INTEREST GROUPS,DEMOCRACY, AND POLICY VOLATILITY

Democratic polities appear to produce more stable policy than do autocracies. In this paper, we explore a potential source of the policy stability observed in democracies: special‐interest groups. We find that interest groups are associated with greater stability in some measures of policy and that groups mediate the stabilizing impact of democracy on policy. We also find that the impact of interest groups on policy volatility depends on the degree of polarization in a society. (JEL P16, O43, D7)     

垄断竞争、利益集团与贸易战

本文借助Grossman and Helpman(1995)提出的贸易战模型,研究了在垄断竞争情况下,大国双方在产业内贸易上所实施的均衡进出口政策。结论表明,利益集团的产生将使政府在"最优进出口关税"的基础上调整贸易政策安排,利益集团将在贸易政策上得到政府更大力度的支持;并且,政府偏向于将优势产品集中于本国消费,对差异化程度较高的产品实行高水平的进出口壁垒;同时,利益集团将引发两国之间的贸易战,政府对政治捐献偏好的增加、产品竞争力的增强将单方面地提升贸易战规模,产品差异化的扩大将带动贸易战的全面升级。     

INTEREST RATE RULES AND WELFARE IN OPEN ECONOMIES

This paper analyses the welfare performance of a set of five alternative interest rate rules in an open economy stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. A rule with a lagged interest rate term, high feedback on inflation and low feedback on output is found to yield the highest welfare for a small open economy. This result is robust across different degrees of openness, different sources of home and foreign shocks, alternative foreign monetary rules and different specifications for price-setting behaviour. The same rule emerges as both the Nash and cooperative equilibria in a two-country version of the model.     

INTEREST GROUPS,ELECTORAL COMPETITION,AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES*

Current models of trade policy formation in representative democracies lack the micro foundations from which the political actions of voters, interest groups, and policy makers can be deduced. This paper provides microfoundations for the most influential of representative democracy models, the Magee-Brock-Young (MBY) model. Probabilistic voting is formally introduced, the conditions for active lobbying are examined, uniqueness of lobbying equilibrium is established, and the responses of different groups' lobbying to exogenous changes are discussed. Finally, the existence of tariff equilibria is studied when, different from MBY, both parties share a common strategy space.     

TOURISM, TRADE AND DOMESTIC WELFARE

Abstract.  Tourism has been regarded as a major source of economic growth and a source of foreign exchange. It has also been viewed as an activity that imposes costs on the host country. Such costs include increased pollution, congestion and despoliation of fragile environments, and intra-generational inequity aggravation. One aspect that has been ignored is the general equilibrium effects of tourism on other sectors in the economy. This paper presents a model that captures the interdependence between tourism and the rest of the economy, in particular agriculture and manufacturing. An important result obtained is that the tourist boom may 'immiserize' the residents.     

DEPRIVATION,INEQUALITY AND WELFARE*

Welfare ranking of income distributions involves a trade‐off between equity and efficiency. A person's feeling of deprivation about higher incomes may be of a relative or absolute type. We consider an intermediate notion of deprivation, a convex mix of relative and absolute deprivations. We then look at the problem of welfare ranking of income distributions when welfare increases under a globally equitable redistribution and under an income increase that keeps intermediate deprivation fixed. All deprivation indices can be regarded as inequality indices but the converse is not true. We also provide a numerical illustration of our results.     

INFLATION,OUTPUT, AND WELFARE*

We study the effects of anticipated inflation on aggregate output and welfare within a search‐theoretic framework. We consider two pricing mechanisms: ex post bargaining and a notion of competitive pricing. Under bargaining, the equilibrium is generically inefficient and an increase in inflation reduces buyers' search intensities, output, and welfare. If prices are posted and buyers can direct their search, search intensities are increasing with inflation for low inflation rates and decreasing for high inflation rates. The Friedman rule achieves the efficient allocation, and inflation always reduces welfare, although it can have a positive effect on output for low inflation rates.     

INTEREST GROUPS AND ECONOMIC POLICY: EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF PROTECTION IN THE BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

This article examines the determinants of the pattern of protection across products in the Brazilian agricultural sector from 1969 to 1989. Three key determinants of policy are explored: interest group pressure, government objectives, and structural change associated with economic crisis and a change in political regime. The principal agricultural policies are analyzed, and nominal protection coefficients (NPCs) and producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) are calculated. When NPCs are used as the dependent variable, econometric results indicate that interest group characteristics such as group size were an important determinant of the pattern of protection. With PSEs, government efforts to raise tax revenues, generate foreign exchange, and control inflation played a more significant role. The results of this paper suggest that future studies of the political economy of protection should pay more attention to the specification of the dependent variable because the conclusions can depend crucially on this choice.     

PRICE DISPERSION,INFLATION, AND WELFARE*

We examine the implications of inflation for both price dispersion and welfare in a monetary search economy. In our economy, if the degree of buyers' incomplete information about prices is fixed, both price dispersion and real prices are increasing in inflation. As the inflation rate approaches the Friedman rule, both price dispersion and welfare losses vanish. If households choose the number of prices to observe, then the optimal inflation rate may exceed the Friedman rule as inflation induces search and, up to a point, raises welfare by eroding market power.     

ASYMMETRIC MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS, PROFITABILITY AND WELFARE

In a differentiated multiproduct Cournot duopoly with linear demand, industry profit usually falls (even though concentration rises) when the distribution of products across firms becomes more asymmetric, if the products are not very differentiated or the total number of products is large. Consumer surplus and overall welfare always fall as the degree of asymmetry increases. These results contrast with the conventional wisdom on the effects of firm heterogeneity and the links between concentration and industry profits.     

通货膨胀、政府收益与社会福利损失

传统"Cagan规则"认为,政府通货膨胀税收益最大化的条件是,通货膨胀率应该为(货币需求关于)利率半弹性的倒数。这一规则是局部均衡条件下的结果,并未考虑通胀的实际经济效应。本文基于交易成本方法在一般均衡框架内讨论收益最大化时通货膨胀率的决定问题。该框架中收益最大化的通货膨胀率小于Ca-gan规则值,这一结论得到了中国1945—1949年恶性通胀时期经验数据的支持。经验结果还表明,相对于Cagan规则,根据交易成本方法设定的通货膨胀率尽管并没有明显提高政府的通货膨胀税收益,却大幅降低了社会福利损失。     

NATIONAL INCOME, WELFARE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

This article explores the assumptions underlying present definitions of national income in its principal uses, and considers the alterations that would be needed to allow for the inclusion of environmental quality. A numerical example illustrates the impact of alternative measures. The discussion concludes that if we want national income to conform more closely to theoretical concepts of welfare indices, then we need to include a proxy for those environmental services that would not be completely free goods if it were possible to overcome their inherent non-marketability. The least unsatisfactory proxy would be the spending on environmental protection.     

SPATIAL DISCRIMINATION,PRODUCT SUBSTITUTABILITY AND WELFARE

The paper examines a quantity–location duopoly game in a spatial discrimination model in which the delivered goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes or complements. By extending the range of the unit transportation cost analysed in the existing literature, it is shown that a dispersed equilibrium arises in which the choice of the optimal locations is affected by the degree of product substitutability. The interaction between the latter and the size of the transportation cost is also discussed in order to verify its welfare implications. In particular, it is shown that in this spatial framework imperfect substitutability may increase welfare.     

MIGRATION,MEDICAL AID AND WELFARE*

This paper constructs a simple rural‐urban migration model that explicitly incorporates the interactions between the individual's migration decision, the risk of incurring an infectious disease and unemployment. We show that providing a subsidy for health investment in urban regions in the form of medical aid does not improve individual welfare. This is because it induces further urban migration, increases the risk of infection and unemployment, and offsets completely the positive cost‐reduction effect.     

WELFARE MEASUREMENT,INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT,AND HETEROGENEITY

This paper concerns welfare measurement in an economy with union wage setting, where the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment. Contrary to results derived in the first best, the current value Hamiltonian is not an exact welfare measure in an economy with unemployment. Instead, the welfare measure also depends on “employment effect,” which are caused by the discrepancy between supply and demand in the labor market. In addition, since unemployment gives rise to heterogeneity, distributional effects will also characterize the welfare measure.     

INTEREST RATES, RATE SPREADS, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Interest rates and the spreads between interest rates are widely regarded as useful indicators of the future level of economic activity. This paper shows that when these series are divided into (i) an ordinary time series process and (ii) the effects of extraordinary disturbances, only the extraordinary disturbances predict economic activity. These disturbances are associated with periods of monetary policy intervention. Most of the predictive power is in contractionary disturbances that have persistent effects over time. The results imply that the predictive power of interest rates comes primarily from periods of contractionary monetary policy and is not due to ordinary movements in interest rates.     

INTEREST AND INFLATION ACCOUNTING

This paper analyses the treatments proposed by Chapter XIX (Annex B) of the 1993 SNA and the manual Inflation Accounting published by the OECD (Peter Hill) as alternatives to the traditional recording of nominal interest. Real interest and interest prime (annex B) are relevant for different purposes. Their amounts are not the same to the extent that actual compensation and full required compensation for inflation differ. The recording of negative real interest is not compatible with the exclusion of holding gains/losses from the SNA current accounts. The accounting treatments in Inflation Accounting (capital transfers, additional lending/borrowing, no nominal holding gains/losses) and Annex B (nominal holding gains/losses, no capital transfers, no new lending/borrowing) are contrasted.