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1.
Momtchil Pojarliev Richard M. Levich 《Journal of International Money and Finance》2010,29(8):1752-1775
We make use of a new database on daily currency fund manager returns over a three-year period, 2005–2008. This higher frequency data allows us to estimate both alpha measures of performance and beta style factors on a yearly basis, which in turn allows us to test for persistence. We find no evidence to support alpha persistence; a manager’s alpha in one year is not significantly related to his alpha in the prior year. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence for style persistence; funds that rely on carry, trend or value trading or with a long/short bias toward currency volatility are likely to maintain that style in the following year. In addition, we are able to examine the performance of managers that survive through the entire sample period, versus those that drop out. We find significant differences in both the investment styles of living versus deceased funds, as well as their realized alpha performance measures. We conjecture that both style differences and ineffective market timing, rather than market conditions, have impacted performance outcomes and induced some managers to close their funds. 相似文献
2.
This article examines the outcomes of accounting firm mergers using data about the frequency of audit switches, the numbers of partners in the respective firms, and perceptions revealed in interviews with partners. Evidence from client switches does not show any evidence that the mergers were followed by cost reductions, or of collusion to force prices up. The effects of the mergers appear to have been elsewhere—the merging firms reduced partner numbers substantially, increasing partner leverage so that individual remaining partners were better off. Data from interviews confirm these findings, and show that the culture of individual firms had a significant effect on determining which group of partners controlled the merged firm. 相似文献
3.
The effect of mergers on credit union performance 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Keldon J. Bauer Linda L. Miles Takeshi Nishikawa 《Journal of Banking & Finance》2009,33(12):2267-2274
The motivation for mergers in the credit union industry differs from the commercial bank industry due to the lack of residual claimants to benefit from wealth gains. In the cooperative ownership environment of credit unions, the owners/members gain utility via the rates offered for loans and deposits. Credit union regulators also gain utility when mergers remove risky credit unions from the industry. We measure these utility gains using the event study method of Bauer [Bauer, K., 2008. Detecting abnormal credit union performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 573–586] employing quadrant tests based on a multivariate test of equality of centroids. We find gains to the owners/members of the target credit union and to the regulators but not to the acquiring firm. We posit that the acquiring credit unions may encounter regulatory pressure to merge. In addition, the owners/members of the acquiring firm may avoid potential disutility in the cooperative insurance environment were the target firm allowed to fail. 相似文献
4.
We investigate the announcement effect of large bank mergers in the European and US stock market. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated on the basis of the performance vis-à-vis the market and a sector index. Mergers result in small positive abnormal returns. Target banks realize significantly higher returns than bidders. In many respects, there is a difference between the announcement effects of European bank mergers compared to those in the US. 相似文献
5.
Spillover of corporate governance standards in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:3
In cross-border acquisitions, the differences between the bidder and target corporate governance (measured by newly constructed indices capturing shareholder, minority shareholder, and creditor protection) have an important impact on the takeover returns. Our country-level corporate governance indices capture the changes in the quality of the national corporate governance regulations over the past 15 years. When the bidder is from a country with a strong shareholder orientation (relative to the target), part of the total synergy value of the takeover may result from the improvement in the governance of the target assets. In full takeovers, the corporate governance regulation of the bidder is imposed on the target (the positive spillover by law hypothesis). In partial takeovers, the improvement in the target corporate governance may occur on voluntary basis (the spillover by control hypothesis). Our empirical analysis corroborates both spillover effects. In contrast, when the bidder is from a country with poorer shareholder protection, the negative spillover by law hypothesis states that the anticipated takeover gains will be lower as the poorer corporate governance regime of the bidder will be imposed on the target. The alternative bootstrapping hypothesis argues that poor-governance bidders voluntarily bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target. We do find support for the bootstrapping effect. 相似文献
6.
Using a hand-collected sample of hedge fund activist engagements from 1994 to 2014, this study analysed the role of derivatives in the hedge fund activism. Evidence shows abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives exceeded the abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who employed derivatives around the activist engagement disclosure period. We also find that idiosyncratic volatility of the targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives was more reduced than that of the targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives. Finally, the probability of takeovers increases for hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives. 相似文献
7.
Previous studies on the choice of stock payment in M&A mainly focus on managerial private information. This study shows that managers also learn new firm‐specific information from financial markets in making this decision. The acquirer's stock price firm‐specific information increases the stock‐payment‐to‐Q sensitivity. The target's stock price firm‐specific information decreases the stock payment probability. Further analyses on deal and firm characteristics as well as shareholder wealth in stock mergers support the managerial learning argument. Overall, this study highlights a new set of information that affects the form of merger payment in mergers and acquisitions. 相似文献
8.
The price of ethics and stakeholder governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Do investors pay a price for investing in socially responsible investments (SRI) funds, or do they obtain superior returns? This paper investigates these under- and overperformance hypotheses for all SRI funds across the world. Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in the US, the UK, and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific countries underperform their domestic benchmarks by − 2.2% to − 6.5%. However, with the exception of some countries such as France, Japan and Sweden, the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are not statistically different from the performance of conventional funds. We also find that the underperformance of SRI funds is not driven by loadings on an ethics style factor. There is mixed evidence of a smart money effect: SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying funds that will perform poorly. Finally, corporate governance and social screens yield lower risk-adjusted returns. 相似文献
9.
Prior research finds that firms hire directors for their acquisition experience, regardless of acquisition quality (whether their prior acquisitions earned positive or negative announcement returns). Using several short- and long-run measures, we examine the effects of directors’ acquisition experience on the acquisition performance of firms hiring them. We find that board acquisition experience is positively related to subsequent acquisition performance, demonstrating that firms appropriately value experience. Beyond experience itself, however, the quality of directors’ prior acquisitions is also important. Our results suggest that firms may be better served to select directors based upon both past acquisition experience and acquisition performance. 相似文献
10.
We analyze the impact of prior performance on the risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers. We contribute to the existing literature by using different measures of risks, a larger data set, and an econometric approach capturing non-linear effects and assigning exact probabilities to the mutual fund managers’ adjustment of behavior. We find that prior performance in the first half of the year has, in general, a positive impact on the choice of the risk level in the second half of the year. Successful fund managers increase the volatility, the beta, and assign a higher proportion of their portfolio to value stocks, small firms, and momentum stocks in comparison to unsuccessful fund managers. Unsuccessful fund manager increase, on average, only the tracking error. We thank an anonymous referee, Bernd Brommundt, Alexander Ising, Stephan Kessler, Axel Kind, Angelika Noll, Jennifer Noll, Ralf Seiz, Stephan Süss, Rico von Wyss, and Andreas Zingg for valuable comments. We acknowledge helpful comments of the participants from the Joint Research Workshop of the University of St. Gallen and the University of Ulm in 2005. 相似文献
11.
How do bondholders view the existence of an open market for corporate control? Between 1985 and 1991, 30 states in the U.S. enacted business combination (BC) laws, raising the cost of corporate takeovers. Relying on these exogenous events, we estimate the influence of the market for corporate control on the cost of debt. We identify different channels through which an open market for corporate control can benefit or harm bondholders: a reduction in managerial slack or the “quiet life,” resulting in higher profitability and firm value; a coinsurance effect, in which firms become less risky after being acquired; and an increasing leverage effect, in which bondholder wealth is expropriated through leverage-increasing takeovers. Consistent with the first two mechanisms, we find that the cost of debt rose after the passage of the BC laws; moreover, it rose sharply for firms in non-competitive industries, and for firms rated speculative-grade. In contrast, there is virtually no effect for firms in competitive industries, or firms rated investment-grade. 相似文献
12.
Heitor Almeida Sang Yong Park Marti G. Subrahmanyam Daniel Wolfenzon 《Journal of Financial Economics》2011
We study the evolution of Korean chaebols (business groups) using ownership data. Chaebols grow vertically (as pyramids) when the controlling family uses well-established group firms (“central firms”) to acquire firms with low pledgeable income and high acquisition premiums. Chaebols grow horizontally (through direct ownership) when the family acquires firms with high pledgeable income and low acquisition premiums. Central firms trade at a relative discount, due to shareholders’ anticipation of value-destroying acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with the selection of firms into different positions in the chaebol and ascribes the underperformance of pyramidal firms to a selection effect rather than tunneling. 相似文献
13.
14.
This paper considers the relation between board classification, takeover activity, and transaction outcomes for a panel of firms between 1990 and 2002. Target board classification does not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is ultimately acquired. Moreover, shareholders of targets with a classified board realize bid returns that are equivalent to those of targets with a single class of directors, but receive a higher proportion of total bid surplus. Board classification does reduce the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid, however, the economic effect of bid deterrence on the value of the firm is quite small. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that board classification is an anti-takeover device that facilitates managerial entrenchment. 相似文献
15.
Shijun Cheng John H. Evans III Nandu J. Nagarajan 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2008,31(2):121-145
We examine whether takeover threats affect the importance of board size using the passage of state antitakeover laws enacted
in mid-to-late 1980s as our empirical setting. While the Complement Hypothesis predicts that board size matters more before the passage of the laws, the Substitute Hypothesis predicts the opposite. For a sample of 350 Forbes 500 firms over the period 1984–1991, we find a significant association between smaller boards and better firm performance before
passage of antitakeover laws, but a much weaker relation (reduced by more than one-third) after the takeover restrictions
were in place. Consistent with the Complement Hypothesis, this finding suggests that decreasing board size is more valuable when the market for corporate control is more active.
相似文献
Nandu J. NagarajanEmail: |
16.
The effect of stock market pressure on the tradeoff between corporate and shareholders’ tax benefits
Ming-Chin Chen 《China Journal of Accounting Research》2015,(2):75-89
The Taiwanese government offers firms that invest in qualified projects in emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corporate 5-yea... 相似文献
17.
The stock price runup of target firms in the market for corporate control has been anecdotally attributed to inside trading. Moreover, the empirical merger and acquisitions literature documents a time-varying level and duration of the stock price runup of target firms. Using a market microstructure approach, we model stock price runup as a stochastic process that shifts between a random walk without drift and a predictable process dependent on a parsimonious set of state variables. Consistent with the market microstructure literature, predictability in prices can be exploited only by the informed trader. The model is capable of explaining the complex stylized facts observed in stock price runup. It is also consistent with the merger wave literature, as we find that capital liquidity, economic growth, and market valuations drive the complex dynamics of stock price runup. 相似文献
18.
China has an A-share market that is open only to local investors and a B-share market that is open only to foreign investors. Contrary to what has been observed in other markets with a similar segmented structure, the China B shares trade at a discount relative to the A shares. We show that the phenomenon can still be explained by basic economic principles. Specifically, the existence of the H-share and the “red-chip” markets in Hong Kong provide good substitutes for the B-share market. We find that when more H shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, the B-share discount becomes larger. This is consistent with the model of differential demand elasticity proposed by Stulz and Wasserfallen (Stulz, R., Wasserfallen, W., 1995. Review of Financial Studies 8, 1019–1057). 相似文献
19.
Allan A. Zebedee Eric Bentzen Peter R. Hansen Asger Lunde 《Financial Markets and Portfolio Management》2008,22(1):3-20
We examine the impact of monetary policy on the S&P 500 using intraday data. The analysis shows an economically and statistically
significant relationship between S&P 500 intraday returns and changes in the Fed funds target rate. The significance and magnitude
of the response is dependent on whether the change was expected or unexpected. An expected change in the Fed funds target
rate has no impact on prices in the broad equity market; however, an unexpected change of 25 basis points in the Fed funds
target rate results in an approximate 48 basis points decline in the broad equity market’s return. The speed of these market
reactions is rapid with the equity market reaching a new equilibrium within 15 minutes.
相似文献
Allan A. ZebedeeEmail: |
20.
I study the information content of bond ratings changes using daily corporate bond data from TRACE. Abnormal bond returns over a two-day event window that includes the downgrade (upgrade) are negative (positive) and statistically significant, although the reaction to upgrades is economically small. Monthly abnormal bond returns around downgrades and upgrades are statistically significant but overstate the magnitude of the reaction relative to two-day abnormal returns. Unlike the bond market, the stock market reaction to upgrades is statistically insignificant. Evidence suggests that the differing inferences on the effect of upgrades in the two markets can be attributed to wealth transfer effects rather than relative market inefficiencies. In the cross-section, the bond market response is stronger for rating changes that appear more surprising, rating changes of lower rated firms, and upgrades that move the firm from speculative grade to investment grade. 相似文献