International Risk Sharing and Low Cross-Country Consumption Correlations: Are They Really Inconsistent?

In dynamic-equilibrium trade models, the common assumption that asset markets are complete implies that correlations of consumption across countries should be quite high. In contrast, measured consumption correlations tend to be rather low. While some suggest this implies that asset market incompleteness is a fundamental feature determining international trade dynamics, this paper provides an example of a simple model economy in which complete markets can be associated with consumption correlations that are lower than output correlations. Conditions for substitution elasticities associated with this result are derived for a two-country, two-good endowment model with heterogeneous agents.     

Monetary Expansion,International Trade and Capital Accumulation*

This paper considers the long-run domestic and foreign effects of a domestic monetary expansion in a two-country model in which the processes of capital accumulation at home and abroad interact with each other via international trade. We investigate the global stability conditions and their relationship with the comparative dynamic effects of a monetary expansion in the model. In particular, we show that under plausible global stability conditions the early analytical results obtained by Roberts (1978) and Shieh (1984) may be reversed in the two-country model.     

Capital mobility and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in open economies

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium two-country optimizing ‘new-open economy macroeconomics’ model to analyze the consequences of international capital mobility for the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Conventional wisdom suggests that higher capital mobility diminishes the effectiveness of fiscal policy. The model laid out in this paper provides an example that a higher degree of capital mobility can also increase the effectiveness of fiscal policy. This tends to be the case if the stance of monetary policy can be described by means of a simple monetary policy rule.     

Savings, Volume of Trade, and Growth

This paper develops a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous growth to analyze the effects of international trade on steady-stage growth. The two countries differ both in preferences and in technologies. It is shown first that both countries cannot simultaneously experience increases in consumption growth from trade. It is then shown that trade can increase output growth for both countries if the attitude towards saving matches the change in the terms of trade in each country. A country facing a decline (rise) in its output price grows faster if its intertemporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low (high).     

Public Debt,Terms of Trade and Welfare: The Role of Capital Production Shares,External Balances,and Dynamic (In)efficiency

In view of still large external imbalances across the world economy and dramatically risen public debts in major advanced economies, this paper reconsiders the relationship between public debt, the terms of trade and welfare in a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model with technological differences across countries. We find that the terms of trade effect of a public debt shock depends only on international differences in capital production shares and the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy. As in a model with similar capital production shares, domestic welfare rises and foreign welfare decreases when Home has a positive external balance and the Golden Rule holds. Under dynamic efficiency, welfare decreases in the debt-expanding, net foreign creditor country if she has a relatively smaller capital production share, and if the welfare effect through the accumulation channel is negative. In contrast, under dynamic inefficiency she can increase her welfare by debt expansion.     

A model for international capital markets closure in an economy with incomplete markets and short sales

Using a two-country dynamic optimization model, we investigate the impact of exchange risk, incomplete information and short sales constraints on international portfolio decisions around market closure. Using optimal control theory, we provide solutions and simulation results. Our model can be applied to solve several problems in financial economics in the presence of market closure, information asymmetry and short sales constraints.     

Comparative Advantage and Economies of Scale: When Does Ricardo Dominate Smith?

This paper develops a two-country, two-sector (X and Y) model of international trade. One country has comparative advantage in the increasing returns Y-sector. The direction of trade depends on the relative size of the countries and the relative strength of economies of scale and comparative advantage. An equilibrium where the smallest country exports the Y-good and the largest country loses from trade is possible. A dynamic equilibrium where the X-sector is subject to learning by doing locks in the initial pattern of specialization. Yet, there may be few welfare gains from protecting the X-sector in the small country.     

The convergence dynamics of a transition economy: The case of the Czech Republic

In this paper we develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model by means of which we seek to explain the long-run path of a transition economy. The model's novel feature is the inclusion of quality investment in the standard framework of applied general equilibrium two-country models. This feature is necessary to explain the trend in the real exchange rate. We present an application to the Czech economy.     

The Balassa-Samuelson Model: an Overview*

This paper introduces a special issue marking the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of two classic papers in international economics, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). We provide a brief analytical treatment of the basic model and an overview of the contributions in this special issue. the special issue includes novel empirical and theoretical approaches related to the Balassa-Samuelson model. Theoretical models include dynamic two-sector growth models, two-country general-equilibrium models, and openeconomy models with imperfectly competitive nontraded-goods sectors. Several papers exploit new sources of data or datasets constructed in new ways from traditional sources. “Under the skin of any international economist lies a deep-seated belief in some variant of the PPP theory of exchange rates.” (Rudiger Dornbusch and Paul Krugman, 1976, p. 540)     

Public Spending on Industries,Private Investment and the Timing of International Trade Policy Changes

This paper incorporates public spending on industries (in terms of a durable public intermediate good) into a two-country, two-period, and two-sector, model with international labour mobility. The relationship between international trade policies, private investment, and public spending on industries has been examined. Due to international labour mobility, a policy change in one country also affect the relevant variables in the other country. The timing of the policy change is shown to be ciritical. [H30, F20]     

Business Cycles Between Developed and Developing Economies

This paper compares the stylized facts of international real business cycles between developed and developing countries. A two-sector two-country real business cycles model is constructed to examine the cyclical behaviors of domestic as well as international macroeconomic variables, and to evaluate the model's consistency with empirical observations. The model predicts correctly that consumption, investment, and saving are procyclical, while the trading balance/output ratio is countercyclical. There exist, however, some discrepancies between the model and the data.     

A two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model with physical and human capital accumulation

We study a two-country endogenous growth model in which the long-run growth is propelled by the accumulation of physical and human capital. We show that in the integrated world economy, there exists a unique and locally saddlepoint stable balanced growth equilibrium. We also show that the incorporation of adjustment costs in the process of human capital accumulation leads to a lower long-run growth rate. We then show that, in the 2-country world economy with international trade, balanced growth is possible. Finally, we present a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem concerning the pattern of international trade. We appreciate the constructive comments from an anonymous referee which have improved this paper significantly. We acknowledge also with gratitude the valuable comments of Hideyuki Adachi, Kosuke Aoki, Daniel Bernhofen, Eric Bond, Koichi Futagami, Ronald Jones, Tamotsu Nakamura and Raymond Riezman on earlier versions. We appreciate also the beneficial comments from the participants of the GEP conference on New Directions in International Trade Theory held in the University of Nottingham and of the Adachi OB Workshop in Kobe University.     

Standardization of intermediate goods and international trade

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the relationship between standardization of intermediate inputs and international trade. We employ a two-country, general equilibrium model with differentiated manufacturing goods. Production of manufacturing goods requires specific intermediate inputs, which can be either specialized or standardized. Standardization and the pattern of trade are determined endogenously in our model. In this framework we derive the effects of trade integration, that is, a decline in trading costs for intermediate goods, on the equilibrium outcome.     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

进出口贸易增长、人民币汇率波动与贸易均衡汇率决定——基于两国模型的理论与政策分析

非市场化商品和劳务、技术进步与人口增长速度差异等因素的存在,使得准确计算人民币均衡汇率面临诸多困难;只有当两国的技术进步增长率与人口增长率之和相等且两国的贸易量为零增长速度时,才会出现零波动幅度的贸易均衡汇率;在两国或者多国构成的国际经济体系中,在一定条件下可能存在贸易汇率波动均衡,但会表现出不同的特征;应根据我国贸易汇率波动均衡特征制订和实施更具灵活性和弹性的贸易政策和汇率政策.     

Any need for coordination of policies towards transit traffic with a negative local externality?

International transit traffic between countries can be expected to increase in the future. This paper investigates whether international policy coordination is appropriate in the case of international transit traffic causing a local environmental externality. This issue is analysed in a two-country model where traffic is used as an input in production. It is found that individual optimization of the countries is likely to result in an outcome with less than optimal international traffic, i.e. too little pollution compared with optimum.     

Controlling Illegal Immigration: Border Control vs. Domestic Enforcement

This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country.

     

Tariffs and Pareto optimality in international trade: The case of unemployment

This paper constructs a non-Walrasian two-country model of international trade, and investigates the possibility of policy combinations including tariffs which lead to Pareto superior trades. While such policies clearly do not exist in the Walrasian full employment situation, the paper shows that there may exist some in the case of unemployment. These policies are studied in various unemployment regimes, and it is shown that their effects depend both on the regime the economy is in, and on the degree of wage indexation.     

Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient

In a two-country model, in which countries differ with respect to the perception of environmental damages and abatement costs, the stability of international environmental agreements is analyzed in a dynamic framework. Three types of agreements are considered: A socially optimal solution, a uniform emission tax (a tax equally applied in both countries) and a uniform emission reduction quota (an equal percentage emission reduction from a base year). Stability is checked for these agreements according to the concept of renegotiation-proofness. It is shown that the stability requirements depend crucially on the parameters defining the interests of the two countries and the type of agreement. Moreover, it is demonstrated that if punishment options are restricted for some reason the stability of an agreement may suffer. One important result of the paper is that if countries exhibit asymmetric interests, stability in the quota regime is higher than in the tax regime and in the social optimum. This might explain why emission reduction quotas have been so popular in international politics despite recommendations of economists to use market-based instruments.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.