United States

Real GDP growth for the second quarter was revised up to an annualized rate of 4.6%, from a second estimate of 4.2%, as final sales advanced 3.2% and inventories contributed 1.4 percentage points to growth. Business investment stole the limelight with a 9.7% advance, while consumer outlays contributed 1.8 percentage points to growth. Newly available data for Q2 also led to an upward revision of residential investment, and a stronger net trade contribution. We expect the economy to grow by just over 3% in Q3, with the economy expanding 2.2% in 2014 as a whole and 3.1% in 2015…     

United States

Real GDP rose by 2.2% on an annualized basis in Q4 2014, as final sales advanced 2.4% while inventories imposed a 0.1 percentage point drag on growth. Consumer spending grew by 4.4% – the strongest since 2006 – contributing 3.0 percentage points to GDP growth. Business investment growth was revised slightly lower to a still solid 4.7% on downward revisions to equipment and intellectual property spending. Lastly, net foreign trade and government spending were drags on growth, subtracting 1.0 and 0.4 percentage points respectively. The economy grew by 2.4% in 2014 and we expect GDP growth will accelerate to 2.7% in 2015.…     

United States

Real GDP rose 3.9% in Q2 2015 as final sales rose 3.9% and the inventory contribution to growth was flat. Consumer spending grew 3.6% and contributed 2.4 percentage points to GDP growth. Business investment grew 4.1% on stronger structures and intellectual property spending. Residential investment meanwhile grew a fairly solid 9.4% in the quarter. Lastly, net foreign trade and government spending contributed 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points to growth respectively. The economy grew 2.4% in 2014 and we expect GDP growth will accelerate to 2.5% in 2015.     

United States

Annualised real GDP growth came in at −0.2% in Q1. Final sales fell 0.6% and inventories added 0.5 percentage point (pp) to growth in the first quarter. Consumer spending rose 2.1% and contributed 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth. Business investment fell 2.0% on a massive 18% plunge in non‐residential structures, while net foreign trade and government spending exerted 1.9 and 0.1 pp drags on growth respectively. The soft Q1 has led us to revise down our 2015 GDP growth forecast from 2.7% in April to 2.3% now. We expect the US economy to grow by 2.8% in 2016.…     

United States

Real GDP rose by 2.0% on an annualized basis in Q3 2015, with final sales up 2.7% and inventories exerting a 0.7pp drag on growth. Consumer spending grew a solid 3.0%, contributing 2.0 percentage points to GDP growth. Business investment advanced 2.6%, led by growth in equipment spending, while residential investment rose by 8.2%. Net foreign trade posed a 0.3pp drag, but was offset by a boost from greater government spending. We see the economy growing by 2.2% in 2016, down from 2.4% in 2015. The picture remains one of solid domestic fundamentals constrained by global headwinds.     

World economy

Following estimated GDP growth of 2.3% in 2016 – which was the lowest since 2009 – we expect the global economy to accelerate this year. We forecast GDP growth at 2.7% in 2017 and then see it accelerating further to 3.0% in 2018, both 0.1 percentage points up from our previous projections from January.     

World economy

Following estimated GDP growth of 2.3% in 2016 – the lowest since 2009 – we expect the global economy to accelerate this year. We forecast GDP growth at 2.8% in 2017 (which is up 0.1 percentage points up from our previous projections from April) and then see it accelerating further to 3.0% in 2018 (unchanged).     

On the simultaneity problem in the aid and growth debate

This paper shows that foreign aid has a significant positive average effect on real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth if, and only if, the quantitatively large negative reverse causal effect of per capita GDP growth on foreign aid is adjusted for in the growth regression. Instrumental variables estimates show that a 1 percentage point increase in GDP per capita growth decreased foreign aid by over 4%. Adjusting for this quantitatively large, negative reverse causal effect of economic growth on foreign aid shows that a 1% increase in foreign aid increased real per capita GDP growth by around 0.1 percentage points. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sources of Structural Change for the UK Service Industries 1979–84

Over the period 1979 to 1984 the UK economy experienced severe structural change in that the oil and services sectors increased their share of employment and output, whilst the share of manufacturing fell by about 5 percentage points. This paper uses input–output tables for 1979 and 1984 to decompose the changes in output of total marketed services and the component industries into the changes due to price changes and those due to volume changes. The volume changes are, in turn, decomposed into those internal to the service industries, e.g. changes in demand for business services by communication, and those external to the industries, e.g. changes in demand for services by manufacturing. The analysis is done at a 101-industry level with results presented in the paper for the five service industries, Distribution and Catering, Transport, Communications, Business Services and Other Market Services. The paper is intended to give insight into the answers to the following questions: How much of the increase in service output has been due to the reallocation of activities previously done within manufacturing? In what respects were services insulated from the effects of the general recession 1979-812? Has the recent growth in services output been due to more consumers' expenditure and other. final demand or to other factors? The main conclusion is that changes in Input–Output coefficients were very important for structure change in UK services, almost entirely because they dominated the fastest-growing sector, business services.     

Are Household Services Overvalued?

A bstract . It has been argued that estimates of the magnitude of household services relative to the Gross National Product (GNP) are generally overstated. Although under certain conditions this conclusion is justified, the explanations given are sometimes questionable. It is shown here that when overstatements do occur it is due to the need for valuation adjustments rather than quantity adjustments to the estimates. Moreover, depending on the points to be demonstrated it is equally correct to express such estimates as a percentage of the GNP or as a percentage of GNP plus household services. Some have argued to the contrary. It is further shown here that when valuations are adjusted to reflect labor market conditions and other factors, estimates of household services are reduced considerably.     

Barriers to entry in the healthcare markets: Winners and Losers from certificate-of-need laws

In states with Certificate of Need (CON) laws, medical services providers must file an application and demonstrate community need before being permitted to start or expand a service. We examine CON laws for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), computed tomography (CT), and positron emission tomography (PET) scanners to test the hypothesis that the approval process favors established incumbent hospitals over new hospital entrants and nonhospital providers. Using Medicare claims data in 2013, we find that states with CON laws have 20 to 33% fewer providers, depending on the type of scanners to which the laws apply. As a result, residents of CON law states are 3.4–5.3 percentage points more likely to travel outside their home county to obtain imaging services than residents of non-CON states. In addition, there is a notable shift in the type of provider: CON laws are associated with 27–53% fewer scans by nonhospital providers per beneficiary, 23 to 70% fewer by new hospitals, but 6 to 21% more scans in older hospitals.     

Money,religion and revolution

How do money and religion affect the support for revolt in nations? We take a different approach from previous studies to provide an answer by using micro-data based on surveys of revolutionary tastes of over 100,000 people living in 61 countries from 1981–1997. Controlling for personal characteristics and country fixed effects, a 4 percentage point decrease in the GDP growth rate increases the probability of a person wanting to revolt by 2.3 percentage points. This rise can be offset by belonging to a religion which lowers the probability of being revolutionary by between 1.8 and 2.7 percentage points (compared to non-religious people). The effect is concentrated amongst people who identify themselves as being Christian. By comparison, Muslims have similar chances of wanting to revolt as non-religious people.     

Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa

This paper uses panel data from African countries and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effects of corruption on economic growth and income distribution. I find that corruption decreases economic growth directly and indirectly through decreased investment in physical capital. A unit increase in corruption reduces the growth rates of GDP and per capita income by between 0.75 and 0.9 percentage points and between 0.39 and 0.41 percentage points per year respectively. The results also indicate that increased corruption is positively correlated with income inequality. The combined effects of decreased income growth and increased inequality suggests that corruption hurts the poor more than the rich in African countries. Received: March 19, 2001 / Accepted: December 14, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" An earlier version of this paper was presented at the first AmFiTan International Conference on Development Ethics in February 2000, Dar er Salaam, Tanzania. I thank two anonymous referees of this Journal for helpful suggestions. I am, however, solely responsible for any remaining errors.     

Labour Market

The pace of improvement in the labour market has stepped up in recent months in line with the stronger performance of the wider economy. The latest Labour Force Survey data, for the three months to November, showed that the level of employment increased by 280,000 on the quarter, the strongest growth on record, while the unemployment rate fell by 0.5 percentage points over the same period to 7.1%…     

Consumer Demand

The consumer was the key driver of the UK recovery during 2013; we estimate that consumer spending accounted for 1.4 percentage points of the 1.9% GDP growth achieved last year…     

江阴市城镇贫困人口医疗服务利用情况调查研究

目的:了解江阴市城镇贫困人口的医疗服务利用情况,提出改善城镇贫困人口医疗服务利用情况的建议。方法:采用问卷调查的方式,对江阴市324户城镇贫困居民进行入户调查,共计925人。结果:江阴市城镇贫困人口的两周就诊率为42.2‰,未就诊比例为64.4%,年住院率为6.2%,未住院比例为29.6%。贫困居民医疗服务利用相对不足,医疗保障水平有待提高。结论:通过开展健康教育,完善医疗保障制度、医疗救助制度,深入开展社区卫生服务等方面改善贫困人口医疗服务利用情况。     

How reliable are forecasts of GDP growth and inflation for countries with limited coverage?

This paper analyses the performance of GDP growth and inflation forecasts for 25 transition countries between 1994 and 2007, as provided by 13 international institutions, including multilateral, private and academic forecasters. The empirical results show that there is a positive correlation between the number of forecasters covering a given country and the forecast accuracy. Simple combined forecasts are shown to be unbiased and more accurate than most of the individual forecasters, although also inefficient. However, only a few institutions provide efficient and unbiased forecasts, with just one out of 13 forecasters providing both unbiased and efficient forecasts of both GDP growth and inflation in the observed period. The directional analysis shows a correct forecast of the change in the forecast indicator in over two thirds of cases. However, the eventual outcome is within the range of available forecasts in less than half of the cases, with more than 40% of outcomes for GDP growth above the highest forecast. Encouragingly, forecasts are shown to be improving over time and becoming more accurate with the increase in the number of forecasting institutions – forecast accuracy measured by mean absolute error improves by 0.3 percentage points for growth and by 0.2 percentage points for inflation for each additional institution providing forecasts.     

Scenarios for long‐term world growth

• In the second of two articles on long‐term world growth, we present a set of stylised scenarios for world growth in the next decade. Our baseline forecast, which sees growth edging down, is compared to scenarios based on ‘lost decades’ in China and India, lower productivity and investment growth and a bigger drag from excess debt. The more likely of these scenarios could cut world growth by around 0.5 percentage points per year, rising to a 1.5 percentage point cut for the most extreme scenario.
• Our baseline forecast assumes productivity and investment grow at a similar pace in the next decade to the past ten years. But there are downside risks to productivity growth, especially in Emerging Markets (EMs). And with investment in China and in commodity exporters slowing, our investment forecast relies on a significant rebound in the major economies.
• Demographic factors are a significant downside risk to our forecast. The negative impact of demographic changes on growth in Japan since the 1990s was not generally foreseen. This risk exists in the US and Europe but also in emerging Asia, a particular concern given that the latter region accounted for over 50% of world growth in 2000–14.
• Growth in commodity‐exporting economies could undershoot our current predictions. Historical evidence suggests a danger that the drop in commodity prices could extend for several more years. Even with zero real growth in commodity prices, aggregate GDP growth in the main commodity exporters might only be around 2.5% per year.
• Another risk area is debt. International evidence suggests debt ratios above certain thresholds slow growth. We find that countries accounting for 44% and 31% of world GDP respectively exceed these estimated public and corporate debt thresholds. But the share is lower, and has dropped, for household debt, thanks to deleveraging in the G7.

     

Long-run and short-run determinants of sovereign bond yields in advanced economies

We analyze determinants of sovereign bond yields in 22 advanced economies over the 1980–2010 period using panel cointegration techniques. The application of the cointegration methodology allows distinguishing between long-run (debt-to-GDP ratio, potential growth) and short-run (inflation, short-term interest rates, etc.) determinants of sovereign borrowing costs. We find that in the long run, government bond yields increase by about 2 basis points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in government debt-to-GDP ratio and by about 45 basis points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in the potential growth rate. In the short run, sovereign bond yields deviate from the level determined by the long-run fundamentals, but about half of the deviation adjusts in one year. When considering the impact of the global financial crisis on sovereign borrowing costs in euro area countries, the estimations suggest that spreads against Germany in some European periphery countries exceeded the level determined by fundamentals in the aftermath of the crisis, while some North European countries have benefited from “safe-haven” flows.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A REJOINDER

In our 2011 survey of the literature in the Journal of Economic Surveys on the effect of government size on economic growth in wealthy countries we find a relatively consistent pattern: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5–1 percentage point lower annual growth rate. This conclusion is questioned by Colombier. In this rejoinder we present a rebuttal of Colombier's argument based on a detailed scrutiny of his own statistical evidence and regression results. Furthermore, we note that several new papers that have appeared since our original paper was published give support to our main conclusion.