Match your innovation strategy to your innovation ecosystem

High-definition televisions should, by now, be a huge success. Philips, Sony, and Thompson invested billions of dollars to develop TV sets with astonishing picture quality. From a technology perspective, they've succeeded: Console manufacturers have been ready for the mass market since the early 1990s. Yet the category has been an unmitigated failure, not because of deficiencies, but because critical complements such as studio production equipment were not developed or adopted in time. Under-performing complements have left console producers in the position of offering a Ferrari in a world without gasoline or highways--an admirable engineering feat, but not one that creates value for customers. The HDTV story exemplifies the promise and peril of innovation ecosystems--the collaborative arrangements through which firms combine their individual offers into a coherent, customer-facing solution. When they work, innovation ecosystems allow companies to create value that no one firm could have created alone. The benefits of these systems are real. But for many organizations the attempt at ecosystem innovation has been a costly failure. This is because, along with new opportunities, innovation ecosystems also present a new set of risks that can brutally derail a firm's best efforts. Innovation ecosystems are characterized by three fundamental types of risk: initiative risks--the familiar uncertainties of managing a project; interdependence risks--the uncertainties of coordinating with complementary innovators; and integration risks--the uncertainties presented by the adoption process across the value chain. Firms that assess ecosystem risks holistically and systematically will be able to establish more realistic expectations, develop a more refined set of environmental contingencies, and arrive at a more robust innovation strategy. Collectively, these actions will lead to more effective implementation and more profitable innovation.     

How you slice it: smarter segmentation for your sales force

Three years ago, 70-year-old Hill-Rom Incorporated was in a position familiar to many mature businesses: The company was strong but needed to be stronger. It was a top producer of hospital beds and specialty mattresses, its core product lines. It also had competitive complementary lines of stretchers, furniture, and architectural equipment. It had an extensive customer base, a respected sales force, and solid profit margins. But by the time Ernest Waaser took over as chief executive in early 2001, revenue growth had been slowing, and competition was on the rise. To secure Hill-Rom's place in the market, Waaser decided to focus first on the sales organization--partly because the cost of sales had risen gradually over the past five years and partly because acquisitions and other initiatives had made the sales organization more complex. The CEO took several steps to restructure the sales force. First, the company changed its customer segments to better reflect customers' demands and financial status, ultimately targeting two main groups: key and prime customers. It then changed the overall structure of the sales organization so it could tailor its approach to these two segments; key customers received more specialized service than prime customers. Finally, Hill-Rom adjusted the sales force after the company took an in-depth look at historical data on products and services and sales completed. Reasons for staffing changes were carefully communicated to the sales force. Because of Hill-Rom's initiatives, the cost of sales is down, short-term revenue growth is up, the outlook for long-term revenue growth looks bright, sales and profit margins are up, and customer satisfaction has increased. Best practice, indeed.     

Housing and debt over the life cycle and over the business cycle

Housing and mortgage debt are studied in a quantitative general equilibrium model. The model matches wealth distribution, age profiles of homeownership and debt, and frequency of housing adjustment. Over the cycle, the model matches the cyclicality and volatility of housing investment, and the procyclicality of debt. Higher individual income risk and lower downpayments can explain the reduced volatility of housing investment, the reduced procyclicality of debt, and part of the reduced volatility of GDP. In an experiment that mimics the Great Recession, countercyclical financial conditions can account for large drops in housing activity and debt following large negative shocks.     

AIDS is your business

If your company operates in a developing country, AIDS is your business. While Africa has received the most attention, AIDS is also spreading swiftly in other parts of the world. Russia and Ukraine had the fastest-growing epidemics last year, and many experts believe China and India will suffer the next tidal wave of infection. Why should executives be concerned about AIDS? Because it is destroying the twin rationales of globalization strategy-cheap labor and fast-growing markets--in countries where people are heavily affected by the epidemic. Fortunately, investments in programs that prevent infection and provide treatment for employees who have HIV/AIDS are profitable for many businesses--that is, they lead to savings that outweigh the programs' costs. Due to the long latency period between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS symptoms, a company is not likely to see any of the costs of HIV/AIDS until five to ten years after an employee is infected. But executives can calculate the present value of epidemic-related costs by using the discount rate to weigh each cost according to its expected timing. That allows companies to think about expenses on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs as investments rather than merely as costs. The authors found that the annual cost of AIDS to six corporations in South Africa and Botswana ranged from 0.4% to 5.9% of the wage bill. All six companies would have earned positive returns on their investments if they had provided employees with free treatment for HIV/AIDS in the form of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), according to the mathematical model the authors used. The annual reduction in the AIDS "tax" would have been as much as 40.4%. The authors' conclusion? Fighting AIDS not only helps those infected; it also makes good business sense.     

Finding your next core business

How do you know when your core needs to change? And how do you determine what should replace it? From an in-depth study of 25 companies, the author, a strategy consultant, has discovered that it's possible to measure the vitality of a business's core. If it needs reinvention, he says, the best course is to mine hidden assets. Some of the 25 companies were in deep crisis when they began the process of redefining themselves. But, says Zook, management teams can learn to recognize early signs of erosion. He offers five diagnostic questions with which to evaluate the customers, key sources of differentiation, profit pools, capabilities, and organizational culture of your core business. The next step is strategic regeneration. In four-fifths of the companies Zook examined, a hidden asset was the centerpiece of the new strategy. He provides a map for identifying the hidden assets in your midst, which tend to fall into three categories: undervalued business platforms, untapped insights into customers, and underexploited capabilities. The Swedish company Dometic, for example, was manufacturing small absorption refrigerators for boats and RVs when it discovered a hidden asset: its understanding of, and access to, customers in the RV market. The company took advantage of a boom in that market to refocus on complete systems for live-in vehicles. The Danish company Novozymes, which produced relatively low-tech commodity enzymes such as those used in detergents, realized that its underutilized biochemical capability in genetic and protein engineering was a hidden asset and successfully refocused on creating bioengineered specialty enzymes. Your next core business is not likely to announce itself with fanfare. Use the author's tools to conduct an internal audit of possibilities and pinpoint your new focus.     

Understanding what your sales manager is up against

Every year, the research firm CSO Insights publishes the results of its Sales Performance Optimization survey, an online questionnaire given to more than 1,000 sales executives worldwide that seeks to examine the effectiveness of key sales practices and metrics. In this article, two partners from CSO provide the 2005 and 2006 survey highlights, which describe the challenges today's sales organizations face and how they're responding. An overall theme is the degree to which the buy cycle has gotten out of sync with the sell cycle. Buyers have always had a buy cycle, starting at the point they perceive a need. Sellers have always had a sales cycle, starting at the point they spot a prospect. Traditionally, the two have dovetailed--either because the seller created the buyer's perception of need or because the buyer pursued a need by contacting a salesperson (often for product information). Now the buy cycle is often well under way before the seller is even aware there is a cycle--in part because of the information asymmetry created by the Internet. The implications for managing a sales organization are profound in that sales training must now address how reps handle an environment in which buyers have more knowledge than they do. The authors offer evidence that sales executives are taking--and should take--aggressive action to train and retain sales talent, manage the sales process, and use sales support technologies to meet the challenges of this new environment.     

How to have an honest conversation about your business strategy

Too many organizations descend into underperformance because they can't confront the painful gap between their strategy and the reality of their capabilities, their behaviors, and their markets. That's because senior managers don't know how to engage in truthful conversations about the problems that threaten the business--and because lower-level managers are afraid to speak up. These factors lie behind many failures to implement strategy. Indeed, the dynamics in almost any organization are such that it's extremely difficult for senior people to hear the unfiltered truth from managers lower down. Beer and Eisenstat present the methodology they've developed for getting the truth about an organization's problems (and the truth is always embedded within the organization) onto the table in a way that allows senior management to do something useful with it. By assembling a task force of the most effective managers to collect data about strategic and organizational problems, the senior team sends a clear message that it is serious about uncovering the truth. Task force members present their findings to the senior team in the form of a discussion. This conversation needs to move back and forth between advocacy and inquiry; it has to be about the issues that matter most; it has to be collective and public; it has to allow employees to be honest without risking their jobs; and it has to be structured. This direct feedback from a handful of their best people moves senior teams to make changes they otherwise might not have. Senior teams that have engaged in this process have made dramatic changes in how their businesses are organized and managed--and in their bottom-line results. Success that begins with honest conversations begets future conversations that further improve performance.     

The new science of sales force productivity

For years, sales managers at many companies have relied on top performers and sheer numbers of sales reps to stay competitive. But while they may have squeaked by on this wing-and-a-prayer technique, their sales teams haven't thrived the way they once did. Today's most successful sales leaders are taking a more scientific approach. Savvy managers are reshaping their tactics in response to changing markets. They are reaching out to new customers in innovative ways. And they are increasing productivity by helping the reps they already have make the most of their skills and resources. Leaders who take a scientific approach to sales force effectiveness have learned to use four levers to boost their reps' productivity in a predictable and manageable way. First, they systematically target their firms' offerings, matching the right products with the right customers. Second, they optimize the automation, tools, and procedures at their disposal, providing reps with the support they need to boost sales.Third, they analyze and manage their reps' performance, measuring both internal processes and results to determine where their teams' strengths and weaknesses are. Fourth, they pay close attention to sales force deployment--how well sales, support, marketing, and delivery resources are matched to customers. These four levers can help sales leaders increase productivity across the board, the authors say, though they have the greatest impact on lower-ranked performers. The overall effect of increasing the average sales per employee can be exponential; it means a company won't have to rely on just a few talented individuals to stay competitive. This is especially important because finding and keeping star salespeople is more difficult than ever. What's more, managers who optimize the sales forces they already have can see returns they never thought possible.     

If private equity sized up your business

As the dust settles on the recent frenzy of private equity deals (including transactions topping $20 billion), what lessons can companies glean? Directors and executives of public companies may now be slightly less fearful of imminent takeover, yet the pressure remains: They face shareholders who wonder why they aren't getting private-equity-level returns. Rather than dismiss the value private equity has created as manipulated or aberrant, public company leaders should recognize the disciplined management that often underlies it. Pozen, a longtime leader in the financial services industry, finds that in the aftermath of buyouts, companies undergo five major thrusts of reform. These translate into five key questions that directors should pose to senior management: Have we left too much cash on our balance sheet instead of raising our cash dividends or buying back shares? Do we have the optimal capital structure, with the lowest weighted after-tax cost of total capital, including debt and equity? Do we have an operating plan that will significantly increase shareholder value, with specific metrics to monitor performance? Are the compensation rewards for our top executives tied closely enough to increases in shareholder value, with real penalties for nonperformance? Finally, does our board have enough industry experts who have made the time commitments and been given the financial incentives necessary to maximize shareholder value? The era of private equity is far from over - the top funds have become very large and are likely to play an influential role in future market cycles. Boards that ask these questions, and act on them, won't just beat the takeover artists to the punch. They will build stronger businesses.     

How to integrate a business plan into your introductory accounting course

This article provides a business plan assignment, along with a business plan grading sheet, oral presentation grading sheet, and peer evaluation form for use in a user-oriented introductory accounting course. The article includes a discussion of issues related to making the group project assignment run smoothly, such as assigning students to groups, simplifying assumptions, ways to add specificity, grading of written reports, and set-up and grading of oral presentations.     

Unemployment and the business cycle

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model where labor effort is imperfectly observable and there is unemployment in equilibrium. In contrast to shirking models in the efficiency wage literature, detected shirkers are not dismissed. Instead, they face a monetary punishment because they forgo an increase in their compensation. Estimated versions of the model can generate the high variation in employment and low variation of real wages observed over the business cycle, and are consistent with existing qualitative evidence about the responses of the economy to fiscal policy shocks.     

Firm life cycle and debt maturity structure: evidence from China

This study examines the effect of firm life cycle on debt maturity structure (DMS) in China. We reveal that DMS is relatively low in the introduction and recession periods, while long‐term debt ratio of growth companies is high. Companies in booming industries need funds but have difficulty obtaining long‐term loans, whereas companies in recession can use more long‐term loans. The Chow test shows that DMS changed markedly before and after the new normal of China’s economy and the implementation of the ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation campaign’. It is urgent to address sunset industries to improve the efficiency of resource allocation.     

如何延长软件生命周期

日前,微软宣布：过了2008年6月,Windows XP就将结束它的生命周期,并且主流版本不再延长。尽管国内外网上呼声非常强烈,但是仍然改变不了Windows XP离岗的命运。自2001年Windows XP发布至今,为了使其系统能正常运行,微软化了很大精力打了许多的系统补丁包,来弥补各种漏洞,其产品已相当成熟了。Windows XP伴随我们走过了7年的漫长的路程,有许多软件的开发都是基于其上的。微软的这项决定预示,我们有许多应用系统软件将面临着一场革命。     

正确运用销售促进推动零售业务发展

当前,零售业务在商业银行整体业务发展中占有越来越重要和突出的地位,搞好零售业务的市场营销成为商业银行展业工作中的重中之重.与批发业务大量依靠人员推销所不同的是,零售业务的拓展需要更多地运用广告宣传、销售促进等与其业务运作特点、规律相适应的营销方式.广告宣传的功效先巳为绝大多数商业银行认识,实际工作中运用也越来越多.相对而言,目前银行业对销售促进尚缺乏系统、全面的了解,而有效的销售促进,是商业银行零售业务发展不可缺少的重要手段.     

Ratings quality over the business cycle

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have long held that reputational concerns discipline their behavior. The value of reputation, however, depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle. In a model of ratings incorporating endogenous reputation and a market environment that varies, we find that ratings quality is countercyclical. Specifically, a CRA is more likely to issue less-accurate ratings when fee-income is high, competition in the labor market for analysts is tough, and securities' default probabilities are low. Persistence in economic conditions can diminish our results, while mean reversion exacerbates them. The presence of naive investors reduces overall quality, but quality remains countercyclical. Finally, we demonstrate that competition among CRAs yields similar results.     

Policy risk and the business cycle

The argument that uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy has been holding back the recovery in the U.S. during the Great Recession has a large popular appeal. This paper uses an estimated New Keynesian model to analyze the role of policy risk in explaining business cycles. We directly measure risk from aggregate data and find a moderate amount of time-varying policy risk. The “pure uncertainty” effect of this policy risk is unlikely to play a major role in business cycle fluctuations. In the estimated model, output effects are relatively small because policy risk shocks are (i) too small and (ii) not sufficiently amplified.     

Bank profitability and the business cycle

An important element of the macro-prudential analysis is the study of the link between business cycle fluctuations and banking sector profitability and how this link is affected by institutional and structural characteristics. This work estimates a set of equations for net interest income, non-interest income, operating costs, provisions, and profit before taxes, for banks in the main industrialized countries and evaluates the effects on banking profitability of shocks to both macroeconomic and financial factors. Distinguishing mainly the euro area from Anglo-Saxon countries, the analysis also identifies differences in the resilience of the respective banking systems and relates them to the characteristics of their financial structure.     

Monetary aggregates and the business cycle

A monetary aggregate consisting predominantly of zero-maturity deposits, called MZM, tends to systematically lead output in the US business cycle. Such fluctuations are observed both before and after the 1979 monetary policy change. Similar dynamics are obtained in a model with multi-stage production and purchase-size heterogeneity when agents optimally choose their mix of cash, checkable, and time deposits used in transactions. The causality in the model runs from real activity to money, rather than the other way around. Although the monetary base is endogenous, through a Taylor-type rule, the lead in MZM is primarily driven by deposit creation.     

Imperfect information and the business cycle

Imperfect information has played a prominent role in modern business cycle theory. This paper assesses its importance by estimating the new Keynesian (NK) model under alternative informational assumptions. One version focuses on confusion between temporary and persistent disturbances. Another, on unobserved variation in the inflation target of the Central Bank. A third on persistent mis-perceptions of the state of the economy (measurement error). And a fourth assumes perfect information (the standard NK-DSGE version). Imperfect information is found to contain considerable explanatory power for business fluctuations. Signal extraction seems to provide a conceptually satisfactory, empirically plausible and quantitatively important business cycle mechanism.