Feuding,arbitration, and the emergence of an independent judiciary

Constitutional Political Economy - Anthropologists, historians, and political economists suggest that private violence—feuding—provides order and enforces agreements in the absence of a...     

Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison

This paper analyzes the contribution of the Swiss and the U.S. Constitution to protect economic liberties, and compares the different strategies that both constitutions rely on to achieve this goal. Pertinent provisions in the Swiss Constitution are rather precise but relatively easy to change, whereas the U.S. Constitution is characterized by vaguely formulated constraints that are difficult to amend formally and that are interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the substantial constitutional changes that did occur in both countries seem to have followed strikingly similar patterns: Initially, regional integration through reciprocal market opening within both countries facilitated the constitutional protection of economic liberties. Subsequently, the constitutional protection of economic liberties eroded in both countries, especially against federal legislation, due to changes in the interpretation of the constitution through the courts, or by formal amendment. Lastly, both constitutions were not immune against sudden demands by special interest groups that were being raised during times of crisis or war. I wish to thank Beat Blankart, Ludger Schuknecht and Barry Weingast for helpful comments.     

Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights

The conflict over scarce resources in the Hobbesian jungle may be avoided if rules of obligation delineating property rights develop along with institutions of governance. One possibility is a “duress contract” as the strongest individual threatens others who agree to enslavement. Thus, “might takes rights.” Alternatively, individuals with similar capacities for violence may enter a “consent contract” establishing rules of obligation and then voluntarily participating in governance. They will not agree to a rights assignment that produces less wealth than they expect through violence, however, so “might makes rights.” A might-takes-and-makes-rights analysis is outlined to explain the continuum of legal institutions and property rights allocations that can evolve between these two extremes of duress and consent. Increasingly finely delineated private property rights tend to evolve under institutions produced by consent contracts, while common pool problems tend to arise near the duress contract end of the spectrum. This paper draws from a larger project on “The Evolution of Law” which has been supported by the Earhart Foundation. Discussions with and comments by Randy Holcombe, Kevin Reffit, and two anonymous referees led to significant improvements in the development and presentation of the arguments, as did discussant comments on a related paper made by Douglas Ginsburg and participants in the Friedrich August von Hayek Symposium on “Competition Among Institutions” in Freiburg, Germany, June 1–4, 1994, sponsored by the International Institute at George Mason University and the Walter Eucken Institute, Freiburg.     

Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment

This paper uses readily accessible aggregate time series to measure the probability that an employed worker becomes unemployed and the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job, the ins and outs of unemployment. Since 1948, the job finding probability has accounted for three-quarters of the fluctuations in the unemployment rate in the United States and the employment exit probability for one-quarter. Fluctuations in the employment exit probability are quantitatively irrelevant during the last two decades. Using the underlying microeconomic data, the paper shows that these results are not due to compositional changes in the pool of searching workers, nor are they due to movements of workers in and out of the labor force. These results contradict the conventional wisdom that has guided the development of macroeconomic models of the labor market since 1990.     

On the coexistence of money and higher-return assets and its social role

This paper adopts mechanism design to investigate the coexistence of fiat money and higher-return assets. We consider an economy with pairwise meetings where fiat money and risk-free capital compete as means of payment, as in [28]. The trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is chosen among all individually rational, renegotiation-proof mechanisms to maximize society?s welfare. We show that in any stationary monetary equilibrium capital commands a higher rate of return than fiat money.     

加强市场法制建设的博弈分析

由于我国正处于经济体制转轨时期，社会上失信行为非常普遍，在这种情况下加强市场法制建设显得由为重要。通过对一个博弈模型的分析，在无法律保障，法律保障不健全的和有充分法律保障的情况下，经济资源的分配有很大差异。只有在法律保障非常充分的时候才能实现经济资源最合理的利用。     

Reassessing the Social Foundations of Welfare (State) Regimes

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was formed in 1964 to ‘create a forum in which the more prosperous member countries [of the United Nations] would come under pressure to agree to measures benefiting the less-developed countries’. More specifically, its formation was ‘a deliberate effort to use international bureaucracy and conference diplomacy to alter current norms affecting trade and development’. UNCTAD's founding reflected the growth in membership of the United Nations of newly independent states. A large number of the e´lites of these new entities keenly felt the iniquity of the world order which had ushered in their formal statehood. UNCTAD and the later call for a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO) therefore were rejoinders to problems encountered by developing countries as a result of the creation and operation of the Bretton Woods system.     

Reassessing the evidence of an emerging yen block in North and Southeast Asia

Using weekly observations on 9 Asian currencies from November 1976 to December 2003, we re-examine the evidence of an emerging yen block in North and Southeast Asia. In contrast to previous research that assumes instantaneous adjustment of exchange rates by the region's Central Banks to variations in the world's main global currencies, we use a dynamic general-to-specific Newey–West estimation strategy that allows gradual adjustment and calculation of both short and long run equilibrium responses. We find that there is no de facto yen block, but although the US dollar remains dominant throughout the region, the yen's influence is rising amongst a subset of the currencies since the early 1990s.     

Openness can be good for growth: The role of policy complementarities

This paper studies how the effect of trade openness on economic growth may depend on complementary reforms that help a country take advantage of international competition. This issue is illustrated with a simple Harris–Todaro model where welfare gains after trade openness depend on the degree of labor market flexibility. The paper then presents cross-country, panel-data evidence on how the growth effect of openness may depend on a variety of structural characteristics. For this purpose, the empirical section uses a non-linear growth regression specification that interacts a proxy of trade openness with proxies of educational investment, financial depth, inflation stabilization, public infrastructure, governance, labor market flexibility, ease of firm entry, and ease of firm exit. The paper concludes that the growth effects of openness may be significantly improved if certain complementary reforms are undertaken.     

Islam-based legal language and state governance: democracy,strength of the judiciary and human rights

Constitutional Political Economy - States embracing Islam-based laws are frequently seen as struggling with establishing democratic institutions, jeopardizing human rights and encouraging executive...     

Reassessing the effects of environmental taxation when pollution affects health over the life-cycle

We introduce the link between pollution, morbidity and productivity over the life-cycle in a two-period overlapping generations model. As the environmental tax improves the health-profile over the life-cycle, it influences saving, investment in health, labor supply and retirement. As a result, we identify effects of environmental taxation beyond the standard crowding-out and productivity effects captured by the past literature. We show that whether those effects are positive or negative for the economy crucially depends on the degree of substitutability between young and old labor. Our numerical examples suggest that that those new effects alleviate the negative effects of environmental taxation on output and decrease potential positive welfare effects.     

Culture,legal heritage and the regulation of labor

According to cross-cultural psychologists, cross-country differences in individualism vs. collectivism constitute an important dimension of cultural variation. Legal-economic theorists argue that legal philosophies such as common law and civil law have developed differently over centuries and have persistent effects. In this paper, we argue that the effects of culture and institutions should not be analyzed in isolation from each other, as this disregards their interactions. We merge the two separate literatures on cultural attributes and legal origin theories, and derive a hypothesis regarding their joint effects on labor market regulations. We hypothesize that the effect of individualism on the political determination of labor regulations should be particularly pronounced in more market-oriented economic systems (as in British common law countries) compared to more rigid and bureaucratic state-centered systems (as in French civil law countries). Market oriented economies give individual effort and ability greater room to flourish, which in individualistic cultures yields weaker labor regulations. The effect of individualism should be smaller in state centered systems. Using data on the average rigidity of labor regulations during the years 1950–2004 in 86 countries, we find that the negative effect of individualism on the rigidity of labor regulations is enhanced by the presence of a common law legal system. In fact, individualism has no effect on the rigidity of labor market regulations in civil law countries. Analogously, the negative effect of common law legal origin on labor market regulations is found to be conditional on the level of individualism. Individualism and common law legal systems are complements in the determination of labor regulations.     

Taylor rules in the open economy

Taylor rules, which link short-term interest rates to fluctuations in inflation and output, have been shown to be a good guide (both positively and normatively) to the conduct of monetary policy. As a result they have been used extensively to model policy in the context of both closed and open economy models. Their determinacy properties have also been analysed in the context of closed and, to a more limited degree, in small open economy models. In this paper, we extend the analysis of the determinacy properties of Taylor rules to the case of a benchmark two-country model. When the rules are specified in terms of output-price inflation we confirm and extend the conventional results from the closed economy literature—satisfying the Taylor principle is the key to ensuring determinacy, although the presence of backward-looking price-setting can affect the determinacy properties of the two-country model. However, the conventional results do not hold when we replace output-price inflation with consumer price inflation in the specification of the rule. In this case, Taylor rules which satisfy the Taylor principle will be indeterminate, unless there is an unusually large home bias in consumption. Similar indeterminacy problems arise when one country targets CPI inflation and the other output-price inflation. In this case we show that, even if determinacy is achieved, large spillovers may occur between countries.     

Fiscal Shocks and the Current Account in the Redux Model: Evidence from the Italian Economy

The main goal of this paper is to study the effects of fiscal policy on the current account in the Italian economy through the analysis of one of the most innovative intertemporal models of recent years, the Obstfeld–Rogoff Redux model. The author proposes an innovative econometric approach to the model, based on the estimation of the microeconomic parameters that appear in its fundamental equations. The estimated parameters are used to empirically determine the multipliers that, according to the theory, connect permanent and temporary variations in public expenditure to the current account. Estimation is carried out on a dynamic extension of the original model, which has been developed modifying the first order conditions system of the maximization problem. Finally, the author provides a comparison between the results obtained and the actual dynamics of the Italian current account balance.     

Existence of a monetary steady state in a matching model: indivisible money

Existence of a monetary steady state is established for a random matching model with divisible goods, indivisible money, an arbitrary bound on individual money holdings, and take-it-or-leave-it offers by consumers. The background environment is that in papers by Shi and by Trejos and Wright. The monetary steady state shown to exist has nice properties: the value function, defined on money holdings, is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and the measure over money holdings has full support.     

On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent

Stigma affects convicted offenders if employers reduce their wage. Current research considers this kind of informal sanctioning as an effective means for reducing crime and proposes its fostering by the government. In this article, I first show that increasing stigma may even enhance crime. While stigma enhances deterrence of an unconvicted offender, it may drive a stigmatized ex-convict towards recidivism. Secondly, I provide a solution for guaranteeing stigma's effectiveness. Notably a harsh(er) punishment for repeat offenders is required. Finally, with the theoretical analysis as a background, stigmatization policies pursued in the States, Switzerland and Spain are compared.     

Existence of a monetary steady state in a matching model: divisible money

Existence of a monetary steady state is established in a random matching model with divisible goods, divisible money, an arbitrary bound on individual money holdings, and take-it-or-leave-it offers by consumers. The monetary steady state shown to exist has nice properties: the value function, defined on money holdings, is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and the distribution over money holdings has full support. The approach is to show that the “limit” of the nice steady states for indivisible money, existence of which was established in an earlier paper, as the unit of money goes to zero is a monetary steady state for divisible money. For indivisible money, the marginal utility of consumption at zero was assumed to be large; for divisible money it is assumed to be large and finite.     

Trading horizons and the value of money

This paper shows that fiat money can be feasible and essential even if the trading horizon is finite and deterministic. The result hinges on two features of our model. First, individual actions can affect the future availability of productive resources. So, agents may be willing to sell for money, even if on that date they have no reason to accept it. This makes monetary trade feasible in all preceding dates. Second, agents are anonymous and direct their search for partners. So, gift-giving arrangements may be prevented because agents can misrepresent their consumption needs. This makes money essential in exploiting any gains from specialization and trade.