Marginal q,Tobin's q,Cash Flow,and Investment

Many studies of the determinants of investment use Tobin's q to control for the investment opportunities of a firm. Tobin's q roughly measures the average return on a firm's capital anticipated by the market. More relevant for investment decisions, however, is the marginal return on capital. In this paper we estimate investment and research and development (R&D) equations using a measure of marginal q. We use marginal q to identify the existence of cash constraints and managerial discretion and as a separate explanatory variable. For a sample of 560 U.S. firms observed over the 1977-1996 period we present evidence confirming the existence of both cash constraints in some companies and managerial discretion in others.     

Prices,incentives, and economic growth

Zusammenfassung Preise, Anreize und wirtschaftliches Wachstum. - In dem Artikel wird untersucht, wie sich politikbedingte Verzerrungen auf die Effizienz der Ressourcenallokation und das wirtschaftliche Wachstum in entwickelten, unterentwickelten und sozialistischen L?ndern auswirken. Eingriffe in die Güterm?rkte k?nnen in Form der Importprotektion, Preiskontrollen und Wettbewerbsbeschr?nkungen erfolgen. Auf den Arbeitsm?rkten verzerren die Arbeitslosenunterstützung, die Kündigungsschutzabkommen, die Sozialversicherungsleistungen und die Lohnsteuer das Arbeitsangebot, w?hrend Mindestlohngesetze und Sozialversicherungsbeitr?ge auf die Nachfrage nach Arbeit einwirken. SchlieΒlich sind Zinssatzverordnungen, K?rperschaftssteuern und Einfuhrbeschr?nkungen die haupts?chlichen Eingriffe in die Kapitalm?rkte. Nach der Betrachtung der wirtschaftlichen Wirkungen dieser Interventionen werden Vorschl?ge gemacht, wie die Verzerrungen beseitigt oder gemildert werden k?nnen.

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Résumé Prix, incitations et croissance économique. - Cet article examine les effets des distorsions imposées par la politique sur 1’ efficacité de l’allocation des ressources et sur la croissance économique dans les pays développés, développants et socialistes. Les interventions sur les marchés de biens peuvent consister de la protection d’importation, des contróles des prix et des freins á la concurrence. Parmi les distorsions sur les marchés du travail, l’allocation de chómage, la protection contre le licenciement, les prestations de sécurité sociale et les impóts sur les salaires affectent l’offre du travail pendant que le salaire minimum et des cotisations d’assurance sociale chargent la demande du travail. Finalement, les régulations des taux d’intérét, les impóts sur les sociétés, et la protection d’importation sont les interventions principales sur les marchés des capitaux. Après une revue des effets économiques de ces interventions, l’auteur donne des recommandations á éliminer ou relacher les distorsions.

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Resumen Precios, incentivos y crecimiento economico. - Este trabajo trata los efectos que tienen las distorsiones creadas por la politica económica sobre la eficiencia de la asignación de recursos y el crecimiento economico en los pafses desarrollados, en vias de desarrallo y socialistas. Las intervenciones en los mercados de bienes pueden manifestarse como restricciones a las importaciones, controles de precios y limites a la competencia. Entre las distorsiones de los mercados laborales, la compensación por desempleo, la reglamentación sobre la seguridad de las plazas de trabajo, los beneficios de la prevision social y los impuestos a los salarios afectan la oferta de trabajo, mientras que la reglamentación del salario mfnimo y los descuentos para la previsión social inciden en la demanda de trabajo. Finalmente, la regulaci?n de la tasa de interés, los impuestos a las empresas y la restriction a las importaciones constituyen las principales formas de interventión en los mercados de capital. Después de pasar revista a las consecuencias económicas de dichas intervenciones, este trabajo présenta recomendaciones para corregir o aliviar las distorsiones résultantes.

     

Geldmenge,Zinssatz, Bankenverhalten und Zentralbankpolitik

Zusammenfassung Entsprechend der Aufgabenstellung steht die Analyse der Zentralbankpolitik im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit. Als Aktionsparameter werden die Kreditgew?hrung der Zentralbank an den Staat, die Rediskontkontingente, der Reservesatz sowie die Verzinsung für in- und ausl?ndische Liquidit?tsreserven betrachtet und ihr Einflu\ auf Geldmenge, Sollzinssatz, Kreditvolumen und Liquidit?tsreserven untersucht. Ausgchend von den Bilanzen der Zentralbank und des Kreditbanken-systems wird zun?chst in einem vereinfachten Gleichgewichtsmodell gezeigt, da\ eine Zunahme der Kredite der Zentralbank an den Staat zu einer über den entsprechenden Betrag hinausgchenden Erh?hung der Geldmenge und des Kreditvolumens führt und — im Gegensatz zu den Wirkungen einer Expansion der Kreditnachfrage — eine Senkung des Zinsniveaus und eine Zunahme der Liquidit?tsreserven zur Folge hat. Dieser Vorgang wird anschlie\end im Rahmen einer dynamischen Analyse genauer beschrieben, wobei die Darstellung der Anpassungspfade u. a. erkennen l?\t, da\ die Liquidit?tsreserven — unabh?ngig davon, ob Kreditanbieter oder -nachfrager verz?gert reagieren — im Anpassungsproze\ eine Pufferfunktion übernehmen. Im erweiterten Modell werden alle Zentralbankparameter in die Betrachtung einbezogen. Au\erdem wird die M?glichkeit der Kreditbanken berücksichtigt, durch Ver?nderung der Termineinlagenverzinsung die Entscheidungen der Nichtbanken über die Zusammensetzung ihrer Einlagen zu beeinflussen. Die hieraus für die Zentralbankpolitik resultierenden Konsequenzen bestchen z. B. im Falle expansiver geldpolitischer Ma\nahmen darin, da\ die von den Banken induzierte Umschichtung von Termin- in Sichteinlagen die Auswirkungen auf Sollzinssatz und Kreditvolumen abschw?cht, w?hrend hinsichtlich der Ver?nderung der Geldmenge neben dem abschw?chenden auch ein verst?rkender Effekt wirksam wird. Summary Money in Circulation, Interest Rates, Commercial and Central Bank Policies. — This paper is mainly concerned with an analysis of central bank policy. Central bank credits to the State, rediscounting quotas, reserve rates, and interest paid on domestic and foreign liquidity reserves are taken to be action parameters, whose influence on money in circulation, debit interest, credit volume and liquidity reserves is examined. Starting from the balance sheets of central and commercial banks, it is first shown, in a simplified equilibrium model, how an increase in central bank credits to the State and an expanding demand for credits influence the amount of money in circulation, the credit volume and the amount of liquidity reserves. This process is then described in greater detail by means of a dynamic analysis which shows among other things that liquidity reserves act as a buffer in the process of adaptation. In an enlarged model, all central bank parameters are taken into consideration. In addition, account is taken of the commercial banks’ possibilities, by changing the interest rate for time deposits, to influence decisions of their clients as to the composition of their accounts. The consequences resulting herefrom for central bank policy, for instance in the case of expansive measures of monetary policy, are these: the regrouping of sight and time deposits induced by the banks weakens the effects on debit interest and credit volume, whereas there is both a weakening and a reinforcement of effects concerning changes in the amount of money in circulation.

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Résumé Argent en circulation, taux d’intérêt, politique des banques commerciales et de la banque centrale. — Ce travail tourne autour d’une analyse de la politique de la banque centrale. Sont considérés comme paramètres d’action les crédits de la banque centrale à l’Etat, les contingents de réescompter, le taux et les intérêts des réserves de liquidité nationale et internationale. Est examiné l’influence de ces paramètres sur le montant d’argent en circulation, sur les intérêts dús, sur le volume du crédit et sur les réserves de liquidité. En partant des bilans de la banque centrale et des banques commerciales, il est démontré d’abord, par un simple modèle d’équilibre, de quelle manière une augmentation des crédits de banque centrale à l’Etat, et une.demande croissante de crédits, influent sur le montant d’argent en circulation, sur le volume du crédit et sur le montant des réserves de liquidité. Puis, ce processus est décrit plus en détail au moyen d’une analyse dynamique, qui prouve, entre autres, que les réserves de liquidité agissent en tampon dans ce processus d’adaptation. Dans un modèle plus large, tous les paramètres de banque centrale sont pris en considération. En outre, compte est tenu des possibilités qu’ont les banques commerciales, en modifiant le taux d’intérêt pour dépóts à terme, d’exercer une influence sur les décisions de leurs clients quant à la composition de leurs dépóts. Les conséquences qui en résultent pour la politique de la banque centrale, par exemple dans le cas de mesures expansives de politique monétaire, sont les suivantes: le regroupement des dépóts à vue et à terme, amené par les banques, affaiblit les effets que subissent les intérêts dús et le volume du crédit, tandis qu’il y a et affaiblissement et renforcement des effets en ce qui concerne les changements dans le montant d’argent en circulation.

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Resumen Cantidad de dinero, tipo de interés, comportamiento de los banco s y politica del Banco Central. — El objetivo del présente articulo es analizar la politica del Banco Central. Los parámetros de acción que interesan aqui son el endeudamiento del sector público con el Banco Central, las Hneas de redescuento, la tasa de réservas mmimas, as(como los intereses que arrojan las réservas de liquidez en el interior y en el extranjero; se analiza la incidencia de estos parámetros en la cantidad de dinero, en el tipo de interés, en el volumen crediticio y en las réservas de liquidez. Partiendo de los balances del Banco Central y de la banca comercial, los autores describen mediante un modelo simple de equilibrio cómo repercuten el aumento de créditos concedidos por el Banco Central al Estado y el incremento de la demanda crediticia en la cantidad de dinero, el volumen crediticio y las disponibilidades liquidas. Este proceso de repercusión se analiza a continuación más detenidamente mediante un modelo dinámico, saliendo a relucir, entre otras cosas, que las réservas de liquidez juegan el papel de ?parachoques?. En un modelo ampliado los autores incluyen todos los parámetros de acción. Además considéra la posibilidad de que la banca comercial trate de influir sobre las decisiones del público respecto a la composici?n de sus depósitos, mediante la variación de los intereses para depósitos a plazo. Las consecuencias para la politica del Banco Central consisten en que por ejemplo en el caso de medidas expansivas el cambio de depósitos a plazo por depósitos a la vista, inducido por la banca comercial, tienda a atenuar los efectos sobre el tipo de interés y el volumen crediticio, mientras que los efectos sobre la variación de la cantidad de dinero quedan tanto reducidos como intensificados.

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Riassunto Quantità di denaro, tasso d’intéressé, comportamento délie banche e politica délia banca centrale. — Al centro di questo lavoro c’è l’analisi délia politica délia banca centrale. Corne parametro d’azione sono esaminati la concessione di credito délia banca centrale alló stato, i contigenti di risconto, il tasso di riserva cosi corne il pagamento d’interessi per le riserve di liquidità all’interno ed all’estero. Partendo dai bilanci délia banca centrale e del sistema délie banche di credito, viene mostrato dapprima in un modello di equilibrio semplificato come un aumento dei crediti délia banca centrale alló stato ed un’espansione délia domanda di credito agiscano sulla quantità di denaro, sui volumi di credito e sul fondo délie riserve di liquidità. Questo processo è quindi descritto con esattezza nel quadro di un’analisi dinamica, laddove tra l’altro risulta che le riserve di liquidità in un processo di adattamento assumono una funzione cuscinetto. Nel modello ingrandito sono inclusi tutti i parametri délia banca centrale. Inoltre è considerata la possibilità délie banche di credito di influenzare mediante la modificazione del pagamento d’intéressé dei depositi vincolati le decisioni délie non banche sulla formazione dei loro depositi. Le conseguenze che risultano da qui per la politica délia banca centrale consistono, per es. nel caso di provvedimenti politicomonetari espansivi, in questo: che ristrutturazione indotta dalle banche di depositi vincolati in depositi a vista indebolisce le ripercussioni sul tasso debitore e sui volumi di credito, mentre per quanto riguarda la modincazione délia quantità di denaro accanto all’effetto cedente diventa efficace anche un effetto rafiorzante.

     

Advertising, in-house R&D, and growth

This paper develops a quality-ladder model of endogenous growthto study the interplay between in-house R&D and combativeadvertising expenditure, and its implications for economic growth,firm size, and welfare. The analysis shows that, somewhat surprisingly,higher incentives to engage in advertising, although combative,unambiguously foster innovation activity of firms. This, possibly,leads to faster growth and even higher welfare. These resultsrest on two features of the model which are well-supported byempirical evidence. First, if firms incur higher sunk costsfor marketing, concentration and firm size rise. Second, firmsize and R&D expenditure are positively related as largerfirms are able to spread R&D costs over higher sales. Theanalysis also suggests that R&D subsidies are conduciveto R&D and growth without inducing firms to raise advertisingoutlays.     

Sons, Daughters, and Parental Behaviour

The prevalence of son preference and its implications for familybehaviour in developing countries have received a great dealof scholarly attention, but child-gender bias is believed tobe empirically unimportant in wealthy, non-traditional societies.Studies by sociologists and psychologists during the past 30years, however, have documented consistent discrepancies betweenthe behaviour of parents of sons and parents of daughters—boystend to increase marital stability and marital satisfactionrelative to girls, and fathers spend more time with, and aremore involved with, sons than daughters. In recent years, economistshave begun to contribute to the child-gender literature, re-examiningthe effects of sons and daughters on family structure and parentalinvolvement with larger samples and greater concern for possiblesources of selection bias. Other economic outcomes, such asmarket work and earnings, have also been studied, and some investigatorshave exploited the randomness of child gender as a source ofexogenous variation in parental behaviour. In general, recentresults suggest that child gender does affect family stabilityand the time allocation of parents, but it is not clear whetherthese responses reflect parental preferences for boys ratherthan girls or differences in the constraints parents face. Footnotes ¹ E-mail address: lundberg{at}u.washington.edu     

Intranational, Intracontinental, and Intraplanetary PPP

A model of adjustment toward PPP for a panel of real exchange rates is introduced that allows varying speeds of convergence within nations, within continents and across continents. We allow for correlation across equations in our panel, and estimate the model using generalized least squares. The panel consists of the price levels of eight cities in four countries and two continents. We do not find evidence in favor of reversion to PPP for any group of cities.J. Japan. Int. Econ.,December 1997,11(4), pp. 480–501. Department of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195-3330 and NBER; Department of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195-3330; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Division, Stop 22, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC 20551.     

Rhonda M. Williams: Competition, race, agency, and community

As the United States approaches the twenty-first century… in an information-based, transnational and managerial economy, it is becoming increasingly apparent that if we do not better negotiate race and ethnicity in our society, we will not adequately solve the problems of economic inequality and discrimination. Racial and/or ethnic divisions and competition shape our efforts to understand and challenge hierarchy and inequity. As long as we ignore those issues, we cannot solve the problems of poverty, unemployment, and crime, nor effect productive job creation and economic justice. Absent a cultural and economic reckoning with racism’s legacies, we will fail to revitalize our cities and to recover from the socioeconomic costs of “ending welfare as we knew it.” Although masked behind pronouncements of a “color-blind” society, unfinished racial business weakens our national will to provide one another the portfolio of social and economic rights essential to the sustenance of humane community in the post-industrial global economy. (Nembhard and Williams 1998).     

Welfare State, Market Imperfections, and International Trade

Within a two-sector-two-country model of trade with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, a more generous welfare state in one country increases welfare in that country and can have positive spillover effects on the other. Furthermore, synchronised expansions of social security are more welfare enhancing than unilateral ones. Our results counter the fears that a race to the bottom in social standards may result from the ‘shrinking-tax-base’ entailed by international capital mobility. While affecting trade patterns and income distribution, capital mobility interacts with welfare state policies in increasing welfare, even when capital flows out of the country that initiates the shock.

Devaluation,Debt, and Default in Emerging Economies

We explore the interactions between exchange rate and fiscal policy, and default on external debt. Exchange rate policy affects the supply of short-term debt facing the government. Under a conventional soft peg, it can be optimal for the government to set the exchange rate at a level in which partial default occurs. In this case multiple equilibria exist, with one featuring high interest rate, overvalued exchange rate, low level of output, and default. Default is also an equilibrium under a hard peg, precisely because devaluation is not an option. Under a hard peg, however, there is a unique equilibrium.

Ability, Openness, and Managerial Decision Making

Impact of the ability and the degree of openness of a manager on decision making is studied. Whether a more able manager increases or decreases the effort of a subordinate depends on the relative quality of information. Greater openness is a two-edged sword: it increases the likelihood that more information will be employed, but it reduces the manager’s incentive to expend effort on obtaining better information. A more open manager is more desirable when the position is relatively more important or the prior information is not very accurate.

Crime, Job Searches, and Economic Growth

This paper constructs a theoretical model with which to analyze the puzzling links between unemployment and crime rates, described in the literature. Most theoretical papers on crime, such as Becker Journal of Political Economy 76, 169–217, (1968), Ehrlich Journal of Political Economy 81, 521–565, (1973), and İmrohoroğlu et al. International Economic Review 41, 1–25, (2000), emphasize the analysis of the equilibrium crime rate, dealing with the unemployment rate as an exogenous parameter, but little attention has been devoted to investigating the influence of the criminal market on the equilibrium unemployment rate in the labor market and how these markets interact. This paper illustrates how the causes of crime play a crucial role in the unemployment-crime relationship, wherein different causality result in different associative relationships between unemployment and crime. The aforementioned conclusion illustrates the theory explaining why the empirical findings related to the unemployment-crime relationship are mixed and equivocal. Second, this paper describes the diverse origins of crime, in which employed workers and unemployed workers have different incentives for entering a life of crime. Employed and unemployed workers assume different opportunity costs by engaging in criminal activities, resulting in different effects on the economy. This explains why crime rates relative to unemployment rates in different countries could be either procyclical or countercyclical.     

Inflation,expectations, and cyclical aggravations

Summary The negative relationship between output and producers' expectations and the positive relationship between output and consumers' expectations, as hypothesized by Brunner and Meltzer, is very sensitive to the choice of the model. These Brunner-Meltzer predictions would not be supported by the results derived from a Fisherian model with or without a Phillips curve specification, such as the models presented in this paper.Within the context of the Fisherian model, an increase in the degree of adjustment by one or both sectors will lead to greater price stability. For policy purposes, this result suggests that the increase in available information or significant reduction in the costs of acquiring information may yield greater price stability. A welfare gain may also be achieved if the parameters are interdependent such that information conveyed to one sector effectively leaks to the other. In the latter case, the policy approach may be to try to influence the exogeneous expectations parameters and the lag adjustment between them.Recent studies have proposed that the labor market—or the market for new entrants and transitory workers—is the arena in which all firms participate. Hence, most of the information regarding price movements could be efficiently gathered in this market. If this is an accurate presumption, thenB* would, to some extent, be a function then of the labor market adjustment parameterA*. Further amendments to the model presented in this paper would, however, be necessary to incorporate this alternative.     

Agricultural productivity, trade, and industrialisation

Traditional development economics states that industrialisationmust be positively correlated with agricultural developmentas in the American and many European cases. However, some recentindustrialisation experiences suggests a negative link whichcan be supported by a simple Ricardian argument Yet this argumentis not consistent with the agricultural ‘leap forward’that often occurred before industrialisation took place. Here,we develop a model in which, for a closed economy, industrialisationfollows rising agricultural productivity. For a small open economy,multiple equilibria are possible and industrialisation tendsto be associated with low agricultural productivity, but istriggered by sudden changes in it.     

Nepotism,Discrimination, and the Persistence of Utility-Maximizing,Owner-Operated Firms: Comment

A recent thoughtful paper by Singell and Thornton (thereafter ST) in the Southern Economic Journal deviates in definitions, modeling, and a result from the traditional literature on tastes for discrimination and nepotism that originates with Becker and Arrow. This comment provides a critique of these three aspects of the ST analysis. In particular, it shows that ST's astonishing result that discrimination will persist in a competitive labor market is unjustified, ST's unconventional definitions of owners with unbiased and biased preferences are wrong, and ST's unique modeling of discrimination and nepotism is unsupported.     

Fragmentation,welfare, and imperfect competition

In this paper, we explore the effect of fragmentation of production processes on social welfare in the imperfectly competitive market. We consider a situation in which firms located in a country strategically decide whether they produce at home or move their production overseas. We show that, in such a situation, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all of the firms move production overseas although domestic production is socially desirable. This implies that “reverse imports” do not necessarily benefit the country. We also discuss the effectiveness of a subsidy for domestic production in improving the social welfare of the country. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (3) (2007) 365–378.     

Product quality, lender liability, and consumer credit

Under ‘linked credit’ (also known as ‘connectedlending’), the buyer obtains a loan from a lender withthe specific purpose of purchasing a certain product. Creditis arranged directly by the seller, who acts as an intermediaryfor the finance company. Within this form of financing, thelender often accepts a measure of liability for defective products.We show that ‘connected-lender liability’ can workas a signalling device for the reliability of sellers, so asto alleviate the market failure that arises when sellers arebetter informed than consumers about the quality of their products.     

Institutional Investors,Trade Linkage,Macroeconomic Similarities,and Contagion of the Thai Crisis

This paper empirically investigates the presence of contagion effects and their causes in the 1997 Southeast Asian crisis. Our empirical results indicate that the Thai crisis was transmitted to neighboring Southeast Asian countries through contagion. They also suggest that the international investors' institutional practice of securing sufficient liquidity and trade linkage were important in spreading the contagion, but the financial integration channel was not important. In addition, the similar macroeconomic conditions of the Southeast Asian countries, such as large capital inflows, large accumulation of current account deficit, and high level of external debt prior to the onset of the Thai crisis, were also responsible for the contagion. J. Japan. Int. Econ., June 2001, 15(2), pp. 199–224. Department of Ecnomics, Korea University, 5-1 Anam-dong, Songbuk-ku, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea; and School of Economics, Kookmin University, 861-1 Chongnung-dong, Songbuk-ku, Seoul 136-702, Republic of Korea. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F30, F31.     

Auditing quality,signaling, and underwriting contracts*

Abstract. This paper examines the interaction between the signaling and agency aspects of a new issue process, The issuing firm can signal its private information by the choice of an auditor. It also employs an investment banker who is better informed about the market demand for the issue and whose actions in selling the new equity securities are unobservable, In this framework the firm's benefits from signaling depend greatly on the time at which its investment banker acquires his private information, If the banker receives a private signal after signing a binding underwriting contract all asymmetric information problems are resolved via a first best agreement that facilitates a separating equilibrium, Under this scenario the issuer's choice of a higher quality auditor induces the banker to exert more effort in selling the issue and to set a higher offer price. The issuer's signaling opportunities are limited when the banker possesses private information prior to contracting. In this case an inefficient underwriting contract is signed in which the offer price is set below the first-best level. While a choice of a higher quality auditor induces a higher offer price and greater proceeds, it also results in a larger informational premium for the investment banker. Considering the incentive effect and the cost of a high quality auditor the issuer may decide not to signal if the latter is too high. Résumé. L'auteur étudie l'interaction entre l'aspect indicatif et l'aspect relatif au mandat d'une nouvelle émission de titres. L'entreprise qui procède à une émission de titres peut livrer certaines indications relatives à l'information privilégiée qu'elle détient par le choix d'un vérificateur. Elle a également recours à un preneur ferme qui est mieux renseigné sur l'accueil que le marché est susceptible de faire à l'émission et dont les agissements dans la vente des nouveaux titres ne sont pas observables. Dans ce cadre de référence, les avantages que l'éntreprise retire des indications qu'elle livre dépendent largement du moment auquel le preneur ferme acquiert son information privilégiée. Si le preneur ferme prend connaissance de l'information privilégiée après avoir signé une convention de prise ferme irrévocable, le fait que l'éntreprise émettrice choisisse un vérificateur de qualité supérieure incite le preneur ferme à déployer davantage d'efforts dans la vente des titres et à fixer un prix d'émission plus élevé par suite de l'équilibre distinctif qui se produit. Les possibilités qu'a l'entreprise émettrice de livrer des indications sont limitées lorsque le preneur ferme possède de l'information privilégiée avant la signature de la convention. Dans ce cas, la convention de prise ferme prévoit un prix d'émission inférieur au meilleur prix possible. Bien que le choix d'un vérificateur de qualité supérieure entraîne un prix d'émission et des recettes plus élevés, il donne lieu également à une prime à l'information plus importante pour le preneur ferme. Compte tenu de l'effet incitatif et du coût d'un vérificateur de qualité supérieure, l'entreprise émettrice peut choisir de ne livrer aucune indication si elle juge ce prix trop élevé.     

Education, training, and economic growth

Ashton, D. and Green, F. 1996: EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, £18.95 paper, £55.00 cased.

Booth, A. and Snower, J. (eds) 1996: ACQUIRING SKILLS: MARKET FAILURES, THEIR SYMPTOMS AND POLICY RESPONSES. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, £15.95 paper, £45.00 cased.

Deakin, B. 1996: THE YOUTH LABOUR MARKET IN BRITAIN: THE ROLE OF INTERVENTION. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, £35.00 cased.

Godfrey, M. (ed) 1997: SKILL DEVELOPMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, £59.95 cased.

Shackleton, J. with Clarke, L, Lange, T. and Walsh, S. 1995: TRAINING FOR EMPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, £55.00 cased.     

Tariffs,implementation costs,and optimal policy choice

Zusammenfassung Z?lle, Durchführungskosten und die Wahl der besten Politik. — Dieser Aufsatz behandelt die Rolle der Durchführungskosten bei der Wahl zwischen der Handelspolitik und der Steuer- bzw. Subventionspolitik als den optimalen Instrumenten, um externe Effekte zu beseitigen oder nicht?konomische Ziele zu erreichen. Es werden F?lle ermittelt, in denen die Durchführungskosten die Rangordnung der optimalen Ma\nahmen ver?ndern k?nnen. Unterschiede in den Durchführungskosten beeinflussen die Wahl der optimalen Politik direkt über die Unterschiede in der Nachfrage nach Ressourcen und indirekt u. a. über ihre Wirkungen auf die optimalen Steuer- bzw. Subventionss?tze. Ein Beispiel für die potentielle Bedeutung der Durchführungskosten liefert eine Fallstudie von drei westafrikanischen L?ndern, die an einer Steigerung der heimischen Reisproduktion interessiert sind.

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Résumé Les tarifs, les co?ts de la mise en application et le choix d’une politique optimum. — Cet article s’occupe avec le r?le des co?ts de la mise en application si l’on doit choisir la politique commercial ou la politique fiscale/subvention comme mesures optimum pour éliminer des externalités ou pour accomplir des buts nonéconomiques. L’auteur identifie des cas où les co?ts de la mise en application pourraient changer le rang des politiques optimum. Les différences en des tels co?ts affectent le choix d’une politique optimum directement par des différences dans la demande de ressource et indirectement par leurs effets sur le taux optimum des taxes/subventions. L’importance potentielle des tels co?ts est illustrée par une étude de cas des trois pays africains-ouest qui sont intéressés à augmenter la production locale de riz.

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Resumen Tarifas, costos de implementatión y electión de política óptima. — Este artículo se refiere al roi de los costos de implementatión en la electión entre políticas de comercio y de impuestos/subsidios como herramientas óptimas para eliminar externalidades o alcanzar objetivos no económicos. Se identifican casos donde los costos de implementation podrian cambiar el ordenamiento de politicas óptimas. Diferencias en los costos de implementatión afectan la electión de la política óptima directamente a través de diferencias en las demandas de recursos e indirectamente a través de sus efectos sobre tasas óptimas de impuestos/subsidios. Una ilustración de la importancia potencial de los costos de implementatión lo proporciona el estudio casuistico de très países de Africa Occidental interesados en aumentar la productión doméstica de arroz.