Majority Shareholder Ownership and Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the influence of majority shareholder ownership on real earnings management. It investigates whether there is a conflict between or an alignment of majority and minority shareholders' interests. If majority shareholders' interests are aligned with those of minority shareholders, a greater majority shareholder ownership lowers real earnings management. On the other hand, if they are not aligned, majority shareholders' attempts to exploit minority shareholders will increase real earnings management. This study does not find a systematic relationship between majority shareholder ownership and real earnings management. However, real earnings management significantly decreases in the upward earnings management incentive bracket as majority shareholder ownership increases. This occurs primarily because majority shareholders are more sensitive to upward real earnings management, which has a negative effect on future performance. These results suggest that the larger the ownership of majority shareholders, the more they play a positive role in mitigating real earnings management. This positive role is only effective in the post‐Asian economic crisis period. These results may suggest that the economic crisis in Korea helped majority shareholders more conscious of the long‐term costs of real earnings management. These findings support the convergence‐of‐interests hypothesis, providing evidence by investigating real earnings management instead of accruals‐based earnings management.     

How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case

This paper examines how the ownership structure and board of directors' features determine the managerial opportunistic behavior exemplified in the management of accounting earnings. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship of firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance systems on the earnings management in the Spanish corporate sector. Results reveal that the varying efficiency of the corporate governance systems is reflected in the way in which accounting discretion is performed. We found evidence that earnings management is reduced as the voting rights of the controlling shareholder increased and that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between insiders' ownership and the earnings manipulation. Regarding the board characteristics, we observe that larger, independent boards, those with a larger proportion of female members, and those with an audit committee compounded by a greater proportion of outside independent directors oversee managers more efficiently, constraining their capacity to manage earnings. To the contrary, board duality increases the likelihood of opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting. We found that when the institutional environment improves in the Spanish context, the discretionary power of the corporate sector to overstate the financial statements is reduced. The findings prove the necessity of reinforcing the rules and regulations toward a more transparent disclosure of the financial statements.     

管理股权、会计选择与盈余质量

本文根据异常应计项目框架和修正的Jones模型,以1995—2004年上市公司数据为样本,对上市公司管理股权通过会计选择影响企业的盈余质量进行了分析。实证研究发现,管理股权比例与盈余质量之间呈U型分布,相对集中的管理股权有利于提高盈余质量。     

Japanese Corporate Groupings (Keiretsu) and the Informativeness of Earnings

This paper examines the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu , on the informativeness of earnings. Keiretsu firms maintain close financial and personal ties through cross-shareholding, credit holding, interlocking corporate directorates, and various business transactions. We propose that the strong interrelations of the keiretsu ownership structure enhance the informativeness of earnings through efficient monitoring of managerial performance. Our empirical results show that keiretsu firms have higher earnings response coefficients than those of non- keiretsu firms, the earnings response coefficient increases as the strength of the keiretsu relationship increases, and discretionary accruals by keiretsu firms are smaller than discretionary accruals of non- keiretsu firms. All of these results suggest that the monitoring ability of the keiretsu improves the informativeness of earnings.     

Ownership structure and corporate liquidity policy

This study analyzes the relationship between corporate liquidity (i.e. the fraction of assets invested in cash and marketable securities) and managerial ownership in the firm's stock. We postulate a negative relationship between excess liquidity and managerial stock ownership as the managers' interests shift from protecting the value of their human capital to maximizing the value of their stockholdings. This managerial behavior is constrained by the disciplining forces of the firm's product market structure and the market for corporate control. While the tests fail to reveal any significant impact of managerial stock ownership, they show that firm liquidity is positively related to the firm's ability to earn economic rents.     

The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Relationship between Innovative Efforts and Performance1

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of managerial share ownership, CEO duality and board independence on the relationship between innovative efforts and performance. The study is motivated by the observation that despite the widely held belief that innovative efforts are crucial to firms' survival, previous studies were unable to provide any evidence in support of this belief. It addresses this incongruity by focusing on the effects of corporate governance on the relationship between innovative efforts and performance. Specifically, this study predicts and finds that managerial share ownership has a positive effect on this relationship while CEO duality has a negative effect. Contrary to the hypothesis, this study finds that board independence also has a negative effect on the relationship between innovative efforts and performance. This contradictory result is, however, consistent with the managerial-incentive theory, which proposes that inside directors are in a better position than outside directors to motivate managers to undertake profitable projects because they have superior access to firms' specific information.     

Analyst Following,Institutional Investors and Pricing of Future Earnings: Evidence from Korea

This paper examines the role of sophisticated investors in pricing future earnings in Korea. Using the future earnings response coefficient (FERC) model, we test the effect of analyst following and institutional ownership on the informativeness of stock returns for future earnings. We find that the informativeness of stock returns for future earnings, measured as the FERC, increases with the analyst following and institutional ownership. We also investigate how the recently introduced Regulation Fair Disclosure in Korea affects the informativeness of stock returns for future earnings and its relation with analyst following and institutional ownership. The results show that the regulation decreases the FERC in general and its relation with analyst following, suggesting that analysts' superior ability is impaired after the regulation.     

Agency costs in the banking industry: An examination of ownership behavior,leverage and dividend policies

This paper examines agency theory arguments in the banking industry by analyzing the effect of four variables that proxy for agency costs—earnings volatility, managers' portfolio diversification losses, bank size, and standard deviation of bank equity returns—on the three financial policy variables of managerial stock ownership, leverage, and dividend yield. It is one of the first studies that examines the determination of financial policy variables, in light of agency concerns, in the banking industry. The study examines the largest 104 U.S. banks during the period 1985–1989. Evidence suggests that bank size and a measure of the managers' portfolio diversification opportunity set affect the bank's level of managerial stock ownership, leverage and dividends.     

Acquiring firms' stock returns: Methods of payment,change in leverage,and management ownership

This study examines the effects of the method of payment, change in leverage, and management equity ownership on the acquiring firm's stock returns around the initial announcement date of the merger. Results indicate that stockholders of mergers financed with stocks suffer significant losses. These losses are larger when management ownership is low and smaller in mergers that resulted in acquiring firm leverage decreases. Stockholders of acquiring firms involved in cash mergers gain significant abnormal returns, provided that acquiring firms increase their leverage and that managerial ownership is high. When management equity ownership is low, leverage has no effect on stock returns. When management ownership is high, mergers which resulted in acquiring firm leverage increases have significant positive effects, and those which resulted in acquiring firm leverage decreases have negative but insignificant effects.     

Publication trends in the Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting: A retrospective review

This study uses bibliometric analysis to assess Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting (JIFMA's) evolution between 1989 and 2021. In this retrospective review, we investigate the journal's performance, authorship trends, and intellectual structure. The journal's international focus is primarily on cross-country studies and the effects of country-level factors on various accounting and finance outcomes. The collaborative network of JIFMA's authors has also grown substantially consistent with rise in research collaboration in general across the world. We identify nine major themes making up JIFMA's knowledge structure: (1) value relevance of accounting information relating to the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards, (2) voluntary corporate disclosure, (3) corporate use of financial derivatives, (4) corporate governance, (5) equity valuation, (6) stock return seasonalities, foreign equity ownership, and cost of capital, (7) earnings announcements and pecking order behavior, (8) triple-bottom-line disclosures, and (9) managerial ownership and earnings management. Our findings will likely benefit JIFMA's editorial board and other journal stakeholders including future researchers.     

股权集中度、董事会结构与盈余管理——来自中国资本市场的经验数据

本文通过封2005年中国沪深A股上市公司的公司治理和财务数据为基础,实证检验了股权集中度、董事会治理与盈余管理水平之间的关系。结果表明,盈余管理与董事长与CEO两职合一显著正相关,与股权集中度、董事会规模（公司法规定的合理范围内人独立董事的比例显着负相关。因此,应当改善股权结构、提高股权集中度,加强董事会的独立性和监督职能,造对于上市公司的盈余管理行为,起到有效抑制的作用。     

民营上市公司CEO持股缓解了代理冲突吗？——基于真实活动盈余管理视角的分析

基于真实活动盈余管理视角,研究了我国民营上市公司CEO持股能否在一定程度上缓解代理冲突。研究发现：CEO持股能够抑制民营上市公司真实活动盈余管理,并且随着CEO持股比例的增加,真实活动盈余管理水平下降,说明CEO持股能够在一定程度上缓解投资者与企业管理层的代理冲突,实现协同效应;董事长与CEO两职兼任时,CEO持股对真实活动盈余管理的抑制效应会加强;深入研究发现,真实活动盈余管理对公司未来业绩产生不利影响,尤其是对企业长期业绩,而CEO持股能够降低真实活动盈余管理给公司业绩带来的负面效应。基于真实活动盈余管理,研究支持了我国民营上市公司CEO持股能够体现出一定的协同效应,缓解投资者与企业管理层的代理冲突。     

A cross‐country study on the relationship between financial development and earnings management

This study investigates whether a country's level of financial development is associated with earnings management in an international setting. Financial development is likely to heighten the monitoring and scrutiny of accounting numbers because of strengthened investor protection laws and regulations as well as sophisticated market participants. Therefore, we first hypothesize that both accrual‐based and real earnings management decrease with greater financial development. However, research shows that managers tend to apply real earnings management, instead of accrual‐based earnings management, under strict accounting standards, regulations, and close auditor scrutiny. Thus, we explore the alternative hypothesis that accrual‐based earnings management decreases but real earnings management increases along with higher financial development. We examine the relationship between financial development and both types of earnings management using 56,830 observations in 37 countries covering the period 2009–2012. The results indicate that both types of earnings management are more restrained under higher levels of financial development.     

Independent directors and earnings management: The moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights

The research results on the suppressing effect of independent directors on earnings management are not consistent in existing literature. In addition, it has been argued that using financial statements provided by top management to investigate top management's earnings management is not appropriate. Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, we used external auditors (including the auditors of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the auditors of two Big Four accounting firms – Deloitte & Touche and KPMG in Taiwan) as respondents in order to obtain less biased data. Second, we investigate the moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. The results show that both the existence of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights have significant suppressing effects on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game

This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects firms' R&D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from profit maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial firms invest more in R&D and have higher output and lower prices compared to their entrepreneurial counterparts. On the other hand, when spillovers are large, owners ‘penalize’ managers for sales. In this case, managerial firms have lower R&D, lower output and higher prices. Nonetheless, managerial firms have lower profits than their entrepreneurial counterparts regardless of spillovers. This paper also examines the welfare effects of a separation of ownership and management. It is found that in terms of first-best social welfare, managerial firms are more (less) efficient than their entrepreneurial counterparts with low (high) spillovers. However, in terms of second-best social welfare, managerial firms are less efficient with all spillovers. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Earnings Management and Cultural Values

Using theory and empirical data from social psychology to measure for cultural differences between countries, this research studies the effect of individualism, defined as the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups ( Hofstede 1980 ), and egalitarianism, defined as a society's cultural orientation with respect to intolerance for abuses of market and political power ( Schwartz 1994, 2004 ) on earnings management. This research finds a significant cultural influence on earnings management. Specifically, the results show that countries scoring high on individualism tend to have lower levels of earnings management. Using the Schwartz (1994, 2004 ) framework, this study finds that egalitarianism is negatively related to earnings management. The analysis shows that, besides the formal investor protection, it is relevant to consider cultural differences to explain earnings management. This analysis also supports the idea that culture may be an important element in the discussion of global convergence towards a single corporate governance model, or the implementation of corporate governance codes inspired by codes from societies with different cultural values.     

Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

We document positive association between earnings management and insider selling after the fiscal year‐end for Hong Kong firms. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our findings suggest that Hong Kong executives manage reported earnings to maximize their private benefits from insider selling. Additionally, we find that a higher proportion of independent directors (INED) on corporate boards moderate the positive association between insider selling and earnings management. Stricter monitoring of earnings management by INED is especially evident when no member of the family with majority ownership is present on corporate boards as a director. This suggests that the presence of family members with majority ownership on corporate boards significantly reduces INED's monitoring effectiveness. Our findings suggest that strict regulations are needed to control insider trading, and independence of corporate boards is important for monitoring of earnings management associated with insider trading. Furthermore, appointment of family members with majority shareholdings should be avoided to enhance independence and to monitor effectiveness of corporate boards.     

How entrenched managers beat earnings expectations before and after SOX

This study investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and how firms meet or beat earnings forecasts. It further examines whether this relationship changes before and after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). We find that, in the pre-SOX era, entrenched managers meet or exceed analyst forecasts more often than their unentrenched counterparts when analysts’ initial forecasts are high. This is mainly due to the drop in analysts’ consensus rather than earnings management. These results nearly disappear in the post-SOX era.     

Ownership concentration,modified audit opinion,and auditor switch: New evidence and method

This study investigates: 1) how does the ownership structure of listed firms influence the relation between their earnings management behavior and auditor opinion; 2) how does the ownership structure influence the relation between the auditor opinion and auditor switch. We find that the level of listed firms’ earnings management is positively associated with the propensity of being issued modified audit opinions (MAOs) by auditors when their ownership structure is highly concentrated. However, the issuance of MAOs is not associated with the auditor switch under such condition. On the contrary, a high level of earnings management is not associated with the propensity of being issued MAOs when firms’ ownership structure is less concentrated. Further, the issuance of MAOs may increase the likelihood of auditor switch. The empirical findings suggest that auditors may cater for the preferences of the real controller of listed firms when issuing audit opinions. Moreover, the “auditor opinion shopping” behavior by listed firms is also affected by listed firms’ ownership structure.     

Multiple banking relationships,managerial ownership concentration and firm value: A simultaneous equations approach

This paper examines how the number of banking relationships affects the interaction between managerial ownership and firm performance, and sheds light on the conditions under which banking relationships play a role in alleviating shareholder–manager conflicts. Our results provide several interesting insights. We document that bank monitoring has substantial value when managers are improperly incentivized, but that it becomes less important when managers are properly incentivized. There is a substitution effect between the value-increasing benefits of managerial ownership and bank monitoring. We also find that any existing free-riding concerns from having too many banking relationships are problematical only when Tobin's Q is high and managerial ownership is high.