说明了供应链企业间建立长期的合作伙伴关系是可能与必然的。     

会计制度变迁的寻租博弈

会计制度作为一种公共物品,具有经济后果。其变迁的过程会诱发各相关利益集团的寻租博弈活动。经过充分博弈后,会计制度会达成纳什均衡,并且一旦出现新的诱因,又会引发新的寻租博弈活动,如此反复循环,向会计制度的理想状态——帕累托均衡逼近,实现社会资源的最优配置。     

解决交易中死博弈的途径

将信用担保机制引入到交易中,并按新的商品交易流程予以实施.以解决因交易双方信用的缺失引起的死博弈,实现交易各方共赢.     

业务外包中的质量博弈分析

在业务外包中,购买商和供应商有短期交易和长期合作,本文利用博弈论中的重复博弈理论,建立了博弈模型,并且在不同条件下讨论了购买商和供应商基于产品质量的有限次与无限次重复博弈.讨论结果表明：长期关系会使应商提供的产品质量更高.     

Efficient inequality: differential allocation in the local public sector

This paper examines the consequences for social efficiency if the locally provided public input can be differentially allocated among residents. We derive the distributional efficiency condition, which is the distribution of public inputs that maximizes within-city gains from trade. Differential allocation also causes modifications to the standard (Samuelsonian) allocative efficiency condition. Additionally, we explore the consequences of differential allocation for the median voter model. Standard empirical voter models are seriously flawed because they fail to distinguish final public output production from either individual demand or the distribution of publicly provided inputs. Finally, we derive the club sharing efficiency condition.     

Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for a two-stage game of asset creation

The paper studies a two-stage economy where consumers choose first the asset structure and then use it in a standard general equilibrium framework to transfer wealth across time and states of nature. The financial structure is chosen by maximizing indirect utility functions, using continuous random selections from the second-stage equilibrium correspondence. We depart from Bisin (J Econ Theory 82:19–45, 1998) where an endogenous beliefs approach was used and the asset creation was left to financial intermediaries. Moreover, our approach allows us to go beyond a mixed strategies result as we obtain an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for the economy with incomplete information about future endowments.     

一个企业经营者的激励博弈模型分析

论文把博弈论引入到激励问题的研究中,将企业所有者和经营者作为博弈的双方,通过建立在完全信息和不完全信息条件下经营者激励的静态和动态博弈模型,来研究企业所有者和经营者行为.通过博弈模型的分析,得出完全信息和不完全信息条件下企业所有者和经营者对于激励约束问题的决策和对策.     

我国中间产品反倾销的公共利益问题探讨

自1997年我国发起第一起反倾销调查至今,我国反倾销调查绝大多数是针对中间产品的进口。本文针对我国反倾销产品的特征,结合这些产品下游产业的行业垄断特征,研究了我国中间产品反倾销的公共利益问题,指出对中间产品合理征收反倾销税可以提高我国整体福利。     

Local Government Finance and Industrial Policy in China

The paper considers the way in which the system of local government finance in China affects the design of local industrial policy. It starts by using recently collected data from selected cities to demonstrate the importance of indirect taxes for financing local services. It then presents a theoretical model which shows how the financing system can lead local governments to distort local industrial structure. Finally, it uses this model to consider whether the 1994 tax reforms can be expected to reduce these distortions. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Testing equality of variances in the analysis of repeated measurements

The problem of comparing the precisions of two instruments using repeated measurements can be cast as an extension of the Pitman-Morgan problem of testing equality of variances of a bivariate normal distribution. Hawkins (1981) decomposes the hypothesis of equal variances in this model into two subhypotheses for which simple tests exist. For the overall hypothesis he proposes to combine the tests of the subhypotheses using Fisher's method and empirically compares the component tests and their combination with the likelihood ratio test. In this paper an attempt is made to resolve some discrepancies and puzzling conclusions in Hawkins's study and to propose simple modifications.
The new tests are compared to the tests discussed by Hawkins and to each other both in terms of the finite sample power (estimated by Monte Carlo simulation) and theoretically in terms of asymptotic relative efficiencies.     

利益集团的博弈与房地产政策的选择

文章以重庆房地产利益集团为例,分析房地产市场中各利益主体间的博弈,特别是博弈过程中的地方政府行为,并提出了对地方政府这种行为的相应对策。     

Land and residential property markets in a booming economy: New evidence from Beijing

Beijing's housing market has boomed over the last fifteen years. The city's population grew by 40.6% and per capita income (in constant RMB) by 273.9% from 1991 to 2005. Using two geocoded data sets, we present new evidence on the real estate price gradient, land price gradient, population densities, and building densities in Beijing's recent free housing market. The classic urban monocentric model's predictions are largely upheld in Beijing. We also document the importance of local public goods, such as access to public transit infrastructure, core high schools, clean air, and major universities, most of which have exogenous locations, as important determinants of real estate prices.     

Tiebout choice and residential segregation by race in US metropolitan areas, 1980–2000

This article examines the link between local government fragmentation, or “Tiebout choice,” and segregation between black and white residents. As suggested by Tiebout [Tiebout, C., 1956. A pure theory of local public expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64, 416–424.], fragmented local governance structures may encourage households to vote with their feet and sort into communities based on their willingness to pay for local public services. This outcome has been well documented. The nuance explored here is that, if the demand for local public services varies by race or if households have preferences for neighbors with specific racial characteristics, local government fragmentation may foster an increase in residential segregation by race across neighborhoods and jurisdictions. Results from metropolitan-level regressions suggest that increased Tiebout choice is associated with increases in black–white residential segregation within US metropolitan areas. Comparable results are obtained from household-level estimates, where the black racial composition of a household's census tract of residence is regressed on household-level controls and racially stratified measures of Tiebout choice. Results from both approaches suggest that a 10% increase in Tiebout choice would increase neighborhood segregation by no more than 1%, while segregation across jurisdictions would increase by between 4% and 7%.     

(Non-)Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models

This paper reconsiders equilibrium existence in models with migration and voting over local public goods. We show that under some straightforward assumptions on preferences and income distributions, the basic structure of multicommunity models (i.e., perfect mobility, majority rule, single crossing property) implies that no equilibrium with jurisdictions conducting different policies can exist. Stratification equilibria—with sorting of the population according to income classes—are therefore not as natural as is sometimes suggested. Mechanisms that can serve to support stratification (i.e., tight housing markets, returns to scale in the provision of publicly consumed goods) are discussed.     

n-人博弈中的策略选择及股权比例与实际势力不对称问题分析

股东控制公司的一条重要途径是通过持有公司股份。然而在对公司控制中,股东真正追求的应该是控制能力而不纯粹是股份比例的大小。这种能力在文章中称之为势力。股份大小与势力成正比,但不是一个简单的函数关系。从投票角度来说,一个大股东有时完全处于被动地位,而小股东却能获得与份额不相称的势力,这完全取决于股权结构状况。文章从一个简单的案例入手,分析了处于不同结构与情境下股权结构与势力结构的变化。从中可以看出,结构问题往往还预示着参与人各方之间的冲突可能性。