The Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism Needs Better Categories: Clearing up the Confusions that Result from Blurring Analytic and Lay Concepts

Synopsis It has been difficult to make progress in the study of ethnicity and nationalism because of the multiple confusions of analytic and lay terms, and the sheer lack of terminological standardization (often even within the same article). This makes a conceptual cleaning-up unavoidable, and it is especially salutary to attempt it now that more economists are becoming interested in the effects of identity on behavior, so that they may begin with the best conceptual tools possible. My approach to these questions has been informed by anthropological and evolutionary-psychological questions. I will focus primarily on the terms ‘ethnic group’, ‘nation’, and ‘nationalism’, and I will make the following points: (1) so-called ‘ethnic groups’ are collections of people with a common cultural identity, plus an ideology of membership by descent and normative endogamy; (2) the ‘group’ in ‘ethnic group’ is a misleading misnomer—these are not ‘groups’ but categories, so I propose to call them ‘ethnies’; (3) ‘nationalism’ mostly refers to the recent ideology that ethnies—cultural communities with a self-conscious ideology of self-sufficient reproduction—be made politically sovereign; (4) it is very confusing to use ‘nationalism’ also to stand for ‘loyalty to a multi-ethnic state’ because this is the exact opposite; (5) a ‘nation’ truly exists only in a politician’s imagination, so analysts should not pretend that establishing whether something ‘really’ is or is not ‘a nation’ matters; (6) a big analytic cost is paid every time an ‘ethnie’ is called a ‘nation’ because this mobilizes the intuition that nationalism is indispensable to ethnic organization (not true), which thereby confuses the very historical process—namely, the recent historical emergence of nationalism—that must be explained; (7) another analytical cost is paid when scholars pretend that ethnicity is a form of kinship—it is not.     

The Economics and Bioeconomics of Folk and Scientific Classification

Synopsis This paper is the product of a collaboration between a biologist (Ghiselin 1997) who works on the philosophy of classification and an economist (Landa 1981, 1994) who works on the ‘Economics of Identity’: how and why people classify people based on identity in the context of a theory of ethnic trading networks. In developing the ‘bioeconomics’ (the synthesis of economics with biology) of classification, we crossed a number of disciplinary boundaries—anthropology, economics, sociology, biology, and cognitive psychology including evolutionary psychology’s ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics. Using a bioeconomics approach, we argue that folk classifications—the classifications used by ordinary persons—have much in common with scientific classifications: underlying both is the need for economy of information processing in the brain, for the efficient organization of knowledge, and for efficiency of information acquisition and transmission of information to others. Both evolve as a result of trial and error, but in science there is relatively more foresight, understanding, and planning.     

The origins of meso economics

The paper starts from Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, ‘creative destruction’ leads to economic development ‘from within’ (macro). It is argued that Schumpeter’s approach can be developed into a new—more general—micro-meso-macro framework in economics. Center stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualized by many agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a ‘deep’ invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualization process unfolds over time—modelled in the paper as a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention—and here meso represents a process component of a visible ‘surface’ structure. The macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence. At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and, at the surface level, as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one.     

Alternative evolutionary theories: A historical survey

Our overview has the objective of making our study relevant to bioeconomists. The need for the ‘alternatives’ to the Synthetic Theory of Evolution in social-economic studies was substantiated, for example, by Colombatto (Journal of Bioeconomics, 5, 1–25, 2003), who maintains that the natural-selection theory is ‘ill suited’ to describing evolutionary processes in economics. He proposed an alternative ‘non-Darwinian’ approach by equating the ‘non-Darwinian’ approach with a definite version of neo-Lamarckism. Yet, as we will show, there is a palette of alternative approaches within and beyond the neo-Lamarckism. We hope to give bioeconomists more choice in their theoretical modeling and constructing of analogies between biology and economics. It will also be shown that in the light of suggested definitions the concept of ‘universal Darwinism’ recently discussed in bioeconomics makes little sense as a generalizing category. In addition, in the concluding part of the paper we demonstrate that the majority of alternative approaches are far from being pigeonholed as archaic and once and for all wiped off the theoretical landscape. On the contrary, in recent years one can observe some revival of interest in the theoretical ‘heresies’.      

Neighborhood structure and the evolution of cooperation

This paper deals with the problem of explaining the survival of cooperative behavior in populations in which each person interacts only with a small set of social ‘neighbors’, and individuals adjust their behavior over time by myopically imitating more successful strategies within their own neighborhood. We identify two parameters—the interaction radius and the benefit–cost ratio—which jointly determine whether or not cooperation can survive. For each value of the interaction radius, there exists a critical value of the benefit–cost ratio which serves as the threshold below which cooperation cannot be sustained. This threshold itself declines as the interaction radius rises, so there is a precise sense in which dense networks are more conducive to the evolution of cooperation.     

Don’t blame the P2P file-sharers: the impact of free music downloads on the purchase of music CDs in Canada

This study measures the extent to which P2P file-sharing activities act as substitutes or complements to music purchases in markets for CDs. The paper breaks with the mainstream economics approach which dominates the music file-sharing discussion. Whereas such models assume relationships at the micro level (e.g. between file-sharing and purchases) based on observations made at the macro level, our evolutionary economics approach measures the direct effects using micro data representative of the Canadian population. The behavioral incentives underpinning free music downloading, novel to this paper, are the multiple effects of: ‘unwillingness to pay’ (market substitution), ‘hear before buying’ (market creation), ‘not wanting to buy a whole album’ (market segmentation), and ‘not available in the CD format or on electronic pay-sites’ (market creation). Although the two first mentioned incentives significantly influence CD album purchases—i.e. there is a negative and significant market substitution effect and a positive and significant market creation effect—on the whole, these two effects ‘cancel’ one another out, leading to no association between the number of P2P files downloaded and CD album sales.     

The process and a simple logic of ‘meso’. Emergence and the co-evolution of institutions and group size

‘Summing-up’ aggregation of micro decisions contrasts with structural emergence in complex systems and evolutionary processes. This paper deals with institutional emergence in the ‘evolution of cooperation’ framework and focuses on its size dimension. It is argued that some ‘meso’ (rather than ‘macro’) level is the proper level of cultural emergence and reproduction. Also Schumpeterian economists have discussed institutions as ‘meso’ phenomena recently, and Schelling, Axelrod, Arthur, Lindgren, and others have dealt with ‘critical masses’ of coordinated agents and emergent segregations. However, emergent group size has rarely been explicitly explored so far. In an evolutionary and game-theoretic frame, ‘meso’ is explained in terms of a sustainably cooperating group smaller than the whole population. Mechanisms such as some monitoring, memory, reputation, and active partner selection loosen the total connectivity of the static and deterministic ‘single-shot’ logic and thus allow for emergent ‘meso’ platforms, while expectations ‘to meet again’ remain sufficiently high. Applications of ‘meso-nomia’ include the deep structure of ‘general trust’ and macro-performance in ‘smaller’ and ‘well networked’ countries which helps to explain persistent ‘varieties of capitalism’.     

Federal Stability in Unequal Societies

The stability of federal systems is a thorny issue. Several scholars have attempted to come to grips with this problem and have proposed mechanisms or institutions which may contribute to the stabilization of federal systems. In many instances, however, the underlying mechanisms and micro-foundations are poorly specified. In this paper I build upon existing models dealing with decentralization and secession to incorporate unequal income distributions and externalities of public goods. Based on this some insights may be derived on the appropriate mechanisms to foster federal stability. JEL Classification: H77, H41, C72 This paper partly draws on research funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 5004-0487882/1). An earlier version entitled ‘‘Federalism and the Size of Nations’’ was presented at the conference ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional Stability’’ at Duke University (Durham, April 30–May 1, 2004). Comments by participants at this conference and greatly appreciated. First version: March 2004, this version: November 1, 2004     

The Sensory Order and other Adaptive Classifying Systems

Synopsis Hayek’s cognitive theory, which seeks to describe the operation of a particular order, in fact provides a paradigmatic account of knowledge-generating orders in general. We claim that this paradigm provides a fertile conceptual framework for exploring a variety of problems in economics and social theory. In particular, we shall show that Hayek’s conception of the ‘map’ and the ‘model’, which he uses to explain the operation of the complex adaptive classifying system called ‘mind’, are promising analytical devices with applications extending to social structures of various kinds and complexity. We use Hayek’s notion of the map and model to analyze how different social structures – regarded as classifying systems – work in terms of their input, processing, and output capabilities. The adaptive characteristics of such systems, via communicative routines, multi-level classification, and feedback, form central motifs for our discussion of markets, science, and other social structures. We show that by analyzing the knowledge-generating characteristics of such structures we are also able to gain insights about the circumstances affecting their adaptive properties.     

Using Labels to Investigate Scope Effects in Stated Preference Methods

Insufficient sensitivity to scope (variations in the scale of the environmental good on offer) remains a major criticism of stated preference methods, and many studies fail a scope test of some sort. Across a range of existing explanations for insensitivity to scope (commodity mis-specification, embedding, warm glows) there seems to exist no clear conclusion on how to deal with the problem. This paper provides an alternative explanation for insufficient sensitivity to scope, based on re-definition of the determinants of value for environmental goods within an attributes-based choice model. In the proposed framework respondents’ Willingness To Pay need depend not only on physical characteristics of a good, but may also depend on the ‘label’ under which the environmental good is ‘sold’ in the hypothetical market. To investigate this problem, a Choice Experiment study of biodiversity was conducted. We find that controlling for the effects of a label—in this case, national park designation—leads to significant increase in the scope sensitivity of welfare measures.     

Sugden’s critique of Sen’s capability approach and the dangers of libertarian paternalism

The force of Sugden’s critique of Sen’s capability approach depends on the interpretation of the approach adopted. It is persuasive when public reasoning about what is good (or best) for people can justify policies which promote opportunity through (potentially objectionable) restrictions on liberty. Sunstein’s discussion of preference formation and politics shares key elements of Sen’s views. His proposals for democratic controls illustrate the potential danger Sugden signals about application of the capability approach. Sugden is also critical of paternalist views inspired by the findings of behavioural economics. One of these—Sunstein and Thaler’s ‘libertarian paternalism’—is a worrying extension of Sunstein’s earlier views and opens the door to a much wider range of interventions. Sugden rightly and forcefully resists it. His critique of the capability approach may, by contrast, be better seen as sounding a cautionary note than as an act of resistance.     

Competition policy: ten lessons learnt from the financial crisis

The financial crisis brought great challenges also for competition policy. The aim of this paper is to summarize the most important insights for competition policy that could be derived from the turbulent period 2008–2010. The financial crisis is seen as project that demanded sound management from competition policy and enforcement. The insights will be presented in the instructive form of ‘lessons learnt’ which represents a common approved project management technique. We come to the result that the financial crisis is not the result of ‘too much competition’, but of regulatory failure and that the main answers to the financial crisis have to come from ‘smart regulation’. The relaxation of competition policy would be the wrong policy response in troubled times since competition policy can play an important role in bringing the crisis economy back on track. In contrast to banking we see no economic rationale for rescue packages for other economic sectors by referring to systemic risk. The renaissance of industrial policy is viewed with great skepticism since empirical evidence shows that the effort of picking ‘winners’ all too often results in saving ‘losers’.     

Sustainable Development and a Dwindling Carbon Space

Curbing global warming by setting long term maxima for temperature rise or concentrations of greenhouse gases defines spaces within which further emissions of these gases are to remain (referred to here as ‘carbon spaces’). This paper addresses questions related to how to share between countries the carbon space and/or efforts to stay within it, in the perspective of sustainable development; different allocation mechanisms are reviewed, responding to criteria such as ‘responsibility’ for climate change, ‘capability’ to engage in abating it, and ‘potential’ or future contribution. The carbon space remaining at any time will depend on effective mitigation up till that time, and will condense if more stringent maxima are to be set; per capita this space becomes smaller with rising population. Sharing the carbon space in a fair way requires “convergence” of currently widely unequal per capita emissions. If the world is to stay within the carbon space consistent with <2° warming, then developed economies—the wealthiest sources of greenhouse gases should quickly and deeply engage in mitigation. Also, substantial mitigation is to take place in developing countries and that this will require substantial support to developing countries (financially, technologically). Changing development paths can make a major contribution to climate change mitigation; this requires changes in investment, production and consumption patterns. Green New Deals as proposed in the context of a widened response to the current economic crisis could become a first phase of a fundamental transition towards a decarbonised global economy worldwide. Concerns to do with equity as well as sustainability must be incorporated and integrated into coherent transitory strategies.     

It's easier to contract than to pay: Judicial independence and US municipal default in the 19th century

It is well established in the literature that an independent judiciary can act as a signal of credibility by a sovereign state and as a guarantor of creditor rights. However, to date there has been little systematic work analyzing how an independent judiciary reacts to fiscal stress and public-sector default. This article addresses that very question by evaluating how and if judicial independence affects default rates using US municipal data through the nineteenth century. Overall, the results do indicate that greater judicial independence is associated with a significantly lower likelihood of default. This channel largely occurs through the method by which a member of a state's court of last resort is selected (either appointment or popular election) and term length.     

Social Market Economy: origins,meanings and interpretations

This paper investigates various possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’—60 years after its political initiation in Germany. We focus on the variety of intellectual sources that influenced the formation and interpretation of the concept in Germany during the first half of the last century. Our particular attention is on Müller-Armack’s definition of a rather dualistic concept of ‘social’ versus ‘market economy’ and the subtle differences it has with an original (Freiburg School) view of ordo-liberalism that lends itself more easily to a constitutional economics perspective.

Voice matters in a dictator game

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

The Bioeconomics of Cooperation

When transactions and information are costly and exchange is non-simultaneous, ‘institutions matter’. They matter because exchange under these circumstances subjects the participants to potentially harmful behaviors by other participants, among which are: opportunistic behavior, agency, the free-rider problem, cheating, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Institutions constrain these behaviors, allowing the participants to take advantage of the gains from trade and specialization, and thereby facilitating cooperation. Individuals adhere to institutional rules because they gain by doing so. Because the individual gains are inseparable from the structure of the institutions, the institutions themselves necessarily become the focus of the analysis—as we see in the new institutional economics (NIE). The new group selection position in biology involves a similar shift in focus from the level of the individual to the group when studying the evolution of altruism. But some of the proponents of group selection go further, arguing that altruism in biology evolves because it is in the interest of the group, but not the individual. In fact, group level analysis is necessary in biology, as in the NIE, because it allows for the discovery of ‘institutions’ that constrain cheating, opportunistic behavior, etc., thereby making participation in the group in the long-run self-interest of the individual. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On the distribution of product price and quality

We investigate the structure of demand by focusing on the distribution of prices within narrowly-defined classes of goods. We observe considerable heterogeneity—products that are functionally similar but presumably of different ‘quality’ may sell at very different prices. We analyze distribution of prices for bottles of wine, used cars, houses in London and week-long holidays in Majorca, and observe in each case that the the resulting distribution is more skewed than the lognormal but less skewed than a Pareto distribution. We then present a theoretical model whereby products can distinguish themselves along multiple hedonic dimensions of ‘performance’, with these product attributes being random variables subject to multiplicative interactions. Variations of this model can reproduce a lognormal price distribution and a Pareto distribution as lower and upper bound benchmarks (respectively).

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.