Foreign ownership and bribery: Agency and institutional perspectives

In this study we examine the effectiveness of formal institutions (as the macro-level mechanism) and external auditing (as the micro-level mechanism) in controlling multinational firms’ engagement in bribery. We adopt World Bank’s data and investigate 38,673 firms in 113 countries. Our results suggest that a firm’s engagement in bribery is positively related to its foreign ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate the substitute effects of formal institutions and external auditing in controlling this unethical activity. We argue that in a situation whereby formal institutions are weak, a firm’s internal governance mechanism plays a vital role in controlling bribery.     

An Empirical Investigation on Firms’ Proactive and Passive Motivation for Bribery in China

This research investigates firms’ bribery motivations in China. Based on resource dependence theory and anomie theory, we identify resource conditions as firms’ proactive motivation to bribe and firms’ perceived institutional environment as their passive motivation to bribe. We use the data from 2002 World Business Environment Survey, collected by the World Bank, to investigate firms’ bribery in the world’s largest emerging market, China. We employ a multi-level logistic model to test our hypotheses. The results show that unsatisfactory general and task environmental conditions may trigger firms to bribe in order to compete for better resources and opportunities; institutional conditions such as the security expenditure and anomie climate may make firms perceive bribery as a common phenomenon and thus induce firms to bribe. This research provides some insights to understand business bribery behaviors in emerging market. It also discusses some managerial implications and guidelines for policy-making from the findings.     

Firm Networking and Bribery in China: Assessing Some Potential Negative Consequences of Firm Openness

Economic openness, both in terms of increased international trade exposure and enhanced inter-firm networking, has been a key element of China’s economic emergence since the implementation of market reforms and the “opening-up policy” over 30 years ago. Unfortunately, these changes have also coincided with the increased incidence of bribery and corruption. Both in general, and in the specific context of China, research on the relationship between a firm’s tendency toward openness and its propensity to engage in bribery is scarce. This study seeks to fill this gap based on empirical evidence provided by a large sample of Chinese firms. The findings of the study reveal that firms’ increased networking and openness tend to occur contemporaneously with greater bribery and corruption. We suggest that this may be due to the misuse of guanxi-based networks that coincide with the presence of firms’ open network strategies, heightened by the potential loss of resource and capability heterogeneity (and hence reduced competitive advantages) in the context of openness. We further find that firms paying bribes do so as an attempt to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic processes and ineffective institutional support that might tend to hinder their development.     

How data analytics is transforming agriculture

Two discussions about the interaction between data analytics and competitive analysis have been taking place in the past decade: one focusing on micro-level firm capabilities and the other on macro-level industry competitiveness. We seek to integrate the micro- and macro-level analyses via the lenses of firms in agricultural input markets. Agriculture is undergoing a tremendous transformation in the collection and use of data to inform smarter farming decisions. Precision agriculture has brought a heightened degree of competition for input supply firms, forcing greater interactions among friends and foes.     

Financial Behaviour Under Economic Strain in Different Age Groups: Predictors and Change Across 20 Years

Journal of Consumer Policy - The present study examined the multiple micro- and macro-level factors that affect individuals’ financial behaviour under economic strain. The following...     

Government Intervention,Perceived Benefit,and Bribery of Firms in Transitional China

This article examines whether (1) government intervention causes bribery (or corruption) as rent-seeking theory suggested; (2) a firm’s perceived benefit partially mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior, as rational choice/behavior theory suggested; and (3) other firms’ bribing behavior moderates the relationship between government intervention and a firm’s perceived benefit. Our study shows that government intervention causes bribery/corruption indeed, but it exerts its effect on bribery/corruption through the firm’s perceived benefit. In other words, a firm’s perceived benefit fully mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior. We also find that other firms’ bribery positively moderates the relationship between government intervention and a given firm’s bribery. This study partly proves that firms are rational actors. Potential benefit encourages them to practice bribery. Besides, this research also supports the rent-seeking view of bribery/corruption, which argues that government intervention is a source of bribery/corruption. However, we have also identified that only those government interventions that will create “rent” can cause bribery/corruption.     

Why does the diffusion of environmental management standards differ across countries? The role of formal and informal institutions in the adoption of ISO 14001

This research explores the factors underpinning the international diffusion of environmental management standards (EMSs), focusing on how macro-level institutions explain differences in the extent to which ISO 14001 has penetrated into each country. We argue that macro-level institutions affect the diffusion of ISO 14001 by shaping both how managers assess it and the pressures that stakeholders exert on firms to adopt it. Our results, based on a sample of 49 countries between 2000 and 2014, show that informal and formal institutions, namely, uncertainty avoidance and market-supporting institutions, contribute to explaining cross-country variations in the number of firms implementing ISO 14001.     

International Bribery: Does a Written Code of Ethics Make a Difference in Perceptions of Business Professionals

This article analyzes the attitudes of United States business professionals toward the issue of international bribery, and in particular, whether or not having a written code of ethics has an effect on these attitudes. A vignette relating to international bribery from a widely used survey instrument was employed in a nationwide survey of business professionals to gather information on ethical attitudes of respondents. Data were also collected on gender of respondents, whether or not respondents were self-employed, whether or not the respondents’ firms had a written code of ethics, and to what extent the respondents’ firms generated revenues from international operations. Attitudes concerning whether or not international bribery is ever acceptable exhibited wide dispersion. Respondents from firms that have a written code of ethics were significantly less likely to find international bribery acceptable. Firms that generate revenues from international operations were significantly more likely to have a written code of ethics than were firms which did not generate revenues from international operations. Implications of the findings for business policy are discussed. Joseph A. McKinney is Ben H. Williams Professor of International Economics at Baylor University. He was previously on the faculty of the University of Virginia, and has served as visiting professor to universities in Japan, France, the United Kingdom and Canada. His research interests include business ethics, international trade policy, and regional economic integration. Carlos W. Moore is the Edwin W. Streetman Professor of Marketing at Baylor University, where he has been on the faculty for more than 30 years. His research interests include business ethics, marketing and advertising evaluation, and small business strategies. He has done consulting on bank marketing and new product development.     

Corruption,Types of Corruption and Firm Financial Performance: New Evidence from a Transitional Economy

Using a nationwide survey of provincial institutional quality and a sample of private manufacturing small and medium scale enterprises (the SMEs), this paper contributes to the literature by considering for the first time the effects of corruption on the financial performance of Vietnamese private SMEs. Interestingly, contrary to previous findings, we find that corruption when measured by a dummy variable, does not affect firms’ financial performance after controlling for heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. However, the intensity of bribery and the majority of the forms of corruption were found to have negative impacts on firms’ financial performance. Hence, a typical approach using only a dummy variable for bribery might not adequately evaluate the impact of bribe intensity or even ignores the negative impacts of some types of bribes on firms’ financial performance. The findings suggest that anti-corruption measures are vital for the development of the Vietnamese private SMEs.     

Crafting a paying-it-forward mindset in business: Five principles for a competitive employer branding advantage

Kindness can strengthen your employer brand. The business environment is changing, and the value of kindness in the corporate world is garnering increased attention. Paying it forward is a way to pass acts of kindness on to others. This allows employees and business partners to go above and beyond formal expectations that not only benefit the individuals involved but also the businesses they represent. Paying it forward can potentially create competitive advantage for firms from an employer branding perspective (to attract and retain talent) and in the broader market sense. This behavior can strengthen the employer brand in numerous and effective ways, and managers must understand, engage in, and encourage such conduct. In this article, we discuss different examples, benefits, and risks of paying kindness forward on a micro-, meso-, and macro-level. After providing this foundation, we introduce practical guidelines for managers on how to foster a paying-it-forward mindset among employees and the broader organization. The guidelines were created using insights from interviews we conducted with stakeholders in a business ecosystem in northern Sweden.     

Configuration of External Influences: The Combined Effects of Institutions and Stakeholders on Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies

This article introduces a theoretical framework that combines institutional and stakeholder theories to explain how firms choose their corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy. Organizational researchers have identified several distinct CSR strategies (e.g., obstructionist, defensive, accommodative, and proactive), but did not explain the sources of divergence. This article argues that the divergence comes from the variability in the configuration of external influences that consists of institutional and stakeholder pressures. While institutions affect firms’ social behavior by shaping the macro-level incentive structure and sources of legitimacy (distal mechanisms), firms’ stakeholders can amplify or buffer the institutional forces by acting as mediators (proximate mechanisms). The two dimensions are interdependent in that stakeholders draw legitimacy and power from institutions, and institutions are often actualized through stakeholder mechanisms. Together, they form a particular configuration of external influences that shapes how focal firms construct their CSR strategy.     

Determinants of Bribery in Asian Firms: Evidence from the World Business Environment Survey

While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World Business Environment Survey data to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test 10 hypotheses on determinants of bribery. We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and corporate governance are important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes.     

The interconnections between bribery,political network,government supports,and their consequences on export performance of small and medium enterprises in Thailand

In emerging economies, the government is the main sector that plays a significant role in providing various kinds of support to help local entrepreneurial firms build their capabilities to effectively compete in export markets. However, due to a weak institution in these countries, a question begs to be answered whether government support is efficiently allocated to these firms. The aim of this research is to explore the interconnection between bribery, political network, and access to government support, as well as their effects on the export performance of small and medium enterprises in Thailand. Survey data collected from a sample of 170 firms that joined the trade exhibition in Bangkok were analyzed to provide evidence. Results from partial least squares regression showed that although government support was strongly associated with a firm’s export performance, the extent to which government support was received was found to be strongly associated with the political network that entrepreneurs have developed as well as the extent of bribery that they have engaged in.     

The Shareholder–Manager Relationship and Its Impact on the Likelihood of Firm Bribery

We examine the impact on firm bribery of two corporate governance devices heavily studied in corporate governance research—i.e., separation of ownership and control, and equity share of the largest shareholder. In addition, we investigate the impact of the principal–owner’s gender on firm bribery. From agency theory, we predict that firms with the owner also acting as a manager (owner–manager) are more likely to engage in bribery compared to their counterparts with separation of ownership and control. We argue that an increase of the equity share of the largest shareholder can either increase or decrease firm bribery likelihood depending on the net cost-benefit effect of such bribery actions. In addition, we predict that bribery is more likely to occur when the principal–owner is male rather than female. Using a rich dataset of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of 2002–2005, we find that the equity share of the largest shareholder is negatively and male principal–owner is positively associated with the likelihood of firm bribery. Furthermore, we reveal that owner–manager is more likely to bribe when the principal–owner is male rather than female. We also observe that the effect of owner–manager is smaller as the equity share of the largest shareholder increases.     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth,and Governance Environment: The Case of Bribes

This study examines the relationship between family control and young entrepreneurial firm’s bribing behavior around the globe. Relying on over 2,000 young firms from the World Bank Environment Survey, we find that family control helps to reduce a firm’s bribery behavior, but further investigation shows that this effect only exists in countries with weaker macro-governance environment. In countries with more established and transparent governance mechanism, family control does not seem to make any difference. We interpret our findings as the business family’s preservation of socioemotional wealth.     

Dividend policy and religion: International evidence from firms with Islamic Label

This paper builds on prior research and argues that religion, as an informal cultural institution, may impose constraints on corporations. The framework of Shariah-compliant firms presents a unique opportunity to investigate this assertion and checks whether firms with Islamic label pay out more or less dividend. Since Islamic Law narrows the investment opportunity sets for Shariah-compliant firms, one would expect Shariah-compliant firms to pay out more dividends to shareholders (investment constraint hypothesis). On the other hand, the prohibition of interest-bearing financing, make of retained earnings an appealing alternative to finance projects, hence resulting in lower dividend payouts (financing constraint hypothesis). Tests on a sample of 13,249 firm-year observations from 17 Islamic countries support the investment constraint hypothesis: Shariah-compliant firms pay out more dividends than non-Shariah compliant ones. Our results are robust to various specifications and after controlling for different variables and addressing potential endogeneity concerns.     

Is Guanxi Orientation Bad, Ethically Speaking? A Study of Chinese Enterprises

Guanxi as one of the key factors leading to business success in China (PRC) has ironically been synonymous with bribery. This raises some serious questions: should Western foreign firms do business in China? How should they do business with Chinese firms? This study investigated the relationship between guanxi orientation and cognitive moral development in an attempt to determine whether the level of guanxi orientation of Chinese business people affects their ethical reasoning. Based on a classification of Chinese enterprises (Nee, 1992), it was found that Chinese enterprises rely on guanxi for business to different extents. However, their levels of cognitive moral development are not significantly different, suggesting that guanxi orientation has very little to do with ethical reasoning (as captured through an established measure of cognitive moral development). Furthermore, time in profession was found to positively affect guanxi orientation; however, age failed to predict guanxi orientation and education turned out to be a negative predictor of guanxi orientation.     

Bribery in International Business Transactions

Globalization leads to cross-border business transactions between societies with very different norms and regulations regarding bribery. Bribery in international business transactions can be seen as a function of not only the demand for such bribes in different countries, but the supply, or willingness to provide bribes by multinational firms and their representatives. This study addresses the propensity of firms from 30 different countries to engage in international bribery. The study incorporates both domestic (economic development, culture, and domestic corruption in the supplying country) and international factors (those countries’ patterns of trade and involvement in international accords) in explaining the willingness to bribe abroad. The propensity to provide bribes was the lowest when corruption was not tolerated in the multinational firms’ home countries, when the firms’ countries were signatories of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention, and when those countries traded heavily with wealthier nations. Further, these findings are maintained when controlling for levels of economic development and cultural values in the supplying country. In terms of culture, firms from high power distance countries showed a somewhat greater propensity for providing bribes in transactions with less-developed nations.     

Should the payment of bribes overseas be made illegal?

In a recent contribution to this journal Professor A. Argandona explored the general characteristics of corruption and their implications for the corporate sector. Against this background this paper examines one specific form of corruption: the payment of bribes usually by agents of private firms to civil servants and politicians overseas. The paper focuses specifically upon current attempts by western states to criminalise overseas bribery and the problems such efforts are likely to face. Emphasising the centrality of the demand for corrupt payments as well as their supply, the paper concludes by highlighting a pivotal relationship between bribery on the one hand and the abuse of human rights on the other.     

Business Approaches to Combating Bribery: A Study of Codes of Conduct

The question of what firms do internally in the fight against bribery is probably as important to the successful outcome of that fight as formal anti-bribery law and enforcement. This paper looks at corporate approaches to anti-bribery commitment and compliance management using an inventory of 246 codes of conduct. It suggests that, while bribery is often mentioned in the codes of conduct, there is considerable diversity in the language and concepts adopted in anti-bribery commitments. This diversity is a feature of the language used in describing parties to bribery and in defining which activities are prohibited (e.g. promising bribes versus actually giving them, gifts and entertainment, and solicitation. This diversity of language and concepts suggests that it might be useful to extend and deepen efforts in business associations and international organisations to build consensus on the meaning of bribery and corruption. In contrast, the bribery codes show evidence of an emerging consensus on managerial approaches to combating bribery. This involves the deployment of a distinctive mix of management tools, including financial record keeping, statements by executive officers, internal monitoring, whistle-blowing facilities, creation of compliance offices and threats of disciplinary action.