International perspectives on the supply of informal venture capital

Despite major changes in the number and range of sources of finance for new and small ventures in the United Kingdom in recent years, there continues to be a shortage of risk capital for ventures actively seeking external equity finance. In the United States the informal venture capital market plays a major role in filling this equity gap, particularly in the early stages of venture development.However, there is little comparable information on the size of the informal venture capital pool in the United Kingdom or other European economies, despite recent recognition that the apparent underdevelopment of this market in the U.K. represents a major barrier to the development and growth of new ventures. This paper, therefore, presents the first analysis of the informal venture capital market in the U.K. and compares the characteristics and attitudes of U.K. informal investors with those in the U.S.The data reported in this paper have been obtained from a combination of postal survey and snowball sample techniques that generated useable information from 86 informal investors. Informal investors are playing an important role in venture financing in the U.K. in three ways: they make small scale investments in new and early stage ventures, where the equity gap is most significant; they are more permissive in their financing decisions than the formal venture capital industry in terms of having lower rejection rates, longer exit horizons, and lower target rates of return; and they invest locally and can thereby close the regional equity gap arising from the overconcentration of venture capital investment in the core South-East region in the U.K.In terms of demographics, U.K. informal investors share many of the characteristics of North American informal investors: they are predominantly male, with an entrepreneurial background, financially well-off without being super-rich, and identify investment opportunities from friends and business associates. There are a number of key differences, that may be attributable to differences in contextual factors such as personal tax regimes, regulatory environments, wealth distribution, and the structure of the formal venture capital and IPO markets. For example, U.K. informal investors are significantly older than those in the U.S. reflecting the influence of higher U.K. tax rates on the rate of capital and wealth accumulation.More generally, in comparison to U.S. investors, U.K. informal investors: have more investment opportunities brought to their attention; seriously consider more proposals but invest in no more opportunities; operate independently with syndication and joint investment relatively uncommon, reducing the average total investment per financing round available to ventures; fail to identify entrepreneurs themselves as a primary source of information on investment opportunities; have higher rate of return and capital gains expectations; are slightly less patient investors; and are rather less satisfied with the overall performance of their informal investment portfolios, reflecting intercountry and intertemporal variations in investment climate and conditions. It appears, therefore, that the general inefficiency of the informal capital market identified by Wetzel (1987) (which reflects the invisibility of informal investors, the fragmented nature of the market, and the imperfect channels of communication between investor and entrepreneur) is compounded in the U.K. case. The extent to which this reflects contextual differences on the one hand or simply a slower developmental process in the U.K. will only be common methodological basis. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, however, a key conclusion is that the information networks available to U.K. informal investors are less effective than those in North America, and in particular appear to contain lower quality information and a higher degree of redundant information. Specific forms of intervention in the market by, for example, stimulating the flow of information through the promotion of informal investment networking and brokerage services along the lines of U.S. and Canadian examples such as VCN and COIN therefore appear defensible.     

Cross-listing pursuit of unseasoned foreign firms after going public in the U.S.

We examine a company's cross-listing decision with a unique sample of unseasoned foreign firms that went public in the U.S. and later cross-listed abroad. We find that these firms are motivated by their pursuit of global growth opportunities in both the capital and product markets. They strategically bond with the U.S. market through their U.S. IPOs to signal their commitment to increased shareholder protection, which facilitates their future capital raising efforts. Their higher quality is evidenced with characteristics of larger firm size, larger issue size, being prominent in their home countries, underwritten by prestigious underwriters, with lower issue costs and greater analysts' coverage than their non-cross-listing peers. Further analysis shows a positive valuation effect and increased liquidity for their U.S. shares around the cross-listing event. Additional findings suggest that foreign issuers seek cultural or geographical proximity when they further cross-list abroad.     

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis.In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading.The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences.The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors.While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.     

An analysis of U.S. small and medium‐sized manufacturers' international business relationships

Notwithstanding the dominant role of the United States in world trade, little is known about the relationships between smaller indigenous manufacturers and their foreign customers and how these differ from domestic market relationships. Using data from a recent study among 201 U.S. small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), the article reveals that (a) these firms tend to put much more emphasis on the domestic side of their business, while the foreign market receives secondary treatment; (b) the atmosphere governing their relational exchanges differs in the two types of markets, being relatively healthier in domestic business; and (c) their domestic business performance levels, although moderate, are significantly higher than those found in foreign markets. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Acquisition of Additional Equity Capital by Small Firms – Findings from the National Survey of Small Business Finances

While the importance of venture capital to the growth of small firms has been widely discussed during the past decade, little is known about the acquisition of additional equity capital, especially internal equity capital, by the majority of small firms in the U.S. This paper utilizes the information collected in the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993 and 1998 Small Business Finance Surveys to investigate the acquisition of additional equity capital by small firms. While the importance of public issue markets and venture capital investment in promoting the growth of small dynamic firms cannot be denied, the importance of external equity capital seems to be overstated. Only a very small number of small firms acquired additional external equity capital. It is the internal equity capital, not external, equity, that is one of the major financing sources for most small firms. We found that younger, lower quality firms were more likely to acquire additional internal equity capital than other firms. There appeared to be a “pecking order” of borrowing from internal sources to traditional lenders to non-traditional lenders. In addition, internal equity capital and debt acquired from traditional and non-traditional lenders appeared to be complementary financial resources.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

The structure of the investment networks of venture capital firms

Venture capital firms are linked together in a network by their joint investments in portfolio companies. Through connections in that network, they exchange resources with one another. The most important of those resources are the opportunity to invest in a portfolio company (good investment prospects are always scarce), the spreading of financial risk, and the sharing of knowledge. All venture capitalists operate in very uncertain environments, none more so than the one confronting high innovative venture capitalists, HIVCs,¹ that specialize in investing in high innovative technology companies. The most uncertain of all their investments is a high-technology start-up with nothing more than a product in the head of the founder. There is uncertainty about the talent of the entrepreneur, the market need for the product, the development of a saleable product, the raising of second-round financing for working capital and expansion; the manufacturing of the product, competitors' responses, and government policies such as capital gains tax and ERISA rules, to name some of the major components. It is a formidable list. Indeed, it is hard to name a segment of any other industry that bears more uncertainty than HIVCs.A venture capital firm copes with uncertainty by gathering information. This research shows that the amount of coinvesting by a firm depends on the degree of uncertainty it faces. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the degree of coinvesting.By examining how venture capital firms were connected by their joint investments, it was found that the top 21 HIVCs comprise a tightly coupled network. And of that group, none is more tightly bound than the nine HIVCs located in California. In contrast, the group of top 21 firms that invest mainly in low innovative technology companies, LIVCs, is more loosely bound. HIVCs are more tightly bound together because they shoulder more uncertainty and therefore have a greater need to share information with one another.The practical implications of this study are as follows: Venture Capitalists. It is vital to be well-connected to other venture capital firms. They are important sources of information and investment opportunities. For HIVCs, the California group is central in the network, so links to them are valuable. Communications in a tightly coupled system are swift, so it is likely that information is disseminated very quickly among members of the group. It probably facilitates the setting of a market rate for venture capital. A disadvantage of a tightly bound system is that information flowing among the members has a redundancy and sameness about it, so to ensure a supply of fresh information, members should have as many links as possible to other organizations and individuals besides venture capitalists. Entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs submit a proposal for funding to venture capital firms, they can assume that news will spread fast to other firms. Thus, they should not use a bird-shot approach; rather, they should select their targets with rifle precision. The proposal should be submitted to a few firms that are known to specialize in the type of product or service that the entrepreneur is planning to make. Entrepreneurs should be concerned about more than the price of the deal. When the top 61 firms invest in a portfolio company, they bring information, contacts, and “deep pockets” to the companies in which they invest. Those factors are significant in nurturing a growing company. Policy Makers. The networks of HIVCs and UVCs are quite different. The HIVCs cluster around oases of high-technology entrepreneurship in the northeast and California, whereas the LIVCs are more evenly spread throughout the U.S.A. HIVCs are located almost exclusively in the so-called “bi-coastal regions of prosperity.”This study found cliques among the venture capital firms. But it found no evidence that the top 61 firms exclude other venture capital firms from their coinvestments of first-rounds of capital. More research is needed before conclusions can be drawn about the power and influence of the top firms. Researchers. In a recent article, Granovetter (1985) suggests that if we are to explain economic behavior, we must understand the networks in which transactions are embedded. This research shows that the networks formed by the syndicated coinvestments of venture capital firms may help us to explain their behavior. A general model for coinvestment networks that is developed in this article is applicable to analysis of syndicated coinvestments not only of venture capital firms, but of investors and lenders in general.     

Strategic alliances by venture capital backed firms: an empirical examination

A growing body of literature examines the formation of strategic alliances as an important value-added role provided by venture capital firms. This paper contributes to this literature by examining two related questions: whether venture capital firms use strategic alliances as a substitute or compliment to capital infusion, and how venture capital firms use alliances to mitigate different types of risk. Results from 2505 venture-backed startups reveal that venture capital firms treat alliance formation as a substitute for capital infusion and that the breadth of the network of syndication partners investing in the startup increases the number of its strategic alliances. We also find intentionality in alliance formation. Specifically, firms operating in industry environments characterized by technical risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating technical risks, and firms operating in environments characterized by market risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating market risk. Our findings lend additional support to the perspective that alliances represent an important mechanism through which venture capital firms add value to their portfolio companies.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Venture Capital in Spain by Stage of Development

This paper examines the investment decisions of 51 Spanish venture capital firms by stage of development. The results showed that venture capitalists ranked evaluation criteria related to the characteristics of the entrepreneurs, manager background, and management team experience as more important than market and product characteristics. Factors affecting the required rate of return were more important for the early-stage firms than for late-stage firms. Discounted cash flow analysis is the most frequently used valuation method. Private venture capital firms invest more during late development stages, while public venture capital firms invest more during the early stages. The results can be used by firms seeking venture capital, venture capital firms, consultants, and support agencies that provide capital-acquisition assistance. By gaining insight into decision criteria and processes, firms can develop better and more targeted materials to attract capital. Venture capital firms can use the information from this study to better understand their decision processes, individually and relative to competitors. Consultants and support agencies can use the information to provide better advice to both firms and venture capital firms. Information is this study could easily be built into training programs for both new and existing businesses. Finally, the results can also be incorporated directly into university courses that include material related to venture capital.     

Customer Service as a Strategic Weapon in International Operations

Customer service is an important competitive weapon in international markets becuase of its ability to acquire and retain overseas customers (especially intermediate firms) and, thus, enhance companies' revenues. Customer service is especially critical when foreign vendors are perceived as offering similar products at comparable prices, and purchasers have doubts about suppliers' willingness to carry out various post-purchase responsibilities. This paper reports the results of a study of the customer service programs of 151 U.S. non-service companies with international operations in five or more foreign countries. Sixty-nine firms responded to their customer service efforts in international markets and 81 addressed domestic customer service programs, allowing for comparisons to be made between international and domestic customer service operations. The study's results indicate that copmanies realize the importance of customer service in marketing to international customers, yet customer service for international markets is not considered to be appreciable more important than it is for domestic ones. Much similarity in perceptions about international and domestic customer service programs being in place. Whether this similarity occur from a careful analysis of domestic and international markets or simple expediency is uncertain.     

Informal risk capital investors: Investment patterns on the East Coast of the U.S.A.

In this study we profile a group of informal investors, their investment criteria and the nature of their referral network. The study supports the findings of several earlier studies. It indicates the existence of an extensive informal investment community on the East Coast of the U.S.A., which can provide substantial financial resources to startup and young firms. A full 58% of the sample investments were in startups; a huge proportion compared with formal venture capital sources. The study further supports earlier findings that this group is difficult to locate, for entrepreneurs and researchers alike. This opaque market consists primarily of friends and business colleagues who individually provide modest sums of money ($20,000–$50,000), but are often able to use their network to assemble a group of investors who will sponsor the entire funding requirement. 130 informal investors report that in three years they and their networks raised 38 million dollars to support 286 new venture proposals.There are also encouraging indications that these angels are both enthusiastic and persistent. Many of them claim that they have achieved higher returns via angel activity than any other investment options that they have tried. Of the angels who did better with alternative investment options, more than 80% are still prepared to make further investments. Even those who reported failed investments in the informal risk capital market remain supportive: over 65% indicate a willingness to invest again.The criteria by which the angels screen the proposals differ markedly from those of the venture capital community. In particular, the angels do not appear to be interested in a thorough business plan, a sine qua non for venture capitalists. Unlike the capital firms, angels are not interested in competitive insulation. They do not limit their investments to industries that are appealing, or with which they are familiar, nor do they care very much about the degree to which the entrepreneur has identified competition. However, they are in close agreement with the venture capital community in their concern with the management ability of the venture team and a requirement that there be a clear, demonstrated need for the product or service, preferably in a market with large potential.The study has shed some light on the structure of the referral networks of angels. Though we do not know from this study how the respondents themselves first heard of the ventures that were described in this survey, we do know that their referral network is composed primarily of friends and business colleagues; to whom they refer as much as 60% of the proposals that they receive and in which they themselves eventually invest. Thus they pass on serious opportunities to their network. Their referees are inclined to be very supportive; in our sample almost 75% of them also invested in the venture. The current strategy for informal investors is to approach mainly close contacts. These are inclined to be supportive (85% also invested in the venture) and to follow a trusting investment behavior pattern, relying mainly on the recommendation of the angel. This strategem ensures that the total capital requirements are met via the network. However, given the results of this study; the angels might be well-advised not to stop here, they might also approach at least one professional. Only a small proportion of professionals were approached by our sample of angels (less than 30%). As the study shows, professionals are more effective at selecting successful ventures. Thus a mixed strategy may be called for; use mainly trusting referees to ensure full capitalization and a limited number of professional referees to screen the proposals. This will help ensure that those proposals that do get supported by the more trusting members of the network have been competently screened, thus increasing to the probability of venture success.A discriminant analysis revealed some useful pointers in helping the informal investor select successful ventures. First it is critical to select only ventures in which the entrepeneur can be relied on to evaluate the risks of the ventures and manage these risks well; Angels do not need entrepreneurs that will gamble with their money. Equally important is to avoid placing too much credence on highly articulate sales pitches by the venture team, or too much reliance on ventures in which the main emphasis is on product and proprietary protection. Rather insist on being shown clear evidence that the product or service has channel and/or market acceptance. It is also important for Angels to stick to investments where they know the industry well, and to back venture teams with a solid reputation and a propensity to get involved in the details rather than gloss them over. As in the case of studies of venture capital investments, competitive insulation in the early stages of the venture is also important.     

When are venture capital projects initiated?

This paper examines how public market information relates to the initiation of venture capital projects. Analysis of venture capital investments in the U.S. between 1980 and 2007 indicates that venture capitalists tend to defer new investment projects in target industries with substantial market volatility. This delay effect of market volatility is reduced if the target industry experiences high sales growth or if competition among venture capitalists is intense in the target industry. The paper provides further evidence to corroborate the view that venture capitalists rationally respond to market shifts in their investment decisions.     

Determinants of corporate listings on stock markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Ghana

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) economies have established stock markets to encourage the mobilization of domestic funds and attract foreign capital in-flows for corporate investment and growth. But domestic corporate listings on stock markets have been abysmal. This study examines the reasons behind the low patronage of stock markets by domestic firms in SSA using Ghana as a case study. Data for the study was obtained from 110 out of the 200 largest firms in Ghana and included firms which were listed on the stock market and unlisted firms over three time-periods from 2002 to 2009. The findings show that knowledge about stock market dynamics and financial institutions' support encourages listing on the stock market. However, extensive information and disclosure costs requirements, and loss of ownership and control discourage listing on the stock market.     

Emerging strategies in the venture capital industry

This article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms. There are three main sets of results:First, the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different “strategic groups.” Members of these “groups” are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms: 1. Financial Resources—Equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources (five major sources) resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm. 2. Staff Resources—The way venture capital firms use staff resources, particularly regarding investee management assistance, is becoming increasingly varied across different groups. Some firms provide fewer than 2-days per year, while others provide up to 450 man-days per year per client. 3. Venture Stages—While the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1,2, and 3 investment, specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages. 4. Use of Financial Resources-Firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make ($100 M to $1000 M) and in their role as a direct investor versus a “broker” for institutional funds. Practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways. First, they may find it useful to compare their firm's orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm's that comprised this study. Second, they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine, clarify, and/or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm.A second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups. Annualized, after-tax return on investments of between 25% and 40% remain the most common objective across all firms. A 5-to-6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms.A third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater “certainty” about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm. The most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline.Practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry. Second, they should consider the finding that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry.It is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger, older funds. Some of these funds would be characterized as “industry leaders, pace-setters, and innovators.” The sample provides a solid representation of the “broad middle” of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry. While larger, older funds are under represented, their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about “future direction of the venture capital industry.“Finally, the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital. For investors, the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied. Basically, this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry/geographic considerations.For users of venture capital, the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs. Users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities, staff utilization orientations, sources and uses of financial resources. This should make for more informed “shopping” among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to “shop” for the most compatible firm.     

Market integration and contagion: Evidence from Asian emerging stock and foreign exchange markets

This paper examines whether Asian emerging stock markets (India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand) have become integrated into world capital markets since their official liberalization dates by estimating and testing a dynamic integrated international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) in the absence of purchasing power parity (PPP) using an asymmetric multivariate GARCH(1,1)-in-Mean approach. Also examined in this paper is whether there are pure contagion effects between stock and foreign exchange markets for each Asian country during the 1997 Asian crisis. The empirical results show that first, both currency and world market risks are priced and time-varying, suggesting that an international asset pricing model under PPP and constant price of risk might give rise to model misspecification. Second, the stock markets for India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand were segmented from the world capital markets before their liberalization dates, but all six markets have become fully integrated since then. Third, the market liberalization has reduced the cost of capital and price volatility for most of the countries. Finally, as for the contagion effects, strong positive impact of return shocks originating from the domestic stock market to its foreign exchange market during the crisis is found. This dynamic relationship between stock market and foreign exchange market is consistent with stock-oriented exchange rate models.     

The role of venture capital in financing small business

Venture capital is a primary and unique source of funding for small firms because these firms (with sales and/or assets under $5 million) have very limited access to traditional capital markets. Venture capital is a substitute, but not a perfect substitute, for trade credit, bank credit, and other forms of financing for small firms. Small businesses are not likely to be successful in attracting venture capital unless the firms have the potential to provide extraordinary returns to the venture capitalist.This study provides an analysis of a survey of venture capital firms that participate in small business financing. The survey participants are venture capital firms that were 1986 members of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), the largest venture capital association in the United States.The average size of the venture capital firms responding to the survey is $92 million dollars in assets, with a range from $600 thousand to $500 million. Twenty-three percent of the respondents have total assets below $20 million, and 27% have assets above $100 million.The venture capitalists' investment (assets held) in small firms delineate the supply of venture capital to small firms. Sixty-three of the 92 venture capitalists' have more than 70% of their assets invested in small firms.The venture capitalists were asked how their investment plans might change with changes in the tax law that were projected in the spring of 1986. Fifty-four percent expected to increase their investments in small firms, and 38% did not expect to change these activities.Venture capitalists are very selective in allocating their resources. The average number of annual requests that a venture capitalist receives is 652, and the median number is 500: only 11.5 of the respondents receive more than 1,000 proposals per year.     

Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries

The rapid internationalization of markets for venture capital is expanding the funding alternatives available to entrepreneurs. For venture capital firms, this trend spells intensified competition in markets already at or past saturation. At issue for both entrepreneurs and venture capital firms is how and when venture capitalists (VCs) can provide meaningful oversight and add value to their portfolio companies beyond the provision of capital. An important way VCs add value beyond the money they provide is through their close relationships with the managers of their portfolio companies. Whereas some VCs take a very hands-off approach to oversight, others become deeply involved in the development of their portfolio companies.Utilizing surveys of VCs in the United States and the three largest markets in Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France), we examined the determinants of interaction between VCs and CEOs, the roles VCs assume, and VCs' perceptions of how much value they add through these roles. We examined the strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles through which VCs are involved in their portfolio companies, and we analyzed how successful such efforts were. By so doing we were able to shed light on how and when VCs in four major markets expend their greatest effort to provide oversight and value-added assistance to their investment companies.Consistent with prior empirical work, we found that VCs saw strategic involvement as their most important role, i.e., providing financial and business advice and functioning as a sounding board. They rated their interpersonal roles (as mentor and confidant to CEOs) as next in value.Finally, they rated their networking roles (i.e., as contacts to other firms and professionals) as third most important. These ratings were consistent across all four markets. VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom were the most involved in their ventures, and they added the most value. VCs in France were the least involved and added the least value; VCs in France appeared to be least like others in terms of what factors drove their efforts. Our theoretical models explained a greater proportion of variance in governance and value added in the United States than elsewhere. Clear patterns of behavior emerged that reflect the manner in which different markets operate. Among the European markets, practices in the United Kingdom appear to be most like that in the United States.Determinants of Governance (Face-to-Face Interaction)We operationalized VC governance or monitoring of ventures as the amount of face-to-face interaction VCs had with venture CEOs. We found some evidence that VCs increase monitoring in response to agency risks, but the results were mixed. Lack of experience on the part of CEOs did not prompt significant additional monitoring as had been predicted. A more potent determinant was how long the VC-CEO pairs worked together; longer relationships mitigated agency concerns and reduced monitoring. Contrary to expectations, perceived business risk in the form of VCs' satisfaction with recent venture performance had little impact on face-to-face interaction. Monitoring was greatest in early stage ventures, indicating that VCs respond to high uncertainty by increased information exchange with CEOs. We measured two types of VC experience and found different patterns for the two. Generally speaking, VCs with greater experience in the venture capital industry required less interaction with CEOs, whereas VCs with greater experience in the portfolio company's industry interacted more frequently with CEOs than did VCs without such experience.Determinants of Value AddedWe argued that VCs would most add value to ventures when the venture lacked resources or faced perceived business risks, when the task environment was highly uncertain, and when VCs had great investing and operating experience. Contrary to expectations, VCs added most value to those ventures already performing well. As we had predicted, VCs did add relatively more value when uncertainty was high: e.g., for ventures in the earliest stages and for ventures pursuing innovation strategies. Finally, we found that VCs with operating experience in the venture's focal industry added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs have a strong preference for VCs with similar backgrounds as their own. We found no evidence that experience in the venture capital industry contributed significantly to value added. Together, these results suggest that investigations of the social as well as economic dimensions of venture building may prove a fruitful avenue for future study. Overall, the results showed that value-added is strongly related to the amount of face-to-face interaction between VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours VCs put in on each individual venture.Implications for Venture CapitalistsThe competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies become more globalized. Thus, the pressure on venture capital firms to operate both efficiently and effectively is also likely to build. It is as yet unclear whether the recent trend toward later stage, safer investments will continue, and how those venture capital firms following this path can differentiate themselves from other sources of capital. Venture capital firms that are able to choose the appropriate bases for determining governance effort and the appropriate roles for delivering added value to their portfolio companies will be those most likely to survive.In the largest, most robust markets (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom), more effort is expended by venture capitalists to deliver something of value beyond the money. This suggests that the tradeoff preferred by those succeeding is to be more rather than less involved in their investments. Our results indicate that VCs clearly economize on the time they devote to involvement in their portfolio companies. However, our results also indicate that they do this at the great peril of producing value insufficient to justify the cost of their product.Implications for EntrepreneursOur findings provide two important insights for entrepreneurs. First, they show that where and when they obtain venture capital is likely to have an impact on the extent and nature of effort delivered by their venture capital investors. It appears that on average entrepreneurs receiving venture capital in the United States and the United Kingdom will be more closely monitored and will receive more value-adding effort from their VCs than will those in France or the Netherlands. Needless to say, entrepreneurs should consider their preferences for level and type of involvement from their investors as they consider their choice of partners. In France, for example, VCs put great emphasis on their financial role in comparison with other roles, but they contribute much less than VCs elswhere via other strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles.The second key implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs may be able to gauge what roles VCs will see as most important, when VCs are more or less apt to become involved in their companies, and when they believe they can most add value. Such knowledge may help CEOs anticipate VC activity, be aware of the parameters of VCs' preferences, communicate their own preferences, and negotiate the timing and extent of interaction. For example, although our results indicate that geographic distance significantly limits face-to-face interaction, it appears to have less impact on the amount of value added.Implications for ResearchersMuch more can be learned about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative governance arrangements. Little is known about how formal structures such as contract covenants and board control work in conjunction with informal oversight and interaction. Even less is known about how value is added and how it is best measured. Although this study took a step toward developing a model of the circumstances under which value is added, the theory and its operationalization await further development.     

International versus domestic entrepreneurship: New venture strategic behavior and industry structure

International entrepreneurship is defined in this study as the development of international new ventures or start-ups that, from their inception, engage in international business, thus viewing their operating domain as international from the initial stages of the firm's operation.One hundred and eighty-eight new venture firms in the computer and communications equipment manufacturing industries are classified according to the percentage of their sales in the international market. Ventures with no sales derived from international activities are considered “domestic” new ventures, and ventures with sales from international activities comprising greater than 5% of total sales are considered “international” new ventures.The strategy and industry structure profiles of international new ventures are significantly different from domestic new ventures. The internationals pursue much broader market-based strategies, seeking a strategy of broad market coverage through developing and controlling numerous distribution channels, serving numerous customers in diverse market segments, and developing high market or product visibility. The internationals also emphasize a more aggressive entry strategy, building on outside financial and production resources to enter numerous geographical markets on a large scale. Securing patent technology is also an important component of their strategy. This suggests that the internationals compete by entering the industry on a large scale, seeking to penetrate multiple markets, with the recognition that external resources are necessary to support such an entry.Whereas both the domestics and the internationals characterize domestic competition as being relatively intense, the international new ventures compete in industries with higher levels of international competition. It is not clear from this research whether the new venture selects an industry with a high degree of international competition and therefore responds with an international orientation or, because the new venture has an international orientation, it perceives or recognizes a higher degree of international competition. Another industry structure difference is the internationals' perceived higher degree of restrictiveness due to government regulation. It is unclear whether this restrictiveness motivates new ventures to seek less-regulated international environments or if it indicates that when competing internationally, the new venture is confronted with increased regulatory requirements.Domestic new ventures are distinguished by their emphasis on a production expansion strategy and customer specialization strategy. The production specialization strategy consists of focusing on limited geographical markets, maintaining excess capacity, and pursuing forward integration. The customer specialization strategy incorporates the production of a specialty product that is purchased infrequently. Thus, for both of the domestic strategies, a consistent “closeness” between the producer and consumer is implied. This may be an important basis underlining the new venture's decision to compete in an exclusive domestic context.This study offers initial support for the notion of international entrepreneurship by its findings that there are significant differences between new venture firms competing domestically and new ventures choosing to also enter international markets.