Price cap regulation: A case study of some pitfalls of implementation

There has been considerable discussion of price-cap regulation as an alternative to traditional rate-of-return regulation. This paper examines some of the practical pitfalls of price-cap regulation. First, a model of a terminating price cap is developed. Next, this model is used to propose some problems of implementation. These problems are evaluated in the context of a case study of the Tucson Electric Power Company, which faced a type of price cap for several years in the 1980s. Extensions of the specific case to more general lessons about price-cap regulation are considered.     

Price-cap versus rate-of-return regulation

Rate-of-return regulation has been criticized for providing inappropriate incentives to regulated firms and for being costly to administer. An alternative is price-cap regulation, by which ceilings (caps), based on indices of price and technological change are imposed, below which the regulated firm has full pricing freedom. The differences and similarities of the two are reviewed herein in the light of recent literature. In practice, price-cap is not distinct from rate-of-return regulation. Especially for the multiproduct firm, information requirements—the ultimate source of problems with rate-of-return regulation—are comparables. Price-cap regulation fails to address the real regulatory issue of whether an industry is, in whole or in part, a natural monopoly.     

The relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly: The role of price-cap regulation

This paper examines the role of price-cap regulation in influencing the relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly. Based on a simple model of mark-up pricing, a combination of analytical and numerical analysis is used to show how cost increases among the firm's products can cause a divergence of prices from the Ramsey structure if the cost increases are non-uniform or if the demand elasticities for the products are non-uniform. However, in the absence of additional cost changes, profit-maximising prices which are subject to a price-cap constraint converge to the Ramsey structure if the previous period's quantities are used as weights in the firm's price-cap constraint. Consequently, given this formulation of the firm's price-cap constraint, only in situations of recurring cost changes are prices likely to show on-going divergence from the Ramsey structure.This paper reports on research funded by the Australian Electricity Supply Industry Research Board. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions.     

Choosing Among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry

We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firms earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation.     

Price-cap regulation of congested airports

This paper investigates price-cap regulation of an airport where the airport facility (e.g. runway) is congested and airlines have market power. We show that when airport congestion is not a major problem, single-till price-cap regulation dominates dual-till price-cap regulation with respect to optimal welfare. Furthermore, we identify situations where dual-till regulation performs better than single-till regulation when there is significant airport congestion. For instance, when the airport can cover the airport costs associated with aeronautical services simply through an efficient aeronautical charge then dual-till regulation yields higher welfare.     

Asymmetric equilibria under price cap regulation

This study analyzes the effects of a price-cap regulation on market outcomes in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies. Although two firms are ex-ante identical, there are asymmetric Cournot equilibria as well as the symmetric equilibrium under the price-cap regulation, when the price-cap level is binding. By contrast, the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique and equivalent to the most asymmetric Cournot equilibrium under a binding price-cap level. We present several comparative statics results with respect to the equilibrium outcomes. The main concern of this study is the welfare effect of a change in a price-cap level. We show that when asymmetric Cournot equilibria or the Stackelberg equilibrium are focused on, a reduction in a price-cap level may be socially harmful even if the price-cap level is more than the competitive price.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans

Despite the popularity of price-cap regulation in practice, the economic literature provides limited guidance on how to determine the X factor, which is the rate at which inflation-adjusted output prices must fall under price-cap plans. We review the relevant basic principles, and then determine how to set the X factor: (1) when only a subset of the firm's products are subject to price-cap regulation, and when product-specific costs and productivity cannot be measured; (2) when changes in regulated prices affect the economy-wide inflation rate; and (3) in the presence of such structural changes as strengthened competitive forces.     

PROMOTING INNOVATION AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TO BUSINESSES

This paper examines the concomitant effects that competition, regulation, market characteristics, and corporate ownership have on the deployment of advanced telecommunications services (ATS) to business customers through the econometric analysis of a rich data set that identifies the competitive, regulatory, and economic climate for each incumbent's wire center in the United States. The authors conclude that local competition, inter-LATA (local access and transport area) approval by the Federal Communications Commission, and high unbundled network element price to embedded cost ratios have positive impacts on the deployment of ATS, while voluntary federal price cap regulation and location in a rural area have negative impacts. ( JEL L51, O32, M21)     

The effects of regulation and competition on the price of AT&T intrastate telephone service

Using data on AT&T intrastate toll prices, this study examines the effect of changing regulatory practices and increased competition on AT&T pricing behavior in the intrastate long-distance telecommunications industry. The results suggest that, with some qualification, the price of AT&T telephone service is lower in states which have the longest history of departure from rate-of-return regulation. Moreover, the regulatory climate has a far more significant effect on AT&T prices than does competition. The paper outlines several possible explanations for these results.     

The determinants of market share for the `dominant firm' in telecommunications

The present study examines the factors affecting the market share of the dominant firm in long-distance telecommunications, AT&T. A theoretical model is specified which includes competing long-distance rates (e.g., those of MCI and U.S. Sprint), price-cap regulation and advertising expenditures as determinants of the dominant firm's market share. Using intercity long-distance carrier charges for 1984–1994, this study points out the importance of AT&T's own rate structure, those of its major competitors, and government regulations in determining AT&T's market share over time.     

Designing price caps for gas distribution systems

We examine the applicability of price-cap mechanisms to the regulation of gas distribution company rates for gas supply and transportation services. Although distribution companies will continue to be regulated for the foreseeable future, we argue that a hybrid of price and profit regulation of transportation rates will increase allocative efficiency and provide greater incentives for productive efficiency. The design of incentives for cost minimization in long-term gas supply contracts is more challenging, but an index cap, based on the cost of gas acquired by other distribution companies, merits attention.     

Elasticities of substitution for a regulated cost function

This paper proposes a modification to the Uzawa (1962) characterization of the Allen partial elasticity of substitution under cost minimization to take account of the behavioral properties of the cost function for a firm subject to rate-of-return regulation.     

Enhancing the user role in the development of technical standards for telecommunications

The paper examines the actual and potential roles of business users of telecommunications services in influencing the development of technical standards. Variours institutional structures in the user community are examined as they relate to user particioation in formally constituted standards development arganizations. Discreparcies between users and suppliers in participatory motivations, strategies and resources are noted. The standardization process in telecommunications emerges as a technology-push initiative led by the suplly industries. However, structural changes in the telecommunications industries have resulted in new approaches to standards making. As a result, standards have acquired a new significane in terms of user control user technical and service evolution. Using the development of European standards for digital wireless telephony as an example, it is argued that this new standardization environment mandates a much more active role for users. However, it is also argued that the user stake in telecommunications standards is not of an equivalent nature to the supplier stake. Thus, a theortical framework is presented which that effective user involvement will require the development of a parallel institutional structure for the user community.     

Telephone pools and economic incentives

We identify the incentive structure for a firm that participates in a pooling arrangement. These pooling arrangements have been common in the telecommunications industry, both in the United States and in Canada. We identify alternative mechanisms, including cost caps, yardstick competition, transfer prices, and fixed revenue allocators. A pooling firm has inferior incentives for cost reducing innovation, truthful reporting of costs, and avoidance of abuse relative to alternative mechanisms. These incentive problems are similar to those that arise under rate-of-return regulation. Notably, transfer/access pricing, does not rectify the poor incentives embodied in pools. However, pooling does facilitate demand enhancement, due to its ability to internalize potential network effects.The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Southwestern Bell Telephone in the preparation of this paper. The views expressed are those of the authors and not those of Southwestern Bell. We are grateful for comments received at the 14th Annual Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University, and valuable suggestions by Michael A. Crew and the referee.     

Using Market Prices to Regulate the Costs of a Utility‘s Inputs

This paper analyzes the problem of determining allowable cost of a utilitys inputs when the price of these inputs may be highly volatile and when hedging and long-term contracting are the norm in the supply of these inputs. In such an environment, benchmarks based upon the observable market price of an input are natural regulatory mechanisms to consider. This paper studies such incentive-based regulation. The first section uses contingent claims analysis to investigate a representative contract currently in place. The analysis indicates that this regulation may impose an important monitoring role on the regulator in order to prevent the utility from taking extremely risky positions in fuel markets. Further investigation of benchmark-based regulation is undertaken in a principal-agent framework in which the utility has the dual role of choosing a fuel portfolio and undertaking expenditures to reduce fuel costs. In this setting, it is shown that benchmark-based compensation is, at best, ineffective. Within the same setting, contracts based upon cost sharing are studied and found to be superior at obtaining a tradeoff between risks and cost reduction.     

Mixed linear-nonlinear pricing with bundling

The practice of setting marginal prices below marginal costs is so common in telecommunications offerings that it can justifiably be labeled a stylized fact. In this paper, we present a stylized model that establishes conditions under which this practice is economically efficient and profit-maximizing. A multiproduct monopolist who sells some of his goods according to a nonlinear price schedule, while selling the remaining goods at linear prices, is said to use a mixed price structure. We develop a simple model to characterize welfare- and profit-maximizing mixed prices. It is shown that standard results obtained separately for linear and nonlinear prices do not hold when mixed prices are used. In particular, the marginal price facing the largest buyer can be above or below marginal cost. The result is shown to depend on whether the goods are substitutes or complements. Implications of these results for telecommunications prices are derived, and the intuition underlying our stylized fact is developed.     

Price-cap Regulation of Airports: Single-till Versus Dual-till

Abstact This paper takes up the debate whether price-cap regulation of airports should take the form of single-till or dual-till regulation. The contribution is to model single- and dual-till regulation, evaluate their welfare implications, and compare them to Ramsey charges. We show that single-till regulation dominates dual-till regulation at non-congested airports with regard to welfare maximization. However, none of them provides an airport with incentives to implement Ramsey charges. A Ramsey optimal price-cap regulation, which achieves this goal, is also presented. Thanks to Kay Mitusch, Pio Baake, and Sascha Lukac for very helpful comments.     

企业经营创新、动态能力与竞争优势关系研究

伴随企业外部经营环境的变化,企业开展经营创新以提升竞争优势显得更为迫切。以陕西省商业企业为例,对企业经营过程中创新活动与企业竞争优势关系进行探讨,得出如下结论：企业经营创新可划分为业态组合和业态整合,二者对企业竞争优势培育具有显著正向影响,且业态整合的影响作用更强;企业动态能力正向调节企业经营创新对竞争优势的影响;机会识别能力对业态组合与企业竞争优势关系的作用更突出,而整合重构能力对业态整合与企业竞争优势关系的作用更突出,服务柔性能力和组织柔性能力对业态经营与企业竞争优势均有显著正向调节作用。据此,提出相关对策建议。     

Price-cap regulation and market definition

One of the merits claimed for certain types of price-cap regulation is the possible long-run convergence of the prices of multi-product firms to Ramsey prices. Typically such regulated firms define commodities by such devices as dividing the day into discrete periods, customers into age-groups, distances into ranges, and so on. Allowing that such division is endogenous throws doubt on the ability of Laspeyre quantity-based price-caps to encourage an efficient market definition and hence to generate an efficient price structure.