美国资信评级行业监管及启示

美国信用评级业发展已有一百余年的历史,资信评级机构也一直引用声誉理论说明其在评级过程中会保持足够的执业谨慎,但安然破产、次贷危机、欧洲主权债务危机等事件使监管者认识到,仅靠“声誉”无法保证评级机构勤勉尽责,必须加强监管。该文对美国资信评级监管历史进行了简要回顾,分析了资信评级行业存在的主要问题,讨论了多德法案对资信评级行业的监管重点,介绍了多德法案之后资信评级行业监管的后续进展,并对完善我国资信评级监管提出相关建议。     

信用评级的危机——近期美国信用评级监管措施及对我国的启示

本文力求从相关研究中摘取关键性数据展示关于信用评级的失败,同时收集整理了与研究成果相关的美国监管机构加强信用评级监管的最新措施,并结合当前正处在征求意见阶段的《征信管理条例》的制订,对我国信用评级业发展讲行了深入思考。     

日韩信用评级行业发展及对我国的借鉴

比较日韩评级行业在债券市场发展程度、行业监管、市场对外部信用评级结果需求以及双评级模式实施等特点,提出我国评级行业适当开放国内评级市场、降低评级结果在监管法规中的依赖作用、拓展评级结果应用领域等五个方面的建议. 力图寻求发展我国评级行业的新途径,推动评级行业进一步健康发展.     

Intensified Competition and The Impact on Credit Ratings in the RMBS market

In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of intensified competition on rating quality in the credit rating market for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in the period 2017–2020. We provide evidence that competition between large credit rating agencies (CRAs) (Moody's and Standard & Poor's) and newer smaller ones (Dominion Bond Rating Service Morningstar and Kroll Bond Rating Agency) creates credit rating inconsistencies in the RMBS market. While a credit rating should solely represent the underlying credit risk of a RMBS, irrespective of the competition in the market, our results show that this is not the case. When competitive pressure is higher, both large and small CRAs tend to adjust their rating standards (smaller CRAs react to large CRAs and vice versa).     

A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies: In Search of Truth,Not Scapegoats

The undergoing financial turbulence has raised significant concerns over the role that credit rating agencies (CRAs) played in the inception, magnification and expansion of the crisis. In response, the EU legislature has adopted Regulation 1060/2009, which, for the first time, set out a legally binding pan‐European authorization regime for CRAs, which issue ratings that have been used by EU‐based financial institutions. As the turmoil turned into an unprecedented Eurozone debt crisis, EU politicians have been calling for tighter regulation of the credit rating industry. Drawing on the relevant empirical and theoretical research and building upon a comparative study of the corresponding US framework, the paper discusses critically the principles underlying EU Regulation 1060/2009 and the most recent suggestions for its reform. The paper argues that although, overall, the EU Regulation seems to be a well‐balanced instrument in the sense that it introduces the essential checks upon CRAs’ behavior while avoiding excessive regulatory intervention, more fine‐tuning is needed in certain fields, including, rating shopping, financial ties with rated entities, abuse of inside information, transparency and CRAs’ accountability.     

开放条件下信用评级市场发展及监管问题研究

自2017年起,我国信用评级市场开始加速对外开放,我国信用评级市场间机构竞争格局必将产生新变化,信用评级水平必将得到有效提升.在开放条件下,我国信用评级监管可以借鉴美国经验,重点关注监管法治建设层级不足、金融安全风险、利益冲突等问题.因此,应加快各地《信用评级业管理暂行办法》等配套制度建设;完善市场退出机制,加强信用评...     

信用评级业的专家责任问题

传统上,美国信用评级机构主张评级报告属于涉及公共利益的意见,援引宪法第一修正案进行抗辩。作为金融征信的重要内容,信用评级业在未来可能引发一系列专家责任案件,而现今中国法律体系对于专家责任的规定不健全。虽然专家责任的法律属性还需要进一步讨论,但是目前更重要的是先处理专家责任。中国法院在处理信用评级引发的案件时,可以借鉴美国的司法判例,以信用评级报告在商事交易中的作用认定专家责任的大小。     

Fuzzy Numbers in the Credit Rating of Enterprise Financial Condition

Most of the parameters used to describe the credit rating are in linguistic terms, which are vague and difficult to put into precise numerical values. Fuzzy set theory, which was developed to handle this kind of vagueness, is used to represent and to aggregate the various linguistic data usually used in commercial banks. To illustrate the approach, numerical examples are solved and compared with existing approaches.     

资产证券化信用评级制度与系统性风险分析

资产证券化的复杂性和高度杠杆化加剧了投资者与发行人之间的信息不对称问题,信用评级制度作为信息披露手段,在减轻信息不对称、促进风险资产定价和保护投资者利益等方面发挥着重要作用.但若缺乏有效的制度保障,资产证券化信用评级过程中隐含的对系统性风险的累积和传导危险则会对金融系统稳定产生负面作用.我国信用评级制度缺乏良好的法律监管环境和充分的市场竞争,难以支持资产证券化产品的多样化发展和规模的快速扩大趋势.对此,需从宏观审慎监管框架的确立、信用评级监管权力的统一和制度完善以及评级行业的市场化推进等方面完善信用评级制度.     

我国大数据征信行业的发展现状、问题与对策

近年来,我国大数据征信广泛应用于反欺诈策略、信用评估、授信策略与风险定价、贷后管理等领域。针对我国现有征信模式存在的问题,提出明确信息采集范围、加快行业整合、推进应用场景多元化、提升个人信用意识等相应对策。     

Financial Reporting and Credit Ratings: On the Effects of Competition in the Rating Industry and Rating Agencies' Gatekeeper Role

This paper studies firms' financial reporting incentives in the presence of strategic credit rating agencies and how these incentives are affected by the level of competition in the rating industry and by rating agencies' role as gatekeepers to debt markets. We develop a model featuring an entrepreneur who seeks project financing from a perfectly competitive debt market. After publicly disclosing a financial report, the entrepreneur can purchase credit ratings from rating agencies that strategically choose their rating fees and rating inflation. We derive the following core results: (1) More rating industry competition leads to stronger corporate misreporting incentives if ratings are sufficiently precise or if rating agencies assume a gatekeeper role. Under imperfect rating industry competition, (2) agencies' gatekeeper role primarily weakens firms' misreporting incentives, which then influences rating agencies' strategies, and (3) firms' misreporting and rating agencies' rating inflation can be strategic complements when agencies assume a gatekeeper role. (4) Regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing rating industry competition or at weakening rating agencies' gatekeeper role improve investment efficiency as long as corporate misreporting incentives are not significantly strengthened.     

中美信用评级市场发展比较与启示

本文结合中美信用评级市场发展脉络,从评级机构、收费模式、监管模式等方面分析两国信用评级市场发展过程中的不同特征,认为美国信用评级市场健康发展的原因在于评级机构重视市场声誉以及监管机构注重加强引导与监管。借鉴美国经验,我国的信用评级机构应该注重加强信用评级机构的内部治理,提高信用评级机构的国内外影响力;同时加强外部环境建设和信息披露制度建设,建立科学统一的外部评级机构管理制度。