Why the surge in savings won't last

• ▀ The coronavirus lockdown caused UK savings to surge. We think the household saving ratio will average over 15% in 2020 - almost twice its long-run average - while the corporate sector is likely to run a hefty financial surplus.
• ▀ Evidence suggests that economic shocks usually push up the desire to save, to the detriment of growth. But the uniqueness of the Covid crisis and its aftereffects could limit the extent of the private sector's increased prudence.
• ▀ Scarred by recent events, consumers may remain thriftier as normality returns. But the short duration of the economic contraction and the windfall nature of lockdown savings mean any long-term rise in savings rates could be modest.
• ▀ Meanwhile, post-pandemic, a more cautious attitude to investment and efforts to repair balance sheets suggest higher saving by firms. But the prospect of weak corporate profit growth will, in our view, offset those forces.

     

Is the UK government pursuing the correct fiscal plan?

• The Autumn Statement saw the Chancellor reaffirm his objective of achieving a budget surplus in the next Parliament and he followed this by introducing a binding target to balance the structural current budget by 2017–18.
• But this places even more policy weight on the ‘output gap’ – a variable which cannot be measured with any certainty and which, as a concept for dictating policy, has serious flaws. If the OBR is too pessimistic on spare capacity, the outcome will be an unnecessarily tight fiscal squeeze.
• Meanwhile, a fiscal surplus requires that another sector of the economy runs a deficit. So committing to this objective implies more control over the public finances than governments actually enjoy.
• Returning the public finances to the black would be positive for fiscal sustainability. But it could have some undesirable consequences if the counterpart to a stronger fiscal position is, as expected, the household sector moving further into the red.
• Furthermore, our detailed analysis of the government's latest spending plans concludes that the scale of the planned cuts to departmental spending will be impossible to deliver, particularly given the commitments to protect spending on health, international development and parts of the education budget.
• As such, in a departure from our normal practice, our UK macroeconomic forecasts assume that the planned spending cuts will be reined back, regardless of who wins the next election.

     

France

The government of Mr. Chirac, which was elected in March, is establishing a liberalising, market-oriented stance on economic policy. Controls on prices and foreign exchange have been relaxed, credit controls are being dismantled and, in spite of opposition from President Mitterrand, a large-scale privatisation programme is planned. The draft 1987 budget proposes to cut public expenditure in real terms for the first time in 28 years and to use the savings to reduce both taxes and the budget deficit. The projected tightening of the fiscal stance is not expected to hold back output which the government forecasts will rise 2 1/2 per cent this year and 3 per cent in 1987. Inflation is also forecast to improve steadily and the current account is moving into surplus. Unemployment, currently at a postwar peak of 10.7 per cent, is expected to fall towards the end of the year.     

SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS

The US economy has twin deficits: internal (the budget deficit) and external (the current account). In sharp contrast, the UK combines a PSBR surplus with a rising current account deficit. Japan and West Germany both enjoy large current surpluses, though in Japan the public sector deficit is narrowing whereas in Germany it is rising. Remarkably, as Figure 1 shows, the present position on the public sector and overseas balances in each of the three major OECD economies and the UK is quite different. Japan is the mirror image of the US: the budget and overseas balances have been moving in the direction of surplus - private sector savings have been more stable. For the UK and West Germany (though again as images of one another) it is movements in private sector savings which have driven the current account. How has this come about?     

SOCIAL SAVINGS

Abstract ‘Social savings’ is a cliometric concept to measure the benefit to society of technological improvements. The terms are defined, and the relationship between social savings and consumer surplus, total factor productivity and growth accounting measures is discussed. We critically outline Fogel's original application of social savings to American railroads in 1890, before looking at subsequent uses of the concept, both to other transport improvements and to other technological changes more generally. The paper concludes by setting out areas to which social savings could be applied, as well as setting out guidelines that future economic historians should use when applying the technique, in order to maximize the likely usefulness of any such work.     

IS THE WORLD SHORT OF SAVINGS?

The opening up of Eastern Europe may give rise to a surge in investment as the former socialist economies move to a market-based system. The scope for modernization of the region in terms of its industrial, environmental and social capital raises the question of how the increase in demand can be accommodated. Since the Ergonomic shock of the early 1980s, most of the world's net saving has been provided by Japan and West Germany in the form of huge current account surpluses. If GMU now implies a significant drop in German savings, does this mean, as the OECD has recently suggested that there is a risk that world savings will be inadequate?     

Savings and the Budget

The fall in the personal sector savings ratio to a record low last year has been a major factor behind the rapid growth of domestic demand in the past two years and the associated deterioration in the current account. It is also a major uncertainty in the Chancellor's Budget judgement. Existing econometric relationships for the consumption function have failed to predict the fall in personal savings over the past few years. Possible explanations include statistical error, the effects of financial deregulation, the housing boom, expectations of higher growth in incomes, and demographic influences. In this Viewpoint, we report on a new consumption function that successfully explains the decline in savings. It provides evidence of a major demographic influence resulting from the decline in the proportion of the population in the 45–64 age cohort, the main savers in society. Subsidiary effects arise from the boom in house prices, and statistical mis-measurement. The equation predicts an appreciable revival of savings over the next few years as the 45–64 age cohort grows again. These shifts in demographic structure reflect the after-effects of the Second World War. This new evidence suggests that the Chancellor has done quite enough to ensure a slowdown in consumption, and that he would be ill-advised to heed calls for special measures to boost savings. By contrast, well conceived tax changes that remove microeconomic distortions in the tax system (perhaps moving in the direction of an expenditure tax) would improve the tax structure, and may well increase the scope for tax cuts in future budgets. Our new consumption function also lends weight to the Chancellor's argument that the current account deficit is not a source of concern, insofar as it arises from a shift in savings associated with demographic changes that will be reversed in due course.     

Adjusting to the Oil Price Fall

In his Budget speech last March Mr. Lawson said “If we can survive unscathed the loss of half our North Sea oil revenues in less than 25 weeks, then the prospective loss of the other half over the remainder of the next 25 years should not cause us undue concern.” In this Viewpoint we ask whether Mr. Lawson's optimism was premature. Although we continue to believe that the fall in oil prices will have favourable effects on the UK economy, there will be problems of adjustment which could be painful. We ask the following questions: (a) What adjustment to the balance of payments is needed to compensate for the fall in oil prices? (b) How will the adjustment occur? (c) How far can the recent weakness of sterling be explained by the fall in oil prices, or is there a more alarming explanation?     

The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non‐profit firm mixed duopoly

A mixed duopoly setting is examined where a private non‐profit firm (NPO) competes with a private profit‐maximizer. The NPO's stakeholders select a contract for their managers. A novel NPO objective function is utilized which takes into account all the likely returns to the NPO's stakeholders (NPO profits and the surplus accruing to the NPO stakeholders) in such a commercial setting. In sub‐game perfect equilibria, it is shown that the NPO's managers generally will not be given the NPO's true objective to optimize. It is also shown that aggregate social welfare may increase or decrease due to this managerial contracting behavior or the use of NPO membership fees. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

预算结余索取权安排、棘轮效应和预算松驰关系研究

预算结余和棘轮效应涉及的均是本期对下期的影响。本文研究这两种制度安排对预算编制松驰和预算执行松驰的影响。采用实验方法收集数据,统计分析发现：（1）在各种预算索取权安排下,预算责任人都有制造预算编制松驰的激励;当棘轮效应不存在时,各种制度安排下的预算编制松驰程度无显著差异;当棘轮效应存在时,不同预算结余制度安排下,预算编制松驰程度不同,留用利益比例与预算编制松驰负相关;（2）当棘轮效应不存在时,如果预算结余留用比例足够高,预算责任人可能没有制造预算执行松驰的激励;当棘轮效应存在时,在各种预算索取权安排下,预算责任人都有制造预算编制松驰的激励;无论棘轮效应是否存在,在不同的预算结余索取权安排下,预算执行松驰程度不同,留用比例与预算执行松驰负相关。（3）棘轮效应对预算编制松驰有抑制作用,对预算执行松驰有促进作用。     

The role of organizational culture,capabilities, and adoption of e-marketing on nonprofits' organizational performance

Nonprofit organizations are facing increasing challenges to survival and mission accomplishment in a market economy. Thus, many nonprofit organizations are actively exploring how to enhance organizational performance through Internet and communication technologies in the digital era. The relationship between e-marketing adoption and organizational performance of for-profit companies has been studied intensively. However, this relationship has not been examined in the nonprofit context. The objectives of this study are to investigate factors promoting the adoption of e-marketing and the latter's effect on the performance of nonprofits. This paper surveyed 54 nonprofits and used partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) to test the research hypotheses grounded in resource dependence theory and e-marketing orientation. Results indicated that top management's attitudinal emphasis on e-marketing does not lead to e-marketing adoption. Differs from for-profit companies, nonprofits' e-marketing adoption is mainly related to planning and implementation capabilities. Moreover, although planning strongly influences e-marketing adoption, implementation capabilities play a crucial role in a performance-driven adoption. Hence, if e-marketing is adopted without sufficient manpower and skills, organizational performance will not be enhanced even with adequate e-marketing budget.     

MORE PENSIONS MIS‐SELLING AHEAD: BY GOVERNMENT OF COURSE1

Not only was the infamous Pensions Mis‐selling episode of the 1990s caused directly by government legislation; government has continually mis‐sold on an enormous scale its own pension creations, the state pension schemes. The history of state pensions is a history of broken promises, yet today's pension establishment welcomes the Pension Commission's recommendation for a higher state pension. With this mindset it is hardly surprising that similar approval is given to the Commission's other main recommendation – a National Pensions Saving Scheme, which has all the hallmarks of a fiasco in the making. Furthermore to the extent there is a savings crisis, government is a clear culprit, regularly resorting to low interest rates and the printing press to favour borrowing and not saving. Nor is it surprising that government itself will retain its gold‐plated pension arrangements and in all likelihood will be exempt from these proposals.     

Pushing the limit? Fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union

Governments are confronted with the growing realization that they face fiscal limits on the size of debt and deficits relative to GDP. These fiscal limits invalidate Bohn's criterion for fiscal sustainability, which allows explosive debt relative to GDP, eventually violating any fiscal limit. We derive restrictions on a fiscal rule, necessary for the government to eliminate explosive behavior. These restrictions require that the response of the primary surplus to debt be relatively strong, and that the primary surplus be cointegrated with both debt and output. We test these empirical implications for a panel of eleven EMU countries, and find that they are satisfied, implying that fiscal policy does not create explosive behavior.     

Summer Budget: calculated risk or reckless gamble?

• The Chancellor had created the expectation that his Summer Budget would be radical and he did not disappoint. The ‘rabbit from the hat’ was a compulsory ‘living wage’, expected to reach £9 per hour in 2020, which Mr Osborne hopes will help to compensate the lower paid for the slashing of in‐work benefits. This has effectively transferred responsibility for supporting low‐income households from the government to employers. The OBR expects this to have a relatively muted impact on employment, but this view looks pretty optimistic and the policy represents a major gamble.
• The reduction in welfare spending, plus an easing of the near‐term fiscal squeeze, has helped to smooth the public spending ‘rollercoaster’. But with a plethora of giveaways failing to disguise a net increase in the tax burden, the Budget is likely to weigh on growth prospects, even if the Chancellor's big gamble pays off.
• Alongside the Budget the Chancellor announced a new fiscal mandate, which will require governments to run a budget surplus in “normal times”. But meeting this mandate will require a fiscal stance very far from the historical norm and it will also force other sectors to move into deficit to compensate. It will also mean a looser monetary policy than would otherwise be the case. So a policy presented as creating room for fiscal policy to respond to future economic shocks could potentially narrow the scope for the more potent weapon of interest rate cuts.

     

Demography and the U.S. current account deficit

We examine whether aging in the trading partners of the U.S. has affected their demand for foreign (i.e., U.S.) assets enough to materially affect the U.S. current account balance. There is reason to think that demography may be at work in international capital flows because the standard life-cycle model of consumption behavior predicts that a household's age will influence its saving behavior. Moreover, simple national accounting identities link a country's current account balance to its savings–investment imbalance. Thus, differences in national age-profiles should affect the current account. To test this theory's plausibility and significance, I simulate a multi-region overlapping generations model that is calibrated to match the demographic differences among the major industrialized countries over the past 50 years. In the model, it is found that these differences can explain some of the observed long-term capital movements in the G-7. In particular, the model does a good job of predicting the size and timing of U.S. current account deficits.     

Ageing's raging savings debate

• ? Demographic changes have played a crucial role in pushing savings rates up and real rates down in the advanced economies. Despite some voices to the contrary, we think such forces will remain in place for many years to come.
• ? For such a predictable process, it's amazing that the economic implications of ageing are so hotly debated. Ageing affects everyone's lifetime savings decisions and has an impact on macroeconomic variables through several direct and indirect channels, the strength of which varies over time.
• ? The impact of ageing on savings depends on interpreting two distinct long‐term drivers. On the one hand, aggregate savings may start to fall as the baby‐boomer “bulge” in advanced economies transitions from the peak period of saving to the phase of lower saving in retirement.
• ? On the other hand, rising life expectancy should lead individuals to save more during their working lives or wait longer to retire. Greater labour market participation by those close to the official retirement age suggests that rising life expectancy is already leading many to remain in the workforce for longer – a trend that is likely to continue.
• ? Accounting for ageing and rising life expectancy together, we find there will be no major decline in savings even as the elderly's share of the population rises further.
• ? The impact on future real interest rates will, if anything, be negative. Comprehensive studies have reached a similar conclusion, taking into account the impact of demographic changes on savings, investment and other factors affecting real interest rates.
• ? Ageing populations may be complicating the escape from low global inflation. Crosscountry evidence suggests older populations may prefer lower inflation. As societies in advanced economies continue age, there is a downside risk to the long‐term outlook for inflation and bond yields.

     

UK Forecast in Detail

Deficit reduction continues to be a slow process. And while the Government officially remains on course to meet its objective of a budget surplus by the end of the decade, it will not take much to knock that target off course, including an acceptance of the implausibility of current plans.     

Why the UK saving ratio is unlikely to flip anytime soon

• ? With inflation down and wages rising, the outlook for consumer spending in the UK is brightening. But should households opt to boost savings, the mood could darken.
• ? We think a meaningful rise in the saving ratio from its recent record lows is unlikely, though. Austerity may be easing, but the drag from fiscal policy is still set to limit households’ savings resources, while the durability of the current expansion may reduce the motivation for precautionary saving.
• ? What's more, any rise in interest rates on savings accounts will probably be even slower than the modest pace we expect for Bank Rate. And with the demographic shift toward an older, less thrifty, population, the appetite of households to save looks set to remain subdued.

     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year the Chancellor followed "the path of prudence and caution", cutting taxes by £4bn and budgeting for a public sector surplus of £3bn. This year - rather more compellingly - he is travelling the same route. Against the background of a record current account deficit and rising inflation, Mr. Lawson has tightened fiscal policy, cutting taxes in 1989–90 by nearly £2bn - less than is needed to offset real fiscal drag. His main priority, reaffirmed in the Budget speech, is to tackle inflation and, to this end, he chose not to revalorize excise duties. This was reinforced by a reduction in national insurance contributions, which not only benefits the low paid in relative terms, but also sharpens the incentive to supply labour at the bottom end of the wage spectrum. But this reform of national insurance is not cheap. Even though it is not practicable to implement the changes until October, the cost in 1989–90 is estimated at £1bn, rising to £2.8bn in 1990–1. This is equivalent, in PSDR terms, to a 2 per cent cut in the basic rate of income tax arid, in our post-Budget forecast, precludes further tax cuts in 1990. Unless there is an unexpectedly large rebound in personal savings, the Chancellor is likely to find himself in his present position in a year's time: presiding over a large budget surplus but unable to reduce it significantly for fear of rekindling inflation or aggravating the current account deficit. Simply writing declining numbers for the PSDR into the MTFS offers no genuine guidance on medium-term fiscal policy and may even be positively misleading to financial markets.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.