INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*

This article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship. The interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. Local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration. We compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination.     

Economic determinants of global mobile telephony growth

This study examines the substitution effect between fixed-line and mobile telephony while controlling for the consumption externality associated with telephone networks. A dynamic demand model is estimated using a global telecommunications panel dataset comprised of 56 countries from 1995–2000. Estimation results show the presence of a substantial substitution effect. Additionally income and own-price elasticities are reported. Analysis of impulse responses for price, income and network size indicate substantial mobile telephone growth is yet to be realised. However, price ceilings imposed in the fixed-line network can retard the growth of the mobile network.     

Is fixed-mobile substitution strong enough to de-regulate fixed voice telephony? Evidence from the Austrian markets

In this paper, we estimate own-price elasticities for fixed network voice telephony access and national calls services for private users as well as cross-price elasticities to mobile services using time series data from 2002 to 2007 from the Austrian markets. Using instrumental variable estimates and considering cointegration, we find that access is inelastic while calls are elastic. We conclude that the retail market for national calls of private users can probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure from mobile. Access-substitution on the other hand does not seem to be strong enough to justify de-regulation.     

On the Economics of Callback Services

This paper investigates the economic effects of callback services, an issue which has previously brought much disputes and conflicts. Whereas the existence of callback services has been attributed to a rate disparity between countries, we show that it can arise either from the inefficiency of domestic markets or from the accounting rate which is far from cost-based. Although callback service is an inefficient means of utilizing resources, its introduction may lead the international telephony markets in an efficient direction when inefficiencies exist in the market. It also helps us understand why conflicts occur among the agents with respect to the legitimacy of callback services by comparing the international telephony markets before and after the introduction of callback services.     

What’s the aim for competition policy: optimizing market structure or encouraging innovative behaviors?

Innovation is usually thought of as a change in the fundamentals of an economy, which can require adjustments by policy-makers. The latter are usually thought as in regard to a dominant vision, which is to restore an optimal market structure, and leads to a competition policy mainly aimed at controlling for antitrust practices and limiting market power. In this paper, we favor another vision of innovation, as a discovery process that cannot allow ex ante a definition of best practices. Dealing with information issues in two different and alternative perspectives, we argue that antitrust authorities confront a market imperfection–market failure dilemma (MI–MF dilemma) which leads them to favor the existence of appreciative and discretionary policy rather than encouraging the existence of any market structure thought of as optimal as regards the current state of information. We conclude with policy implications, contrasting the EU with the US. This paper was presented at the 10th International J.A. Schumpeter Society Conference on Innovation, Industrial Dynamics and Structural Transformation: Schumpeterian Legacies, Milan 2004. It owes very much to the collaboration of J-L Gaffard with M. Amendola in the recent years. However he is not responsible for the way we have taken advantage of it.     

Separating complements: the effects of competition and quality leadership

The literature on the tragedy of the anticommons typically suggests that producers of complementary goods should integrate themselves. Recent decisions by the antitrust authorities seem however to indicate that there exists a tradeoff between the “tragedy” and the lack of competition characterizing an integrated market structure. In this paper we analyze such tradeoff in oligopolistic complementary markets when products are vertically differentiated. We show that quality leadership plays a crucial role. When there is a quality leader, forcing divestitures or prohibiting mergers, thus increasing competition, lowers prices and enhances consumer surplus. However, when quality leadership is shared, “disintegrating” firms may lead to higher prices. In this case, concerns about the tragedy of the anticommons are well posed in antitrust decisions.     

Market Activities and Trust of North Korean Refugees

This study investigates the effects of North Koreans’ informal market activities on their trust. Using survey data on North Korean refugees living in South Korea, we find that North Korean refugees who previously traded goods in markets in North Korea have higher trust in most people. By contrast, the experience of trading in markets did not affect trust in other North Korean refugees, suggesting little evidence of in‐group favoritism. Our main result is robust when we apply the instrument variable approach. This finding suggests the possibility that increased marketization in North Korea leads to a weakened control of the authorities over the North Korean society.     

An econometric assessment of telecommunications prices and consumer surplus in Mexico using panel data

We analyze telecommunications prices in Mexico by using a panel data of countries similar to Mexico to estimate demand models for mobile and fixed-line telecommunications. We find that Mexico’s actual mobile and fixed-line prices are below the predicted prices based on similar countries’ prices. Mexican consumers are paying lower prices than what one would expect based on comparisons of comparable countries. We calculate that in 2011 Mexican consumers received at least $4–$5 billion (USD) in consumer surplus from these lower mobile prices and in 2010 they received over $1 billion (USD) in consumer surplus from these lower fixed-line prices. These findings are in contrast to the general perception that concentrated telecommunications markets in Mexico are resulting in high prices and harming consumers.     

Stock and credit market expansion and economic development in emerging markets: further evidence utilizing cointegration analysis

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between equity and credit market development and economic growth, in a sample of five very important ‘emerging’ markets. In particular, employing a multivariate time-series methodology to test for long-run trends and causality between variables that proxy for stock market development, credit market development and economic development. The results seem to suggest that equity markets have a role to play only in relatively liberalized economies, like Chile and Mexico. In financially repressed economies, like India, the equity market does not affect real sector growth. Furthermore, the banking crises in the 1980s and 1990s in Chile and Mexico resulted in a negative relation between economic growth and the credit market. In South Korea, equity and credit markets both affect economic growth, but not vice versa. In countries where the nature of the stock market has been speculative, like Taiwan, a negative relationship is detected between equity market development and economic development.     

Antitrust Enforcement and Nonenforcement as a Barrier to Imports – with Illustrations from the Japanese Film Dispute

The role of antitrust in opening foreign markets to imports is a strong yet often unpredictable undercurrent in international trade disputes. The U.S. government may seek to protect its exporters who are denied access to a foreign market either by enforcing U.S. antitrust laws or by using trade law remedies against the importing country for not enforcing its antitrust laws. Both actions raise issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction and comity.The primary goals of antitrust law and trade law are sometimes complementary but often diverge. Antitrust is primarily intended to benefit consumer welfare, while the purpose of trade law is to gain access to foreign markets for the benefit of domestic enterprises and their workforces. Consequently foreign market access pursued under antitrust law can raise novel issues when there is no apparent injury to domestic consumer welfare suffers from too little competition, whereas trade law pursue market access strictly as principles of fairness that have no necessary relationship with consumer welfare anywhere.This paper examines two aspects of antitrust law – (1) non-enforcement by the importing country, and (2) enforcement of U.S. law to compel access to the foreign market – and discusses the current dispute between Eastman Kodak Co. and Fujji Photo Film Co. as an illustration of the issues introduced above.     

Diffusion of mobile telephony in India: An empirical study

Diffusion of new technology is an important driver of economic growth. In this paper, diffusion of mobile telephony in India is studied. There is a vast diffusion potential in this country which needs to be exploited efficiently and in a rational way. This paper investigates the social, technological, economical and political (STEP) factors that have influenced the diffusion process of mobile telephony especially the diffusion speed. The epidemic model, which is widely employed in the diffusion studies of mobile telephony, is used for the study. The data is fitted into logistic, gompertz, and bass models by nonlinear least squares and it is found that gompertz model best describes the diffusion process of mobile telephony in India. The study reveals that competition and government intervention played a significant role in accelerating the diffusion speed of mobile telephony by making the technology affordable. It is found that mobile telephony is a substitute for fixed line telephony in India. The findings will be useful in taking managerial decisions with respect to factors in forecasting and controlling the diffusion process of emerging technologies.     

The economics of korean unification

We simulate the impact of a customs union and an exchange rate unification of North and South Korea. Factor mobility and technological change are of critical importance. If factor markets do not integrate, the macroeconomic impact on South Korea of economic integration is relatively small, while the effects on North Korea are large. With factor market integration, there is a significant impact on the South Korean income and wealth distribution. If integration is accompanied by external capital inflows, there is a significnt appreciation of the real exchange rate with deleterious implications for the South Korean traded-goods sector.     

Toward a Wider Analysis of Market Definition: Theory and Evidence from the Turkish Telecommunications Industry

This article develops a novel approach to the analysis of market definition. The article empirically investigates the main components of market definition, such as market power, substitution, and the simultaneous interaction between the demand and its determinants for the fixed and mobile voice services. To this end, I employ the multivariate Johansen cointegration methodology and analyze the Turkish voice telecommunications industry. While the VECM analysis confirms the presence of a simultaneous long-term causality relationship among the variables, the Johansen normalization results reveal demand elasticities that enable the analysis of market power and fixed-to-mobile substitution. My findings suggest that the fixed and mobile voice services, which are traditionally viewed as separate markets, can be defined as products that compete in the single market.     

西部数据收购日立存储经营者集中反垄断审查述评

2012年3月,商务部附加限制性条件批准了西部数据收购日立存储的经营者集中案件。与以美国联邦贸易委员会为代表的国外反垄断执法机构的实践相比,商务部对该案的审查过程更为曲折,并且在界定相关市场、选取救济方式等问题上采用了独特的处理方式。本案反映出企业自身经济效率的提升和促进国民经济的整体发展已成为我国经营者集中案件反垄断审查过程中的重要考量因素。     

On the efficiency of racetrack betting market: a new test for the favourite-longshot bias

A number of empirical studies on the efficiency of racetrack betting market have shown the ‘favourite-longshot bias,’ which means longshots are overbet while favourites are underbet. Asian markets such as Hong Kong and Japan, however, have produced some contradictory empirical evidence to the bias. One critical element in the efficiency test procedure is how to assess the unobservable objective winning probability of a horse in a race. This paper proposes a new test framework with a more general evaluation of the objective probability of winning than the traditional method. Unlike the traditional method, our model allows the heterogeneity of the horses and the races. We apply the new empirical method to test whether the favourite-longshot bias is present in racetrack betting market of Korea. We found that the favourite-longshot bias exists in the racetrack market of Korea and the result distinguishes Korean racetrack market from other Asian markets.     

ELECTRIC POWER DEREGULATION: BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS

The incentive failures of rate-of-return regulation are well known and thus raise the question of whether to deregulate electric power. The development of long-distance transmission and of alternative power sources in networks has spawned several institutions that would or could allow markets to substitute for such regulation. These include long-term contract sales, spot power exchange, contract power pooling, shared facility ownership, and economic dispatch. Because of the current surplus of power, the existence of such institutions has caused increasing competition in the electric power market and has catalyzed the movement to deregulate generators from state authority and to restructure utility assets. By encouraging this movement, regulators can further the discipline that markets already exert on prices and costs. By making counterproposals to the utilities, regulators can influence asset restructuring so that some of the capital gains inherent in such restructuring can be shared with consumers in the form of rate relief. Finally, for the future, the cotenancy agreement—which is antitrust supervised and competitively ruled—has promising possibilities for deregulating transmission and distribution.     

Cooperation In R&D With Spillovers And Delegation Of Sales ∗

Cooperation in several phases of the innovation process is viewed by antitrust authorities with suspicion. They face the dilemma between providing the right incentives for the appro-priability of returns to R&D and the risks of diminishing product market competition. The current legislation in the European Union and the United States gives special treatment to cooperation in R&D and the joint exploitation of results (extended cooperation).

We study several collusive regimes for a class of examples in which vertical relations are explicitly introduced. Regarding antitrust policy implications we fmd that: a) there is an ana-lytical justification to a ‘rule of reason’ treatment for extended cooperation in research joint ventures and, b) individual exemptions, though restrictive of competition, might be welfare improving.     

Financial systems and economic growth in South Africa: a dynamic complementarity test

This study examines the relationship between banks, stock markets and economic growth in South Africa. The study attempts to answer one critical question: are stock markets and banks complementary to one another in the process of enhancing economic growth? The complementarity between the stock markets and banks is examined by including a set of interactive terms in a standard growth model, alongside bank development and stock market development proxies. In order to test the robustness of the results, three proxies of stock market development have been used, namely stock market capitalization, stock market traded value and stock market turnover – against the ratio of bank credit to the private sector, a proxy for bank-based financial development. The economic growth is, however, proxied by real GDP per capita. Using the ARDL-Bounds testing procedure, the study finds that the complementarity between stock market development and bank-based financial development is weak and sensitive to the proxy used to measure stock market development.     

IS THE REVENUE ALLOCATION SCHEME OF FORMULA ONE MOTOR RACING A CASE FOR EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY?

Recent allegations from participants of the FIA Formula One World Championship (F1) suggest that its authorities violate European competition law in two ways. First, they allegedly abuse market power by forcing unfavorable contracts on media revenue allocation upon teams as a whole and on smaller teams in particular (vertical allocation of media revenue). Second, they allegedly form a cartel with selected teams to the detriment of smaller teams by providing unjustified extra payments to these teams (horizontal allocation of media revenues). In doing so, the cartel members allegedly secure supracompetitive rents from the authorities and cement an unfair competitive advantage over the outsider teams. Employing concentration measures from empirical economics, we present an assessment of whether the current antitrust allegations against F1 may be considered valid or not. We show that the allocation scheme employed in F1 considerably differs from those in other professional sports championships. We find the empirical picture to be consistent with an anticompetitive interpretation of F1 media revenue structures and policies. We conclude that there is merit in initiating an in‐depth antitrust investigation of Formula One motor racing. (JEL K21, L12, L40, L83, Z20)     

Entrepreneurial finance and economic growth

This paper develops a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multi-market collusive agreements. A centralized organization (called the unitary or U-form) allows price coordination across several markets, whereas with decentralized (the multidivisional or M-form) firms the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market while investigating the other is lower. We show that the firm’s choice of internal structure depends to a large extent on product substitutability and the instruments used by the antitrust authority.