TIMELINESS OF ACCOUNTING REPORTS AND THEIR INFORMATIONAL CONTENT ON THE CAPITAL MARKET

Timeliness is recognized as an important characteristic of accounting information by the accounting profession, the users of accounting information, and the regulatory agencies. According to the evidence presented in this paper, accounting reports with shorter delay have a higher informational content than those with longer delay. At the time of release to the capital market, the effect of delay on the information content seems to be more significant in the case of the interim rather than the annual reports. This may be explained by the major characteristics which differentiate the information contained in the interim reports from that contained in the annual reports, the differences in their role in the investor's decision process, and the existence of substitute information.     

THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF BOND RATINGS

This paper explores the risk structure of interest rates. The focus is on whether yields on industrial bonds indicate that market participants base their evaluations of a bond issue's default risk on agency ratings or on publicly available financial statistics. Using a non-linear least squares procedure, the yield-to-maturity is related to Moody's rating, Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating, and accounting measures of creditworthiness such as coverage and leverage. Market yields are found to be significantly correlated with both the ratings and a set of readily available financial accounting statistics. These results indicate (1) that market participants base their evaluations of an issue's creditworthiness on more than the agencies' ratings and (2) that the ratings bring some information to the market above and beyond that contained in the set of accounting variables. The paper also asks whether the market views Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings as equally reliable measures of risk or whether the market attaches more weight to one agency's ratings than the other. Finally, the hypothesis that the market pays more attention to the accounting measures and less to the ratings if the rating has not been reviewed recently is tested.     

金融效率理论框架与我国金融效率实证考察

金融效率相对低下是对中国 2 0余年金融改革与发展历程的最好注解 ,提高金融效率是实现中国金融可持续发展的核心目标。本文首先以金融效率为线索对金融发展理论进行了简要的梳理 ,认为金融效率研究应在赋予了全新金融效率观的金融可持续发展理论的框架下展开 ,由此界定并提出金融效率的涵义与有效的研究方法 ;同时 ,对中国金融效率 ( 1 990～ 2 0 0 1 )实证分析的结果验证了中国金融效率相对低下的结论 ,其根源可归结为高层金融资源的严重缺乏 ;最后 ,本文建议不仅要建立合理的多层次的金融体系 ,更应从系统的视角加强各层次金融系统内部、各层次金融系统之间以及金融系统与经济系统之间的协调。     

MAINBANKS AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS

We explore the effects of mainbanks on investment efficiency in financial distress. The previous literature argues that firms with close financial relationships with banks have lower costs of financial distress because of a reduced underinvestment problem. Although benefits may accrue to such close relationships, we contend shortcomings are possible as well. A firm in financial distress without a mainbank may be forced to reduce investment or sell assets to a buyer who has a higher value. However, for a firm with a mainbank, this disciplinary force is weakened. To firms with poor investment opportunities, the presence of mainbanks may actually induce an overinvestment problem. The empirical findings reported here are consistent with this idea. JEL classification: G31, G33, G34.     

THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross‐sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market.