资本市场会计信息披露暨治理问题研究--基于上市公司会计信息披露不对称的视角

上市公司会计信息生产和披露质量直接影响了资本市场的稳定健康发展。资本市场会计信息生产和披露存在着一定的供求机理,直接影响了会计信息生产和披露的质量。由于管理主体上的虚化、内控弱化和治理结构上的偏差、会计信息系统的集成和共享性弱以及从业人员素质上的差异,使得上市公司会计信息披露存在着不充分性、非主动性、虚假性和滞后性问题,由此增加了资本市场信息不对称和风险发生的可能。因此,严厉打击资本市场会计信息造假,规范资本市场会计信息披露,需要进一步完善资本市场会计信息披露制度,创新和完善新技术背景下会计准则和会计制度,加强对现有上市公司会计信息生产和会计信息披露标准的制定和使用,提升上市公司会计信息生产和会计信息披露独立审计监督的标准化和规范化水平,加强上市公司会计信息生产和披露监督标准化体系建设。     

论适度强制性信息披露

尽管目前对上市公司信息披露进行管制已是国际通用的做法,但理论界对是否管制以及如何管制仍存在分歧。非管制论主张,上市公司完全可以自愿披露信息,无需强制性信息披露,代理理论(agency theory)、通信理论(signalling theory)与个人契约是构建非管制论的三大支柱。在非管制论的支持者看来,为有效履行受托责任、争夺市场资源及向市场传递良好的信号,上市公司会自愿披     

会计信息披露问题的信息经济学解释

会计作为一种通用的商业语言,其信息披露的程度好坏直接影响市场经济秩序。本文试图运用信息经济学中的信息不对称理论,对会计信息披露问题展开讨论,以期针对披露中的问题提出相应的建议,更好地发挥会计信息的使用效果。     

会计信息披露与有效市场的关系

提高资本市场效率是会计信息披露追求的目标,讨论建立会计信息披露制度之前有必要研究分析一下有效市场的有关理论,有效市场假说为会计信息披露规范的理论研究提供了有益的思路。     

消除上市公司会计信息披露中的信任危机

我国股市的信息披露制度从无到有,已经形成一套初步的信息披露制度,对维护股市秩序、保护广大投资者利益起了积极作用.但是,我们看到上市公司的会计信息披露存在问题依然不少,会计信息披露所涉及的违规、违法事件仍时有发生.如琼民源的造假、蓝田股份的欺诈、银广厦的虚幻神话等;加之美国"安然"公司丑闻、"世通"公司30多亿美元虚假利润,人们对会计信息的可信性产生了深深的疑虑,从而引发了对上市公司会计信息披露的信任危机.     

浅析我国上市公司会计信息披露制度的现状及改进措施

一、我国上市公司会计信息披露的现状会计信息披露是解决会计信息需求者与生产者之间信息不对称问题的重要途径,其质量的高低直接决定着资本市场的有效程度和社会资源的配置效率。上市公司及时、真实、充分、公平地向广大投资者披露可能影响投资者决策的信息是上市公司必须履行的义务。从宏观而言,它有助于国家的宏观调控和市场的运转,     

信息披露与信贷市场的信息不对称

信贷市场中的信息不对称对银行业的经营风险有着双重影响，本文章通过模型来证明在银行资产组合的风险是自主选择和自然选择这两种不同的情况下，信息披走路对银行风险有着不同的影响，为了使信息披走路政策在银行风险控制中发挥真正的作用，银行必须识别和选择自身的资产风险，国际标准和众多的国际经验也为我国银行业风险管理和控制提供了一定的借鉴和参考。     

Information relevance, reliability and disclosure

This paper examines the relation between information’s properties, such as reliability and relevance, and public disclosure policy. It shows that the optimal accounting system often involves a carefully balanced combination of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, with mandatory reporting focused on more reliable information. The emphasis on reliability causes the welfare-maximizing mandatory report to consistently lag behind the financial market in incorporating value-relevant information.     

Consolidation, fragmentation, and the disclosure of trading information

It is commonly believed that fragmented security markets havea natural tendency to consolidate. This article examines thisbelief, focusing on the effect of disclosing trading informationto market participants. We show that large traders who placemultiple trades can benefit from the absence of trade disclosurein a fragmented market, as can dealers who face less price competitionthan in a unified market. Consequently, a fragmented marketneed not coalesce into a single market unless trade disclosureis mandatory. We also compare and contrast fragmented and consolidatedmarkets. Fragmentation results in higher price volatility andviolations of price efficiency.     

Performance volatility,information availability,and disclosure reforms

Using the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley reform as an exogenous disclosure shock, we find that high, relative to low, volatility firms opt for lower levels of information availability pre reform and experience increases in information availability, CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity, myopic behavior, CEO compensation with a structure tilted towards more cash pay, and a reduction in firm value post the reform. Our findings suggest that mandating high levels of information availability across the board increases managerial evaluation risk and produces additional agency costs for firms with volatile performance.     

Financial contracts,opportunism, and disclosure management

This article shows that if all variables that determine a firm's future cash flows are not contractible, it can be ex ante optimal to design a financial contract that admits debtholders waiving debt covenants on a discretionary basis and firms investing opportunistically subsequent to contracting. Further, as the contractible variable becomes less informative, the contract attaches greater significance to it. Finally, uncertainty in the magnitude of reporting latitude induces aggressive reporting by the firm to avoid violating the covenant or to enhance the chances of a waiver. The debtholders respond by sometimes not allowing the firm to implement mutually beneficial projects.     

企业内部控制及其信息披露

按照美国COSO委员会提出的报告,企业的内部控制是受董事会、管理当局和其他职员的影响,为取得经营效果和效率、财务报告的可靠性、遵循适当的法规等目标而提供合理保证的一种过程,应由控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息沟通、监督五个方面的内容构成.     

Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined

Review of Accounting Studies - Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private...     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.     

Accounting, hybrids and the management of risk

This essay addresses the implications of accounting and hybrids for the management of risk. We argue firstly and most generally for a definition of hybrids that extends beyond organisational forms. The existing literature, we suggest, has been too focused on organisational forms, and has largely neglected the hybrid practices, processes and expertises that make possible lateral information flows and coordination across the boundaries of organisations, firms, and groups of experts or professionals. Secondly, we argue that the management of organisations is rapidly being transformed into and formalised around the management of risk, while much of the management of uncertainty occurs through a variety of hybrids that reside beyond the formalised practices of risk management. Thirdly, we argue that accounting practices are central to these issues, in so far as accounting is constantly engaged in a dual hybridisation process, seeking to make visible and calculable the hybrids that it encounters, while at the same time hybridising itself through encounters with a range of other disciplines. We address these issues in three main stages. The first section considers the ‘discovery’ of hybrid organisational forms by researchers on management and organisations over the course of more than two decades. The second section examines the ways in which economists, lawyers and other social scientists have considered the issue of hybrids. Here, the preoccupation with hybrid organisational forms largely continues, with its attendant neglect of hybrid practices, processes and expertises. The third section considers the discovery of a wider range of hybrids by researchers in accounting, and examines two specific arenas in which the hybridising of accounting expertise has been central: the microprocessor industry, and the various encounters between medical and financial expertise in the context of the ‘New Public Management’ reforms. The essay concludes with a discussion of the implications of this broader definition of hybrids for accounting and the management of risk.     

Isolating the effect of disclosure on information risk

This study examines companies with two classes of shares that entitle their holders to identical cash flow and voting rights but that are available to mutually exclusive sets of investors: A shares to domestic investors and B shares to foreign investors. Price differences between A and B shares are higher in firms with a greater disparity in the disclosures that they make to domestic and foreign investors. This association is more pronounced when the cost (benefit) of information transfer is higher (lower). The results suggest that disclosure disparity creates meaningful differences in investors' average information precision across A and B shares and thus influences the cross-sectional variation in price differences.     

Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts

In this paper, managers differ from each other in terms of the probability that they are ??forthcoming?? (and disclose all the earnings forecasts they receive) or ??strategic?? (and disclose the earnings forecasts they receive only when it is in their self-interest to do so). Strategic managers choose whether to disclose their forecasts based on both the disclosure??s effects on their firms?? stock price and on their reputation among investors for being forthcoming. Our findings include: strategic managers can build a reputation for being forthcoming by disclosing unfavorable forecasts; managers?? incentive to build a reputation for being forthcoming may be so strong that they disclose even the most negative forecasts; as managers become more concerned about their reputation: (a) the current price of the firm in the event the manager makes no forecast increases; (b) managers who have a high probability of behaving strategically (as forthcoming) in the future issue forecasts more (less) often in the present.