转型期国有企业经营者的激励机制与激励契约

企业是要素市场一系列契约的结点。对企业经营者的激励契约问题进行研究,具有重要的现实意义。利用“激励相容”机制,可以实现“个人理性”和“集体理性”的统一。从博弈理论的角度来看,“激励相容”达到的是一个“纳升均衡”状态,这是达到帕累托最优的必要条件。     

制度设计应遵循的原则和基本要求

制度设计应遵循普适性原则、效率原则、交易费用最小化原则、激励相容原则、和谐性原则及帕累托改进原则。制度设计要合理进行制度的资源配置,提高制度效益,同时要注重与意识形态和惯例相结合。制度有其生存的环境,不能简单地移植。制度变迁存在着路径依赖现象,因而初始制度设计至关重要。     

有线数字电视公共节目定价中的机制设计

机制设计理论认为,对于任意给定的一个经济或社会目标,在自由选择、自愿交换、信息不完全等分散化决策条件下,可以通过经济机制的设计,使经济活动参与者的个人利益和设计者既定的目标一致。该文通过博弈分析,探讨目前有线数字电视公共节目定价方式的不足,并提出了一种新的公共定价实施机制,证明这种定价机制是对原有定价机制的一种帕累托改进。     

农户参与新农村社区公共品供给的博弈分析北大核心CSSCI

农村公共品供给是新农村社区建设顺利进行的重要保障,财力不足已成为制约农村公共产品供给的瓶颈,"零税费时代"这一问题更加突出。在农村公共品供给不足的背景下,提升农户参与新农村社区公共品供给的意愿是一个有研究价值的问题。基于农户自愿供给的角度,建立了信息对称和信息不对称背景下农户参与农村社区公共品供给的博弈模型。研究表明,农户在单价段博弈中容易陷入"囚徒困境",而在无限次重复博弈过程中可以实现"帕累托"最优。应该采取典型示范、增加农村社区中社会资本的存量、发展民间组织、完善农户的需求偏好表达机制、实现多主体供给等多方面的激励机制,使农户之间的非合作博弈走向合作博弈。     

农户参与新农村社区公共品供给的博弈分析

农村公共品供给是新农村社区建设顺利进行的重要保障,财力不足已成为制约农村公共产品供给的瓶颈,"零税费时代"这一问题更加突出。在农村公共品供给不足的背景下,提升农户参与新农村社区公共品供给的意愿是一个有研究价值的问题。基于农户自愿供给的角度,建立了信息对称和信息不对称背景下农户参与农村社区公共品供给的博弈模型。研究表明,农户在单价段博弈中容易陷入"囚徒困境",而在无限次重复博弈过程中可以实现"帕累托"最优。应该采取典型示范、增加农村社区中社会资本的存量、发展民间组织、完善农户的需求偏好表达机制、实现多主体供给等多方面的激励机制,使农户之间的非合作博弈走向合作博弈。     

我国信托业监管制度的优化:基于金融危机启示的制度分析

对美国金融危机的深入分析可以看出,合理高效的金融监管体制的内核应该是制度环境与制度安排的动态相容.我国信托业监管矛盾根源于内外激励约束的一致性缺失,使得信托业固有的机构监管模式与制度环境及信托本质难以耦合,弱化了监管效率.针对我国信托业监管制度的缺陷,本文提出了信托业监管模式优化的原则与思路,从制度变迁的主观绩效和客观绩效两方面探讨了信托业监管效率的帕累托改进.     

高考录取机制的博弈分析

本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果,均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是,真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略,达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制,真实偏好是学生的优势策略,结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制,对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。     

走出经济效率的误区

经济效率即帕累托效率，是根据帕累托标准来衡量所能够达到的最好的状态。达到经济效率要满足交换条件、生产条件、定点条件三个条件。帕累托效率概念本身有很大的局限性，即达到帕累托效率并不能保证实现其他的目标例如公平、自由等等。而且帕累托效率很可能会与公平、自由主义等相冲突；帕累托效率具有与福利主义同样的缺陷。     

高考录取机制的博弈分析

本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果，均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是，真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略，达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制，真实偏好是学生的优势策略，结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制，对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。     

基于效率的环境产权分配

由于双边道德风险的存在,无论将环境产权分配给排污者还是受害者,一般来说,都难以使双方均作出有效率的预防行动配置决策。因此,在排污者与受害者之间变更环境产权归属,一般并不会导致帕累托最优竞争均衡。本文通过对两种非效率均衡的比较,从确认最低成本预防者角度分析了环境产权的分配。这种规则下的环境产权分配将导致相对更有效率的结果。     

The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey–Boiteux pricing versus bundling

This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey–Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the final allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satisfies a condition of renegotiation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.     

Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information

Suppose that the centre wishes to make transfers between member states of a federation to reduce inequality. However, it lacks precise information concerning the cost differences that are responsible for the initial income inequality. We examine the implications of asymmetric information for the design of the transfer scheme. We show that if member states’ inherent cost levels as local public good providers take discrete values, the first best, or ‘complete information’, transfer scheme may or may not violate incentive compatibility. If inherent cost is a continuous random variable, such a scheme certainly violates incentive compatibility. We also explore the possibility of binding participation constraints. In our model, a binding incentive compatibility constraint leads to a reduction in effort devoted to cost reduction, and a binding participation constraint will also lead to a violation of Samuelson's optimality condition for public good provision.     

Participation constraints of matching mechanisms

Matching mechanisms have been proposed to improve public good provision in voluntary contributions. However, such decentralized subsidizing mechanisms may not be Pareto‐improving and may suffer from incomplete information and incredible commitment. This paper examines participation constraints of matching mechanisms with small matching rates in two cases of equilibria. At interior equilibria, there always exist small Pareto‐improving matching schemes regardless of preferences. This universal existence is useful for cooperation among heterogeneous players in the context without global information of preferences or at the international level without central governments. At corner equilibria, matching schemes work in different ways and have distinct welfare effects in certain cases, and the existence of Pareto‐improving matching schemes is not universal but is possible under certain conditions. The paper further characterizes Pareto‐improving matching schemes, and shows that it is easier to reach Pareto‐improving matching outcomes if players value more on public goods and have stronger substitution between private and public goods.     

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

The idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without “common values”. Consequently, the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved exactly, and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large, but finite private information economies.     

Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information

We characterize generally the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions public goods game for two consumers with private information.The two consumers simultaneously make voluntary contributions to the public good, and the contributions are refunded if the total falls short of the cost of the public good. Several families of equilibria (step‐function, regular and semi‐regular) are studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for regular and semi‐regular equilibrium allocations to be interim incentive efficient are derived. In the uniform distribution case we prove (i) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient regular equilibria when the cost of production is large enough and (ii) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient semi‐regular equilibria when the cost of production is low enough. Step‐function equilibra are proved to be interim incentive inefficient.     

The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test

In collaborative negotiation, stakeholder representatives are charged with the development of a mutually acceptable set of public policies. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. In this paper, we employ an Edgeworth box framework to investigate the nature of bargaining over public goods (environmental policies) that have multiple attributes. We then design and conduct laboratory experiments within this framework to test whether negotiated outcomes satisfy standard axiomatic bargaining predictions under a variety of conditions. Specifically, we test whether two parties with Pareto inefficient endowments of two goods will trade to Pareto improving and Pareto efficient outcomes, and to the Nash bargain in particular. We vary whether the Nash bargain coincides with or diverges from the outcome that maximizes the joint payoff, or the outcome that equalizes payoffs, and whether subjects are provided full or partial information. We find that bargainers reach Pareto improving and efficient outcomes across treatments, but withdraw support for the Nash bargain when it generates unequal payments or when payoff information is private. We conclude that this experimental framework offers a promising method for studying multi-attribute negotiations.     

公共品供给的实验研究 及其未来可能的进展

传统经济学基于理性“经济人”基础,认为公地悲剧问题是个体理性选择的必然结果,公共品供给需采取与个体真实公共品偏好相兼容的激励机制,并由政府承担供给角色。实验经济学研究则提供个体异质社会偏好的稳健性证据,并在合适的惩罚、沟通交流和声誉等机制下提供诸多可以实现公共品自愿供给的实验证据,表明群体或自愿组织也可作为公共品供给主体。这些公共品实验研究为现实公共治理创新提供更为科学的偏好基础和公共治理思路。     

Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation

We make two contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if agents' preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity constrained single crossing, then there exists a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism that is budget balancing. Second, we show that, even without capacity constrained single crossing, existence of a budget balancing Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism is guaranteed if the set of agent types contains no atoms.     

Public goods with congestion

I consider the problem of the efficient provision of a congested (limited capacity) public good in a setting with asymmetric information. I show, in particular, that when the capacity of the good is limited, in a wide class of economies it is possible to construct an incentive compatible mechanism that always produces the good at the efficient level, balances the budget and satisfies voluntary participation constraints. This result is in contrast with the corresponding impossibility result for pure public goods due to Mailath and Postlewaite (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 351-359) and Rob (J. Econ. Theory 47 (1989) 307-333).