国际

摩根大通3季利润下滑4%每股业绩超预期10月13日晚间消息,摩根大通集团(JPM)宣布,第三财季的利润同比下降4%,至42.6亿美元,合每股1.02美元。每股业绩超出市场普遍预期。小摩的利润下滑主要与企业交易撮合业务下滑,导致投行的收费下降有关。     

新闻扫描

摩根大通3季利润下滑4％每股业绩超预期 10月13日晚间消息，摩根犬通集团（JPM）宣布，第三财季的利润同比下降4％，至42．6亿美元，合每股1．02美元。每股业绩超出市场酱遍预期。     

雅戈尔（600177） 品牌服装业务发展良好

三季报点评 11年三季报EPS为0．56元,其中服装业务贡献约0．22元,净利润同比增长48％,业绩略超预期。前三季度营业收入80．3亿元,同比增长1．4％,营业利润18．1亿元,增长69％,利润总额18．6亿,增长53％,归属上市公司股东净利润为12．4亿元,增长48％,EPS为0．56元,业绩超预期。房地产业务收入确认和品牌服装业务发展良好是业绩超预期的主要原因。     

杰米·戴蒙续写传奇

当雷曼兄弟、贝尔斯登、花旗等金融机构被国际金融危机“折磨”得苦不堪言时,摩根大通却成为这场金融风暴中美国唯一坚挺的大型金融机构：2009年全年摩根大通实现净利润117亿美元,即使在2008年最困难的一年该机构还有56亿美元的净利润,截至去年第四季度摩根大通已经连续第22季盈利。然而,     

“做服务银行的银行” 专访摩根大通银行(中国)有限公司资金服务部中国区金融机构业务销售总监兼上海分行副行长邹炼

8月下旬,记者在北京金融街的英蓝国际大厦中如期采访到了摩根大通资金服务部中国区金融机构销售部总监邹炼。她言简意赅,访谈效率极高,对如何更好地服务中国客户深有感触。摩根大通银行在全球有6条业务线,其中3条在全球运营,分别为投资银行业务、资产管理业务、资金及证券业务,还有3条业务线仅在美国本地运营,分别为银行卡业务、商业银行业务、个人业务。邹     

美国大型银行集团:战略调整与业绩表现

正2011年初以来,美国银行业的盈利状况较2010年继续改善。美国联邦存款保险公司11月数据显示,7437家参保金融机构第三季度利润总和达353亿美元,比上年同期增长48.3%,为2007年第二季度以来的最高水平,63%的参保金融机构净利润同比出现增长。规模最大的四家银行集团中,除摩根大通净利润同比下降之外,美国银行、花旗集团、富国银行净利润均出现上涨。然而,次贷危机的"创伤"仍在困扰着美国银行业。在危机阴影依然笼罩、欧洲债务问题再起波澜的宏观环境下,银行的经营战略将是影响长期业绩表现的关键因素。本文试对四大银行集团危机后的战略调整与近期业绩表现进行分析。     

摩根大通的E动力

电子平台为摩根大通开拓中国业务提供了强劲动力。近年来,外资银行在中国开展的各项金融业务一直在有条不紊地进行着,其中作为优势业务的电子银行业务更是在中国市场上表现优异。2010年和2011年,摩根大通被《贸易福费廷》杂志评为"全球最佳贸易银行"。在中国,通过网上贸易平台,摩根大通为客户提供传统的贸易融资方案和结构性贸易融资方案,其中包括供应链融资、进出口融资、进出     

“做服务银行的银行”——专访摩根大通银行（中国）有限公司资金服务部中国区金融机构业务销售总监兼上海分行副行长邹炼

8月下旬,记者在北京金融街的英蓝国际大厦中如期采访到了摩根大通资金服务部中国区金融机构销售部总监邹炼。她言简意赅,访谈效率极高,对如何更好地服务中国客户深有感触。摩根大通银行在全球有6条业务线,其中3条在全球运营,分别为投资银行业务、资产管理业务、资金及证券业务,还有3条业务线仅在美国本地运营,分别为银行卡业务、商业银行业务、个人业务。邹炼主管的金融机构服务部所在的业务线是资金管理及证券服务,主要是为中国的金融机构服务。     

建发股份 中报略超预期

中报利润同比增长50％,略超预期。建发股份发布2011年上半年度业绩预增公告,预计公司2011年上半年实现净利润与上年同期相比增长50％左右。共业绩大幅增长主要有以下两方面原因：l,供应链运营业务持续发展,营业收入和净利润较上年同期均有所增长,     

两条主线发掘券商股机会

我们认为，2015年券商业绩仍可保持较高的增长。但大幅超预期的概率较小。综合对于传统业务和创新业务的简要分析。初步判断，2015年行业总收入增长约22％，净利润增长约35％。     

国际领先银行操作风险管理经验

银行操作风险管理是银行面临的风险之一。银行操作风险在全球范围内给许多金融机构造成了严重的经济损失。有些是人为欺诈或流程缺失,有些则是天灾、恐怖袭击或恶意破坏行为所致。巴塞尔银行监管委员会对操作风险管理提出了国际标准。但目前操作风险的理论研究、实际应用、制度规范等仍然薄弱。中国建设银行批发业务总监、管理学博士顾京圃对操作风险相关问题的研究有着深厚的功底,并发表过一系列专著。我刊摘录发表之以飨读者。     

Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment,Cash Flow,and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

This article presents evidence suggesting that the relationship that existed between the partnership of J. P. Morgan and its client firms partially resolved the latter's external financing problems by diminishing the principal-agent and asymmetric information problems. I estimate and compare investment regression equations for a sample of Morgan-affiliated companies and a control group of nonaffiliated companies. The econometric results seem to indicate that companies not affiliated to the House of Morgan were liquidity constrained.     

Pierpont and the Capital Market

For almost forty years Trevor Sykes was one of the most recognizable business journalists in Australia. Sykes created his Pierpont character in February 1972 while writing for Australia's leading financial paper, the Australian Financial Review . Pierpont was a take on J. Pierpont Morgan, founder of the J. P. Morgan banking house. Sykes used his Pierpont column to research and reflect on the curious world of Australian business. Articles were mostly in narrative form, comprising an in-depth critique of one or more companies and written with more than a touch of humour. Over the years Pierpont garnered a large following, and it is therefore quite possible his musings influenced investors' beliefs about company fundamentals. We assess this possibility by examining the share price movements of companies around the time they found themselves featured in a Pierpont column. We extend previous work in this area by examining the market reaction to a popular columnist's writings published regularly over a lengthy period, and by implementing an extensive double-coding procedure that allows us to more finely and reliably partition trading recommendations based on the content of each column. In brief, we find evidence that stocks with positive coverage by Pierpont enjoyed abnormal returns averaging 6.4 per cent over thirty days around the publication date, while stocks with negative coverage suffered abnormal losses of 5.5 per cent. Trading volume was also affected.     

Bankers Trust and the Birth of Modern Risk Management

A leading financial practitioner traces the origins of the risk management concepts and applications widely used in today's financial institutions to their development at Bankers Trust in the 1970s. The bank became a pioneer out of necessity and entrepreneurship. Lacking the relationships with large corporations enjoyed by J.P. Morgan and Chase, Bankers Trust had to find ways to offer financial products its well‐established competitors could not. The innovations in risk management came from the Bank's “Resources Management” group, which was responsible for its trading and funding activities (but not corporate lending). By applying probability theory to its trading positions, the bank found an effective way to measure “market risk.” Extensions and refinements of this methodology were then used to measure credit risk and, later, liquidity risk and operational risk. These statistical methods and probabilistic concepts were brought together in a metric called Risk Adjusted Return On Capital, or “RAROC,” as it eventually became known throughout the financial services industry. RAROC was a concise way to measure and communicate the economic profits that had been generated by a transaction, product, or business unit, given the amount of “risk‐based” equity capital that was necessary to generate that profit. At Bankers Trust, RAROC eventually was used not only to evaluate profitability, but to guide strategic planning, capital allocation, and incentive compensation. And tools incorporating the same concepts, but with names like Value at Risk (or VaR), were later adopted by many other banks as well as regulators, including the framers of the Basel Accords. The author closes by suggesting how and why Bankers Trust's risk management culture began to deteriorate after 1995, and the bank was acquired by Deutsche Bank in 1998.     

Estimating JP Morgan Chase's Profits From the Madoff Deposits

JP Morgan Chase had deposits from Bernard L. Madoff's investors totaling $5.5 billion at one point in 2008. The Chase account was supposedly where most of the funds in his Ponzi scheme were deposited. Any large deposit can be a considerable source of profit to a bank. Assuming that the deposits returned the bank's net interest margin and grew at a random geometric rate, this article estimates that JP Morgan Chase generated $435 million in after‐tax profits from this very large account over the course of 16 years. With JP Morgan Chase the target of pending lawsuits relating to the Madoff fraud, this article's methodology and results may be of interest to litigants, prosecutors, journalists, and academics.     

Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs

This paper investigates the influence that a firm’s distance from control has on its performance, using balance sheet information and a unique data set on small business ownership. This study fills a gap in the empirical governance literature by investigating whether there is expropriation of minority shareholders in small business groups. Contrary to observations for large business groups, results show a positive relationship between the separation of control from ownership and firm performance. Results also underline that tunneling promotes controlling shareholders’ profit stability rather than profit maximization in small business groups.     

Going-public vs. private sales: A two-tiered agency approach

This paper models a situation where an entrepreneur with assets in place and uncertain development opportunities decides whether to sell the business to public capital markets or to place it privately to a conglomerate. It finds that the two-tiered managerial hierarchy of a conglomerate is likely to cause more adverse effects of agency problem. Thus, going-public dominates private sales in motivating the entrepreneur to acquire more information about investment opportunities and in the profit performance of the business. The entrepreneur obtains less wealth if he sells the business privately at a price representing its profit potential when the entrepreneur and the manager of the conglomerate have the same managerial interests.     

Post‐financial crisis changes in financial system structure: An examination of the J.P. Morgan & Co. Syndicates after the 1907 Panic

In the post‐2008 crisis period, policy makers debate the implications of banking system concentration. To shed light on this debate, we study a postcrisis period in which less banking regulation existed than in the present period, reasoning that an examination of a less regulated market might reveal useful insights about present day market agents' postcrisis actions. The years immediately following the Panic of 1907 merit study because the period shares important features with the post‐2008 crisis financial system: increasing interconnectedness, the growing complexity accompanying the rise of new industries, the rapid deployment of new communications technologies, and substantial innovation in financial instruments. Because the 1907 crisis preceded the Clayton Anti‐Trust Act of 1914, it also provides a window into studying market agents' behavior before legislation was enacted to discourage banking system concentration. We find evidence that the market share of corporate bond underwritings at J.P. Morgan & Co. increased in the post‐1907 crisis period. We suggest a mechanism by which market share increased: a more concentrated configuration of corporate bond underwriting syndicates. We also indicate that Morgan's increased share may have been a proxy for increased certification value of underwriter reputation because of systemic knowledge Morgan gained during the resolution of the Panic of 1907 rather than for increasing bargaining power. We do not find evidence that Morgan used market power to extract rents from issuers despite increased market share and more concentrated syndicate organization. While our results must be interpreted cautiously due to data limitations, possible lessons for present‐day policy makers are that consolidations in the financial system after a financial crisis are complex. Some consolidations may come about from information and reputational gains produced during the crisis. Others may be moves by some firms to concentrate market power and still others from efforts to improve efficiencies in intermediation.     

The kinesthetic speaker. Putting action into words

Speeches and presentations offer an interesting catch-22: executives don't want to spend long hours creating them, and people don't want to sit for long hours listening to them. Ultimately, though, executives can't live without them. That's because a good speech or presentation has the power to inspire people to act on the speaker's behalf and create change. Author Nick Morgan, a longtime speech-writer and speaking coach, says what's most often lacking in today's speeches and presentations is what he calls the "kinesthetic connection." Many good speakers connect aurally with their audiences, telling dramatic stories and effectively pacing their speeches to hold people's attention. Others connect visually, with a vivid film clip or a killer slide. Some people do both, but not many also connect kinesthetically. Morgan says the kinesthetic speaker feeds an audience's primal hunger to experience a presentation on a physical, as well as an intellectual, level. Through awareness of their own physical presence--gestures, posture, movements--and through the effective use of the space in which they present, kinesthetic speakers can create potent nonverbal messages that reinforce their verbal ones. In this article, Morgan describes techniques for harnessing kinesthetic power and creating a sense of intimacy with an audience--a closeness that is more widely expected from speakers since the advent of television. For instance, kinesthetic speakers should make use of audience proxies--individuals in the crowd who serve as representatives for the others. Ultimately, the author says, a speech or presentation offers something of great value to business executives: it's the best vehicle for winning trust from large groups of people--be they employees, colleagues, or share-holders.     

国有及国有控股企业“利挤税”的财务分析

国有及国有控股企业经营盈利时总想少上缴给国家财政,而出现亏损时总能得到国家财政补贴。本文分析了我国国有及国有控股企业“利挤税”式的税收不遵从的内生机制,并通过利润分配、利润弥补亏损、存货计价和固定资产核算的会计处理来实现。只有通过体制改革使我国经济社会发展中不需要存在的国有及国有控股企业民营化、需要存在的国有及国有控股企业财政化,才能消除“利挤税”分配机制。