市场约束、流动性援助与存款保险——基于银行审慎经营的激励兼容分析

银行审慎经营是金融稳定的微观基础，而银行治理过程中利益相关者的动态均衡是银行审慎经营的保证。市场约束是利益相关者参与银行治理的外部机制，流动性援助和存款保险是维护金融稳定的安全设施，市场约束、流动性援助和存款保险的激励兼容才能增加银行审慎经营可能性。在一定的制度设施基础上。完善市场约束，减少流动性援助和存款保险带来的道德风险，建立一个市场约束、流动性援助和存款保险激励兼容的外部框架有利于银行的审慎经营。     

Deposit Insurance,Banking Crises,and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows and Rates

Using evidence from Russia, we carry out what we believe to be the literature's cleanest test of the direct impact of deposit insurance on market discipline and study the combined effect of a banking crisis and deposit insurance on market discipline. We employ a difference‐in‐difference estimator to isolate the change in the behavior of a newly insured group (i.e., households) relative to an uninsured “control” group (i.e., firms). The sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminishes markedly after the introduction of deposit insurance. The traditional wake‐up call effect of a crisis is muted by this numbing effect of deposit insurance.     

限额存款保险与中国银行业的市场约束

一般认为,限额存款保险制度让存款人的资产部分地暴露于风险之中,从而市场约束虽然比无保险状态下较弱但仍然有效,因此世界上实行存款保险制度的国家多采用限额保险。本文认为,中国银行业特殊的股权结构,以及长期以来政府对大银行的资金支持形成了存款人规模偏好和银行大而不倒(too big to fail)的预期;这一预期特征必将异化市场约束,进而导致银行陷入无序的规模竞争并激励其风险承担;如果单纯实施限额存款保险制度,非但不能修正中国商业银行市场约束的异化问题,而且将强化公众的大而不倒预期,使市场约束面临更严重的扭曲。     

存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响—基于跨国微观角度的实证分析

金融危机后,全球加快了存款保险制度建设的步伐,2015年5月,我国成为全球第 114个建立显性存款保险制度的国家。本文基于全球80个国家的1122家上市银行的微观数据, 研究存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响,研究发现：存款保险制度的建立增大了个体银行的 风险承担,表现为道德风险效应。此外,本文还研究了存款保险机构性质、存款保险基金管理 方式、风险差别费率、存款保险基金来源和共同保险这5个存款保险制度设计对银行风险承担 的影响。最后根据实证结论,提出相关政策建议。。     

Islamic Banks,Deposit Insurance Reform,and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework

Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are subject to more market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased the market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.     

存款保险、市场竞争与银行经营稳健性

本文基于银行存款市场空间竞争模型,探讨存款保险制度的实施效果和福利效应,及其与市场竞争政策的交互作用。研究表明,政府隐性担保尽管能够保障存款人利益,但会降低存款人对银行经营稳健性的要求,使得银行追求高风险高收益资产从而降低经营稳健性;而市场化的存款保险制度通过费率与风险挂钩的激励机制,能够有效提升银行经营稳健性,同时避免过高政策成本负担,实现较高的社会福利水平。随着市场竞争强化,引入风险差别费率保险制度,在提升银行经营稳健性和增进社会福利方面的效果逐渐增强。模型分析表明,当长期允许机构自由进出市场时,政府强化竞争政策短期可能降低银行的经营稳健性,但长期内高风险银行逐渐退出市场而更有效率的低风险银行进入市场,这种柔性市场退出机制使得银行业整体经营稳健性增强。因此,在金融市场中强化竞争政策,推行并完善当前市场化的风险差别费率存款保险制度,长期内有助于在保护存款人利益的同时,提升银行稳健性和社会福利。     

基于市场约束的国际显性存款保险制度改革趋势及启示

上世纪90年代以来的金融危机使得越来越多的国家重新审视系统性风险防范的问题,存款保险制度作为有效手段被广泛推崇并在很多国家得以确立.随着市场约束成为<新巴塞尔资本协议>三大支柱之一而被国际银行监管界所广泛熟知,如何将市场约束的理念反映到存款保险制度的改进之中来进行探讨,也将对我国的存款保险制度的推出产生有益启示.     

Bank Mergers and the Dynamics of Deposit Interest Rates

Despite extensive research interest in the last decade, the banking literature has not reached a consensus on the impact of bank mergers on deposit rates. In particular, results on the dynamics of deposit rates surrounding bank mergers vary substantially across studies. In this paper, we aim for a comprehensive empirical analysis of a bank merger’s impact on deposit rate dynamics. We base the analysis on a unique dataset comprising deposit rates of 624 US banks with a monthly frequency for the time period 1997–2006. These data are matched with individual bank and local market characteristics and the complete list of bank mergers in the US. The data allow us to track the dynamics of bank mergers while controlling for the rigidity of the deposit rates and for a range of merger, bank, and local market features. An innovation of our work is the introduction of an econometric approach for estimating the change of the deposit rates given their rigidity.     

Bank Contingent Capital: Valuation and the Role of Market Discipline

This paper develops a structural model to evaluate contingent capital notes (CCN) of Basel III under alternative regulatory closure rules. Our dynamic model has a fixed default barrier and at specific discrete time points an additional higher default barrier depending on the closure threshold. The closed-form expressions of CCN and subordinated debts (SD) in the simple Merton model are presented to understand the convex relationship between the price and capital ratio trigger of CCN and to examine the effects of closure rules on CCN and SD through their derivatives’ properties. Our numerical results in the more general model show that a lax closure rule increases the price of SD and distorts the risk information of issuing banks, but not so for CCN. The policy implications are that CCN are more effective than SD in terms of enhancing market discipline because the price/yield information of CCN is more sensitive to the issuing bank’s risk than SD and will not be distorted by regulatory closure rules.     

Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline,Deposit Insurance,and Banking Crises

This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.     

国有股权与公司IPO中的审计师选择行为及动机

审计师选择是审计研究的核心问题。本文首次研究了国有股权在中国A股IPO市场对审计师选择的影响及其具体机制。我们发现,国有股比例越高,公司选择高质量的审计师的概率越低;当国有股权比例较低时,高质量的审计师能够降低IPO发行抑价,但是,国有股比例的提高会损害高质量审计师降低IPO抑价的作用,并且,国有股比例越高,IPO抑价越高。这说明国有股权对IPO中的审计师选择的影响既不是因为国有股比例的提高容易导致公司与低质量的审计师合谋,也不是因为国有股权可以代替高质量的审计师在降低IPO融资成本过程中的作用,而是因为国有股权会损害高质量审计师声誉机制的发挥,进而损害了其在降低IPO融资成本过程中的作用。本文对于丰富和深化我们关于中国A股市场审计师选择行为和审计师声誉机制作用发挥的认识,具有非常重要的作用。     

我国建立银行存款保险制度的初步探讨

我国经过20年的改革，在金融体制及其运行机制逐步向市场轨道转换的过程中，新旧体制之间出现摩擦与矛盾，使银行潜在的经营风险不断扩大，建立适合我国国情的存款保险制度以化解金融风险已经成为当前各国政府急需解决的课题。     

Market Interest Rates and Commercial Bank Profitability: An Empirical Investigation

The widespread notion that commercial banks “borrow short and lend long” implies that sharp market interest rate increases may induce a significant number of banking failures. This paper develops a method for estimating average asset and liability maturities for a sample of large money center banks. Regression models are tested to determine if market rate fluctuations have a significant impact on bank profitability. The conclusion is negative: large banks have effectively hedged themselves against market rate risk by assembling asset and liability portfolios with similar average maturities.     

存款保险与金融机构的市场退出问题

一个稳定的金融体系是宏观经济健康运行的关键。经济和金融体制改革过程中金融机构的市场退出问题往往引致严重的经济动荡。存款保险制度的建立是应对金融恐慌的制度安排，也是解决金融机构市场退出问题的主要途径。同时，我们应该建立为减少金融机构由于信息不对称引起的风险过度承担的激励机制。     

强制保险对机动车险市场的影响

即将实施的《中华人民共和国道路交通安全法》是我国第一部道路交通安全法律,保监会据此制定了《机动车第三者责任强制保险条例》,详细规定了机动车辆第三者强制保险的具体内容,将对商业保险公司的机动车辆产生重大影响。对此,各保险公司应加强制定费率规章,增设绝对免赔额制度和明确对机动车辆超载问题的处理标准。     

Optimal Bank Reorganization Policies and the Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance

Optimal dynamic regulatory policies for closing ailing banks and for deposit insurance premia are derived as functions of the rate of flow of bank deposits, and interest rate on deposits, the economy's risk-free interest rate, and the regulators' bank audit/administration costs. Under competitive conditions, the threshold assets-to-deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed is shown to be greater than or equal to one. Optimal deposit insurance premia and probabilities of bank closure are shown to be nondecreasing in the bank's risk on investment and nonincreasing in the bank's current assets-to-deposits ratio.     

The Cost of Deposit Insurance for Privately Held Banks: A Market Comparable Approach

Previous empirical studies that use an option pricing model to estimate deposit insurance costs have been limited to banks that issue publicly traded securities: a bank's security prices are used to infer its risk characteristics. However, if deposit insurance costs are needed for privately held banks, as would be the case under a system of risk-based insurance premiums, then an alternative method is required. This paper presents a “market comparable” approach for valuing private banks' deposit insurance. The approach first uses information on public depository institutions to identify the statistical relationships between a bank's supervisory accounting data and its risk characteristics derived from equity market data. Second, it uses these relationships to predict the risk characteristics of a private depository institution based on its supervisory accounting data. This approach is applied to over 7000 private banks and thrifts to estimate their risk characteristics and their implied risk-neutral and physical probabilities of insolvency. For the vast majority of institutions, these risk characteristics and insolvency probabilities are within a reasonable range.     

Central Bank Policy Paths and Market Forward Rates: A Simple Model

Increasingly many central banks announce likely paths for future policy rates. Recent experience suggests that market forward rates can differ substantially from those announced. Models commonly adopted in policy analysis ignore such differences. This paper studies a simple model that can capture deviations between announced paths and market forward rates. We detail the macroeconomic transmission of such deviations and show how the model can inform policy deliberations.     

Market Discipline and the Use of Stock Market Data to Predict Bank Financial Distress

We assess the extent to which stock market information can be used to estimate leading indicators of bank financial distress. We specify a logit early warning model, designed for European banks, which tests if market based indicators add predictive value to models relying on accounting data. We also study the robustness of the link between market information and financial downgrading in the light of the safety net and asymmetric information hypotheses. Some of our results support the use of market-related indicators. Other results show that the accuracy of the predictive power depends on the extent to which bank liabilities are market traded.      

印度国家银行:在改革中前进

印度国家银行作为印度最大的国有银行,改革以来正显示着其应有的 活力,尽管存在的问题依然不少。 印度国家银行至今已有两百年历史,最早可以追溯 到1805年6月2日成立的加尔各答银行。根据1955年 的《印度国家银行法案》在合并几家银行的基础上,印 度国家银行成为由中央银行——印度储备银行高度控股 的国有银行,总部设在孟买。