Life insurance demand and borrowing constraints

The literature devoted limited attention to exploring the relationship between financial development and life insurance demand. Financial development supports life insurance supply by providing confidence in the financial system, more efficient payment systems, and higher availability of financial instruments. However, financial development reduces households' needs to save by relaxing borrowing constraints, indirectly affecting life insurance demand. We contribute by providing a demand‐driven explanation of the negative consequences of financial development on life insurance development. We find that more credit‐constrained countries have higher life insurance penetration on average. Indirectly, the role of borrowing constraints signifies the importance of life insurance policies as a financing tool in case of the realization of various background risks. This study integrates the knowledge from life insurance theory, life insurance lapse, policy loans demand, and saving under liquidity constraints literature and produces implications for researchers, policymakers, and life insurers.     

Financing and the demand for corporate insurance

In this paper we examine the insurance decision of a firm with private information regarding its cash flows and insurable losses. We show that, even in the absence of bankruptcy costs and information production by insurers, the firm's attempts to hedge its information risk can induce it to demand insurance. If higher operating revenues are accompanied by a lower insurance risk, the firm will choose to self-insure. In contrast, if higher operating revenues are accompanied by a higher insurance risk, the firm will demand insurance. In fact, if its insurable losses are relatively small, the firm will fully insure its losses. Further, if there exists considerable uncertainty regarding the firm's insurance risk, the level of coverage demanded by the firm is dependent on its private information, with higher levels of coverage signaling favorable information regarding the firm's future operations.     

Money demand heterogeneity and the great moderation

A forward-looking model of the demand for money based on heterogeneous and sluggish-portfolio adjustment can simultaneously account for the low short-run and high long-run semi-elasticities reported in the literature. The parameter estimates from the model for the short-run and long-run interest semi-elasticities are 1.04 and 13.16, respectively. A simulated version of the model suggests that the Great Moderation can be partially attributed to financial innovations in the late 1970s. When moving toward a more flexible portfolio, the model can account for almost one-third of the observed decline in the volatilities of output, consumption, and investment.     

The effect of overconfidence on insurance demand

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review - Sandroni and Squintani (Am Econ Rev 97(5):1994–2004, 2007) argue that in the presence of overconfident agents, the findings of Rothschild and Stiglitz...     

Guaranteed renewable life insurance under demand uncertainty

Guaranteed renewability (GR) is a prominent feature in many health and life insurance markets. We develop a model that includes unpredictable (and unobservable) fluctuations in demand for life insurance as well as changes in risk type (observable) over individuals' lifetimes. The presence of demand type heterogeneity leads to the possibility that optimal GR contracts may have a renewal price that is either above or below the actuarially fair price of the lowest risk type in the population. Individuals whose type turns out to be high risk but low demand renew more of their GR insurance than is efficient due to the attractive renewal price. This results in imperfect insurance against reclassification risk. Although a first‐best efficient contract is not possible in the presence of demand type heterogeneity, the presence of GR contracts nonetheless improves welfare relative to an environment with only spot markets.     

On heterogeneity in non-life insurance. Part II

Abstract

Extract

While in some linear estimation problems the principle of unbiasedness can be said to be appropriate, we have just seen that in the present context we will have to appeal to other criteria. Let us first consider what we get from the maximum likelihood method. We do not claim any particular optimum property for this estimate of the risk distribution: it seems plausible however that one can prove a large sample result analogous to the classical result on maximum likelihood estimation.     

Firm's demand for insurance: An explorative approach

This paper addresses the question, what influences the insurance demand of companies and examines the influence of managerial risk aversion in this decision process. An explorative research approach based on qualitative data analysis is applied to explore the factors influencing the insurance related decision behavior in organizations. Using interviews and observations of firm's insurance managers, the results identify interdependencies between factors of insurance demand, such as ownership structure, managerial discretion, volatility of earning, size, services of the insurer, and business diversification which allows to propose a framework of contextual factors affecting company's insurance demand. Within this framework, the data imply managerial risk attitudes as decisive factor in the decision process about insurance demand in companies. This explorative study enriches the existing theories of firms’ insurance demand and addresses feedback from practice into theory.     

Corporate demand for insurance: Some empirical and theoretical results

While risk aversion explains individual consumer demand for insurance, it does not explain the corporate demand for insurance. Studies have suggested a variety of incentives that motivate corporations to purchase insurance. We find that the primary motivation for corporate insurance purchases can be explained by the bondholder's me-first rule. In return for insurance, bondholders will charge stockholders a lower cost of debt, thereby increasing firm value.     

The welfare cost of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets

We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs. We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss. After identifying some “types” which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we derive the key factors defining the demand and cost functions in each market induced by these unobservable types. These are used to quantify the efficiency costs of unpriced heterogeneity. We apply our methods to the US Long‐Term Care and Medigap insurance markets, where we find that unpriced heterogeneity causes substantial inefficiency.     

中国保险需求地区差距的实证研究

本文分别构建了我国地区人身险和财产险影响因素的实证模型,使用1996年～2008年的省际面板数据,重点采用动态系统GMM估计方法,检验人身险和财产险需求地区差异的动态形成机制。研究发现：与人身保险需求相比,财产保险需求近年来的“习惯形成”特征更为显著,收入水平的增长更有利于加快当前财产保险市场的发展;东部省份的经济发展...     

Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals. JEL Classification D82 · D91 · G22     

A note on increased probability of loss and the demand for insurance

It is shown that the effect of increased probability of loss on the demand for insurance depends on whether both insured and insurer are aware of the change. When both insurer and insured share the same beliefs about the probability of loss (symmetric information), an increase in the loss probability may lead risk-averse agents to demandless insurance.     

中国城镇失业保险的供求矛盾及对策研究

失业保险是指个人在失去工作或等待就业期间能从政府或社会得到保证基本生活需要的物质帮助。我国的失业保险制度从无到有逐渐发展壮大到今天,虽然已初步形成体系,但伴随着我国失业人口的与日俱增,现行的失业保险供给远远满足不了实际需求,在政府资金缺口的约束下,这一供求矛盾还将继续存在甚至有扩大的趋势。将失业保险制度的创新与促进就业的政策措施相结合,对于解决城镇失业保险的供求矛盾,实现标本兼治有着重要的意义。     

About a duration index for life insurance contracts

Abstract

In this paper, after having defined the duration for a “generic” life insurance contract, we bring out some of its properties. We also prove that, in some cases, duration is a natural extension of well-known duration indices.     

扩大内需的支点:社会保险制度的健全

社会保险是降低居民未来不确定预期,扩大消费的重要手段,是有效发挥扩大内需政策的前提和基础。研究我国社会保险支出与居民消费关系,有助于认识社会保险对城镇居民消费影响的特点,对于如何通过社会保险体系的完善促进城镇居民消费有着重要的意义。实证研究表明,社会保险支出与城镇居民收入、消费存在着长期均衡的协整关系。社会保险支出对消费增长长期看有正向促进作用,但短期内有抑制作用,且社会保险支出影响消费有时滞。     

保险公司偿付能力风险信息对称性与市场供求

保险公司偿付能力充足性是保险监管的内容之一,但是这一信息却往往不被投保人所获知,造成保险供给(保险公司)和保险需求(投保人)两方信息的不对称.本文以保险公司存在偿付能力风险为基本假定,以累积性预期理论和风险调整资本收益率构建保险需求和供给模型,分析在信息对称条件下和信息不对称条件下保险需求的变化及其对保险供给和保险公司...     

Comparative statics under multiple sources of risk with applications to insurance demand

In this paper we propose an answer to the following problem of comparative statics in models with multiple sources of risk: How a risk averse agent will change his coinsurance demand when the distribution of the insurable loss is shifted? To answer the question, we first comment on Jack Meyer's results and then we show how an alternate approach leads to more definitive comparative statics.     

保险公司治理评价:指标体系构建与评分计算方法

保险公司治理评价是保险公司治理理论与实践的重要组成部分。本文构建了一个涵盖股东权益机制、董事会治理、监事会治理、经理层治理、信息披露机制、利益相关者治理、公司治理文化、公司社会责任等8个一级指标以及与之相关的33个二级指标和117个三级指标的保险公司治理评价指标体系。本文基于层次分析法对保险公司治理评分的计算方法进行了探讨,并籍此对保险公司治理评分进行了算例分析。该保险公司治理评价指标体系与评分计算方法有利于促进保险公司自身的治理诊断控制,并能为保险公司的股东、债权人、员工、客户等各类利益相关者的相关决策及政府的监管提供有益的指导与参考。     

A viable and cost-effective weather index insurance for rice in Indonesia

The potentially adverse effects of droughts on agricultural output are obvious. Currently, Indonesian rice farmers have little financial protection from climate risk via catastrophic weather risk transfer tools. Done well, a weather index insurance (WII) program can not only provide resources that enable recovery, but can also facilitate the adoption of prevention and adaptation measures and incentivize risk reduction. However, implementations of WII programs have faced difficulties because of basis risk—among several other obstacles. Here, we quantify the applicability, viability, and likely cost of introducing a WII for droughts for rice production in Indonesia. To reduce basis risk, we construct district-specific indices that are based on the estimation of Panel Geographically Weighted Regressions models. With these spatial models, and detailed district level data on past agricultural productivity and weather conditions, we identify an algorithm that can generate an effective and actuarially sound WII in some districts but not in others. We then measure its effectiveness in reducing income volatility for farmers by reducing this basis risk, at the district level. We end by calculating an actuarially robust and welfare-enhancing price for this scheme and prioritize the districts in which it can be implemented.     

The effect of information disclosure on demand for high‐load insurance

Economists, regulators, and consumer protection agencies have highlighted the welfare losses for consumers who purchase high‐load insurance against modest stakes risks. Mandatory information disclosure is a potentially attractive public policy tool that might improve consumers' choices, but has not been widely tested in insurance settings. We conduct an incentive‐compatible insurance demand experiment, in which we manipulate the information disclosed to subjects. We test whether any of the three most commonly suggested disclosures affect insurance demand, disclosing either (1) the true probability of loss, (2) the contract's expected loss, or (3) the insurer's profit on the transaction. Similar to consumers in naturally occurring insurance markets, subjects in the laboratory demonstrate significant demand for high‐load insurance against modest stakes. However, we find no effect of any of the three disclosure treatments on subjects' insurance choices. We discuss the implications of our results for possible public policy initiatives in insurance markets.