PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FROM MARKET ECONOMIES

In the past decade governments all over the world have begunprivatizing state enterprises—indeed, it is becoming quitehard to find a country without a program of privatization underway or at least on the policy agenda. This striking reversalof the push to expand state ownership in the 1960s and 1970sresults from generally poor performance of state enterprisesand a disappointing record of past reform efforts that fellshort of ownership change. This article examines the objectives of privatization and thestrategies for achieving them, documenting recent trends andreviewing the experience with privatizing state-owned commercial,manufacturing, and service enterprises in both competitive andnoncompetitive markets. The authors analyze the various tacticsthat can be or have been employed, in relation to scope, pace,sequencing, and methods of implementation. The evidence showsthat privatization produces benefits of efficiency and innovation—ifdone right. The lessons of experience discussed in the articleoffer guidance on how to realize the promise of privatizationwhile minimizing the risks and costs.      

CHANGES IN MARKET PERCEPTION OF RISKINESS: THE CASE OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL

In 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency stated that the eleven largest banking firms were “too big to fail,” implying they would receive de facto 100 percent deposit insurance. The question is whether this announcement altered the market's perception of the riskiness of all banking organizations, not just those included in the Comptroller's statement. We address this question with two tests. First, through the examination of changes in institutional equity ownership from 1980 through 1988, we find that the announcement is associated with increases in institutional ownership at a time when a comparable set of nonfinancial firms saw reductions in institutional holdings. Second, through the examination of stock returns behavior of bank holding companies around announcements of dividend cuts and omissions from 1974 through 1991, we find that the Comptroller's 1984 announcement altered the market's reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by bank holding companies not specifically included in the Comptroller's statement.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN EMERGING MARKET: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Despite significant capital-market reforms in the mid-1980s, the Israeli government and banks continue to play an unusually dominant role in Israeli financial markets. Israeli banks operate as merchant banks and, through pyramid structures of ownership, control large segments of manufacturing, construction, insurance, and services. In addition, the banks dominate all facets of the capital market, including underwriting, brokerage, investment advice, and the management of mutual and provident funds.
Because of this dominance by the banks, several important mechanisms of corporate governance are missing. There is no effective market for corporate control; institutional investors have little incentive to monitor corporate managers; and those managers in turn have little incentive to improve firm performance and increase shareholder value.
To be sure, there has been an impressive wave of IPOs on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) in the 1990s. But those firms' stocks have substantially underperformed the market since going public, and many higher-quality Israeli firms have chosen in recent years to list their securities on the NASDAQ and not at home. The main reason the most promising Israeli firms go public in the U.S. is because that is where U.S. and other foreign investors want to buy them; such investors want the assurances that come with the U.S. corporate governance system.     

MARKET EFFICIENCY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE

This study extends evidence on the efficiency of stock markets in developing countries using data from the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), and also addresses some methodological issues which have contributed to the sparseness of similar studies. Evidence is provided that small markets such as the NSE may provide empirical results consistent with weak-form efficiency. This evidence holds for the NSE irrespective of whether bid-, ask-, or market-price series are used in conducting the study.     

INTERNATIONAL LISTINGS, THE SECURITY MARKET LINE AND CAPITAL MARKET INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF US LISTINGS ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE

This paper examines for international capital market segmentation by testing for changes (both inter-temporally and inter-beta) in the parameters of the riskreturn pricing relationship caused by the listing of US stocks on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 1965 and 1987. It is hypothesized that international listings reduce the negative effects associated with barriers to international investments, help integrate world markets and therefore decrease internationally listed stock's required returns. Significant negative deviations from the Sharpe-Lintner (SL) pre-listing pricing relationship during the postlisting period are therefore expected, primarily caused by decreases in the intercept parameter. We find, in support of the hypothesis, significant negative deviations from the predictions of SL for our sample, although they do not appear to have an intertemporal dimension. These deviations are largely associated both with decreases in the value of the SL model's intercept parameter and with low beta firms, and point toward some integration benefits from US listings on the LSE.     

THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES AS A COINTEGRATED SYSTEM: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET

In this paper I examine the term structure of Eurocurrency interest rates from six countries (with maturities of one, two, three, and six months) using unit root tests and cointegration tests that are robust to departures from independent and identically distributed errors. The main conclusions are: (1) Eurocurrency interest rates have one (and only one) unit root when viewed individually, and (2) for each of the countries examined, Eurocurrency interest rates are cointegrated—with one equilibrium relationship—when viewed jointly. These conclusions are consistent with the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis and suggest that in efficient markets arbitrage generally prevents rates on different maturities of a given asset from drifting too far for an extended period.     

THE VALUE ADDED BY BANK ACQUISITIONS: LESSONS FROM WELLS FARGO'S ACQUISITION OF FIRST INTERSTATE

Wells Fargo's recent acquisition of First Interstate Bancorp represents one of the relatively uncommon cases in which the economic values of both the acquiring and acquired banks increased sharply upon announcement of the deal. The transaction is also one of the few cases where the bidder in a major bank acquisition chose purchase instead of pooling accounting–despite the fact that the deal was openly hostile and that Wells Fargo had to fight off a competing bid from First Bank Systems.
Based on the stock market's reaction to this merger battle, as well as the results of their study of 153 bank mergers over the period 1985–1991, the authors argue that the most promising mergers are those presenting large opportunities to reduce costs by eliminating redundant operations. The stock market is much less responsive to other merger rationales such as diversification or entry into new markets in pursuit of growth.
The Wells case also suggests that a preoccupation with the accounting treatment of a merger is a mistake if it becomes the primary reason for turning down a deal that creates economic value, or if it prevents the bidder from choosing the lowest-cost method of financing the deal. Throughout the bidding contest for First Interstate, the stock market responded positively to the success of Wells Fargo's efforts, even though purchase accounting would have a large adverse impact on reported earnings.
But if the stock market does not appear to care about the accounting treatment of a merger, the method of financing does appear to matter to investors. In general, acquisitions financed with cash are viewed more favorably by the market than stockfunded transactions. The evidence also suggests, however, that acquiring firms can reduce the negative impact of stock deals by making conditional offers (those in which the number of shares depends on the stock price performance of the acquirer) and by combining such offers with stock repurchase programs.     

FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LESSONS FROM THE RAILWAY AGE

In recent years suggestions for reforming the provision andfinancing of infrastructure services in developing countrieshave focused on private participation. This alternative to publicfinancing is seen as a way both to minimize the inefficienciesof public administration and to avoid the need for externalborrowing. In fact, for much of the nineteenth century, infrastructureprojects were privately financed and built. This approach, however,did not obviate the need for government intervention and foreigncapital. Because of the difficulties of assessing projects,investors were reluctant to commit their funds, and governmentsturned to subsidies and loan guarantees to encourage investment.Often, however, government intervention only replaced one setof problems with another. Investors with government-guaranteedloans had no incentive to monitor the firm's performance—alimitation that led to the diversion of funds and frustratedthe public interest. This article draws out the implicationsof this experience for policymakers in developing countriestoday.      

THE EFFECTS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES ON STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE OPTIONS MARKET

This paper examines the impact of the announcements of dividend increases on the volatility of underlying stock returns implied by option prices, and analyses whether the impact is related to the label associated with the dividend increase. The results suggest that the announcements of labelled dividend increases are accompanied by a decrease in implied volatility, while the announcements of unlabelled increases in dividends are associated with no change in implied volatility. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that signal implicit in the announcements of dividend increases provides noisy information about the firm's volatility.