The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Auditor Expertise and Human Capital Development

Two critical aspects of the model of auditor expertise development in Tan and Libby [1997] are that audit firms do not value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors but do value it in experienced auditors. We update the former and extend the latter. Our paper predicts and finds that audit firms now do value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors, especially when their supervisors have higher tacit knowledge. Our proxies of value include higher promotability assessments, annual evaluations, and cash bonuses. Our paper also extends Tan and Libby [1997] by positing that enhanced development of expertise and audit firm human capital are two reasons audit firms value tacit knowledge in experienced auditors. As predicted, higher tacit knowledge in experienced auditors is positively associated with higher tacit knowledge acquisition by their inexperienced subordinates and with stronger firm commitment of inexperienced subordinates having higher tacit knowledge.     

Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.     

The effects of mergers on product positioning: evidence from the music radio industry

This article shows that mergers between close competitors in the music radio industry lead to important changes in product positioning. Firms that buy competing stations tend to differentiate them and, consistent with the firm wanting to reduce audience cannibalization, their combined audience increases. However, the merging stations also become more like competitors, so that aggregate variety does not increase, and the gains in market share come at the expense of other stations in the same format. The results shed light on the effects of mergers and, more broadly, on how multiproduct firms may use product positioning as a competitive tool.     

Rules of proof,courts, and incentives

We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort‐feasors to exert care when evidence is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Burden of proof guidelines are then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role in contrast to that of passive adjudicator.     

Demand shocks,capacity coordination,and industry performance: lessons from an economic laboratory

Antitrust exemptions granted to businesses under extenuating circumstances are often justified by the argument that they benefit the public by helping producers adjust to otherwise difficult economic circumstances. Such exemptions may allow firms to coordinate their capacities, as was the case of the post‐September 11, 2001, antitrust immunity granted to Aloha and Hawaiian Airlines. We conduct economic laboratory experiments to determine the effects of explicit capacity coordination on oligopoly firms' abilities to adjust to negative demand shocks and on industry prices. The results suggest that capacity coordination speeds the adjustment process, but also has a clear procollusive effect on firm behavior.     

ECONOMIES OF SCOPE,SYNERGY, AND THE CAPM

The purpose of this paper is to integrate the multiproduct theory of the firm into financial theories. The relationship between economies of scope and synergy in conglomerate mergers is formally established in the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. It also is shown that a competitive market for corporate control would compete these benefits away.     

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity‐constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price‐quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price‐quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal collusion is attained with simple price‐quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding.     

The role of demand information and monitoring in tacit collusion

Motivated by the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models, we construct lab experiments to test the effects of two factors on collusion: information (regarding next period's demand state) and monitoring (of a rival's past action). Results indicate that information may facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. A robust finding is that subjects in the Rotemberg and Saloner treatment cooperate as predicted by this theory: collusion falls dramatically in anticipation of unusually large demand and returns to high levels otherwise. These results suggest that tacit and fairly elaborate collusion could arise in stochastic environments.     

A Multiproduct Cost Study of Savings and Loans

This paper investigates the cost structure of savings and loans. Most studies of financial institutions have failed to take into account the multiproduct nature of these institutions. Using the multiproduct approach, the existence of subadditivity, multiproduct global and product-specific economies of scale and scope, and substitutability between inputs is investigated. A translogarithmic cost function is estimated using 1982 data on California savings and loans. Restrictive functional forms also estimated are rejected. Standard errors for the statistics calculated are estimated, and various statistical tests are conducted. Previous authors have not calculated standard errors for these statistics. No evidence of subadditivity in the industry is found.     

The composite cost function and efficiency in giant Japanese banks

This study provides further empirical investigation, in the context of giant Japanese banks, of the recent claim by Pulley and Braunstein (1992, A composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking, Review of Economics and Statistics 74, 221–230), that their new composite model for the multiproduct cost function has important advantages over the separable quadratic, generalized translog and standard translog models. In addition to assessing the composite model's relative ability in measuring global scope and scale economies, the study also extends the P-B analysis to assess measurement of product-specific scope and scale economies, pairwise cost complementarities between outputs, changes in the marginal costs of outputs and technological change. The results appear to confirm P-B's chain. The persistent finding of scale economies for large Japanese banks is also investigated and confirmed.     

Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit collusion? Inference on conduct parameters in the airline industry

We provide empirical evidence that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines using a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modelled as functions of multimarket contact. We find (i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, whereas carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; (ii) cross‐price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on equilibrium fares; (iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; (iv) assuming firms behave as Bertrand‐Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs.     

The role of budgeting in eliminating tacit collusion

While accounting textbooks emphasize the roles of budgeting in controlling and coordinating agents' activities, the principal-agent literature has focused primarily on the control aspect. Recent papers have studied the coordination aspect of budgeting in settings in which the agents are technologically dependent (sequential or joint production is considered). In this article, we develop a role for budgeting in coordination, despite the agents being technologically independent (individual production is considered). In our model, the principal uses relative performance evaluation to extract information rents from the agents. However, the use of relative performance evaluation results in a multiple equilibria (tacit collusion) problem. The value of budgeting procedures is derived from their ability to coordinate the agents to arrive at the right equilibrium.     

Futures in Australian education—tacit, token and taken for granted

This article critically examines ways in which futures are conceptualized in the language of Australian education. From an analysis of selected examples of research reports, policy documents and other texts, it is suggested that futures in Australian educational discourse are often conceived in terms of (1) tacit inferences, (2) token invocations or (3) taken for granted assumptions. Conceptualizing futures in such ways may be disempowering and allows education in Australia to be vulnerable to forces of economic and technological determinism.     

原则导向、隐性知识与会计准则的有效执行——从会计信息生产者的角度

与国际趋同的中国会计准则体系已经初步建立,但从会计信息的生产者角度,新的会计标准如何被普通会计工作者完整掌握并有效运用,还值得深入研究。本文从隐性知识及其传递理论出发,指出会计准则从规则导向走向原则导向,在更好地适应复杂经济交易的同时,也使会计准则中隐性知识的比重上升——原则性描述大量替代量化标准,这使新准则的执行更加困难。在考察了欧盟和俄罗斯首次执行IFRS的经验后,基于隐性知识理论,本文提出会计准则被有效掌握需要三方面的配合:准则制定机构提供应用指南的思路变革、审计师执业中对客户实务的指导以及会计教育改革的深化,而这三者的最终目标就是确保新会计准则中的隐性知识被有效传递。     

Financial Crises as a Phenomenon of Multiple Equilibria and How to Select among Them

When equilibrium is indeterminate (i.e., not unique), applied theory often obtains uniqueness either via ad hoc sunspots or via global games. This paper highlights the relative merits of a third selection mechanism—best-response dynamics (BRD)—in the context of various financial crisis frameworks. For example, in the context of a bank run, selection via BRD is preferred (to ad hoc sunspots) because it provides an explicit coordination narrative and (to global games) because it accounts for the fact that depositors realistically may decide to join or leave a bank's queue upon observing its length.     

The interaction among disclosures,competition, and an internal control problem

This paper studies the effect of an internal control problem on a firm's disclosure policy where firms compete in non-cooperative investment game, with each firm deciding to invest in its current technology or to invest in a non-proprietary innovation. By adopting the innovation, a firm earns higher revenues at the expense of its non-adopting rival. Each principal decides on a disclosure policy for its firm that entails releasing an agent's internal cost report of the firm's current technology to the rival firm. The agent has private information about the current technology's cost and an incentive to overstate the cost. An effect of disclosures is to increase coordination between the firms, which, without a control problem, increases firm profits. However, under the same conditions that disclosures were beneficial without the control problem, disclosures may be harmful to the principal with the control problem because increased coordination between the firms allows the agent to earn higher rents. Competition substitutes for commitment to an investment policy that limits the agent's rents and this disciplining role of competition is diminished with disclosures.     

Epistemology, social technology, and expert judgement: Olaf Helmer's contribution to futures research

The article discusses Olaf Helmer's contribution to the development of futures studies by focusing on four basic theses defining his approach. (1) Quasi-laws in social sciences and futures studies can in fact be treated in the same way that the natural laws of the physical sciences. (2) In order to make predictions, one need not appeal to a strict logical derivation, as the “covering laws” doctrine of logical-empiricism suggests. (3) Prediction and explanation are not logically symmetrical as positivists believe, thus the conditions needed for explanation are not those required for prediction. (4) Local, tacit, personal and expert knowledge are crucial in developing a foresight methodology. In conjunction, these four theses open the way to a unique theory of social prediction and to variety of “unorthodox items of methodological equipment for the purposes of prediction in the inexact sciences.”     

Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization

We provide a new theory of the role of banks as catalysts for industrialization. In their influential analysis of continental European industrialization, Gerschenkron and Schumpeter argued that banks promoted the creation of new industries. We formalize this role of banks by introducing financial intermediaries into a “big push” model. We show that banks may act as catalysts for industrialization provided they are sufficiently large to mobilize a critical mass of firms and that they possess sufficient market power to make profits from coordination. The theory provides simple conditions that help explain why banks seem to play a creative role in some but not in other emerging markets. The model also shows that universal banking helps to reduce the cost of acting as catalyst. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, N2, O14, O16.     

A Computational Model of Coordination for the Design of Organizational Decision Support Systems

The Information Technology (IT) for realizing Organizational Decision Support Systems (ODSS) is in a nascent stage of development. This is particularly true in the area of coordination, which is a critical element of ODSS, and which distinguishes ODSS research from earlier research in Group DSS and individually oriented DSS. As a first step in ODSS coordination research, alternative representation schemes need to be examined in terms of both their match with the prevailing needs of organizations and of existing IT approaches that can be brought to bear. Matching ODSS needs with coordination representation requirements is examined by using several supporting reference disciplines including foundational DSS and recent ODSS research frameworks/architectures. Existing IT approaches are adapted from the reference disciplines of Active DSS, Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI), and Mathematical/Computational Organization Theory (MCOT) to operationalize a computational model of coordination that: (1) embodies the philosophies of Active DSS—including the idea that automated intelligent agents can play a significant role in supporting decision makers by independently carrying out rudimentary tasks to support the various phases of a decision making process; (2) adapts DAI and IT approaches to reflect practical human organizational realities including what we refer to as the ‘Open-Ended Knowledge World‘, and the evolutionary nature of organizations—whereby ODSS coordination representations will be subjected to almost constant revision due to both external environment disruptions and internal events that require adjustments to a preliminary plan; and (3) reflects the fact that organizational goals are often vague, which implies that a coordination representation should be sufficiently robust to reflect ad hoc analysis accommodating of strategy changes.     

The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria

Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with the interests of advertisers, although equilibrium coordination is far from perfect. Coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets.