Determinants of privatization of public corporations: evidence from the Japanese experience

The main purpose of this study is to find factors affecting privatization decisions. This study investigates the determinants of privatization by applying the probit model for a data set of special public corporations in Japan. In December 2001, the Japanese government made a resolution to consider the privatization of special public corporations, evaluating 74 special public corporations for possible privatization. In the empirical analysis on the determinants of privatization, we find that among several factors affecting privatization decisions, two are important—the market condition factor and the policy/regulation factor. As for market conditions, a public corporation which exists in a commercialized industry is about 20% more likely to be privatized than others. As for the policy and regulation factor, the public corporation’s privatization under a single regulator is about 25% more likely, compared with the public corporation’s privatization under multiple regulators.     

National Income Accounting and Public Policy

Modern national income accounting was designed in the early 20th century for the purpose of providing improved indicators about the performance of the economy so that government policy makers could better control the economy. The way that performance is measured affects the types of policies used to try to accomplish policy goals. Two attributes of national income accounting are analyzed for their effects on economic policy. First, government production is included in the national income accounts at cost, rather than at market value as private sector output is measured. This biases policy toward a larger public sector. Second, output is measured as a homogeneous dollar amount. This biases policy toward focusing on increasing quantities of inputs and outputs in the production process, rather than on innovation and entrepreneurship, which are the true engines of economic progress. Economic policy could be improved by focusing less on national income as an indicator of policy, and more on the underlying processes that foster economic progress.     

To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning

In this paper, we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of a pollution standard, a probability of inspection and a fine for non-compliance, in a context where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly, and the penalty may include gravity and non-gravity components at the regulator’s discretion. Under given penalties, the optimal policy entails compliance with the standard as long as a quite intuitive condition is met. Non-compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages. Interestingly, the appropriate structure of the penalty under non-compliance is highly progressive, while the best possible shape of the fine under compliance is linear. If the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of the fine, linear penalties are socially preferred and the optimal policy induces compliance.      

Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information

We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm when the firm is imperfectly informed about its efficiency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The firm’s risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undereffort by an inefficient firm as in Laffont and Tirole (J Polit Econ 94(3):614–641, 1986) and the effort distortion increases as the firm becomes more risk-averse. Further, the regulator benefits from sequential contracting with the firm where the firm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires information, albeit the benefit diminishes as the firm becomes more risk-averse.      

Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer

This paper explains why some governments fail to adopt policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to the types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, we show that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. We also show that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, we discuss which equilibrium should be more plausible. We conclude that the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges can dominate the former unless the citizen’s estimate of environmental risk is sufficiently low.     

Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise

This article analyzes the effect of the cost that an agencymust incur to adopt a new regulation (the "enactment cost")on the agency's incentive to invest in expertise. The effectof the enactment cost on agency expertise depends on whetherthe agency would regulate if it fails to acquire additionalinformation about the regulation's effects. If an uninformedagency would regulate, increasing enactment costs increasesagency expertise; if an uninformed agency would retain the statusquo, increasing enactment costs decreases agency expertise.These results may influence the behavior of an uninformed overseer,such as a court or legislature, that can manipulate the agency'senactment costs. Such an overseer must balance its interestin influencing agency policy preferences against its interestin increasing agency expertise. The article discusses the implicationsof these results for various topics in institutional design,including judicial and executive review of agency regulations,structure-and-process theories of congressional oversight, nationalsecurity, criminal procedure, and constitutional law.     

THE POLITICS OF PRECOMMITMENT WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSACTION COSTS

Despite the lack of legal channels through which binding commitments can be made by the government, economic and political factors enable it to affect future outcomes. In practice, large transaction costs are associated with any significant change of policy, and therefore the current government can adopt policies so that certain outcomes are more likely to be realized by its successor. In this paper it is argued that transaction costs combined with electoral uncertainty are likely to drive the current government to adopt a policy which is extreme relative to the preferences of the existing political parties. This policy is adopted in order to ensure that due to transaction costs, the future government will not depart radically from the most preferred policy of the current government. If the current policy is likely to affect the election outcome, then, in addition to the above considerations, the electorate attitudes would have to be taken into account by the government. Hence, the current government confronts two factors in choosing its policies: the behavior of the future government and the behavior of the electorate. The interplay between the two factors determines the choice of the current policy.     

Governance–Based Analysis Of Regulation

This article surveys current literature on the developing nature of regulatory systems and regulatory reforms, attempts to place such arrangements in the pervasive context provided by public policy processes and institutions, and argues that an explanation of the 'governance of regulation' is crucial to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of regulatory practice. The article begins by defining the range of meanings of regulation, then goes on to emphasize the importance of the framework of governance within which regulatory policy and practice proceed. The location of regulatory reform in contemporary debates on state–market relations and related managerial reforms is examined. Reference to this framework highlights the significance of the public policy process through which regulatory policies must be delivered, and the key role within that framework of political categories of analysis. The article ends by considering the issue of 'policy transfer' between developed and developing economies, and the need for policy–relevant research into regulatory systems and policies in developing countries.     

Symposium on New Directions in Fiscal Federalism: An Introduction

Issues of fiscal federalism—broadly defined to includethe tax, expenditure, and debt policies of different levelsof government, as well their interaction—have attractedheightened attention from academics and policymakers alike.Global changes in institutional structures and economic conditionswithin and among countries, including fiscal, economic and politicalreforms, have highlighted the importance of the division offiscal and political responsibilities among governments. Competitionamong governments, as well as the development and evolutionof mechanisms of horizontal and vertical fiscal coordinationand cooperation among them, have been the subject of a rapidlydeveloping literature. Better understanding of the fiscal policiesand interactions of governments, and of their institutionaland political underpinnings, presents deep intellectual challengesas well as opportunities for useful policy applications. The five papers in this symposium are a selection of papersbased on keynote addresses presented at a September 2006 conferenceon "New Directions in Fiscal Federalism"     

The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?

We investigate the political determinants of liberalization in OECD network industries, performing a panel estimation over 30 years, through the largest and most updated sample available. Our results contrast with the traditional wisdom according to which right-wing governments do promote market-oriented policies more intensively than left-wing ones. Our findings reveal a neglected role of the so-called neoliberalism in promoting left-wing market-oriented policy. As a result, we claim that ideological cleavages ceased to act as determinants of the liberalization wave observed in network industries. This result is confirmed when controlling for the existing regulatory conditions that executives find when elected. Furthermore, we find that the country’s exposure to other countries’ policy initiatives acts as a positive stimulus for liberalization policies.     

Implications of Regulation Policy Incentives for Strategic Control: An Integrative Model

Abstract ** : This paper proposes an internal management perspective of the company, as a complement to longstanding principal‐agency theory, for understanding the interchange between regulator and company. It draws from a longitudinal research project on understanding the implications of regulation policy incentives for strategic control in the management of UK monopoly network utilities and the management implications of regulatory policy making. This paper reports on how two utility companies have managed regulatory objectives alongside organizational ones in electricity distribution and gas transportation and suggests a new integrative model of strategic control for understanding utility management. It concludes if regulation policies are to be effective then regulators should understand the internal management of the companies if performance targets are to be attained .     

Decoupling in electric utilities

Distributing electricity to users has been covered through the charge per kilowatt-hour for electricity used. Conservation advocates have promoted policies that “decouple” distribution revenues or profits from the amount of electricity delivered, claiming that usage-based pricing leads utilities to encourage use and discourage conservation. Because decoupling separates profits from conduct, it runs against the dominant finding in regulatory economics in the last 20 years—that incentive-based regulation outperforms rate-of-return profit guarantees. Even if distribution costs are independent of use, some usage charges can be efficient. Price-cap regulation may distort incentives to inform consumers about energy efficiency—getting more performance from less electricity. Utilities will subsidize efficiency investments, but only when prices are too low. If consumers fail to adopt energy efficiency measures that would be individually beneficial, decoupling can increase welfare, but only if all energy revenues are separated from use, not just those associated with distribution.     

The Optimal Timing of Adoption of a Green Technology

We study the optimal timing of adoption of a cleaner technology and its effects on the rate of growth of an economy in the context of an AK endogenous growth model. We show that the results depend upon the behavior of the marginal utility of environmental quality with respect to consumption. When it is increasing, we derive the capital level at the optimal timing of adoption. We show that this capital threshold is independent of the initial conditions on the stock of capital, implying that capital-poor countries tend to take longer to adopt. Also, country-specific characteristics, as the existence of high barriers to adoption, may lead to different capital thresholds for different countries. If the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases with consumption, a country should never delay adoption; the optimal policy is either to adopt immediately or, if adoption costs are “too high”, to never adopt. The policy implications of these results are discussed in the context of the international debate surrounding the environmental political agenda.      

Frontrunners and Laggards: The Strategy of Environmental Regulation under Uncertainty

The extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts. First, companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation. Second, ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates. Finally, regulators use limited information provided by the industry. I construct a game-theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator. In equilibrium, companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry. This profit-driven behavior is not always socially detrimental, however, as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost. Additionally, the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates: if companies condition compliance on the installation cost, only low-cost companies install in equilibrium. The analysis combines “regulatory capture” with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator.     

Gender and climate change: Do female parliamentarians make difference?

This paper investigates whether female political representation in national parliaments influences climate change policy outcomes. Based on data from a large sample of countries, we demonstrate that female representation leads countries to adopt more stringent climate change policies. We exploit a combination of full and partial identification approaches to suggest that this relationship is likely to be causal. Moreover, we show that through its effect on the stringency of climate change policies, the representation of females in parliament results in lower carbon dioxide emissions. Female political representation may be an underutilized tool for addressing climate change.     

Implications of Bid Design and Willingness-To-Pay Distribution for Starting Point Bias in Double-Bounded Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation Surveys

We examine starting point bias in double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys. We investigate (1) the seriousness of the biases for the location and scale parameters of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) in the presence of starting point bias; (2) whether or not these biases depend on the distribution of WTP and on the bid design; and (3) how well a commonly used diagnostic for starting point bias—a test of the null that bid set dummies entered in the right-hand side of the WTP model are jointly equal to zero—performs under various circumstances. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the effect of ignoring starting point bias depends on the bid design and on the true distribution of WTP. A well-balanced, symmetric bid design may result in very modest biases even when the anchoring mechanism is very strong. The power of bid set dummies in detecting starting point bias is low. They tend to account for misspecifications in the distribution assumed by the researcher for the latent WTP, rather than capturing the presence of starting point bias.     

Environmental taxation,information precision,and information sharing

We analyze how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a sequential game in which regulators and firms face costs uncertainties. First, the regulator chooses the intensity of emissions taxes to reduce externalities. Then, facing common and private information with noisy signals, firms compete in the marketplace and choose outputs. We show that, under nonuniform quality of signals across firms, the regulator may calibrate differentiated tax policy. We also show that the social impact of more precise private signals hinges largely and fundamentally on the value of the ratio of the slopes of the marginal damage and the marginal consumer surplus. Finally, we investigate information sharing between polluters and its impacts on welfare. We stress that, when there are threats of severe environmental damages under deep uncertainties, collusion is welfare reducing and may jeopardize the regulatory process. Regulators need to set an appropriate precautionary policy. Numerical simulations illustrate the results that the model delivers.     

EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN THE LABOR MARKET

Some have criticized government antidiscrimination programs for causing efficiency losses both by devoting public resources to monitoring and enforcement and by distorting personnel decisions. This paper examines the efficiency consequences of such programs when discrimination is caused by a market failure and when regulators are imperfectly informed about individual firms' personnel policies.
This paper outlines a simple model of "statistical discrimination" and shows that an equal opportunity rule, which constrains employers from offering different wage schedules to different groups, will improve the efficiency of this economy. Employers will attempt to evade such regulation, and the paper describes an evasion strategy in which employers search for worker "qualifications" that can act as proxies for race or sex. The paper discusses problems involved in monitoring and enforcing compliance, and considers two possible responses by the regulatory agency. The first is analogous to "disparate impact" judgments in which the type of information that employers can use in personnel decisions is regulated. The second is an affirmative action-type policy that monitors the outcomes, rather than the process, of hiring and compensation decisions. Affirmative action policies have some advantages since they permit employers to use information more efficiently than do policies that attempt to regulate personnel decisions directly. However, affirmative action policies are likely to lead to charges of preferential treatment.     

产学研合作创新补贴方式研究:以欠发达地区企业为例

针对企业创新行为给予补贴是政府鼓励企业创新的常见政策,由于受自身条件限制,欠发达地区政府在创新补贴发放形式上必须作出合理的选择。在考虑企业学习吸收能力的同时引入创新投入分配比例系数并建立三阶段博弈模型,分析欠发达地区产学研合作创新政府补贴策略的最优方式。分析结果表明:欠发达地区政府实施创新补贴策略可以有效激励企业加大创新投入规模;在宽松的知识产权保护政策下,随着学习吸收能力的提高,企业投入产出及社会福利均增加;相比之下,政府采取创新产品补贴策略时的各项产出均优于创新投入补贴。     

Improving the econometric precision of regulatory models

Regulatory regimes often attempt to introduce quasi-competitive pressures by undertaking comparative efficiency assessments between the regulated companies and setting company-specific cost reduction targets based on those comparisons. The UK water industry is one example of such a regime—indeed, it has emphasized the importance of maintaining the number of independent companies in order to preserve the robustness of the modeling. For example, in 2007, the Competition Commission considered whether the merger between Mid Kent Water and South East Water might prejudice the ability of the regulator (Ofwat) to make comparisons across water companies for the purposes of assessing performance and setting price controls. In this paper, we examine this issue and provide specific recommendations to regulators. Our cross-sectional results show that the impact of this merger is not significant. We demonstrate that joint estimation of all the sub-models using the ‘seemingly unrelated regression’ (SUR) procedure in a cross-section and/or panel data framework can dramatically improve the accuracy of the modeling. Moreover, the merger does not affect the confidence intervals significantly under such approaches, which still remain far superior to those under Ofwat’s cross-sectional approach. Based on these results, we recommend that Ofwat and other regulators adopt SUR and/or panel data analysis and thereby reduce their reliance on having sufficient numbers of independent companies.